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Preface 
The first steps towards this research were made in the years 1980-1985, when I was a 
staff member in the office of the Dutch Bishops' Conference. Those years are flanked by 
two important events for the Dutch Church. In January 1980 the Special Synod of the 
Dutch Bishops was held in Rome. In May 1985 Pope John Paul Π visited Holland. 
Fairly regularly during those years the question arose how far the Bishops in Holland 
could exercise their own responsibility and how their policy should be given form and 
substance flowing from, or next to, or in critical debate with the influence laid down by 
Rome. I am thinking of issues like the policy of the bishops concerning theological 
research and education, or concerning the situation of pastoral workers, men and wo­
men. Clarification of questions of competence, theological as well as administrative-
juridical, was not simple. There was no adequate and generally accepted framework, 
although people have said that the principle of subsidiarity can function as a guide-line. 
Then the Extraordinary Synod of Bishops of 1985 recommmended a study to examine if 
the principle of subsidiarity can be applied within the church and what that application 
could mean. I decided to take up the challenge. 
Up to the middle of 1993 I was busy exploring and defining the field of research, 
studying the relevant literature, and writing the first draft Then came the chore of 
writing the final text and its translation into English. As far as I know there is no speci­
fic literature on the applicability and validity of the principle of subsidiarity to the 
church itself since the middle of 1993. Earlier specific literature is taken up or at least 
mentioned in this research. 
For their continuing support I thank my sons and especially my wife: I have put her 
patience to the test. I have a great respect for dr A. van Santvoord msc, who translated 
the (original) Dutch text in English. I thank also the successive presidents and members 
of the Presidium of the Conference of Priest-Religious in the Netherlands for their 
encouragement. I appreciate it that prof. dr. P. Camps ofm and the other editors have 
inserted this dissertation in the series KTC. The proposals of prof. dr. J. Provost for the 
final editing of the text were a great help. Finally I must mention the staff of the library 
of the Theological Faculty in Tilburg, who always helped me in a pleasant way! 
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Introduction 
The Extraordinary Synod of Bishops of 1983 recommended a study to examine 
whether and how the principle of subsidiarity can be applied to the church'. The 
principle of subsidiarity offers, in the vision of the church of person, society, and state, 
a formal framework for the demarcation of the administrative competencies. An appeal 
to this principle is often a protest against growing centralization. 
This research aims to clarify the (administrative) relationships between the central 
authority in the catholic church and the particular churches. The specific question of 
this research is: does the church consistently apply to itself what it says about the 
principle of subsidiarity, c.q. is it theoretically possible to do so? This research intends 
to fully debate the fundamental aspect of the question: is the principle of subsidiarity 
valid within the church? Concretely the question always refers to two distinct spheres 
for the application: a. the relation between the hierarchy and the faithful and b. the 
relations within the hierarchy and between the universal and the particular church(es). 
We will pay attention to these aspects too, especially as they refer to canon law. 
The research wants to resolve a sixty-year old question, that was explicitly put anew by 
the Synod of 1985. This research is thus also an answer to the question of that Synod. 
Until now there have been positive and negative scholarly answers, but always in 
shorter studies. In answering the question we also find that there are several papal 
pronouncements that the principle of subsidiarity can be applied to the church. The 
Synod of Bishops in 1967 underlined this when it made the principle of subsidiarity 
one of the leading principles in the revision of the Code of 1917. 
The principle of subsidiarity as "gravissimum principium" of social philosophy was 
formulated in Quadragesimo anno (1931) in nrs 79-80. "It contains three basic ideas: 
1) The human person is the quid pro quo of all collective activity, and no collectivity 
must arrogate to itself what can be done by the individual. 
2) Smaller social units must not be deprived of the possibility and the means for 
realizing that of which they are capable. Larger units must restrict their activities to 
spheres which surpass the powers and abilities of the smaller units. 
1
 Synode 1985,563. 
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3) The more comprehensive units, and especially the state, must respect the hierarchi­
cal order of the different forms of social association and must help the inferior units so 
that they are better able to do themselves that of which they are capable"2. 
The principle has a two-sided meaning: staying aloof if possible is necessary for larger 
administrative units and their authorities, but they must give support if this is needed. 
The principle demands that competencies are adequately defined. It teaches in general 
terms that government and exercise of power in society means: to create the preconditi­
ons so that persons or groups can develop themselves. 
The principle of subsidiarity should always be seen in relation to the principle of 
solidarity. Both principles are not only basic principles of the social doctrine3 of the 
church, but they fit together in a wider socio-scientific framework, namely, the 
framework of an organologica! vision of society. 
This research is divided in two parts. PART ONE is about the development of the 
principle of subsidiarity in modem catholic social philosophy and social doctrine. To 
describe this development as such is important to understand the meaning of the 
principle. To attain a fundamental understanding of the principle of subsidiarity one 
needs to look very well into its history. We hope to find above all 
- how and why the first 'basic idea" of the principle of subsidiarity became a central 
idea in modem catholic social doctrine; 
- why one has to see this principle always in relation to the principle of solidarity; 
- what precisely is the relation of both principles, if the principle of subsidiarity is 
sometimes called the principle of competency to the principle of solidarity. 
Especially the fact that both principles belong essentially together is important for Part 
Two: a constant objection to the validity of the principle of subsidiarity for the church 
itself is the suggestion that it has an individualistic tendency. 
Because the principle of subsidiarity fits within the wider framework of the organologi-
cal vision of society, we must describe both versions of that larger framework. The 
well-known corpus version has in itself the tendency to centralism and collectivism; 
the other, developed by I. Kant, opposes this tendency. In this Kantian version of the 
organologica! concept the parts have mutual constitutive relationships with each other 
and with the whole. Did catholic social philosophy recognize the centralist tendency 
during the 19th century and can the principle of subsidiarity be seen as the expression 
of the counter-balance to this tendency? Was there an influence of modern, liberal, 
ideas to catholic social and political philosophy, although these modem ideas were 
rejected? 
This rejection was very clear in the first half of the 19th century. The (corporatist) 
reaction of catholic intellectuals in France and Germany to individualism, economical 
liberalism, and political centralism was structured by the organologica! concept. In this 
г
 Kaufmann 1988,280. See for the original text of QA 79-80: V, nt 83. 
' After the encyclical Centesimus annus (nr.2) it seems justified to keep this term as Pfiirtner 1980, 
60-74 and Nell-Breuning 1987 did with force of arguments. But it is not clear whether they have 
a definitive answer to the very critical remarks of Chenu 1979, 87-96 on the social doctrine of the 
church, if it is supposed to be a universal model for society. Cf V, nt 55. 
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first phase of modem catholic social philosophy the specific place of the person was 
not an issue because of the fundamental rejection of liberalism in all its manifestations 
for political and economic reasons. 
But does the same count for von Ketteler? His texts are important because he was the 
first in modem catholic social philosophy to give a description of the principle of 
subsidiarity; we will examine his texts closely. 
One cannot examine modem catholic social doctrine without giving attention to Rerum 
novarum, because this encyclical is its first papal expression. Only if one analyses this 
encyclical in relation to other socio-political encyclicals of Leo, one can find its specific 
character and its special meaning for the development of the principle of subsidiarity. 
It is self-evident that we examine the formulation and the meaning of the principle of 
subsidiarity in Quadragesimo anno. Is the formulation of the principle firmly rooted in 
the encyclical? What is the relation with the concept of "iustitia socialis", which is the 
central subject of the encyclical? 
After we have reached a more complete understanding of the principle of subsidiarity, 
we want to answer the specific question of the research in PART TWO. There the 
partners to the discussion are not only from the field of social philosophy, but especial­
ly from that of ecclesiology and canon law. 
First we give in historical order the answers of hierarchical teaching authority: Pius 
ΧΠ, Paul VI, the Synods of Bishops of 1967, of 1969, and 1985, and John Paul II. We 
can give the answers in historical order, because they are all positive and there hardly 
are (basic) arguments given; only the Synod of 1985 put questions about the validity. 
We also ask if the principle was implemented in the Code of 1983. 
Then we give the answers of philosophers, theologians and canon lawyers in a 
systematic way. We can divide these answers in two groups: some say the principle is 
valid in the church, others say it is not. The first group gives as the main argument that 
the church is (also) a societas, an association4. The second group bases its negative 
answer on the concept of church as communio, which means for them that it has a very 
special nature, which makes a comparison with other associations impossible. Metho­
dologically this position means that there is an unbridgeable chasm between theology 
and canon law on the one hand and philosophy and social sciences on the other. 
The arguments are presented: it is hermeneutically correct and important to try first of 
all to get a good insight in all the arguments that have been given. After this presentati­
on we can start the systematic search for an answer to the specific question in a debate 
with the given answers. 
First there is the obvious historical and systematic question of a possible influence of 
the principle of subsidiarity on both the concepts of the church, which were current in 
the period (before Vatican Π) that the principle was formulated in social doctrine. We 
saw that the validity of the principle of subsidiarity was not formally rejected in this 
4
 Although it is not a usual practice we refer to the church as an "association", because this word 
is an adequate translation of societas: cf Π, nt 6. 
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period, but did it function as the counter-balance to the overwhelming centralist 
tendency in these visions on the church? 
It is generally accepted that Vatican Π marks a fundamental change in ecclesiology. 
The question is what the administrative-structural consequences of this change are. For 
example, are the competencies of papacy and episcopacy adequately defmed and 
demarcated? 
This actual ecclesiology has its point of reference especially in Lumen gentium. Its 
most important structural ecclesiological concepts are "People of God" and the more 
hierarchical concept. We will examine Lumen gentium with the hypothesis that in 
these texts the relationships within the episcopate have changed: the centralist tendency 
of the preceding period comes to an end. There will be a close analysis of these texts, 
in which the term "in quibus et ex quibus" is the hermenéutica] key, and of the Nota 
Explicativa. But this fundamental change was not decisive, as the call for application of 
the principle of subsidiarity shows time and again. The relationships between primacy 
and episcopacy and their tasks are not clearly marked off in Vatican Π nor in the Code 
of 1983. 
In recent years the idea is that the concept of the church as communio will solve the 
problems. We give an argumentation that the concept of communio is methodological­
ly a preferable term for the church. But its structural implications need to be amplified, 
because as such one can understand it only spiritually or as an appeal for unity as 
uniformity, which leads again to centralism5. One can call on the principle of subsidia­
rity, but what does that mean for the two spheres in the church we mentioned above? 
So the actual status quaestionis is: what is the importance of the principle of subsidiari­
ty especially for the communio ecclesiology? In the framework of this research we can 
formulate the problem also as follows: does or can this ecclesiology, which is an 
organica! concept, avoid the pitfall of centralism? 
Can the principle of subsidiarity clarify the idea of the communio fide Hum; what is the 
relation between the church as a community and as an institution; what can we say 
about the proper responsibilities of the faithful? What are the implications of an im­
plementation of the principle of subsidiarity for the communio Ecclesiarum: does it 
clarify the relationships between the papacy and the bishops, between the universal and 
the particular church(es)? Does it imply a more explicit demarcation of competencies? 
A function of clarification does not yet mean that the principle of subsidiarity is proved 
to be valid in the church. This validity needs to be clearly demonstrated: this will be 
done from the fact that for Lumen gentium the church is also "sacrament" and incarna­
ted, not only communio. 
5
 The Dutch Bishops' Conference put this problem prudently in its contribution to the preparation 
of the Synod of Bishops of 1985 by saying: "En ce qui concerne la communion, on se demande 
aussi parfois si on ne porte pas trop particulièrement attention sur celle existant entre les évêques, 
ou entre les conférences episcopales et le Saint-Siège, aux dépens de celle entre les évêques et leurs 
proches collaborateurs...''; "Le Saint Siège reconnaît-il suffisamment la collégialité qu'il demande 
aux autres?": Synode 198S, 253 and 255. 
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After that we can say that the theological clarifications on the basis of the principle 
must be translated in canon law. We look at its task and method in general from the 
view-point of the principle of subsidiarity and give some concrete proposals in content. 
In the final chapter we will present the results of the research. 
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PART ONE: The Development of the Principle of Subsidiarity 

I The Organologica! Vision 
IThe Classical Model 
The fable of Menenius Agrippa1 originates probably from the fifth century ВС. This 
Roman senator wanted to try to stem the uprising of the people so that it would place 
itself again under the authority of the Senate. According to tradition, the fable helped to 
restore peace in Rome, and promoted the acceptance of a leading role for the senate 
while providing safeguards for the protection of the people against abuse of power. 
The fable runs: 
Long ago the human body was not yet one whole reality, but each part had its 
own life, its own will, and its own thoughts. One day the members asked themsel­
ves why they were so busy the whole day long. They concluded that the reason 
was to be found in the stomach, which is situated at the center, and which was 
being served by all other members, while it did nothing. The other members 
thought this was crazy and they decided to stop. The feet no longer walked, the 
hands no longer held anything, and the mouth refused to chew. But when this had 
gone on for a whole day, the members did not feel happy. It became clear tiiat the 
stomach was not just being fed, but that the food was transformed into strong 
blood which coursed through the arteries to the members and which was necessa­
ry for them. In the new situation the members were in danger of becoming victims 
of an action which was intended only to affect the stomach. The members realized 
this, began to function again, and were no longer unhappy. 
The fable is a prototype of the organologica! vision on associations, such as the family, 
society as a whole, organizations within society, and the state. It is this vision we want 
to look at more closely. 
1
 Dohm 1978,526. Some indications where one can find the fable are here too. 
1 
2 First Description of the Organologica! Vision 
If one tries to find a short definition of this vision in the more recent reference works 
one will have a hard time to find it2. But if this vision is important in this research, we 
need to indicate what we mean by it. 
The organologica! vision of society understands society (and other forms of associati­
ons) as one whole, as a unity. The vision rejects the idea that such an association would 
consist of a mass of loose and unrelated individuals, that the human being would be a 
solitary reality and that associations are based purely on agreements3. 
Classical descriptions of associations in the organologica! vision are the human body 
and the tree. Examples of other kinds of totality are also classical: 
- the heap of sand in which the parts have no relation to each other, the grains of 
sand exist independently of each other, 
- a machine in which the parts are in connection with each other, but the parts can 
exist by themselves, even though they have meaning only through the whole. 
Such examples already imply that associations in the organologica! vision are living 
beings or living entities: the noun "organism" suggests as much. 
Ambros provides the foundations on which the organologica! vision, and every more 
concrete organologica! concept, is based4: 
a. the idea of wholeness and unity in opposition to a simple collection (the heap of 
sand); 
b. the idea that the individual realities are parts and not self-sufficient; 
с the idea that the parts form a structure in which each specific relation to the whole 
is determined each time, and which determines the external appearance of the who­
le. 
2
 No mention of "organologica! vision" or "organologica! concept" as entries in the Encyclopedia 
Br titanica in the 1981 Macropaedia-edition, nor in the recent Dutch encyclopedias as the Grote 
Larousse or the Grote Winkler Prins. The Micropaedia-edition of The New Encyclopedia 
Brittanica (1973-1974), Vol VI, p. 739, gives in the article "Mechanical and organic solidarity" 
(referring to Durkheim): "In a society with organic solidarity, there is relatively greater division of 
labour, with individuals functioning much like the interdependent but differentiated organs of a 
living body". Dreier 1973,1699 says in some sentences something in the article "Organlehre" about 
the transmission in the 19th century of "die Vorstellung des lebenden Organismus auf sociale 
Gebilde", but says that this presentation, like any other image, leads to misunderstanding. Zippelius 
1987, 3262 posits that neither a literal idea of the state as organism nor an analogous idea is 
meaningful. Koslowski 1989, 39-40 says that a social unity can be compared to an organism, but 
for him this is only part of a description of the relationships within that unity. 
3
 Stark 1962,109-110. The usual English expression is "organic"; that sounds like a métaphore. 
We use "organological" to indicate that it concerns a "concept" of society (cf П, nt 49). In this way 
Ambros 1963, 14 refers to "organologiche Gesellschaftskonzeptionen". 
4
 Ambros 1963,15-16. 
2 
In short, the organologica! vision on associations can be recognized in this way: the 
idea of some kind of unity, the idea of lack of self sufficiency of the parts, and the idea 
of the structuring of the whole, must always be present. 
3 An Association as Organism: the Linguistic Status 
3.1 Literal or figurative 
In the preceding paragraph it is made clear that associations can be called organisms. 
However, the noun is used primarily for a concrete, individual, independent, living 
reality: a single cell, a plant or an animal or a human body. These are biological-
physiological realities, in which the concrete existence of the parts and of the whole are 
in a continuum, and are directly dependent one on the other (remember the fable of 
Menenius Agrippa) or at least, where the parts cannot exist independently. 
Is an association such an organism? One can only say quite clearly "No" and one can 
argue that "no" in two ways: 
a. People and groups of people can retreat from society to a greater or lesser degree 
without losing the basis of their (at least biological) existence. In what we may call 
the social organism there is not such a substantial unity as there is in a biological 
organism, there is not the same directness and necessity of mutual relationships. In 
fact we see that political, economic, and cultural interests are often opposed: 
individuals and groups do not always work together harmoniously, they often 
oppose each other; yet that does not necessarily lead to disintegration of the state or 
of society. 
b. In the Spring of 1981 an international research group, brought together in the 
European Value Systems Group (under the direction of J. Kerkhofs s.j. and R. de 
Moor) did a research into the values and norms in nine West European countries5. 
One cannot prove from this research that modern man in Western Europe feels that 
he is essentially part of a greater whole. Far from it in fact. The person wants his 
freedom and wants to be autonomous in his judgment; collective ideals are no 
more, and the "Γ of the individual conscience becomes the principle of social 
organization as well as the principle for testing collective convictions6. Modem 
western man does not feel that one is an integral part of a social organism and does 
not function as such. 
1
 Stoetzel 1983 gives the results of that research. They are confirmed in a research which covered 
more countries in 1990 (cf Halman 1993), of which we find a report in : P.Ester - L. Halman - R. 
de Moor (eds). The individualising society: value change in Europe and North America, Tilburg 
1993. 
' Defois 1983, 27, 42 and 51. Defois says that this Western person has a "volonté personaliste" 
which "n'est autre que celle du sujet bourgeois dont les droits de l'homme et de l'individu traçaient 
la route libérale". See for an analysis of the concept bourgeois subject: Metz 1984, 29-42. 
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And yet, state and society have been called an "organism" for as long as people have 
practised political reflection7 and there are similarities between the biological and the 
social organism': 
a. there is a certain unity, connection, and interaction between the whole and the parts. 
Political, economic, and social processes show that; 
b. society as such survives change and/or even interchange of its parts: there is 
continuity and history'; 
c. society as such has its own goals which can be achieved by the (organized) parts. 
Ambros' distinguishing characteristics which we mentioned above are also applicable 
to the biological and the social organism. 
We already said that associations are not "organisms" in the way individual living 
beings are. The use of the noun is not identical for both categories. In the latter 
situation it is used in a literal sense. But how is the noun used when applied to associa-
tions? 
Is it used as a metaphor? Using a metaphor means that one attaches a "label" (here: 
organism) to another object (here the association) which so far did not have that label, 
while the object reacts against it. Using a metaphor really shows a new aspect of reality 
and explicates it10. 
There are two reasons why we should not use the noun as a metaphor in this context: 
a. the use of the noun "organism" (or traditionally corpus) is an old custom in socio-
political thought. One could perhaps speak of a "dead metaphor" which has lost the 
tension of a real metaphor and which little by little seems more literal (as when we 
speak of the leg of a table). 
b. there are some similarities between a biological-physiological whole and an 
association (as we indicated) and so the use of the noun is not really alien to the 
object, so that it would react against such use. 
Ricoeur says that the metaphor in poetical language has a similar function as the model 
has in scientific language: he calls both "instruments of re-description". Does this 
mean that "organism" is used as a theoretical model? The model (in the vision of 
Ricoeur and others) does not allow inference for the area of reality on which it is 
applied". Because our research posits that there are similarities between the 
biological-physiological organism and associations, we cannot accept that organism is 
seen simply as a theoretical model for such associations. 
7
 Dohrn 1978, 519-623; Schlanger 1971,192. 
'Kliiber 1968,848-849. 
' a . Ambros 1963,16. 
10
 Ricoeur 1974, 52-54 
11
 Ricoeur 1974, 51-52; Ricoeur 1975,302-306. 
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32 Analogous use of "organism" 
In this research the position is taken, with Gundlach and von Nell-Breuning, that 
"organism" is used analogously, whenever it is used in connection with associations'2. 
Why this choice for analogy? Because the noun "organism" as indicating a biological-
physiological whole is not the same concept as when it is used for an association. It is 
not an univoce use of the noun. But neither are the two realities totally different: that is 
the case with 'Ъапк", used as a noun for sand along the river as well as for a financial 
institution. Such use is called "aequivocitas". 
We speak of analogy if a word is used neither univoce nor aequivoce". In analogy 
there is a distinction between ratio communis and ratio propria1*. In terms of "orga­
nism", the ratio propria is the biological-physiological whole (the tree, the body) while 
the ratio communis has a broader meaning. It is precisely this broader meaning which 
we see in the organologica! vision, for which Ambros offered the foundations, which 
can be used also for biological organisms. 
In this vision one makes a choice for the way one sees the human being: not the 
"isolated individual, the monad, who only secondarily affirms his co-existence with 
other subjects"15, but as a person who knows that being human and becoming subject is 
essentially a communal project. 
It is important to point out that, when one designates an association in terms of an 
organism, one does not yet say anything about the content of this association: nothing is 
said about how the relations between persons, between partial groups, between 
persons and partial groups, between partial groups and the whole will be. To speak 
about "organism" or an organologica! vision of society is something formal and offers 
only the rough outlines, the beginnings to form a theory about associations. Ambros' 
three foundations, seen as ratio communis, are in the same category; it is (only) posited 
that relationships must exist or will exist but it does not say anything about the how and 
what of those relationships. 
The formal character is clear in the historical researches of Meyer and Schlanger. They 
show that the concrete meaning of "organism" is different in different authors. They 
show in their researches of the use of "organic" and "mechanic" by a variety of authors, 
that the only conclusion one can arrive at is that the use of these images covers a great 
variety of ideas. 
a
 Gundlach 1931Д, 1614; Nell-Breuning 1947,9-11; cf Nell-Breuning 1990,46. Cf V, nt 65. 
13
 St Thomas, Summa Theologica J, q 13, a 5: "Neque enim in us quae analogice dicuntur, est una 
ratio, sicut est in univocis, nee totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis; sed nomen quod sic multipliciter 
dicinir, singificat diversas proportiones ad aliquid unum"; cf Rikhof 1981,167-171. Coreth 1957, 
468 gives the following meaning to analogy: "die Eigenart eines Begriffs, der in der Anwendung 
auf verschiedene Seiende oder Seinsbereiche einen wesentlichen Sinn wandel erfährt, ohne jedoch 
die Einheit des Begriffsgehalts zu verlieren". 
"Rikhof, ibid. 
" Metz 1974,57 desribes the idea of subject in this way, only to reject iL 
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Meyer emphasizes that an author cannot be classified simply by the fact that he uses 
"organism" or "machine" for a society, but that one needs to see how the image 
functions in the theory as a whole". One can speak of a general opposition where 
"mechanism" stands for a society in which "all individual parts exist independently and 
unchangeably and become communally operative only through an external force 
(interest, superior force of authority)"; while "organism" stands for a society "in which 
the parts are only relatively independent, because they exist only as members, organs, 
functions", and they exist by virtue of the whole. In this way one can assign a writer a 
place -or he can do so himself- in the polemic between the two visions on society17. But 
even then it appears from history that the last word has not yet been spoken in this 
matter". 
Schlanger says in her study on the concept "organism" as analogon at the end of the 
18th and in the 19th century, that the content of the concept is variable: especially in 
the texts on political questions it is not possible to indicate precisely what the meaning 
of "organism" is". She indicates an important function of analogy: the "fonction de 
facilitation". Analogy offers expressions, arguments, models, support filled with 
fantasy: it has a heuristic function20. Her remark that one must recognize that "orga-
nism" has a political or rhetorical meaning is very important: by describing society or 
the state in this way one wants to indicate that harmony, integration, and solidarity are 
more important, more fundamental than opposition of interests or classes, and are in 
fact prior to these21. In an organological vision the emphasis will then easily be given to 
social harmony, which leaves no room for opposition. In fact, this can lead to a fear of 
conflict; and to prevent it, one will call on force and public authority, which anticipate 
conflictual situations22. 
14
 Meyer 1969,133. 
17
 O.e., 128-129. He quotes O. Spann, Kurzgefasstes System der Gesellschaftslehre, Berlin 
1914. 232. 
" O.e., 139-147. Meyer concludes (p 132): "Man wird also sagen müssen, dass bei der Untersu-
chung mechanischer und organischer Metaphorik die Angabe einer gewissen eideüschen 
Restbestandes, der für alle Metapheren - hier organisch, dort mechanisch - reklamiert werden kann, 
schlecht möglich ist". 
19
 Schlanger 1971, 27 and 31: "les continus de la repésentation, eux, varient selon les époques"; 
cf 114-115 and 222-225. 
20
 O.e., 17-20 and 256. 
21
 Cf. Schlanger 1971, 33,91-99 and 256. 
22
 In an article in Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant d.d. 14-5-1993 about the book L'angélisme 
exterminateur. Essai sur l'ordre moral by A.Slama (Paris 1993), G.Groot writes that in such a 
vision the state becomes like a mother who prevents her children to do anything out of fear they will 
make mistakes. 
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4 Danger of the Organologica! Vision 
The heuristic function and the formal character of the broad meaning in the organologi­
ca! vision disappear through this emphasis on harmony and solidarity, and the vision 
becomes nonnative. Unity and solidarity in state and society are imposed; essential 
differences, independence and responsibility of the individual persons and groups or 
associations are negated. So the organologica! vision offers room for a centralistic 
concept of the state23. 
The traditional version of the organological vision, the "corpus theory", tends indeed to 
make the individual, the particular, subject to the whole. It looks for analogy in the 
human body, we saw the prototype of it in the fable of Menenius Agrippa. It is only a 
small step in the theory to see not the stomach but the head as the most important part 
of the corpus, and make all other members subject to it. 
By giving so much emphasis to the head or to the whole the organological vision can 
easily become a centralistic vision of state and society, in which the individual person 
is subject to the whole and cannot claim any rights from that whole. The 'Ъеаа" 
(authority) determines everything and, in order to let the whole function well, the 
"members" (individuals or groups) must subject themselves: the interest of the whole 
prevails sometimes even at the cost of the "members"24. 
Older forms of this corpus idea in the history of the West emphasized unitas in a 
"corpus theory", unity in diversity21. This changed in the period of the Roman emperors 
and the Roman Empire became the political body of the emperor; the emperor became 
the head or the soul (animus)™. In the Middle Ages the corpus idea implied also the 
leading role of the head in relation to the other members in corpora like state and 
church27. In the beginning of the 19th century we can see a totalitarian tendency in the 
organological vision28. It almost seems as if centralism is inherent to the theory. 
Can one say that in the forming of the theory there is a moment where this centralizing 
threat in an analogous organological vision can be fought? 
23
 Such centralistic concepts could be: in a totalitarian system the power of the state (and/or the 
party) is seen as unassailable; principles of tolerance, of free development of the person, and of 
autonomy of the various spheres of life and culture are denied: Bracher 1989, 491-92; cf Kaltefleiter 
1988, 769-770, who sees an authoritarian system as a "mild" form of the totalitarian system. 
Collectivism not just gives preference to the collective over the individual, but denies also the 
inalienable proper value of the individual and human rights: Spieker 1987, 370; cf Kliiber 1968, 
806-807. 
24
 Kliiber 1968, 849; Böckenförde 1982,16-17. 
M
 Dohrn 1978, 525-528 (Seneca, Cicero). 
24
 O.e., 529-531. 
27
 O.e., 539. 
21
 Greiffenhagen 1971,206. Cf Schlanger 1971,237. 
7 
51. Kant's Idea of Organism 
5.1. A second prototype 
The organologica! vision has been concretized traditionally in the "corpus theory". 
Kant's (1724-1804) organism theory led to a new organological vision, which is 
colored more by science29 and which determined the organism vision of the period of 
Romanticism30. Kant made a very important breakthrough towards a much more 
general understanding of organological thought. His idea about organisms ("organi-
sierte Körper")*1 have been applied on society by others. He himself suggested it only 
in passing. 
His thoughts about organisms can be found in Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790)32, one of 
the three "Kritiken" which together are a research in the preconditions of human 
knowledge and the characteristics of the cognitive power. Kant's epistemologica! 
problem is not ours and is not really relevant for our research. That is why we present 
Kant's remarks about "organism" without seeing them in the broader context of his 
Kritik der Urteilskraft. 
Kant posited that a natural product is also a goal in/of nature if it is cause and effect of 
itself. He used a tree as example33. A tree is, within the genus, cause and effect of the 
existence of the genus. A tree also develops as individual reality because it grows: that, 
from which it grows, it must make its own. The permanence of a part of the tree 
depends on other parts just as the permanence of the whole is dependent on the parts: 
the leaves are products of the tree but they help the tree to live and they help the trunk 
to grow. Kant also spoke about the ability to recuperate in case there has been a 
wound. 
He then developed this idea that a natural goal is cause and effect of itself34. A thing is 
goal in/of nature if: a) the parts regarding their existence and form are possible only in 
relation to the whole. But that is not yet a sufficient determination because such a thing 
can also exist through an external cause. Therefore, it is needed that b) the parts form 
together a whole because they are mutually cause and effect of their form. Only then is 
it possible that the whole determines the form and the coherence of all parts. 
29
 Böckenfórde 1982,16; Schlanger 1971,200. 
30
 Schlanger 1971,122, Ambros 1963,17, and Greiffenhagen 1971, 201 point out the importance 
of Kant's thoughts in this matter. 
31
 "Organisierte Körper" is the equivalent of organisms, because they are "Gewächse und Tiere": 
L Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft , p.A.292. Also in lieber den Gebrauch theologischer Prinzipien 
in der Philosophie (1788) we find some observations which are not developed there (pA 126-127). 
32
 Edition used L Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft (Hrgb W. Weischedel, Suhrkamp Taschenbuch 57), 
Frankfurt aM 1974. 
33
 K.dU., par. 64. About the importance of the tree as analogon: Schlanger 1971, 199-204. 
* K.d.U., par. 65. 
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It is good to have another look at the tree to get the criteria a little more concrete. In a) 
we can say that a leaf is only a leaf when it is connected with the tree, but that is true 
also in other realities: a sparkplug has a function only in an engine. That is why 
criterium b) is needed to determine the proper nature of the goal in/of nature: the tree 
as a whole gives leaves and roots their place and in their functioning they are mutually 
cause and effect Sparkplug and other parts of the engine are not in this way cause and 
effect in mutuality. 
Kant emphasized that such a "Körper" has an inner cause and that each part exists 
through the others and for the others and for the whole. He underlined that each part 
has a function as productive of the other parts. In such a case we may speak of a goal 
in/of nature: no external cause is involved. 
He defined the organism as: "an organized" product of nature where everything is goal 
and means in mutuality. Nothing is in vain, aimless, or attributable to a blind, natural 
mechanism"**. Essential is the constitutive relation between the parts, and between the 
parts and the whole and the whole and the parts37. 
5 2 The importance of Kant's vision 
At the end of par. 4 the question arose whether there is a theory about "organism" 
which goes against centralistic tendencies in organological thought. Are the ideas of 
Kant in his Kritik der Urteilskraft an answer to this question? 
Kant suggested only in passing the possibility to see the state as an organism according 
to his definition. We find that in a note1* where he says that a "certain alliance" 
becomes clearer when we compare it with an organism such as he describes. Does he 
say that this state39 is an organism? Certainly not in so many words. He only wanted to 
show the analogy with the purposiveness in nature. What is then the reason for this 
analogy? 
We must be careful in interpreting Kant's note in view of the organological theory. 
Kant did not write a complete political philosophy and at the time he was writing this 
passage his interest for constitutional and institutional questions about the way the state 
" "Organisieren" means "so dass sie andere Materie dazu benutzte (sie organisierte)": K.d.U. 
pA.288. 
MK.d.U.,par.66. 
37
 This analysis of the thought of Kant is inspired by Dohm 1978, 580-582, and Ambros 1963,17-
19. Mertens 1990, 261-264 makes an almost identical analysis. 
" K.dLU, par.65 (nt on ρ A 290): "Man kann umgekehrt einer gewissen Verbindung, die aber auch 
mehr in der Idee als in der Wirklichkeit angetroffen wird, durch eine Analogie mit den genannten 
unmittelbaren Naturzwecken Licht geben. So hat man sich, bei einer neuerlich unternommenen 
gänzlichen Umbildung eines grossen Volks zu einem Staat, des Worts Organisation häufig für 
Einrichtung der Magistraturen u.s.w. und selbst des ganzen Staatskörpers sehr schiklich bedient 
Denn jedes Glied soll freilich in einem solchen Ganzen nicht bloss Mittel, sondern zugleich auch 
Zweck, und, indem es zu der Möglichkeit des Ganzen mitwirkt durch die Idee des Ganzen 
wiederum, seiner Stelle und Funktion nach, bestimmt sein". 
39
 Arendt 1982,16 says that this is about the American Revolution (1776-1783); other authors say 
it is about France after the Revolution (1789): Burg 1974,165; Mertens 1990,123. 
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should be organized and about the juridical problems involved, was just beginning40. A 
careful interpretation of the last sentence of the note could be: every member of the 
"Staatskörper" must not just be means but also goal of the whole. Every member also 
cooperates to make the whole possible and its place and function must, therefore, be 
determined from the viewpoint of the whole. He did not say that the members are 
dependent on the whole in their existence or that they are mutually cause and effect of 
each other. Instead of speaking about "form" he used "place and function". He did say 
that the members make the whole possible and that the whole determines the members. 
In short, he did not say: the state is an organism, but he was close to it because there 
are mutually determinant relations between the parts and the whole. That is why he 
could speak of analogy. 
Another reason for the analogy could be found in the inner causality of the organism. 
That is true also in the idea of the "contrat social" where an essential element is that 
persons constitute themselves into a state. Therefore, here too we do not have an 
external cause41. 
Is this a non-centralistic organologica! vision which is distinct from the "corpus 
theory"? It seems that way considering Kant's organism theory as such. 
The parts (the members) are mutually each other's cause and effect and maintain, 
therefore, a relative independence. No part is pure means, not even in relation to the 
whole, which exists only thanks to the parts: as such the whole is no more than the sum 
of the parts and their mutual interplay. That gives the parts a more independent 
position than they have in the "corpus theory" where they have a dependent and 
subordinate place: they are a purely executing organ in relation to the head. In Kant's 
organism theory the relations between the parts and with the whole are mutual and 
continuous and so the parts retain their own position. 
Anyway, Kant pointed to the analogy in this note: the organologica! vision was for him 
too formal and heuristic42. 
40
 Arendt 1982,19; Motens 1990,1-2. From the writings of Kant one can deduce that he opts for 
a parliamentary-democratic state where freedom and equality of the citizens are founding principles: 
Mertens 1990,67-99, esp. 94. 
41
 The remarkable thing about this note in par. 65 is that Kant (almost) unites the concept of 
contrat social with an organologica! vision of the state (Kant speaks about the "ursprüngliche 
Kontrakt": cf. IXant, Metaphysik der Sitten, par. 47). And later on there is a sharp distinction 
between those who start from contrat social which is imaginary or not, and those who stay with an 
organologies] vision of the state. The stumbling block in the doctrine of the contrat social is for the 
latter precisely that people found the state. For Kant both ideas follow naturally from one another, 
or even more clear, if there is an external cause of the state, it would for him never be an organism! 
42
 Cf Ambras 1963, 32: "Zwar hat der Begriff des "sozialen Organismus" keine Entsprechung in 
der empirischen Wirklichkeit, er kann aber doch, wie es Kant vom natürlichen Organismus sagte, 
"ein regulativer Begriff sein, (um) die Nachforschung über Gegenstände dieser Art zu leiten". He 
quotes К.сШ., pA.291. 
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Kant set the trend for those who follow him: that has been said already43. Ambros 
clarifies this. The involvement of the parts with the whole provides a common goal, the 
goal of the whole. That creates unity in diversity. Esthetic beauty was for Kant a form 
of inner purposiveness too. After Kant, the idea of beauty and organism, which are both 
purposive for him, are combined and the organic becomes also the harmonic, the 
proportioned and the well balanced. "Organic" then comes to mean: following imma­
nent laws, harmonically formed, and opposite to mechanistic (external) causality and to 
subjective arbitrariness44. 
6 Criteria for the Organologica! Vision 
In this chapter we gave a description of the organologica! vision of associations of 
persons and we gave some observations about this vision. As the main points we see: 
a. the idea of wholeness and unity of associations of persons such as the family, the 
state and society; 
b. the idea that the parts, individual persons as well as smaller associations, cannot 
exist by themselves, but maintain mutually constituting relations with each other 
and with the whole of which they are part; 
с the idea that the parts form a structure in which the specific relation of each to the 
whole is determined so that the whole has its own specific form or structure. 
In comparison with Ambros' three foundations there is a change in b). This change is 
necessary because of the danger for forms of centralism, a threat which is always 
present in the organologica! vision. The change is especially in the "mutually constitu­
ting relations with each other and with the whole". In the organologica! vision there 
must be attention to the proper place of the part in the whole. 
In Gaudium et spes (та 26) Vadean II opts for the irreplaceable value of the individual 
person, which, however, should not be seen as a solitary individual. This organologica! 
vision does not support an individualistic or a collective vision of the human being45; it 
opted for the vision of a relation between the individual person and the community 
such as Kehl provides. On the one hand there is real community as the individual parts 
are not "simply cogwheels, numbers, or spare parts", but are recognized as part with 
their own responsibility. On the other hand the community is more than the sum of the 
parts: it is an entity with its own value, which makes demands and provides formation 
4 5Cfnt30. 
44
 Ambros 1963,18. See for the social and political consequences Π 3.2. 
4 5
 Von NeU-Breuning states in his "Zur Einführung" (Schneider 1985, 10) that the indication 
"mittelere Position" expresses quite well the position taken here for "den Normalverbraucher", 
although not completely; because "die katholische Soziallehre liege auf eine anderen Ebene und 
könne darum nicht "zwischen", und gar nicht "mitten" zwischen den beiden anderen liegen". Cf. 
NeU-Breuning 1987,354. 
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in its relation with the parts. The community enables the parts to exist, but is also the 
effect of their action4*. 
bi the first part of this study we want to show that catholic social doctrine slowly recog-
nized the danger of the organologica! vision on associations and saw the principle of 
subsidiarity as a counter-balance against this danger. 
44
 Kehl 1992,138-146 and 370. He takes up in this way the theory of "acting communicatively" 
which is linked to the names of K.O. Apel, J. Habermas, J. Heinrichs and HJ. Höhn: Kehl 1992, 
139-140, nt 7. Cf К, 2.1. 
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Π Leading up to the Catholic Social Doctrine (1800 -
1848) 
1 A Totally New Situation 
Because of the French Revolution (1789) there is in Europe a totally new political and 
socio-economic situation. In the first half of the 19th century we find the first traces of 
what will become later the social doctrine of the church. These traces are found 
especially in France and in the German countries. We need to take a closer look at the 
ideas of catholics in these two countries. We will see that they indeed lead up to the 
social doctrine; a reality which some people deny. 
It is not our intention to present these ideas in their totality and in detail. We intend to 
show that the organologica! vision played an (important) role from the start and how it 
can be explained that this vision is so important, and what the roots of that vision are. 
2 France 
Industrialization began in France between 1817 and 1830, followed by the growth of 
an industrial proletariat, consisting mainly of ruined craftsmen and people from the 
rural areas who were looking for a job. In reaction to the poverty and misery which 
resulted, "social Catholicism" originates. We find here the names of P. Bûchez (1796-
1865), A. de Melun (1807-1877), and F. Ozanam (1813-1853)1. 
From the circles of this "social Catholicism" some became members of parliament. 
They did not attempt to create social legislation apart from a law against exploitation of 
children (1841) which could not really be implemented2. 
In this time, up to 1848, the French episcopate was conservative. Apart from some 
individual bishops, the hierarchy did not show any awareness of the existence of a 
social problem3. 
1
 DuroseUe 1951,6-10; Vidier 1969,3-32 gives a short overview. 
2
 DuroseUe 1951, 227-235. 
1
 DuroseUe 1951, 235-240. 
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Notwithstanding all the differences in vision among the leading thinkers4 of this social 
Catholicism we can see a common element in an anti-individualistic attitude5: this is 
clear in the attempt to arrive at corporations, which is present in most of them. 
"Corporatism" is "(he social system in which individual economic freedom would be 
limited by associations of workers and employers in each trade; these associations 
would be endowed with semi-autonomous political and judicial rights vis à vis the state 
and would exercise the power to regulate prices and wages for their own protection 
(...). These institutions were to replace both the liberal, democratic parliaments which 
were developing in Europe at that time and the system of private property holding. The 
corporations rather than individuals would own all property. They would regulate 
political and social relations between members and would meet in a larger corporate 
parliament to decide issues concerning the whole nation; other legislative bodies would 
be abolished"4. This was really a direct attack on the individualism and the vision on 
the state of the Revolution, which only recognized the nation and individual persons. 
Corporations are associations which have authority independent from the state. The 
ruling vision of social monism could not accept that: it sees the state as the only source 
and structure of authority7. 
4
 Within this social Catholicism there were serious political differences: liberal catholics like Ozanam 
were willing, in principle, to accept the existing political order (following De Lamennais); others, 
like Bûchez, were under the influence of the first socialists; others like de Melun, are counter-
revolutionaries: Duroselle 1951,189-209; Maier 1956,175-180; Jedin 1971/1985, 320-322; Schatz 
1986, 76-77; Dreyfus 1988,46. 
5
 Dreyfus 1988,16 calls this rejection of individualism "une des constantes de l'opinion catholique 
de l'époque"; it was seen as "le moteur d'une théologie des intérêts matériels limitée aux seules 
combinaisons qui se résolvent en ecus". In general political and economic individualism form a 
constant element in French legislation after the Revolution. Cf o.e., 17-18; cf Maier 1968, 79-80. 
6
 Camp 1969,26-27. Knemeyer 1987 gives a general definition of "Körperschaft" or corporation: 
"eine mitgliedschaftlich verfasste, vom Wechsel der Mitglieder unabhängige Personenvereinigung. 
Sie ist (so HJ.Wolf) die allgemeine Rechtsform eines Personenverbands einer selbständigen 
rechtlichen und sozialen, oft auch wirtschaftlichen Einheit zur Verfolgung mehr oder weniger genau 
bestimmter Anliegen ihrer wechselnden Mitglieder". Some other words which we find in this area: 
-order = a group of people who have special rights and obligations. Most often one takes three orders 
(sometimes four): the clergy, the nobility, burghers (and sometimes the farmers); Conrad 1962, 652. 
-guild = a corporation of craftsmen in a branch of industry. Guilds are socio-economic interest 
groups. 
-association = a union of people; in this research it is mostly used as equivalent of the Latin word 
"societas";cfVn,2.1. 
7
 Murray 1952,528 and 534-536 offers a plausible explanation of the concept of the "jealous" stale, 
which is also the background of the problematic relationship between church and state in the 19th 
century. His explanation is the already mentioned principle of "social monism": "society is one, in 
the sense that it is to be absolutely homogeneous". Social monism has no place for party interests, 
which attack the unity of state and society and which find concrete expression in parties, orders, and 
other corporate entities. In social monism society is composed of absolutely equal individuals and 
there are no intermediary organisations between the individual and the state. Cf Harskamp 1986, 
78. 
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Corporations are associations with a certain independence and were meant to counter-
act individualism; they put the individual in a context, so that he is not alone in relation 
to the absolute power of the state, and so that free competition is somewhat restrained. 
What could be called a more general catholic social theory did not really develop in 
France till 1848: corporatism as a socio-economic and political system was not thought 
through. There was one dominant issue: the legitimacy of the new French order8. 
We may conclude, therefore, that to find a well elaborated organologica! vision in a 
modem way of thinking about state and society, we should not look to the French social 
catholics of this period. 
3 The German Countries 
We need to have a quick look at the new economic, political, and social situation in 
these countries. Politically, absolutism dominated the scene in this period (since the 
17th century it had been the centralizing tendency in politics); bureaucracy took an 
ever more important place9. Socio-economically, the agrarian sector dominated. But in 
the middle of the thirties the conditions for industrialization were in place: we see 
Gewerbefrei heit and other forms of economic liberalization10; a customs union 
between Prussia and the middle and southern German states came into being; technical 
possibilities became available; there was labor and there was capital; and the railway 
had been constructed. Industrialization between 1840 and 1850 grew rapidly". But all 
this was not without problems. 
How did catholic thinkers react to these developments? 
3.1 Some names 
A.H. Muller (1779-1829) can be characterized as an opponent of liberalism12 and he 
was one of the few who formulated this opposition in a critique on the economic 
liberalism of A. Smith13. Müller was a declared opponent of individualistic profits 
because in his vision it led to class struggle. To prevent that from happening, new 
social forces needed to be integrated in the old guild and orders system14. 
8
 Maier 1964, 44. 
9
 Harskamp 1986,70. For an overview of the various phases of absolutism, see Weis 1985. 
10
 Gewerbefreiheit means that "everyone in any scale, any kind of production, with any kind of 
technique can start a business''. Its (actual) slow implementation means diminution of the economic 
power of the guilds. It implies also an abolition of existing legislation: Harskamp 1986,81. 
11
 O.e., 72-82. 
12
 Klein 1975,100. 
13
 Langner 1975/2,12 and 41-52. 
14
 Leliveld 1965, 89-%. 
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He saw the state "as the intimate linking into a whole, which is energetically moving 
and alive, a linking of common physical and spiritual needs, of common physical and 
spiritual richess, of the common inner and external life of the nation"15. 
In his Signatur des Zeitalters (1820) F. von Schlegel (1772-1829) gave an impression 
of the social disintegration he experienced. Traditional bonds in society were gone and 
exchanged for a "mathematical" and "mechanical" vision of the state and government. 
He desired that the four large corporations (state, church, school, and guilds) with the 
orders be recognized by the state, and he would like to see the state founded on the 
organic cooperation between them". 
From the start of his publishing activity F. von Baader (1765-1841) fought the 
economic liberalism of A. Smith. He spoke about the devaluation with regard to 
content of labor by machines; about ever lower wages while productivity increased; 
about the fact that profit was for very few people; about the danger of job losses 
because of machines. He too is afraid of the revolutionary attitude of the proletariat 
because of the impoverishment17. He slowly arrived at an organologica! vision of state 
and society. His anti-individualism was given form in his vision on state and society 
where the individual person has his own place only because he belongs to a part of the 
"organism". That "organism" has its own continuity in which man is not allowed to 
interfere". 
The old orders were for/. Garres (1776-1848) the means to counteract the absolutism 
of the state because they have a certain internal autonomy. The orders must cooperate 
as members of a body and their representatives should play a role in the political 
processes of decision making". 
These thoughts can be found also in the journal Historisch-Politische Blätter (which 
Görres co-initiated in 1838) which rejected the sovereignty of the people and the 
parliamentary system because the editors saw in them the end of the state20. 
15
 Quoted by Leliveld 1965, 88 from Mutter's Von der Idee des Staates: "die innige Verbindung 
der gesammten physischen und geistigen Reichtums, des gesammten inneren und äusseren Lebens 
einer Nation zu einem grossen energischen unendlich bewegten und lebendigen Ganzen". Leliveld 
notes here that, through this definition of the state, the "Organismuslehre" has become permanently 
part of German catholic social literature. Cf Кuylaars 19S7,68-69. 
16
 Leliveld 1965,101-105. Cf Kuylaars 1957,71-72; Greiffenhagen 1971, 202. 
1 7
 Schnabel Г , 250-251. Baader is the only German of those mentioned here who experienced 
early capitalism in practice because he visited Scotland around 1790; cf Leliveld 1965,110. 
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 Leliveld 1965,113-125. 
1 9
 O.e. 128-135. 
2 0
 O.e. 144-145. Leliveld quotes a characteristic story from the Historisch-Politische Blauer about 
the value of betonging to an order (138-139): the son of a smith can become doctor utriusque iuris 
and asks his father to help him financially. The father refuses after having discussed it with his guild 
members, because it is shameful if children of a smith become doctor! 
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Summing up: these thinkers take a stand in favor of christian monarchy as a vision of 
state and society in which orders and guilds have an important place. It is their answer 
in a time of crisis, an answer they arrive at in dialog with the main trends of the time. 
The strength of their argument lies in: 
- resistance against absolutism and centralism in the state 
- resistance against the ideas of freedom and equality of the Enlightenment and the 
Revolution 
- resistance against individualism 
- their horror about increasing poverty21. 
They fight absolutism through their vision of the worth of the orders, they fight the 
beginning capitalism by pointing to the importance of the guilds. Both forms of 
organization can be seen as corporations. 
Were these catholic thinkers alone in their vision? Were they traditionalist eccentrics 
who idealized the medieval vision of the state and society without giving it any real 
thought, who wanted to guarantee the social and political influence of the church (seen 
as one of the orders) by their defense of the orders? Clearly not. First of all, Hegel 
shared many of their ideas. And they were in the great trends of conservatism and 
Romanticism, which gave a much wider background to their way of thinking. 
Excursion: G.WJ?. Hegel (1770-1831) 
Hegel attributed an important place to the orders and "Korporationen" in his Grundli-
nien der Philosophie des Rechts11. Why? In the section on "Die Sittlichkeit" he 
described how the unity of generality and particularity, of objective order and subjecti-
ve will comes into being in the life of the community and how this happens concretely 
in the state. 
An important sphere in the life of the community is the "bürgerliche Gesellschaft": the 
sphere where a person aims for his special and particular interests, the sphere of 
economic competition (par. 182-189). In short: "Die Individuen sind als Bürger dieses 
Staates Privatpersonen, welche ihr eigenes Interesse zu ihrem Zwecke haben" (par. 
187). 
The Unterschichten (such as small farmers, day laborers, servants, home workers, soldiers, the 
lower cbsss of civil servants, and beggars), who were not part of the classical orders, impoverished 
quickly after 1800: cf Harskamp 1986,101-105. An additional reason in some areas can be found 
in the fact that churches and monasteries no longer had the means to help the socially weaker people 
because of "secularization": Schatz 1986,18 and 33. See Rauscher 1981, 19-28 for this form of 
secularization as expropriation of church property. It meant the loss of the material basis of the 
power and the activities of the church: Schoof 1992,13. 
22
 Edition used: G.WJHegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und 
Staalswissenschaft im Grundrisse, Frankfurt am Main, 1973 (Theorie Werkausgabe, Werke in 
zwanzig Bände, nr.7). For the interpretation of the text I used Avineri 1976, especially chapter 8: 
Soziale Stände, Repräsentation und Pluralismus, 187-210. 
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The state is a totally different structure: particular and common interest go hand in 
hand, people commit themselves consciously to the common good; the state is the unity 
of free persons, where freedom is concretely23 realized and guaranteed (par. 260). 
Between these two spheres there is a need for the intermediary function of the orders 
and "Korporationen", elements of solidarity in the business community. They have an 
integrating function for the mass of individuals. A person becomes a citizen by being a 
member of such an association: the state is not formed out of the mass of individuals24. 
Hegel, therefore, did not opt for individualistic liberalism but neither does he promote 
the return to the old society. He provided orders and corporations with their own place, 
where they bring about the integration of the individual persons into the state; they 
prevent the emergence of an absolutist and "mechanistic" government. The fear for the 
disintegration of society, which we saw in the aforementioned authors was recognized 
by Hegel. But in maintaining the "sphere of egoism" his system provided the way to 
prevent it through orders and "Korporalionen". For Hegel it was never a question of 
"either-or" but of "and-and". And so he arrived at the state as an organism, which is not 
expressed in uniformity; the interdependence of the parts makes it possible to function 
well while relatively autonomous corporations counter-balance the center of power25. 
3.2 Background 
The climate of thought of these people fits in two trends of the time: the beginning 
conservatism and Romanticism. One can distinguish them but not separate Ihem and 
the theorists for both are generally the same persons. Conservatism was a more 
politico-social trend and Romanticism had a more cultural component. 
Common to them was the philosophical critique of individualism and rationalism of the 
Enlightenment and the (economic) critique of rising capitalism. The alternative offered 
is an organologica! vision of state and society, concretized in corporatism. 
ECONOMIC CRITIQUE 
Can we say that the criticism of initial capitalism shows a conservative bias or is it 
justified? One must acknowledge that people of that time only saw the initial stages of 
the new economic order and that did not yet mean economic progress2'. There was 
hardly any social basis for the reforms. It was a small group who managed those 
reforms and who brought some economic liberalization in the political context of a 
traditional absolutism and thus assured a rationalistically political government: the 
reforms came from the top27. As a start of liberal freedom they signified concretely: 
For the concept of "concrete freedom" see DC, nt 41. 
24
 Paragraphs 207,250-256,258 Anm., 288-289,302-303 and 308. 
25
 Avineri o.e., 201-202; cf Schlanger 1971, 213-214. 
26
 Langner 1975/2,48-51; cf Harskamp 1986,80. 
27
 Harskamp 1986,79 says that the reform movement was carried by a very small group of senior 
officials, the so-called "Reformburokraten". They did not receive any social support there was as 
yet no bourgeoisie which had any power, the class of the still powerful nobility with landed property 
were against them. Cf Weis 1985,40. 
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- economically, a step towards an economy of "laisser faire", 
-juridically, the legalization of contractual freedom of the individual to sell his labor, 
- ideologically, the support of the idea that property in the sense of private property is a 
condition for the development of the person and for the functioning of civil society28. 
People like Müller and others could only see this as an ongoing disintegration of 
society, already initiated by absolutism29. And with that we see a second and more 
fundamental critique of conservatism and Romanticism: the critique of individualism 
and of the conception of liberty of the Enlightenment and liberalism. 
THE SOCIO-PHILOSOPHICAL CRTTIQUE 
This rejected the social monism and the individualistic conception of liberty of the 
Enlightenment, which led to a breakdown of the independence of traditional associati-
ons such as orders and guilds30. The breakdown of the old social system offered the 
chance to rational and enlightened thought about state and society and offers a chance 
to individualism. Kaulbach summarizes this succinctly when he states that for this new 
way of thinking only that unity and reality are valid, which the subject itself has brought 
about synthetically31. From this point of view one can reorganize human society "more 
geometrico": the past, what has been developed, has no value as such. 
Conservatism and Romanticism reacted against this kind of individualism and "mecha-
nistic" political government32. Mannheim's article about the origin of conservatism as 
an ideological attitude still has its value in this context33. 
Freedom in economic matters consisted for (revolutionary) liberalism, from the 
viewpoint of rationalism and individualism as described, in freeing the individual of 
any bond by order or guild; politically it consists in the exercise of human rights; 
juridically, in the freedom to enter into personal relationships with each other for the 
"НагекатрІСвб^І. 
2 9
 Langner 1975/2,23: Müller and other conservatives have "den Liberalismus insoweit bekämpft, 
als sie in ihm einerseits einen gemeinschaftsfeindlichen und bindungslosen Individualismus, 
andererseits die Gefahr eines revolutionierenden Gesetzabsolutismus im Rahmen 'mechani-
scher'Mehrheitsdemokraüe fürchteten, die den einzelnen wie im Absolutismus ohne Sicherung 
staatlicher Gewalt aussetzt und zudem als ethisch bindungslos angesehen wurde". In relation to 
absolutism they see "die Freiheit in einer ständischen Ordnung und die ethische Grenze staatlicher 
Tätigkeit in der Restauration der christlichen Monarchie gesichert". 
30
 Absolutism can be seen as the first rational attempt to change traditional social structures: 
Greiffenhagen 1971, 79; cf nt 32. 
31
 Kaulbach 1979,163. 
32
 This reproach of "mechanistic" government returns constantly in the conservative and Romantic 
criticisms. What is meant is the attitude of a ruler who considers himself "maître et possesseur de 
la société", as man before that saw himself as "maître et possesseur de la nature". "Gesellschan ist 
dem modernen Geist keine ontologische Vorgegebenheit mehr, sondern eine nach Massgabe 
rationaler Entwurf zu treffende Versuchsanordnung. Hierbei spielen Verschiedenheit und Grösse 
sozialer Gruppen keine Rolle": Greiffenhagen 1971, 79-81; cf Dijksterhuis 1977, par. 194-230, 
especially 213-214. 
33
 Mannheim 1927. 
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sake of personal advantage. The boundary of freedom lies in the freedom of one's 
fellow-citizens. The idea of equality is postulated on this concept of freedom. 
The (beginning) conservatism posited that such equality did not exist in practice: 
persons are in their most inner being unequal. There is no equality in principle but 
rather an inequality in the division of talents and position. Freedom then means that 
each one develops himself according to his own talents. This could be explained in a 
very subjective way (as early Romanticism did), but according to Mannheim the 
Romantic way of thinking, which became conservative, quickly made the collective 
rather than the individual into the real subject of freedom: organic communities or 
orders34. 
This means that it is not the individual who carries responsibility for his own develop-
ment, but that this is found in the larger group11. Freeing oneself from this group, 
becoming an independent individual, is not possible in this vision because one would 
then lose one's roots: conformity is needed16. Furthermore, social inequality is not 
linked to the individual but to the group. 
Conservatism presupposed a "given harmony", the ordering of "which is guaranteed 
either by God or by social national forces"37, which, therefore, could not be changed 
"more geometrico". What is historically developed is very important: conservatism 
herein followed E. Burke (1728-1797), who reacted in 1790 directly and on principle 
to the events in France with his Reflections on the Revolution in France. He pointed to 
the fundamental value of a slowly growing governmental system: tradition and 
continuity are of irreplaceable value. The real mistake of the Revolution was that 
tradition was thrown out and one tried to remake society and state from scratch. 
Political government is not a question of cold "ratio" but must always be in touch with 
individual people, with exceptions and compromises. This attack on rationalistic 
government was quickly well known in Germany: Burke's book was translated in 1793 
and greatly influenced Müller a.o.M. 
34
 O.e., 430-432. He quotes A.Müller: "Nichts kann der Freiheit, wie ich sie beschrieben habe... 
mehr widersprechen als der Begriff einer äusseren Gleichheit. Wenn die Freiheit nichts anderes als 
das allgemeine Streben der verschiedenartigsten Naturen nach Wachstum und Leben ist, so kann 
man keinen grösseren Widerspruch ausdenken, als indem man, mit Einführung der Freiheit 
zugleich, die ganze Eigentümlichkeit, d.h. Verschiedenartigheit dieser Naturen aufhebt". 
35
 This idea is supported by what Greiffenhagen 1971,160 says about the attitude of the nobility, 
taken over by conservatism: man is seen as a link in a chain of generations and he fulfills his destiny 
as service to the community; the subject is not the person in his individuality, but the institution, 
which is more important as well because it comes first as well as in value. The virtue of service 
becomes in this way the cornerstone of conservative morality. 
34
 See nt. 20. 
37
 Mannheim 1927,433. 
M
 Kaulbach summarizes Burke's position in this way: "Die beste Verfassung sei naturgemäss bzw. 
natürlich, kontinuierlich, langsam und fast un wahrnehmbar in sehr langer Zeit und durch mannig-
fachste Zufalle entstanden. Der subjektiven Reflexion falle in diesem Prozess keine massgebende 
Rolle zu. Nicht eine einheitliche, künstliche Konzeption, keine Hypothese und kein gesetzlicher 
Entwurf sind bei der Entstehung dieser Verfassung massgebend, vielmehr fuhrt die in sich selbst 
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Summarizing, Mannheim said that for the development of conservatism it was 
necessary that there were still circles where this way of life was lived and thought 
about and which, in their traditional living of it, were challenged to be reflexively 
aware of that reality. Later on this reflexive consciousness will be strong enough to 
serve as thebasis for conservative thought. The beginning of conservatism can be seen 
in Prussia in the fight between the nobility and the Reformburokratie. Civil servants 
wanted the reforms which were needed for the development of capitalism but which 
undermine the social and political position of the nobility. The nobility united then with 
the ideological resistance against the Enlightenment: i.e. Romanticism39. 
When we say "Romanticism", we speak about a historical movement covering the years 
between 1790 and 1850, too extensive to present here in summary40. All we want to 
take up here is its social critique which reacted against the deep social, economic, and 
political changes, where the person was seen as an individual. The characteristic 
feature of Romanticism is that it looked at the person as a social being and, as such, it 
criticizes the individualistic approach. 
As basis and background for this criticism Romanticism chose the concept of a social 
organism41. In their opposition to the process of individualization, the Romantics said 
that "reality is in essence a living, dynamic reality, in which the elements are indeed 
qualitatively distinct, but are yet in truth united. The image which expresses this best is 
that of the development of reality as 'natural organism'"42. We explained in chapter I 
what such a (kantian) organologica! concept is in broad outline. 
The Romantics concretized this vision by their plea to maintain the traditional society 
of orders and guilds. There they found a framework which had historically developed, 
as well as a way to offer the person associations: the guilds and the orders were still 
reality for them43. Such a system was the best antidote against individualization and 
und durch sich selbst in Gang gekommene Bewegung der selbständigen Natur in der Geschichte 
zu ihr": Kaulbach 1979, 171. Cf Mannheim 1927, 435^36 and 465^72; Schnabel I, 236-243; 
Kuylaars 1957, 65-66; Greiffenhagen 1971, a.o. 43. 
39
 Mannheim 1927,449^52; Gundlach 1957, 1124-1125. 
40
 Köhler 1961,944, who quotes Schnabel : "So kann die Romantik, diese in sich widerspruchs-
volle Sache nicht definiert, sondern nur historisch begriffen werden" (= Schnabel I, 290). 
41
 Köhler 1961,948-949, mentions F. Schelling (1775-1854) as the one who gave a philosophical 
foundation to the Romantic organism doctrine; Kuylaars 1957,69-70 does the same. Hollerbach 
1957, 140-146 notes that Kant applied the idea of organism to society already before Schelling: 
Schelling did so in 1802, Kant (gropingly) in 1790 (cf 1,5). I assume, therefore, with Greiffenhagen 
and others (cf I, nt 30) that Kant's thoughts, as described in ch. I, are a systematic preparation of 
modem organologica! thinking. 
42
 Harskamp 1986,251. 
43
 The guilds were abolished only formally with the coming of the Gewerbefreiheit, but they still 
had influence all through this period: Harskamp 1986,78-81. The orders still played a role around 
1800 .e.g., in the Western provinces of Prussia in determining taxes and legislation (Schnäble Π, 
67), and even later they kept an advisory function in Prussia (Schnabel Ш, 102-104). 
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offered the best means to regain the lost social unity44. Attention was clearly given to 
"pauperism": the causes for this social need were seen especially in rationalistic 
individualism, in the disappearance of the bonding of the orders, and in the absolute 
pre-eminence given to one's own interest45. 
The return to orders and guilds was thus not an idealistic glorification of the past but 
was based on two solid realities for the Romantics: 
- the philosophical criticism of individualism and rationalism of the Enlightenment 
- the economic criticism of nascent capitalism. 
4 The Start of Social Doctrine as Organologica! Vision 
4.1 Relation with social doctrine 
At the beginning of this chapter we put the question whether the organologica! vision 
has played a role from the start in catholic social doctrine. We already remarked there 
that the choice to see in this period of time the beginning of social doctrine is not 
universally accepted. The choice needs to be accounted for. Some authors do not make 
this choice4* and some positively reject it47. 
Yet, Müller, von Schlegel, Baader, Görres, and the French social catholics set the tone 
for catholic social doctrine in their way of thinking. That social doctrine would develop 
in the second half of the 19th century48. Catholic social doctrine would cherish the 
44
 Stegmann 1969, 336. 
45
 O.e. 338 Stegman quotes Müller about the previous social security: "Er war einer Familie, einer 
Korporation, einer Gemeinde, einem Stande für immer verpflichtet (adscriptus), er war auf Tod und 
Leben einem gewissen Zustande... ergeben und dieser Zustand oder Stand hatte seinesteils wieder 
die Verpflichtung, für ihn zu sorgen. ... die grosse Masse des Volks war durch die Erhaltung der 
unzähligen natürlichen und einzelnen Körperschaften, Obrigheiten, Familien, Gemeinden, Stände, 
den man jener einzelne angehörte, gegen den Verfall seiner eigene Kräfte geschützt und für die 
eigenlichtlich Verlassenen, Gebrechlichen, Heimatlosen, für die wenigen, denen keinen besonderes 
Obdach zuteil geworden war, sorgte die Kirche". 
46
 The clearest example is Klüber 1968,200-201: he jumps from Spanish-Italian late Scholasticism 
with authors like Bellarmine (1542-1621) and Suarez (1548-1617) to von Ketteler, who stands "am 
Beginn der Renaissance der katholischen Gesellschaftslehre im 19. Jahrhundert" and who "die 
weitere Entwicklung des Sozialkatholizismus von Schwärmerei und Romantizismus bewahrte". He 
makes it clear that the natural law categories of Scholasticism are essential for that judgment 
47
 Moody 1953,369 rejects any similarity between Romanticism and true catholic anthropology and 
sociology; cf Gundbch 1957,1124. Maier 1965,49 says that in France the emphasis on "pouvoirs 
intermédiaires" and "vorstaatlichen Gemeinschaften" cannot be explained from ideas about an 
earlier order society or from a "nostalgie de passé", because one can find it in syndicalism as well 
as in christian democracy, so that one must accept a common personalist tradition as basis. But he 
does not say which tradition, nor does he question whether the word "personalist" can even be used 
for that time. Maier 1968,82-84 posits that Müller and others do not contribute any typical catholic 
accents when they enter in public debate and they do not find a place in the Scholastic tradition. 
48
 Köhler 1961,949. 
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principle of corporatism for a long time and discussions about the importance of orders 
and guilds played a role for quite a while49. The authors which we discussed wanted 
nothing to do with individualism and opted for the human being as a social being: this 
will be the durable thread in social doctrine. They prepared the road by their criticism 
of the fundamental social and economic changes50. 
4 2 The organologica! vision and its sources 
In these authors one can find the organologica! vision we described in chapter I, nr. 6. 
Even though the three aspects mentioned there are not found explicitly in each author, 
they are present in a general way: 
- mutual solidarity between people is important and individualism is rejected; 
- associations are seen as important (orders, guilds, corporations) which in their 
interrelationship give form and substance to society and the state. 
What are the sources for this organologica! vision? I pointed already to the importance 
of conservatism and Romanticism. These authors belong there and they have made 
their contribution to them. How does the organologica! vision fit in these trends? 
The philosophical development of the organologica! vision is specific for German 
conservatism. Mannheim showed, as we said, that this conservatism originated as a 
counter movement: the same is true for the organologica! theory of the state51. It played 
an important role in the German states during these years and was characterized by the 
fact that it incorporates the Kantian interaction between the parts and the whole52. In 
this way it became useful as a thought-instrument against absolutism, social monism, 
the centralism of the Reformburokratie, and liberal individualism. For our research it 
is important to point out that the organologica! vision played a role in the fight against 
the absolutism of the state. Therefore, we do not see so much the traditional "corpus 
concept", but rather the organologica! concept, inspired by Kant51. 
This became concrete in the proposal to give the traditional orders, guilds, and other 
corporations their place again in state and society. One sought to limit the power of the 
state and reacted against social monism through the influence of these associations. 
And these associations fit in the framework of the christian monarchy, where the 
"christian" forms an additional guarantee against absolutism. This christian element in 
the monarchy implies recognition of a law given by God, which rules the ruler and the 
ruled and gives both their place54: in such a concept there is no absolute human 
authority. 
49
 Leliveld 1965,147-148; Aubert 1970,17; cf V, nt 63. 
50
 Stegmann 1969, 336. 
51
 Greiffenhagen 1971,200-201. 
52
 Dohm 1978,587-588. For Kant's vision on organism: see 1,5. 
53
 Kuybais 1957,76 (+ nt 168): "Für die Romantik ist das organische Bild vielmehr der Baum,..." 
which is used by Müller and Görres. 
54
 Greiffenhagen 1971, p.174-175, where he quotes Baader extensively. 
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The other important trend is Romanticism. Its real desire was for unity, which was lost 
in individualism and liberalism55. In this it answered the desire of large groups in 
society for the former integration56. The Romantic organologica! vision was antithetic 
against individualism and the idea of harmony was central to it57. 
Its concept of organism fits in the fight against social monism or "the jealous state". 
Schlanger states that "there is no monolithic organism: the organic totality exists by the 
grace of the mutual interaction of the parts. There is no organic state which does not 
identify itself in the interplay of its organs"58. Again, one finds oneself quickly close to 
the new emphasis of the conservatives on associations and the fight against absolutism. 
So we can conclude this part The organologica! vision enters the way catholics think 
about state and society via the practical corporatistic proposals of the social catholics 
in France and, in a more reflexive manner, in the socio-political fight against the policy 
in the German states (esp. Prussia), which wanted to give the liberal principles a 
chance economically and socially. One opted in this period for the nobility which lost 
its influence because of the absolutism of the state, and one stood at the side of all those 
who quickly became the victims of the economic developments. 
The organologica! vision offers arguments against a detested individualism. The last 
quote from Schlanger especially shows that it is the kantian version of that vision. The 
question is how far this remains present in catholic social doctrine. 
It is clear that the organological vision within conservative-Romantic thought is 
expressive, as reaction, of an open anti-individualism: that is the reason one could not 
yet arrive at a formulation of the principle of subsidiarity59. 
55
 Schnabel 1,320-323. 
56
 Harskamp 1986,119. 
57
 Schlanger 1971, 7 and 91-92. 
11
 O.e., 213: "Il n'y a pas d'organisme monolythique: la totalité organique tent à la corrélation des 
parties. Π n'y a pas d'état organique que ne se definisse aussi par la jeu de ses organes". 
59
 CfKuylaars 1957,77-80. 
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Ш W.E. von Ketteier and the Principle of Subsidiarity' 
1 The Importance of Ketteler's Position 
W.E. von Ketteler (1811-1877) is, in modem catholic tradition, the first one to use the 
principle of subsidiarity, without formulating it expressly2. Because the history of the 
principle and its concrete historical setting are a main subject of this research, it is 
important to have a closer look at those places where von Ketteler almost expressly 
formulates it. But let me first give an overview of his way of thinking so that we can 
see it in context. 
His position is specifically important because it is clear that the hypothesis of Isensee 
(and Kaufmann) about the roots of the principle of subsidiarity is confirmed in his 
thought. This hypothesis states that the principle of subsidiarity is the result of the 
organologica! concept and the liberal vision on man and state1. It is this synthesis, as 
expressed by Ketteler, which is the subject of this chapter. 
Unless otherwise indicated I refer for Ketteler's texts to: Wilhelm Emmanuel FreiheiT von 
Ketteler, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe (E.Iserloh, Hrgb): 
- Schriften, Aufsätze und Reden 1848-1866, Mainz 1977 = Schriften 1,1; 
- Schriften, Aufsätze und Reden 1867-1870, Mainz 1978 = Schriften 1,2; 
- Schriften, Briefe und Materialien zum Vaticanum 11867-1875, Mainz 1982 = Schriften 1,3; 
- Schriften, Aufsätze und Reden 1871-1877, Mainz 1977 = Schriften 1,4. 
For Ketteler's main writings I use the following indications: 
- FAK +page nr = Freiheit, Autorität und Kirche (original 1862), in: Schriften 1,1, 222-364. 
- Arbeiterfrage+pagenr = Die Arbeiterfrage und das Christentum (original 1864), in: Schriften 
1,1,367-515. 
- Nach 1866 +page nr = Deutschland nach dem Kriege von 1866 (original 1867), in: Schriften 
1,2,1-127. 
- Programm +page nr = Die Katholiken im Deutschen Reiche. Entwurf zu einem politischen 
Programm (original 1873), in: Schriften 1,4,186-262. 
These four works are the more balanced of his publications: most of his other writings are about 
current events and are more journalistic: cf. Schriften I, 4,186 and Birke 1971,28. 
1
 Höffner 1962, 10-13; Klüber 1968,217-220. 
3
 Isensee 1968, 25 and 71; Kaufmann 1988, 280 posits, with an appeal on Isensee, that the 
principle of subsidiarity as formulated in Quadragesimo Anno "is the result of a synthesis of thought 
in the categories of an organic order (the Scholastic heritage) and of the theory of the liberal state 
(an adaptation of modem thought)". For Ketteler it is not the organologica! concept of neo-
Scholasricism, but of conservatism and Romanticism. 
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Ketteier4 studied law and political science in various German universities and for some 
years he was a civil servant. He resigned because of position in the conflict which then 
raged in Prussia about the relationship between church and state3. He then studied 
theology, was ordained and worked as a pastor (1844-1850). In 1850 he was appoin-
ted bishop in Mainz and he became one of the leading figures in the German hierar-
chy*. 
In two instances he was politically active: in 1848-1849 he was a member of the 
"Frankfurter Nationalversammlung" where he linked up with the liberals7, and in 1871-
1872 he was a member of the "Reichstag", representing the catholic "Zentrum" party. 
2 Ketteler's Political and Social Vision 
From 1848 on he published his ideas about man, society, church and state for a wider 
public. In general his ideas are quite consistent even though there is one real break: his 
change of mind around 1864 about the role of the state in the social question8. 
With Iserloh we may say that freedom is a constant and determinant theme in Ketteler's 
life and work: freedom for man as such, and freedom for associations, especially for the 
church'. He resisted absolutism. He saw this form of centralism in the German states of 
his times: the political governmental power lay too much in the hands of the central 
authority in the state and was not shared sufficiently among the social organizations and 
the municipalities. His organologica! vision was essential in his resistance10. 
In this way he agreed with the (beginning) conservatism, which we outlined in the 
previous chapter. In his theological studies in Munich he was under the influence of the 
circle around Görres and the Historisch-Politische Blätter. These influences were in 
line with the ideas of the "historical school of law" for which F.C. von Savigny (1779-
4
 For extensive biographical data see Lenhardt 1966, 7-15; Müller 1963, 2-17; Rivinius 1976/1, 
11-68. 
5
 The conflict led to the start of the already mentioned (in Π, 3.1) Historisch-Politische Blätter; 
for more information about the events and the consequences: Harskamp 1986, 206-207, 213-216 
and 234-236; Hurten 1986,66-69 and 74; Jedin 1971/1985 394-401; Lönne 1986, 76-84; Schatz 
1986, 83-90. 
6
 Birke 1987, 395. 
7
 Ketteier was chosen as a member of the Frankfurter Nationalversammlung (F.N.) in 1848, the 
year of revolution in Europe (which can maybe be compared with 1989 in Central and Eastern 
Europe). For the importance of this gathering, which was to propose a constitution for a united 
Germany, see Birke 1971,5-6; Lönne 1986,106-116; Hurten 1986, 79-108; Schatz 1986, 96-106; 
Schoof 1992,24. 
8
 See nr. 2.4 below. 
9
 Iserloh 1978,27. 
Langner 1971/1, 65 describes the organologica! concept as the similarity between different 
influences which Ketteler experienced. For these influences see Rivinius 1976/1 and Fastenrath 
1971. 1-73. 
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1861) laid the foundations and whose lectures von Ketteler attended in Berlin". But 
Ketteler did not cling to a rejection of liberal ideas as the conservatives and the 
Romantics did12. He constantly pleaded for freedom of thought and expression without 
censorship, he pleaded for freedom of assembly and association, and for freedom of 
religion. He distanced himself most clearly from the conservatives in his position in 
favor of an independent judiciary, and of the separation of powers: his plea was for an 
independent high court of justice which could control the legislative and executive 
power". In the same line we see this liberal influence in his thinking in the stand he 
took in favor of "Menschenwürde" and "Rechte der Individualität"" and 
"Selbstverwaltung": he saw this right based in reason and nature. This mode of 
expression is close to the anti-absolutist natural law of the Enlightenment15. 
We see here the different roots for Ketteler's socio-ethical thinking: he maintained the 
organologica! vision on state and society and mingled this with elements from the 
liberal tradition such as its vision on natural law16 and its theory of human rights17. 
According to the "historical school of law" law originates from custom and morality. What is 
important is the historically developed legal system as such: this school teaches ideas which are 
comparable with Burke's: cf. Π, 3.2. See also Schroder 1987. Schlanger 1971,125 says about this 
school " ... que tout droit apparaît comme droit coutumier, c'est à dire qu'il est d'abord posé par les 
moeurs, puis par la jurisprudence, et non par l'arbitraire d'un législateur". 
n
 Iserloh 1978,27: "Anders als durchweg die Kirche seiner Zeit vermochte er aber zu entdecken 
und für den deutschen Katholizismus fruchtbar zu machen, was in der Freiheitsbewegung des 19. 
Jahrhunderts, so kirchenfeindlich und mit Irrtümmem belastet sie sich auch anbot, an 
Vernünftigem, Richtigem und menschlich Wünschenswertem enthalten war". 
13
 FAK 285 and Programm 226-227; cf Langner 1974/1, 91. 
14
 FAK 285 and Programm 226-227; cf Langner 1974/1, 91. 
15
 Langner 1974/1,89-98; cf Demmer 1987,1303-1306 about this form of natural law. 
Ketteler cannot take his place within neo-Scholastic thinking about natural bw because this 
takes form in Germany only after the Syllabus (1864): Hollerbach 1973, 27; cf Schoof 1992. It is 
remarkable that Ketteler in FAK gives a number of quotes from SLThomas: FAK 284-288; cf 
Langner 1974/1,63-65,74,95,108-109. Note that Ketteler does not use the texts from StThomas 
about natural law (S Th Ι-Π, q. 91-97) as purely philosophical texts. He looks at them rather from 
the moral theological point of view, as Langner says, and he brings in the authority of the church 
to ñnd support for them. 
17
 Langner 1971/1, 90-99. He comes to the conclusion that the organological and the liberal 
influences have never been truly harmonized in Ketteler; cf Birke 1971, 55-60. Ketteler never 
theoretically came to a satisfactory acceptance of a number of statements from the Syllabus (Pius 
IX, 1864); see for his discussion about these statements, e.g., the freedom of conscience: Nach 
1866, 75-87. 
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2.1 Personal freedom 
We already said that "freedom" is a central category for Ketteler. He meant personal 
freedom, the freedom to realise one self18. It is closely linked with the value of man as 
such: human freedom is a limited realization of God's unlimited freedom. Human 
freedom is a moral freedom: man must make decisions about his actions in 
conscience'9. But it is also a political and social freedom: man must have the compe-
tence to organize his own life, he must have the chance to "Selbstverwaltung"10. 
Human freedom is not an independent sovereignty. On the one hand, man must respect 
the inviolable rights of others (because they too are God's creatures), on the other, there 
is a limit to what man can do for himself21. 
22 Corporate freedom 
Personal freedom was for Ketteler the basis of his reflections on man, state, and 
society. He did not see this personal freedom in an individualistic way, but rather 
relational: man can realize his freedom only in relation to others. He found a double 
basis for this. 
There is a theological basis: the human being is totally dependent on God, and to 
remind one of this reality God has made the life of every person and its development 
dependent on relations with other persons and other creatures22. 
He also found a "natural law" basis. Man works naturally together with others to reach 
his destiny in the various aspects of his life, and to satisfy his basic needs. Human life 
unfolds along two lines: 
- the line of the development of one's own potential, 
- the line of giving help to others and receiving it from others. 
Both are essential aspects in being human; linking the two, the person can fully 
develop himself23. 
Rede vor der XXIII. Generalversammlung der Katholiken Deutschlands (on 1-9-1875) in: 
Schriften 14,525: "Die Freiheit ist vor Allem eine persönliche. Wahre Freiheit ist wesentlich freie 
Selbstbestimmung. Wo die freie Selbstbestimmung auf allen berechtigden Gebieten dem Manne 
entnommen ist, ist es Torheit, von Freiheit zu sprechen". Cf FAK 360: "Die Selbstbestimmung 
bildet das Wesen der Freiheit". 
19
 FAK 232-235. 
In literal translation "Selbstverwaltung" means self-government. "Selbstverwaltung" for the 
municipalities in Prussia during the whole of the 19th century was a political question and, for 
example in 1848, a liberal point of view, which Ketteler always supported: Mumbauer 1924,404; 
cf Birke 1971, 81 for his vision in 1870-1871. Ketteler describes "Selbstverwaltung" as: "Sie 
besteht also wesentlich darin, dass der Mensch in seinem persönlichen, politischen und socialen 
Leben, so weit er für sich selbst sorgen kann und nicht in die Rechte Anderer verletzend eingreift, 
die freieste Selbstbestimmung nach eigener Wahl gemesse, dass er also seine eigenen Angelegen-
heiten auch selbst zu verwalten befugt sei": FAK 246. 
21
 FAK 230,246-248 and 360; cf Rede (nt 18) 525. 
22
 FAK 326-327. 
23
 Arbeiterfrage 399^00 and 455-446. 
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Ketteier made it clear that he differed in this from the liberal opinion, which held as a 
principle that each person can only trust in himself, because it diminishes one's self-
esteem to have to depend on others. Competition then determines the relationships 
between people. He saw the wrong understanding of freedom in the absolute individua­
lization and unlimited competition as happened in the abolition of the guilds and other 
corporations, so that only the state and the individual remained. He believed it was a 
crime on the part of the liberals that they took away the protection of people through 
associations in favor of (individualistic) competition24. 
He posited that man is essentially linked to others if he wants to realize his destiny; 
social life and multiform relationships with persons are ordered in various associations 
and find therein their form. Man is not just a political being, but essentially he is also a 
religious, social, economic being, related to his family. Human nature, therefore, 
desires to give form and substance to these aspects of his being in certain associati­
ons
21
. He did not want to see man as an abstract individual, but looked at him in the 
context of these multiform associations which make it possible to realize his religious, 
moral, political, economic, and any other interest. Absolute, individualistic freedom 
without the possibility to unite with others to defend these interests, is not freedom at 
all. 
He saw two kind of associations, which find their examplars in nature: the mechanical 
and the organic. The "mechanical" association binds people only externally. Ketteler 
pointed here to the liberal idea about associations. There is no interiorized unity; the 
bond exists purely to protect passing interests. 
The "organic" bond is in nature of a higher quality, because there is an inner communi­
on of the parts: family, city, state, the nation, guilds are examples of this kind of bond. 
What binds people spiritually, morally, humanly is "organic"26. An association is more 
perfect if people can develop in greater freedom and find a stronger mutual bond: a 
constant bond between persons, who are developed in their personhood. He pointed 
out that there is a constant tension in an association between the tendency to come 
together and the tendency to strengthen the individuality, the particularity of the 
members27. 
2 4
 Arbeiterfrage 389-390 and 400-401 in a discussion with (the liberal) H. Schulze-Delitsch and 
(the socialist) F. Lasalle. Ketteler places himself here clearly with the Romantic and conservative 
trend as described in Π, 3.2. which is opposed to "atomatization" of society and fights against the 
postulate for equality; cf FAK 280-281. 
" Programm 214-215. 
2 6
 FAK 289-290 (cf nt 67) and Arbeiterfrage 401-402. One can ask whether Ketteler was aware 
of a distinction between literal, metaphoric, or analogous use of "organism": cf I, 3. 
2 7
 FAK 244-245. 
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23 The position of associations in state and society 
Ketteler rejected the absolutism of the state just as the catholic German authors did 
whose position we discussed in the previous chapter. From the starting point of 
"Selbstverwaltung" he opted for the greatest freedom possible for individual persons, 
families, municipalities, and corporations, so that they can take care of their own 
affairs. Only in the various associations can man develop his individuality: that is the 
nature of the human being. The individual person is not free if he cannot link up 
corporatively with other persons. Because it is part of man's freedom to form associati-
ons so that he can fully develop his individuality, there must be freedom for all 
associations, in which man must live, in order to satisfy his spiritual and material 
needs28. 
Ketteler saw the Middle Ages as the era of personal and corporate freedom, but a state 
and social order which could be based thereon had become impossible because of 
absolutism and the egoism of the orders. The previous organizational forms of labor 
had become impossible politically and juridically. Workers had become wage slaves 
and they had lost their independence2'. 
In more general terms he saw the many previous corporate organizations as one large 
social building with many rooms; following that image he said that now there was only 
one room and one roof, the state, which stood over against the masses. He accepted 
that the medieval model could not be copied anew, because it never had a chance to 
develop30. 
He was very careful to indicate new forms, and a reorganization of society in the 
corporate sense as he saw this. In this he consistently followed a line from organologi-
ca! conservatism: one cannot set up a priori a civil and social order; it must grow. It is 
not like putting together a "machine"; this is about the growth of "organisms". He 
wanted to see a social order where there is an organic relationship between the state 
and society, itself consisting of many corporate associations, but this could only grow 
laboriously31. 
2.4 The task of the state 
It is good to determine what Ketteler's line of thought is up to this point. Personal 
freedom is central to it, the "Selbstverwaltung". This is personally realized but not in 
an individualistic way. Man is a social being who needs to be united with others if he is 
to realize self. The most important frameworks are the family, the municipality, the 
Rede 1-9-1875 (see nt 18): "Die zweite Gefahr der Freiheit liegt in einer anderen gleichfalls weit 
verbreiteten Vorstellung, welche die persönliche Freiheit auf die Person, das Individuum 
beschränken will und die Wahrheit verkennt, dass der einzelne Mensch nicht frei ist, wenn er sich 
nicht corporativ mit Anderen vereinigen kann": Schriften 1,4,527. Cf Programm 207 and 214. 
79
 For Ketteler laborers were not free in his time: they were completely dependent because of their 
working for wages and, therefore, they were not capable of "Selbstverwaltung": Arbeiterfrage 
453-454 and Programm 236-237 and 240-241. 
30
 FAK 262 and 288-290; Programm 217. 
31
 Programm 218. 
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corporations, and the state. Within these frameworks man is free to determine his own 
destiny, that is the essence of political and social freedom. If this right is not present, 
there is no freedom, claimed Ketteler32. 
The state had for him an important but limited role. The value and the strength of 
authority in the state are not dependent on their unlimited extension: neither could 
health be measured by man's corpulence. Absolutism forgets that there is a (divine) 
basic law for all associations: there is a need for an interchange between authority (the 
bonding tendency in a association) and freedom. Absolutism corrupts: because it gives 
the state absolute power it denies the freedom of individual persons and the freedom of 
associations33. The authority of the state and individual freedom are not equal realities: 
the state is a means, it exists for man, in defense of his freedom and his rights34. These 
are not possible without a well ordered authority of the state. 
More concretely, the first and most important task of the state is to make sure there is 
justice through a judiciary, which is open to all, and through legislation, which should 
be expressive of unchangeable divine norms35. The political importance for Ketteler 
was that such an independent norm for legislation could be placed over against the 
state36; such a norm, and also the opinions of the "historical school of law", strengthe­
ned his opposition to parliaments, which function as "factories of legislation"37. In this 
situation political parties play a role, which do not represent the people in its multitude 
of orders and corporations, but which represent only partial interests and personal 
interests38. 
The second task of the state is the support of the temporal and immaterial interests of 
people, without interfering with their "Selbstverwaltung". The third task is the 
representation of the state itself in international politics39. 
3 2
 FAK 246. 
33
 FAK 248 and 252; Rede 1-9-1875, in: Schriften 1,4,525; cf Birke 1971,34. We can see here 
the conservative-romantic influence against absolute power: cf Π, 4,2. 
3 4
 Programm, 205: "Der Staat und die Staatsgewalt sind nie Selbstzweck, sondern nur Mittel für 
den Menschen zur Erhaltung und EntWickelung aller Kräfte, welche Gott ihm verliehen hat": cf 
Rede 1-9-1875, in: Schriften 1,4,525. 
35
 FAK 249-250 and 284-286. A parliamentary majority determines the law nowadays, he said 
in Ist das Gesetz das öffentliche Gewissen? (Schriften 1,1,740-741), and with that this majority 
determines also what is good, right, beautiful, and just; many believe that conscience should 
conform itself to that, while it should direct itself by a reality which is above and outside the law, 
a reality which comes from God. 
36
 Langner 1974/1,108-109. 
Ketteler believed that a consistent liberalism should leave people free as much as possible, to 
do what they are able to do. But the current centraliste version of liberalism led to "Vielregieren" 
and to "Fabrikation der Gesetze": FAK 282-283; a little further on in the same book (285) he said 
that laws are only products of people in the "Faktoren (=factories) der Gesetzgebung" for the 
liberalism of that moment 
38
 FAK 290; Birke 1971,35-36. 
39
 FAK 251. 
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In his political Programm (1873) he expanded the legislative task of the state to 
include legislation which must protect laborers against exploitation, and legislation 
which should enable laborers to defend themselves through corporations40. To make a 
correct judgment we must realize that Ketteler went through quite a development 
precisely in this area. One can show the break in the years between FAK and Arbeiter­
frage on the one hand, and Programm on the other. In the first two publications he 
still expected everything from the church and private initiative regarding the poverty of 
the laborers, and he still wanted to abolish capitalism. But after 1864 that changed: he 
accepted that the system which had developed in the meantime could not be simply 
overthrown and that, therefore, concrete social-political measures needed to be taken41 
by a house of representatives42. 
2.5 The relation church-state 
Ketteler is still recognized as the person with whom catholic social doctrine really 
began41. But the second question, which is given much attention in his social-political 
attitude, is the relation between church and state. He always fought against the state for 
the freedom of the church, but he also wanted to make it clear to those in power that 
they need the church, c.q. the faithful. Both these aspects need to be discussed. 
As to the freedom of the church he constantly argued that the relevant passages of the 
Prussian constitution of 1815 should become law in all German states and later in the 
German Empire44. According to that constitution freedom for the church means the 
Here he shows himself very clearly as part of what Camp calls a "third school" of catholics of 
the 19th century. The first school only wanted moral reformation to change the social problems, the 
second school was the (extreme) corporation-people who wanted a return to the (idealized) medieval 
society structure. The third school was ready to accept capitalism, but felt that corrections were 
needed. Leo ХШ will opt for that too: Camp 1969, 26-28; cf Г , 7. 
4 1
 Kliiber 1968, 212-213. Ketteler occupies in this an exceptional position among catholic 
politicians: Kuylaars 1957,318, nt 181. His change of heart is clear in Die Arbeiterbewegung und 
ihr Streben in Verhältnis zu Religion und Sittlichkeit, his homily at the Liebfrauenheide on 
25.7.1869 (Schriften 1,2, 406-428) and in his note for the Bishops' Conference in 1869 Fürsorge 
der Kirche für die Fabrikarbeiter, where he said: "Da also das ganze System nicht um zu stossen 
ist, so kommt es darauf an, es zu mildem (...) und auch die Arbeiter, so weit möglich, an dem, was 
an dem System gut ist, an dessen Segnungen Antheil zu nehmen zu lassen": Schriften 1,3,438. 
In Programm he opted also for a two-tiered system: a "Volkshaus" which should be chosen in 
a one man one vote system, and a Higher House, in which the corporations and the large landow-
ners are represented. Here too is a clear change from his former vision; Langner 1974/1,96 says, 
therefore, that Ketteler's thought is ever more democratic. 
43
 To see his special significance for the social doctrine of the church: Jedin 1971/1985,759-760; 
Pfiimer 1980,9; Birke 1987, 395. 
44
 FAK 315; Programm 192 and 202-204 (art 15): "Die evangelische und die römisch-katholische 
Kirche, so wie jede andere Religionsgesellschaft, ordnet und verwaltet ihre Angelegenheiten 
selbständig und bleibt im Besitz und Genuss der fur ihre Cultus-, Unterrichts- und Wohltätig-
keitszwecke bestimmten Anstalten, Stiftungen und Fonds". However, this law was never in force 
in the German states except in Prussia. After 1848 there was a constant resistance from the church 
against any form of control by the state: Lönne 1986,114-115 and Schatz 1986,100-104. 
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right of the church to arrange her own affairs according to her own principles, subject 
only to general state laws45. 
Ketteler gave four reasons to defend the freedom of the church: 
- the church has a divine mission and a divine foundation; 
- the church has rights which are historically determined and which cannot be 
affected or changed by accidental parliamentary majorities; 
• "Selbstverwaltung" must be accepted also for the church, in the same way as it 
functions for other associations; 
- the church is more than the clergy and all catholics want freedom for the church: the 
will of the people must be respected. 
Ketteler said expressly that the church is not independent of the state, because the state 
has its own rights, and the church wants to obey them from conviction46. The state was 
for Ketteler an institution given by God (with reference to Romans 13,1-8), which 
authoritatively takes care of well ordered relationships in society. The christian must 
obey the authority of the state47. He did not fight for a separation of church and state, 
because they should support each other and so fulfill God's intention for the welfare of 
people. The church should support the state in all possible ways and the state must help 
and protect the church. That is in its own interest too: it brings internal peace and 
strengthens the "moral power" of the people4". He still held this position after 1870 
when the Kulturkampf began, an important cause of which was that, for the German 
political leader Bismarck, catholics were not reliable allies for his nationalistic policy 
in the new, united German Empire49. 
3 The Organologica! Concept and the Church 
One can ask whether Ketteler applied his organologica! vision in the concrete form 
("Selbstverwaltung" for associations) from opportunistic motives. The concept in this 
45
 FAK 312 and 315. That was already his position in 1848: Birke 1971,20-21. 
46
 FAK 312-314. In these passages Ketteler pointed expressly to the freedom of the press and the 
freedom of association, of which (he liberals wanted to deprive the church. It may be good to point 
out that Ketteler's diocese of Mainz was not situated in Prussia (cf nt 44) but in the principality 
Hessen-Daimstadt, where the struggle for the freedom of the church was in full swing in the years 
between 1848 and 1870: Lönne 1986,130 and 151. 
47
 FAK 252-254. 
48
 FAK 325-326; Programm 258-262; cf Schatz 1986,123-125. Ketteler was not speaking only 
about the catholic church because the equality of the different christian denominations vis-a-vis the 
state was essential for him as appears from his Die Centrums-Fraktion auf dem ersten Deutschen 
Reichstage (original 1872) in: Schriften 1,4, 75-76. 
49
 On the Kulturkampf: Lönne 1986,151-171; Schatz 1986,123-140; Raab 1987. It was clear 
that Ketteler's party was opposed to a centralism, which wanted to make one state of Prussia and the 
24 other Gemían states: Die Centrumsfraktion (nt 48) shows that in many places (a_o. 72,78, 86, 
125-132). See for the "Zentrum" party: Morsey 1989. 
33 
form is an attack on the extension of state authority; he also wanted that for the sake of 
the church, which could obtain its corporate rights in this way. And he could hope that 
the power of the church in public life would be strengthened through its influence on 
corporations and individual persons. Such motives surely played a role and they fit in 
with the train of thought of catholics of that time: a christian renewal of society "from 
the bottom up"50. 
But in Vatican I51 it became clear how deeply the organologica! concept was rooted in 
his way of thinking. Ketteler had unsurmountable objections, for more reasons than 
one, against the way the Council wanted to proclaim the dogma of infallibility. 
Personally he believed in it52. But his objections were against a theory which excluded 
the cooperation of the whole church, in whatever concrete form, as an element, 
ecclesiologically necessary and essential for infallible papal statements53. He really did 
not want to discuss the texts about the primacy of the Pope -where the proposal of 
infallibility had its place- separately, but only in connection with the whole section 
about the church54. 
What were his motives? In his two addresses to the Council, in the last period, when 
the discussion was about primacy and infallibility, he gave the following reasons: 
- he was convinced that the theological proof for infallibility is not conclusive55; 
- it was not correct to make primacy into an absolutist power. The consequences of 
doing that should be clear in the political history of the absolute monarchy of the 
past century: arbitrary authority, not bound by laws, is always bad56; 
- the church is an organism too57. Rivinius summarized very well what this meant for 
Ketteler: that the Pope should always be seen "in cooperation, coordination, and 
collegiality" with the other bishops58. The church for Ketteler was a "divine 
x
 Kuylaars 1957, 82-89; Raedts 1990; Aubert 1991,7. 
Ketteler was one of the leaders of the minority in Vatican I: Birke 1987, 396; see for a short 
introduction into this question Rivinius 1976/2 or Schatz 1975. 
52
 Rivinius 1976/1, 353-354; but already in FAK 363 Ketteler shows that he sees as infallible 
magisterium in the church: the whole episcopate in communion with the successor of Peter. 
53
 Schatz 1975, 227. 
54
 Konzilsrede über den Primal des Papstes vom 23. Mai 1870: Schriften 13, 602-603. This 
discourse can also be found in Mansi Bd 52, kol 202-211. 
O.c, 605 and KonzUsrede über die Unfehlbarkeit des Papstes vom 25. Juni 1870, in: Schriften 
1,3, 648-649. This discourse can also be found in Mansi Bd 52, 890-899. 
56
 KonzUsrede 23-5-1870, 608-611 en 614-617. Many participants in the Council desired "die 
Unterstreichung des monolithischen Charakters der römischen Einheit der Kirche", emphasizing 
the principle of authority against the democratic attitude in secular politics and "eine zunehmend 
stärker zentralisierte Organisation der offensiven und defensiven Strategie der Kirche": Jedin 
1971/1985, 780; cf Pottmeyer 1975, 221-222 and 379. 
57 
Ketteler was influenced ecclesiologically by JA. Möhler (1796-1838) and F.A. Staudenmaier 
(1800-1856); they both see the church as an "organism": Rivinius 1976/1, 36 and 46. Cf Weite 
1965,392; Brunner 1979,100; Harskamp 1986, 326-458; Schoof 1992,18. To see the influence 
of Möhler and Staudenmaier on Ketteler: Fastenrath 1971,24-28. 
M
 Rivinius 1976/1, 249. 
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organism" in which no part is totally independent and in which the individual parts 
must be seen in their mutual relationship. Even though the Pope is the head, he 
cannot be seen apart from the other members, in especially the bishops; and he 
cannot exercise his teaching authority without their cooperation39. 
The core of his argument appears in the use of the noun "organism": the Pope 
cannot define something to be revealed truth, separated from the faith of the church, 
of which the bishops are the authorized witnesses. If that were possible, it would 
mean the destruction of the episcopal structure of the church60. 
The organological vision was so essential for Ketteler that, in this decisive moment, it 
stood as the basis for his thought61. 
4 Ketteler and the Principle of Subsidiarity 
When we compare this outline of Ketteler's ideas with the three basic ideas of the 
principle of subsidiarity62, we should not be surprised that he is counted as the first in 
the catholic tradition to have formulated, materially at least, the principle of subsidiari-
ty. His emphasis on personal freedom, on the freedom of the various associations and 
on "Selbstverwaltung", his ideas about the function of the state, are all one true defense 
of the content of the principle of subsidiarity. 
Let us now take a closer look at the two places where Ketteler formulated the principle 
almost explicitly. The two main lines of his thought run parallel: the organological 
concept and liberal ideas in the attention to the singularity and the independence of the 
individual person. 
4.1 Ketteler's description of the principle of subsidiarity 
"OFFENES SCHREIBEN KETTELERS ALS DEPUTIERTEN DER DEUTSCHEN NATIONALVER-
SAMMLUNG AN SEINE WÄHLER". 
Ketteler spoke only once in the Frankfurter Nationalversammlung, namely on Septem-
ber 18, 1848. But he spoke about a subject which was always important for him: who 
is responsible for the education people get? It was about this that Ketteler informed his 
constituents a day earlier63. 
He posited as his principle that parents have the inviolable right to determine how their 
children are to be raised and educated. The state, which must recognize the full 
39
 Konzilsrede 23-5-1870, in: Schriften 1,3. 600-601 and 606-Ï07 and 662-665(7). 
6 0
 Rivinius 1976/1, 258; ci Konzilsrede 20-5-1870, in: Schriften 1,3, 590-593. 
61
 Schatz 1975, 212-213, 215-216 and 222. Ketteler would ultimately accept the decision of 
Vatican I on infallibility, but in his explanation and defense of it, his original vision would 
continually shine through: Rivinius 1976/1, 355. 
62
 See the Introduction. 
6 3
 Mumbauer 1924, 396-407; the letter is dated September 17, 1848 and is addressed to his 
deputy in the F. N. 
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freedom of conscience and religion64, has no other right than to demand from the 
citizenry a certain standard of education, and it can demand from the parents they they 
provide this for their children. 
That is why Ketteler made his stand: the state must create general freedom of education 
("Lehr- und Lernfreiheit") so that parents have the posssibility to let their children be 
educated according to their own principles. That safeguards the right of rich parents. 
But poor parents were forced to send their children to the "Volksschule". But they too 
are responsible for the formation of their children and they do not want to hand that 
responsibility over to the state. Therefore, the state must make it possible for them to 
claim their rights in the education of their children, and the state can only do that if it 
hands over to the municipality the most important institution of education, the public 
school. The majority of the fathers there determines the spirit of the education; and it 
can be a christian education with a link to the church. 
The state has rights in such a "Volksschule". It can oblige the local government to set 
up a sufficient number of such schools and it can determine the standard. In this way 
the state does not enter where the rights of the parents must prevail, and still assures 
that its goals are reached. 
Ketteler started from the principle that each individual person should be allowed to 
exercise his own rights, if he is capable of doing so. He did not want to paint the state 
as a "machine", he said, but "as a living organism". 
"Every lower member moves freely in his own sphere and enjoys the right of the freest 
'Selbstbestimmung' and 'Selbstregierung'. Only when the lower member is no longer 
able to reach his goals, or can no longer defend himself against a threatening danger to 
his development, the higher organ begins to function: the lower organ must then cede 
to the higher that which the higher organ needs so that it can reach its goal." What 
family and municipality can take care of themselves in achieving their natural goal, 
should be left to their free "Selbstregierung"**. 
This too was a constant demand: FAK 333-342 and Programm 208-213. 
65
 Mumbauer 1924,403: "Meine Ansicht geht dagegen von dem einfachen Satze aus, dass jedes 
Individuum seine Rechte, die es selbst ausüben kann, auch selbst ausüben darf. Der Staat ist mir 
keine Maschine, sondern ein lebendiger Organismus mit lebendigen Glieder, in dem jedes Glied sein 
eigenes Recht, seine eigene Funktion hat, sein eigenes freies Leben gestaltet Solche Glieder sind 
mir das Individuum, die Familie, die Gemeinde usw. Jedes niedere Glied bewegt sich frei in seiner 
Sphäre und geniesst das Recht der freiesten Selbstbestimmung und Selbstregierung. Erst wo das 
niedere Glied dieses Organismus nicht mehr imstande ist, seine Zwecke selbst zu erreichen, oder 
die seine Entwicklung drohende Gefahr selbst abzuwenden, tritt das höhere Glied für es in 
Wirksamkeit, dem es dann von seiner Freiheit und Selbstbestimmung das abgeben muss, was dieses, 
das höhere Glied, zur Erreichung seines Zweckes bedarf. Was daher die Familie, die Gemeinde zur 
Erreichung ihres natürlichen Zweckes sich selbst gewähren kann, muss ihr zur freien 
Selbstregierung überlassen bleiben". 
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The principle thus leads Ketteler to his conclusion that the public school should be 
under the responsibility of the government of the municipality because it can take care 
of it, because they must pay for it, and because its own children are educated in it6*. 
In this way of reasoning all three basic elements of the principle of subsidiarity are 
mentioned. 
FREIHET, AUTORITÄT UND KIRCHE 
ш this book he formulates concisely the content of the principle of subsidiarity. Central 
is the activity of the individual member, and only when the individual member is no 
longer able to fulfill his task is there a role for the higher organ: "The activity of the 
individual member stops where the help of a higher organ is needed to achieve one's 
goal". Corporations and orders should be allowed to manage their own affairs freely, 
until it is obvious that they can no longer do so67. 
Here too it is remarkable that Ketteler emphasized the freedom of the "members" in the 
organism. In an earlier passage in FAK he concretized this in relation to the task of the 
state to support the interests of the people, without interfering with their "Selbstverwal­
tung"". 
4.2 Two more remarkable texts 
Ketteler did not use the expression "principle of subsidiarity" in the two texts which we 
discussed or even a word which could be seen as being related. He did so in (at least) 
two other texts, even if the (full) content of the principle of subsidiarity was not 
intended. 
In a passage about people who are unable to work*9 he said that many matters of value 
have fallen into the hands of the state because of "secularization". He called this 
The F. N. decided finally that educational institutions would be under the supervision of the 
state, except religious education where the clergy (it does not say "the church"!) has the right of 
supervision. For the rest, the F. N. accepted freedom of religion and a certain autonomy for the 
churches: Jedin 1971/1985,496-497, Lönne 1986,112-114. 
6 7
 FAK 290: "Der natürliche Organismus wirkt innerlich, lebendig; er schliesst zwischen den 
Theuen eine Lebensgemeinschaft, ein inneres Lebensband; die so gestalteten Organe schliessen sich 
wieder höheren Organismen lebendig an bis zur höchsten organischen Form, die alle Theile in dem 
Einen Individuum zusammenfasst So lebt in ihm Alles und bewegt sich durch ein inneres 
Lebensprincip, in ihm ist Alles freie Selbstbestimmung, freie Selbstregierung, mit der das einzelne 
Glied sich an das Ganze hingibt. Die Thätigkeit des Einzelgliedes hört nur da auf, wo es zur 
Erreichung seines Zweckes der Hülfe des höheren Gliedes bedarf. Es scheint mir nun, das die auf 
Stande und Corporationen gegründete Verfassung diesem Vorbilde mehr entspricht und wahre 
Selbstregierung wie wahre Vertretung mehr ermöglicht. Die Stände und Corporationen scheinen 
mir die Eigenschaft lebendiger Körper und aus der Natur der Dinge gestalteter Organismen zu 
haben,...". 
68
 FAK 251 ; cf nr 2.4 above. 
Arbeiterfrage 376: "Subsidiair haben aber an dem Eigentum der Kirche die Armen ein Recht; 
das Kirchengut ist nach dem canonischen Rechte und nach dem Zwecke der Stiften zugleich auch 
Armengut". 
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robbery, but the church did not insist on its rights to these matters. And then he used 
"subsidiary" in the meaning it still has today of standing for someone else: "Subsidiarily 
the poor have the right of ownership of the goods of the church"70. The state should use 
the yield of the "secularized" possessions for the care of the poor. 
In his Programm in 1873 he posited that the state may supervise education and can 
enforce the duty to go to school. He then said that the rights of parents in relation to 
their children are very extensive, but not unlimited. Parents have duties too in relation 
to their children and if they do not fulfill those, as happens in the poorest sections of 
society, state and church can claim a kind of guardianship. That would then be a 
"subsidiary" right, which the state should never abuse because it would then fall into 
absolutism". "Subsidiary" has again the meaning "standing for someone else", certainly 
where it is linked with guardianship. 
But in this case he gave the third basic principle: if a smaller community cannot fulfill 
its task, a larger community should take its responsibility. 
A real and full formulation of the principle of subsidiarity cannot be found in this 
political program. What we do find is a constant theme of freedom for "Selbstverwal-
tung" for the individual German states, the churches, and individual persons, for 
denominational education; in general freedom for the still existing corporations 
(church, family, city, orders) which, as organic associations, are the building blocks for 
the future structure of society. This is Ketteler's option in opposition to Bismarck's72. 
5 Conclusion 
I have given an extensive review of Ketteler's vision on the individual person, on 
associations, on society, and on the state, because I wanted to show how his organolo-
gica! vision on society looks at the start of the modern social doctrine of the church and 
how it is here that the principle of subsidiarity makes its appearance. 
One could ask the question whether Ketteler in his time was the only one who formu-
lated the principle of subsidiarity materially. That is not the case. One can find it also in 
the writings of the catholic politician F J. von Buss (1803-1878). Like Ketteler he 
strove to create a corporative social order and he too did not want a return to the 
Middles Ages73. Buss recognized the value of the individual and created space for 
With regard to this passage the editors of this part 1,1 of the Sämtliche Werke say that 
"subsidiär" means "ergänzend helfend, wo die Mittel des einzelnen oder der kleinen Gruppe nicht 
ausreichen", which interpretation is too much influenced by QA nr 80. The rather more juridical 
context leads one to see here a more purely juridical meaning: cf V, nt 80. 
1
 Programm 208-211, especially "Dagegen ist es harter Absolutismus, eine wahre Geistes- und 
Seelenknechtung, wenn der Staat dieses, ich möchte sagen, subsidiäre Recht misbraucht". 
72
 O.e., 218-219; cf Lönne 1986,153-154 about the goals of Ketteler's party, the "Zentrum". 
73
 LeBveld 1965,195-196 and 204-208. The linking of Romantic and liberal thought can be seen 
also in Buss: Kuylaars 1957, 92 and Leliveld 1965, 202. 
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individual freedom in the area of politics, society, and the economy. In this context he 
said "that the individual person, and not the state, must take responsibility for those 
things he can do; and that, what an association of people can do, must be done, not by 
the state, but by that association"74. 
Ketteler's thought starts with the organologica! concept, not only according to his own 
words, but also in a number of aspects of its characteristics75. He was convinced of the 
importance of mutual bonding in associations, in society, and in the state. In them 
people realize their potential in relation with one another. He rejected a vision where 
people are only competing with one another as purely independent agents: there is a 
mutual constitutive relationship. Many associations should again provide structure to 
society and the state, as opposed to the situation where there are no associations 
between the individual person and the state, but where they are opposed without any 
go-between. 
At the end of chapter I pointed to the danger of centralism, which constantly threatens 
any organologica! vision. Isensee remarks rightly that the organological concept does 
not necessarily imply the principle of subsidiarity. Therefore I pointed out the impor-
tance of Kant's idea of organism, which can obviate the centralistic danger of the 
organological concept76. For the people who passed before us in chapter II we can say 
that their organological concept, influenced by Kant, was directed against the same 
opposition as Ketteler's: social monism and governmental centralism77. Ketteler is 
surely in the tradition of the conservative-Romantic critique of state and society as I 
described it. His organological concept tends to be anti-centralistic just as the concept 
of his predecessors. 
The principle of subsidiarity is unthinkable for Isensee and Kaufmann without modern 
individualism78. They state that the principle of subsidiarity is the result of the 
organological concept and of the liberal political doctrine. We find a "historical" proof 
in Ketteler and that is different from what Isensee indicates79. 
Langner showed convincingly how Ketteler has been influenced by liberalism. The 
clearest example of this is his idea of "Selbstverwaltung". Ketteler wanted to do justice 
to the individual person as such and that is the new element he brought into the catholic 
Leliveld 1965, 202-205 and Kuylaars 1957,93: "Dass, was der Einzelne besorgen kann, soll 
auch er und nicht der Staat besorgen, und das, was ein Verein von Menschen zu beschaffen mag, 
soll nicht der Staat, sondern ein solcher Verein der Betheiligten bewirken". This is a quote from: 
FJ.von Buss, Die Aufgaben des katholischen Theils leulscher Nation in der Gegenwart oder der 
katholischen Verein Teutschlands, Regensburg 1851 (Leliveld mentions p. 15; Kuylaars p.5). 
75
 CT 1,6. 
76
 CTL 5. 
77
 CT11,4.2. 
78
 Isensee 1968,25; cf nt 3. Herzog 1987, 3564 and Listi 1987, 3374 (appealing to Isensee) also 
underline these liberal roots of the principle of subsidiarity. 
He refers to Rerum novarum 26 and 41, where Leo XIII speaks about the task of the state. 
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thought of the time. This new thought was not given to him by his immediate catholic 
predecessors, but was found in the liberal way of thinking as he knew it from 1848 and 
before: that alone was for him true liberalism80. 
This conviction became a foundation for his organologica! vision: the individual 
person, who is bound to "Selbstverwaltung" and who should be capable of it, realizes 
himself only in the context of various associations. The position of the individual 
person, the role of the associations, and the task of the state: in his vision of their 
mutual relationship he brought out the principle of subsidiarity. He was indeed the first 
to formulate it in 1848! 
And in this way, Isensee's and Kaufmann's hypothesis is affirmed in Ketteler (and 
Buss). The question if whether that also happens later on with the formal formulation 
of the principle of subsidiarity will be studied further below". 
80
 Ketteler made the following distinction more than once: "Ein zweiter Unterschied der früheren 
und die jetzigen Liberalen besteht darin, dass Jene im Kampfe gegen die Polizeistaat nach der 
Freiheit für Allen strebten, während Diese die Freiheit überall da mit frecher Stime bekämpften, wo 
das christliche Volk sich dem unfehlbaren liberalen Systeme nicht unterwerfen will", in: 
Liberalismus, Sozialismus und Christentum (Rede d.d. 14-9-1871): Schriften 1,4, 21-34, here 24. 
In the same way he expressed himself in Wie ist Bismarck ein Feind der Kirche geworden! in : 
Birke 1971,110-114; cf Langner 1974/1,90 and 93-94. He already made some distinction in FAK 
280-284 where he questioned why liberalism at that moment did not recognize the principles of 
"Selbstverwaltung" and "Selbstbestimmung" and why it is in favor of a centraliste vision of the 
state. Birke (p.27) points out that Ketteler distanced himself from the liberals also because they 
became anti-clerical and rejected agreements between church and state. 
81
 It is remarkable that Kliiber 1968,220 says that Ketteler's choice for the principle of subsidiarity 
was not inspired by liberalism but developed in his fight against it Such a point of view is untenable 
even though it is correct in as far as Ketteler rejected a certain form of liberalism (cf nt 80). A little 
further on Kliiber leaves it open whether "in der geistesgeschichtlichen Genesis des Subsidiari-
tatsprinzip auch liberalistische Motive wirksam sind". 
40 
IV Leo XIII: the First Steps towards the Principle of 
Subsidiarity 
1 The Historical Setting of Rerum Novarum1 
Apart from Ketteler there were more catholics in the 19th century who were intensely 
involved in the social problems of the time. A network slowly developed in which the 
"Union de Ftibourg" (1884-1891) had a central position. There were real disagree­
ments in these circles about the question whether or to what extent state intervention in 
the socio-economic reality could be countenanced2. 
Leo seems to have felt that he should take a position in this question and he instructed 
M. Liberatore sj to write a first draft for an encyclical. It was presented on July 5, 
1
 In this chapter we refer to the following encyclicals of Leo ХШ: 
- Quod apostolici (+ pag): Quod apostolici muneris (d.d. 28-12-1878), in: S.DJV. Leonis Papae 
XIII Allocutiones, Epislolae, Constilutiones, Aliaque Acta Praecipua Volumen I, Brugis et 
Insulis 1887,46-55. 
- Diuturnum (+ pag): Diuturnum (d.d. 20-6-1881), in: o.e., 210-222. 
- Humanuni genus (+ pag): Humanum genus (d.d. 20-4-1884), in: SD.N. Leonis etc. Volumen 
Π, 1887,56-75. 
- Immortale Dei(+ pag): Immortale Dei (d.d.l-U-1885), in: o.e., 146-186. 
- Libertas (+ pag): Libertas praestantissimum (d.d. 20-6-1888), in: SD.N. Leonis etc. Volumen 
Ш, 1903,96-120. 
- Sapientiae (+ pag): Sapientiae christianae (d.d. 10-1-1890), in: SD.N. Leonis etc. Volumen Г , 
1904, 6-27. 
- Rerum no varum /RN (+ nr!): Rerum novarum (d.d. 15-5-1891), in: Gundlach 1931,2-63. 
- Au milieu (+· pag): Au milieu des sollicitudes (d.d. 16-2-1892), in: SD.N. Leonis etc. Volumen 
V, 1908,36-51. 
- Satis (+ pag): Satis cognitum (d.d. 29-6-1896), in: SD.N. Leonis etc. Volumen VT, 1900,156-
189. 
- Graves (+ pag): Graves de communi re (d.d. 18-1-1901), in: SD.N. Leonis etc. Volumen Ш, 
1910, 3-14. 
2
 See for an overview of the activities and the persons of the Union: Sorgenfrei 1970, 57-63; and 
Kliiber 1968, 269-270. Ketteler's ideas are brought into the Union by K. zu Löwenstein (1834-
1921): Sorgenfrei 1970, 22. See for the immediate history leading up to Rerum novarum also: 
Kuylaars 1957,100-105 and Aubert 1991. 
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18903. After several re-writings Rerum novarum (RN) was published on May 15, 
1891 : the encyclical is not so much the beginning of the social doctrine of the church, 
but rather a summary of what had been developed among catholics in views on modem 
society4. It is one in a series of encyclicals by Leo about political, social, and economic 
questions5. Socialism and communism had already been condemned but the growing 
following for these doctrines was surely for Leo also a reason to write Rerum 
novarum6. 
It shows a change in Leo's thinking so that we find precisely in this encyclical ideas 
similar to the vision which is developed later in Quadragesimo Anno (nr. 79) and 
which open the way for the principle of subsidiarity. Our research into the first steps 
towards the principle of subsidiarity is not limited to Rerum novarum but covers 
several encyclical letters which together form the beginning of a systematic way of 
speaking by papal authority about modem social problems. They are part of Leo's more 
general program to try to re-root the church in social life and to make the church a 
credible and respected partner in the dialog with the state7. 
2 Vision of the State 
The role of the state in the socio-economic sphere is an important issue in Rerum 
novarum. Leo has a basic conviction that the state must care for the bonum commune*: 
he was quite consistent in this (Diuturnum 212, RN 26 and 28, Au Milieu 42). A 
societas cannot survive unless there is an authority which organizes the individual 
parts in such a way that unity can grow out of diversity, an authority which directs all 
aspirations in a lawful and orderly way towards the bonum commune: there is a need 
for a strong authority in order to reach the common goal (Diuturnum 213 and Immor-
tale Dei 147). What did Leo mean when he spook about bonum commune91! He did not 
give a definition but one can find elements for one in several places: morality, a well-
' Sorgenfrei 1970, 74-79. His research is mainly a systematic elaboration of Antonazzi 1957, a 
critical edition of successive editings of RN including the Muai text 
4
 Camp 1969,80; it is remarkable that the sharp rejection of capitalism by the Union de Fribourg, 
which saw individualism and egoism as its basis, disappeared little by little from the successive 
editings of RN: Sorgenfrei 1970,33 and 61. 
1
 The questions which Leo treated in these encyclicals were for him matters of daily policy: Maier 
1983, 72. 
6
 Camp 1969,12 and 48-51; cf Jedin II, 206. 
'Eupen 1989, 24 and 43; Maier 1965, 70-72; Camp 1969,13; Jedin II, 244; Pfiirmer 1980,10. 
' "Bonum commune" is a traditional and central concept from scholastic philosophy of law, from 
the thinking of church law, and catholic moral theology. Waif 1982/2,435 describes it as "what is 
necessary or useful for all members of the community, which can be preserved or developed only 
by means of the community". The concept is further developed in neo-scholastic philosophy: see 
V,2andK, 1. 
9
 Leo enjoyed a "breit entfaltende Formulierungskunst" according to Köhler and I take for granted 
that bonum commune is indicated also as "communis utilitas" in Diuturnum 212, as "publica salus" 
in Immortale Dei 165 and RN 28: Jedin П, 9, note 10. See also note 40. 
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ordered family life, maintaining the obligations of religion, justice so that people do not 
infringe on other people's rights or on private property, taxes which are not oppressive 
and divide the burden fairly, promotion of trade and industry, a flourishing agriculture, 
possession of material goods needed for a virtuous life, healthy citizens who can 
support and protect the state, public order and security (RN 26-29 and Sapientiae 19). 
In Leo's vision the bonum commune is about fairly general matters. 
This list shows that bonum commune and the duty of the state move in the material and 
the economic as well as in the immaterial sphere. Reflections on the latter offered Leo 
the possibility to condemn modem (liberal) ideas about human freedom, about the 
foundation of the state, about law, and about church-state relationships. He predicted 
that modem secularized society would ruin itself because it refused to accept natural 
law. 
It would lead us too far afield to follow Leo in all his ideas but we want to make an 
exception in looking at what he saw as the source of the state's authority because the 
state occupies a very important place and so does the bonum commune with respect to 
the individual person. 
Leo's theory about the foundation of the state's authority can be summarized in this 
way. Independent of any form of government10, it has a divine origin: Scripture and 
reason teach us that. For Scripture he pointed to texts from Wisdom literature (Pro­
verbs 8, 15-16; Eccl. 18,14; Wisdom 6, 3-4), texts from John (19,11) and a text from 
Paul (Rom. 13) which is a text he quoted in other encyclicals too. He also refered to the 
Fathers. 
The natural law argument states that a person must live in community according to 
God's law and that authority must bring unity in such a community. Authority is ipso 
facto linked to God's will. Authority should be able to force people to obey. But only 
God has the power to put man's free will under strict obligation. If a human being 
exercises such power he can only do so because he has received it from God. Therefo­
re, all who oppose the authority of the state oppose God. 
Giving civil authority another origin, e.g., the social contract, gives it a wrong and too 
weak a foundation. Leo's foundation for the state's authority makes it so strong that it no 
longer rests only on the exercise of power, but it can lay a claim to man's sense of duty 
and his affection, his devotion, and his love (Diuturnum 212-215 and 219-220). 
Leo's vision comes back again in later encyclicals in a different form, but the principles 
are the same: the authority of the state is "causa secunda" and the actual bearers of that 
authority are an image of God's power and providence". 
10
 to Diuturnum Leo still saw patriarchal monarchy as the ideal form of government: Jedin Π, 243-
244. Later on he accepted democracy as a fact: o.e., 252 and Minnerath 1982, 52. 
11
 Immortale Dei 147-148 and Au Milieu 44-45: in this encyclical Leo maintained this attitude 
even in relation to the French government, which advocated an anti-church policy: Maier 1962, 
120-125. 
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Leo gave the authority of the state an unassailable position, if possible even reinforced 
or padded by his thinking about legislation. 
Tlie state promotes the "bonum commune" through legislation: "a law is a prescription 
of right reason, promulgated by lawful authority because of the "bonum commune"11. 
Legislation must be directly based on natural law or derived from it in view of actual 
and concrete circumstances. The obligatory character of natural law points to God: 
natural law is compulsory in a way which no law given only by human beings can ever 
be. Natural law is rooted by God in the human spirit". 
The position of authority and the main points of legislation can both be reduced to God 
himself. The question is whether there is still place for human freedom if authority and 
its legislation is given such a pre-eminent place. 
First of all, Leo denied the existence of a number of freedoms which modem man sees 
as self-evident, such as freedom of speech and freedom of the press (Immortale Dei 
159 and 161). Almost any resistance to authority was unlawful to him; but that follows 
then almost self-evidently14. The present day vision of freedom which focuses on 
creative self development, on setting one's own goals in life, is in contradiction to Leo's 
vision on freedom. For him freedom is the ability to choose the means which will lead 
to one's goal: the good (Libertas 98). Freedom is directed towards that good, towards 
the true; and these concepts have their own immutable content (Immortale Dei 159). 
Human freedom carries with it a risk because a person can be mistaken in his vision of 
what is good and true. Therefore, freedom is in need of help, namely the law which can 
show the way. And so Leo concludes that true freedom is to live according to the law 
and right reason, giving each person the possibility to determine what is good and true 
(Libertas 99-104). And the church will ultimately safeguard freedom because the 
church is the infallible guardian of all truth, natural and supernatural (Libertas 112-113 
and 119). What slowly emerges is a vision of a society in which freedom as we know it 
can hardly exist, a society where one's life finds itself within definite forms and 
obligations in which everyone must make above all a contribution to the common 
welfare. This vision is summarized in this text: 
"In the form of government about which we spoke earlier, the divine and the human 
are indeed ordered and divided in a correct way, the rights of the citizenry are 
safeguarded and are under control of divine, natural, and human laws; the duties of 
all are clearly stated with wisdom and their observance is duly guaranteed. Everyone 
knows that on one's uncertain and difficult journey to the eternal fatherland there are 
leaders whom one can follow safely and who will help one to reach the goal. One 
knows that there are other leaders to give the security, the material welfare and other 
goods, which are the result of one's life in a community, and to safeguard them" 
(Immortale Dei 153-154). 
u
 Sapientiae 9: "Non est lex, nisi iussio rectae ratíonis a potestate legitima in bonum commune 
periata"; cf RN 26, first sentence. 
" Libertas 100-102. Cf St Thomas' S. Th. Ι-Π, q. 91, a 2. Leo did not quote this. 
14
 Schilling 1925,92-94 summarizes Leo's position; this book is still very useful for a first quick 
overview of Leo's ideas. 
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Leo saw the citizen primarily as subject and the duty of the citizen is to be docile 
towards the government and the law (Libertas 110). This seems to originate especially 
in his rejection of Rousseau's ideas and his rejection of the opinion that public authority 
originates with the people11. 
Is there still a possibility of a point of contact for the three basic ideas of the principle 
of subsidiarity, of which a limited role for the state is so important an element16, if one 
characterizes Leo's "general view of the public power" as "the master standing over 
subjects who are merely subjects, as the quasi-father set over the quasi-family and its 
quasi-children"17 ? 
3 Vision of Private Interest 
However important the bonum commune is as the goal of a state and legislation which 
is based on this, it cannot be the ultimate goal of man. That ultimate goal towards 
which all human endeavor must be directed, lies beyond this (short and transitory) life 
and finds its realization in heaven. The "bonum commune" may not only not frustrate 
the reaching of this goal, but must positively promote it (Immortale Dei 149-150). 
Society has been instituted by God so that man can find in it what he needs and what he 
cannot obtain as an individual (Libertas 109). In short: "Society originates in human 
nature, but not so that man would find his ultimate goal therein, but so that man in and 
through society can find the useful means to perfect self'1". 
Also in Rerum Novarum, namely in the passages about private property, it is clear that 
the individual is not absorbed in the "bonum commune". Private property is a natural 
right especially as land ownership. Every person has a natural right to security, and 
private property is the basis for ongoing satisfaction of needs. The state does not have 
to provide that satisfaction because "man exists prior to the state" and, therefore, he 
should provide for himself (RN 5). The first duty of the state is to protect private 
property because the right to it is inviolable (RN 30 and 35). Private property is 
15
 Murray 1954,22-24 summarizes Leo's position about the authority of the state thus: " 1 there is 
such a thing as political authority, and it derives ultimately from God, the author of nature, although 
the people mediate this authority to the actual ruler; 2 since the political relationship is grounded in 
nature, there is by nature a distinction between ruler and ruled; 3 therefore the rights of the ruler and 
the duties of the ruled ultimately rest upon a religious sanction; 4 the ruler ought to imitate the 
manner of the divine governance, since his authority ultimately comes from God; and the ruled in 
tum ought to be subject to the authority of the ruler, since this subjection is a duty owed ultimately 
to God himself. And Curran 1992, IOS says: "Leo's understanding of the political order was 
authoritarian or at best paternalistic". 
" See Introduction. 
17
 Murray 1953/1, 24. 
" Sapientiae 6: "Non enim ob hanc causam genuit natura societatem ut ipsam homo sequeretur 
tamquam finem, sed ut in ea et per earn adiumenta ad perfectionem sui apta reperirei". 
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necessary and the basis in the search to improve the lot of people is the inviolable 
protection of private property". 
In these passages about property and in the way the right to it is based, Leo voiced the 
opinion of moral theology of the day: that is one of Beutter's conclusions from his 
research about the way moral theology speaks about property in the 19th century20. 
He points to a way of thinking in the West which became a dominant feature of the 
Enlightenment, of the political and economic liberalism, and of the French Revolution; 
it led to the formulation of basic human rights21. This tendency sought to liberate 
individuals from structures of power which dominated man in politics (in absolutism) 
and economics (mercantilism). The person in his uniqueness then becomes the pivot 
("Angelpunkt") in the way one looks at problems. Moral theology from the middle of 
the 19th century reflected, in its way of looking at property, the bourgeois world view 
of personal freedom and initiative and also of the attempt to achieve economic and 
social self determination. This bourgeois movement was the socially dominant force 
and saw every attempt to bring about change in the existing proprietary relationships as 
an attack on society and its foundations. Moral theologians adopted the individualistic 
traits of that vision of property22. 
To say that the right to private property is a natural right is relatively new in Western 
thought; de Sousberghe proved this. Locke stated it in his 'Treatise on Civil Govern­
ment" (1689) and based it on the right to the fruits of one's own labor. In the course of 
the 18th century it was formulated as man's right to determine his own destiny by his 
own work and initiative, as his right to provide for his needs by his labor and the stable 
fruits of his labor, property. The right to the fruits of one's labor was already accepted 
in the Middle Ages but in a juridical and political sense in opposition to the extreme 
fiscal claims of the state. Riding on the wave of individualistic thought which was also 
19
 RN 12 quoting S Th Π-Π, q.66, a 2. But St. Thomas did not speak about private property as an 
inviolable right: he rather posed the question whether private property can be allowed. It is better, 
he said in "Respondeo", because there is more care for things and there is less quarrelling. As to the 
use of things he then said: "et quantum ad hoc non debet homo habere res exteriores ut proprias, 
sed ut communes, ut scilicet de focili aliquis eas communicet in necessitate aliorum" (!); cf 
Sousberghe 1950, 585 and 601 ff. Schilling 1925, 123-124 must try to wriggle his way out when 
wants ID show that the opinions of Leo and St. Thomas are the same; Habiger 1990, 22-28 and 343-
346 speaks about a political-necessary difference in emphasis only regarding socialism. This does 
not seem to be tenable; and so Weber 1982,77-78 posits that Leo differs from St Thomas' point 
of view because of his rejection of socialism. 
20
 Beutter 1971, 152: 'Rerum novarum ist eine konzentrierte Spiegelung der katholischen 
Eigentumsbegründung jener Zeit". 
21
 These basic rights are the fundamental rights of the individual vis-a-vis the state classically 
formulated in the French Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen of 1789: its content 
slowly developed in Western history: Wissen 1987,74-77. 
22
 Beutter 1971,96-97 and 143-145. 
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opposed to the power structures mentioned, it now received its fundamental character 
and was formulated as one of the basic human rights, as e.g. in France23. 
L. Taparelli d'Azeglio sj (1793-1862) adopted it in his book about natural law24. In this 
way he brought it about that the individualistic idea of private property found its way 
into moral theology25. This individualistic way of thinking can be seen also in his 
disciple and colleague M. Liberatore sj (1810-1892)26 and in T. Zigliara op (1833-
1893)27 who both worked on the text of Rerum novarum. 
Liberatore had a lot of influence on the content of the encyclical2" and it is, therefore, 
important to study his thought. In his ideas about property and freedom of association 
Liberatore formulated the principle on which these rights are based: man as man has 
certain rights which are not derived from the state because they belong to man by 
nature and they existed before the state came into being29. Sorgenfrei underlines why 
Liberatore is so grounded in the liberal tradition, which sees man as an individual in 
the formula "prior to the state", in sharp contrast to the "animal sociale et politicum" of 
the aristotelian-thomistic tradition30. Labor has for him a personal character and it 
should benefit the working person and his family31. The state must safeguard the 
"bonum commune" and can interfere in the economic order concerning conditions and 
23
 Sousberghe 1950,587-592, especially 588: "L'argument du droit au produit du travail reste, dans 
la littérature médiévale, un argument de juriste, affirmation du droit de l'individu sur ses biens en 
face des prétentions fiscales du pouvoir politique. Aucune philosophie ne vient en faire un argument 
de droit naturel, capable de décider du problème de structure de la société". 
24
 O.e., 593-594; it shows Taparellis' way of thinking that he posits in that book: "Les hommes sont 
entre eux, par la nature humaine, réciproquement indépendants,.... " (italics in the original text; 
AL·.): Taparelli 1863, nr. 109 (p 119) and idem nr. 129 (p 141). See for Taparelli himself: 
Zimmermann 1981,26 and G. Dianin, Luigi Taparelli D'Azeglio: Die Bedeutung seines Denkes für 
die Moraltheologie, in: ERirger (Hrgb), Ethische Theorie praktisch. Der fundamental-moraltheo-
logische Ansatz in sozialethischer Entfallung, Münster 1991 (Schriften des Instituts für christliche 
Sozialwissenschaften der westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Bd 23). 
* Beutler 1971, 97; Sorgenfrei 1970,118; Utz 1980, 30-31. 
MBeutterl971,97andl04. 
27
 Sorgenfrei 1970,82,127-130,138 and 186-187; especially 142, nt 122, where it is clear that 
Ziguari succeeds in making of St Thomas' quote, taken in nt 19, only a duty of christian charity to 
give alms of what one has in superfluity! Cf Weber 1982,77. 
и
 Sorgenfrei 1970,88-94 and Jedin П, 205; cf Antonazzi 1957,86-96 where it is clear that the text 
of RN 5-12, dealing with private property, has hardly changed in the editing process after 
Liberatore's corrections of Zigliara'sadaptation; this text shows much similarity with what we read 
in Liberatore 1889,154-158. We already mentioned the typical interpretation of S Th Π Π, q.66, a 
2, which we find also in RN 12 and 19 (Sorgenfrei 1970,149): cf nt 19. 
29
 Liberatore 1889,181-182. 
30
 Sorgenfrei 1970, 136; cf St. Thomas, De regimine principum, 1,1: "Naturaliter est autem 
nomini, ut sit animal sociale et politicum, in multitudine vivens"; cf Klüber 153-154. 
11
 Liberatore 1889,263: "Π lavoro è, senz'alcun dubbio, funzione individuale, non sociale;...". 
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situations of labor and when the economic order negatively interferes with the political 
aims32. 
Still, is it strange to read how he reacts against liberalism and individualistic 
capitalism" while he absolutizes one of its roots: the natural right to private property34. 
The passages on property in Rerum novarum are clearly influenced by liberalizing and 
individualizing thought35 and the same is true for the passages about labor. Therefore, 
Leo posited that the fruits of labor belong to the worker. Material satisfaction of needs 
is clearly not a task for the state because man exists prior to the state and, therefore, by 
nature he has a right to a secure existence, and the material and lasting condition for 
that is private property (RN 4-8, and 35). 
I believe this proves sufficiently that the bonum commune, however important it is, 
cannot be for Leo the goal to which private interest is basically subject: it is in service 
of the development of the individual person. So it is clear that the first basic idea of the 
principle of subsidiarity, namely the human person as the quid pro quo of all collective 
activity, is present in Leo's magisterial documents. For Leo too man has basic rights in 
the state and in opposition to it; this is expressed in "man is prior to the state"36. The 
issue of private property is clearly linked to that, because Leo obviously saw private 
property as the economic base for personal development and selfhood of people. The 
"wealth" which the poor do not have can only be built up when the right to private 
property is safeguarded especially in land ownership (RN 35). It is important to posit, 
in view of the aforementioned hypothesis of Isensee, that liberal influence (also) lies at 
the base when this first basic idea was formulated37. 
12
 La: "Sotto un tale riguardo lo Stato ha diritto a regolarlo ed armonizzarlo ed eziandio a limitarlo, 
quando il ben comune lo richiegga"; and 345-346: "Una certa intervenzione dello Stato nei fatti 
economici nella società è indispensabile. L'abbandonarli al conflitto degli egoismi é trasferire 
nell'industria l'idea Darwiniana della lotta per l'esistenza, in cui i più forti trionfano"; cf Liberatore 
1888, 101 (=par 94) "....que le but de l'Etat envisage uniquement l'ordre extérieur de l'homme, la 
tutelle des droits, le paix publique". 
33
 Sorgenfrei 1970, 134; cf Antonazzi 1957, L 13-24, and Liberatore 1889, 350; see also the 
reference to Darwin, above. 
34
 It would worthwile to do more research about this, but apparently the works of Liberatore have 
not really been the subject of much research: "Zu Liberatore gibt es noch immer kaum eine 
nennenswerte Literatur" says Schmidinger 1988,116, nt 30. 
35
 Jedin Π, 204-206; Utz 1980, 59; Hoffe 1984/1, 54; Talmy 1963,150; Utz 1980, 65; Weber 
1982,76 and Habiger 1990,343-346 state that it is not Leo's intention to protect private property 
without recognizing its social character; such a nuance can be found in RN 7 and 19. According to 
them Leo was only reacting against the exaggerations of the socialists regarding the legitimacy of 
private property. That may be true in general but RN 12 could then have been formulated more 
clearly. The sentence "maneat ergo, cum plebis sublevatio quaeritur, hoc in primis habere 
fondamenti instar oportere, privatas possessions inviolate servandas" could have been completed* 
"the right (to private property)" or "(private property) as such" (cf Kroh 1980, 82-83); the text as 
it stands suggests "any existing private property" (and that is true also for RN 35). 
M
 Minnerath 1982,129-130 points this out also. 
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The question is whether the other two basic ideas can also be found in Leo's docu-
ments. 
4 Further Steps towards the Principle of Subsidiarity 
The other two basic ideas regard the caution with which larger social units are to 
approach the operating sphere of smaller ones, unless the smaller ones cannot fulfill 
their function3*. We can fmd these ideas expressed in a number of places in Rerum 
novarum. 
4.1 Freedom for the family 
While discussing private property Leo repeated his ideas about the family. The family 
is a small but real societas which, as such, is prior to the state: society is built up of 
families39. The rights of the family are, therefore, prior to the rights of the state and are 
at the very least equal to them in as far it concerns the maintenance and independence 
of both. Society and state are, therefore, not allowed to hinder or diminish the rights of 
the family in any way; on the contrary, they must support and safeguard them. The state 
may interfere in the internal questions of the family only when the family cannot 
manage or when within the family mutual rights are violated. 
The test for a rightful external interference is whether parental authority, especially the 
authority of the father, is being respected in its natural rights. Substituting parental care 
with any form of state care for children is against natural justice40. 
43, A limited but important role for the state 
Leo placed as the central principle that the state must foster the bonum commune in 
such a way that through legislation, ordering and the manner of government, the 
welfare of the community and of individual people will be promoted (RN 26). Govern-
ment should not interfere in the socio-economic sphere unless there is a real need, as 
we shall explain. The political task is to create space through legislation for the socio-
economic sphere, which has its own rules, as well as for other spheres which should 
keep their own independence in relation to the state. The state has a task of "general 
providence" and should not interfere unlawfully, not even in the socio-economic 
order41. Promoting the bonum commune in a general way will improve the situation of 
the proletariat, and that is the best way. 
Apart from that, it is, according to Leo, a question of iustitia distributiva*2 that the state 
gives extra care to the plight of laborers. Their poverty and lawless condition justifies 
M
 See Introduction. 
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 Cf Habiger 1990,13. About the relation state-family see also nt 64 and 65. 
40
 RN 9-11. It appears that here Leo's "literary care" (cf nt 9) causes problems for interpretation. 
Gundbch is forced to translate three different Latin words as "Staat": "civitas", "societas civilis" and 
"república"; and "civilis coniunctio" and "convictus humanus" in that same paragraph have almost 
an identical meaning: Gundlach 1931,12-13 (RN nr 10), 2nd paragraph. 
41
 Murray 1953/2, 560. 
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 S Th П-П, q 61, a 1; cf Kliiber 1968,723-727. See about the different forms of iustitia: V, 2.1. 
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such state intervention. The care for the bonum commune implies final responsibility 
for the material satisfaction of needs. And that is certainly so for laborers, who are also 
citizens, in the cities even forming the majority, and who also contribute to the "wealth 
of nations". The laborer should be assured at least of a house, of clothing and food. 
Such intervention is of great importance for the state itself because laborers have such 
an important role to play. 
Such an interference is justified also in questions of working condition in the broad 
sense. Leo stated that in general the rights and property of all need to be protected. The 
rich could take care of themselves, but the poor and hired laborers, who have no wealth 
of their own*3, had to rely on state protection (RN 26-29). Still, even in this case Leo 
wanted a reserved attitude of the state: legislation intended to support the laborer 
should not go beyond restoration for disadvantages or fending off dangers. Organizati-
ons of laborers, or organizations of labor and management, are the proper institutions 
to regulate these matters. Together with the state christian organizations should play 
the most important role in teaching all classes their rights and duties and in protecting 
those who cannot protect themselves (RN 34 and 36). 
43 Freedom for the associations 
Those organizations have their own freedom. They came into being out of the natural 
tendency of man to live in community with others because each individual is limited: 
they have the same basis as the state itself. Therefore, the state cannot forbid (hem and 
all sorts of associations (except in certain situations) because that would undermine its 
own foundation. It is the task of the state rather to protect them without interfering with 
their internal organization or functioning (RN 36-38 and 41-42). 
4.4 First steps towards the principle of subsidiarity 
We can say in conclusion that the three basic ideas of the principle of subsidiarity can 
be found at least in Rerum novarum. It was Leo's conviction that the human person is 
the quid pro quo of all collective activity; that smaller social units (family and other 
associations) must have the opportunity to realize their potential; that (especially) the 
state must be reserved in its actions and must do only what cannot be done by some 
other organization. 
5 Conflicting Influences 
With this we are confronted with the different influences we find in Leo's pronounce-
ments. On the one hand we find a clear and dominant place for authority while on the 
other we see his observations about the reserved way the state should act and the 
unmistakable liberal influences in his thinking about basic rights and private property. 
Why does Leo give such a central place to authority and power in society? We already 
saw that it was a point of principle for him that civilized society cannot exist without a 
43
 RN 29: "...miserum vulgus, nullis opibus suis tutum...". 
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well based authority. The decline in appreciation of authority was in his eyes the cause 
of all evil in society44. There must be a central authority which proposes the goals in 
society and which interprets the ordering of natural law and executes it. 
But we also find liberal influences in Leo's thinking in the concept of property; and his 
ideas on state intervention in the economic sphere were quite liberal, according to 
Camp "more liberal than he cared to admit". In that he held the same position as most 
European governments which also held that liberal point cf view of non-intervention 
(except Germany and England which were the most industrialized countries). He did 
not want radical changes in property rights by the state as the socialists and the 
corporatiste wanted, but he did insist on regulation of the use of property. Intervention 
by the state could only be allowed if there was a clear case of exploitation of laborers 
and when negotiations by the unions about wage and conditions of work failed. It is a 
last resort43. Leo did not want to end capitalism as those two movements intended 
because capitalists have rights too. He wanted to put an end to the excesses and the 
exploitation so that more people could profit from the material advantages capitalism 
brings. But his ideas about a just wage (RN 34) were opposed to liberal principles 
although they fit in with his fight against exploitation, which is a denial of the value of 
the laborer as a human being46. 
There is also a completely different reason for Leo to relativize the power of the state. 
Natural knowledge and power are not autonomous because they are essentially im­
perfect. Natural knowledge cannot function without Revelation, of which the church is 
the only supernatural protectrix47; and political power comes ultimately from God. We 
see an important difference here between Leo's vision and modem social and political 
movements. He saw in these movements a revolutionary concept of the state based on 
social monism: giving the state the right to be the only principle of order for social 
life49. Rom the viewpoint of that interpretation of modem movements and in reaction 
against it Leo demanded time and again freedom for the church. 
One should not forget that the idea of the church as a societas perfecta became ever 
stronger during Leo's pontificate. The expression was already used by Pius LX49 but in 
the discussions about the schema for the dogmatic constitution of the church in 
preparation for Vatican I it was clear that it still did not have a generally accepted 
content10. Leo formulated the content classically: the church is a societas perfecta 
because it has its own goals, its own means, and its own organization51. And so he 
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Sapientiae 18. 
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demanded that the church be given a position next to the state as an equal partner in 
dialog, as societates of the same order they should be "in ordinata colligatio" (Immor­
tale Dei 152-153). Leo gave the church even a position above the state52 and in this 
way the church became the counterbalance against a too dominant role of the state. In 
this way he tried to give his ideal form and substance, the Pope as the international 
arbiter between states53. 
All these influences come together in Rerum novarum without any mediation so that 
the encyclical cannot present a systematic theory of society. Leo wanted more than 
those catholics who strove only for moral change, but he did not want the radical 
change which the corporatists proposed. He did not go beyond a vague outline of the 
desired social structure14. Such tentativeness and the conflicting visions in Rerum 
novarum explain that the formulation of the principle of subsidiarity cannot yet be 
expected. There is an even more general explanation for this. First of all, the general 
economic situation of a large part of the population in Western Europe was not such 
that people were capable of determining their own destiny; people were mostly still in 
an economically dependent position which could be changed only slowly in the 
direction of independence: the activity of catholics should be directed towards that (RN 
35 and Graves 7 and 10). 
The economic dependency of the "miserum vulgus" went hand in hand with cultural 
and moral dependency of the "multimelo imperita": the majority of people must be 
protected against false theories which threaten true freedom and morality, and which 
affect the very foundations of society55. That is why (absolute) freedom of speech and 
the press was not possible (Libertas 110-111). 
In Leo's vision a strong state authority was needed for the time being, until the econo­
mic and cultural level of large parts of the population reached the level where people 
could determine their own destiny. Only then could the principle of subsidiarity have a 
real basis in society: until that time an active and initiating governmental policy was 
needed. 
E
 Immortale Dei 151: "ita eius potestas est omnium praestantissima"; ciSapientiae 18 and Salis 
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Action: cf Maier 1965,270-278, Maier 1983, 73; McSweeney 1980, 78-79. 
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 Jedin Π, 206; Camp 1969, 27-28 posits that Leo belongs in "the third school" just as Ketteler, 
and he adds "His views on the right ordering of society were not so systematically presented as were 
his opinions on other social questions and were often distressingly vague". 
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 Murray 1954, 16-27, especially 25, where he places real emphasis on this reason for Leo's 
position: "the spiritual and cultural childhood in which he found broad masses of his Catholic 
people". 
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Within the church too authority was predominant. Leo defended this in conformity with 
the neo-scholastic influence in theology which stressed the central authority in the 
church theologically at the expense of the personal aspect56. We can see this in his 
ecclesiological encyclical Satis cognitum where we do not find any basic rights of the 
faithful in relation to the church but only a duty to subject oneself and to be obedient to 
the Pope: this was true for bishops as well as for the simple faithful. The central 
authority (instituted by Christ) is the only foundation of the church as a whole and there 
was no way that one could think of a constructive, constituent contribution of the 
faithful57. 
6 Organological Concept and the Principle of Subsidiarity 
As was the case with Ketteler so we can also now ask the question whether Leo used 
an organological concept and whether the indicated steps towards the principle of 
subsidiarity play a correcting role in regard to the centralistic tendencies. 
Did Leo assume an organological vision on associations, the characteristics of which 
we gave earlier58? The image of an organism seems to make an appearance in Leo's 
encyclicals in two different ways. In one of his first encyclicals he wanted to show that 
the idea (of "socialists, communists, and nihilists") of the equality of people is contrary 
to the relationships of power as created by God. He said "that society, just as the 
church, is one body: composed of many members, one nobler than another, but all 
necessary in relation to one another and directed towards the common good"59. A few 
years later he posited that the state, in conformity with nature, is an organism with a 
great differentiation in members which each have their own function, precisely as 
members and which are ordered to work together for the common good60. 
In this context it is important to remember Leo's statements which we already men-
tioned. He believed it is a demand of nature that people live together in society because 
they cannot fulfill certain needs individually. And Leo thought it could not be denied 
54
 Weite 1965,401. 
51
'Satis 174 and 185-187, andSapienliae 15-16. Liberatore, who in socio-economic elements was 
so influenced by liberal ideas, said (in 1888, 74 = par 66): "Ce dernier (= "le peuple";A.L.) n'a 
aucune autorité dans é g l i s e ; il constitue uniquement la multitude à régir et à gouverner"; cf o.e., 
155 (= par 138). 
51
 See 1,6. 
59
 Quod apostolici 49: "Inaequalitas tarnen iuris et potestatis ab ipso naturae Auetore dimanar, ex 
quo omnis patemitas in caeüs et in terra nominatur"; and 50: "...quo scilicet civitas, quemadmodum 
Ecclesia, unum esset corpus, multa membra complectens, alia aliis nobiliora, sed cuneta sibi invicem 
necessaria et de communi bono sollicita..."; cf Thibault 1972,166. In this encyclical we find a first 
beginnmg for the vision in RN on private property (52): "..jus proprietatis ac domimi, ab ipsa natura 
profectum, intactum cuilibet et inviolatum esse ¡übet...". 
№
 Humanum genus 6S: "Quemadmodum perfectus corporis habitus ex diversorum existit iunctura 
et composirjone membrorum, quae forma usuque différant, compacta tarnen et suis distributa locis 
complexionem efficiunt pulchram specie, firmam viribus, utilitate necessariam: ita in república 
hominum quasi partium infinita propemodum est dissimilitudo ...". 
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that the human being is by nature not a "solitary wanderer" but is destined by nature to 
live in community, in the society (Diutumum 213-214). A few years later he said again 
"that man is by nature destined to join others and to be part of a family and of civil 
society", because otherwise it would not be possible to provide for basic necessities 
(Immortale Dei 147). 
This survey will be sufficient to show that Leo indeed worked with an organologica! 
vision. He did not seem to use analogy or metaphor: nature demands this way of 
organization as we can see it in a body. There are mutual constitutive relationships and 
there is a structure in which each one is given a place. We can underline the essentially 
social nature of man which in these texts is posited on principle: it exists 'Ъу nature". 
But this literal vision of the social organism as a body implies an authoritarian view, a 
predominant place for authority in society. There are no mutual constitutive relation­
ships between the parts and the whole: the parts do not influence policy and govern­
ment in the state because authority as such cannot allow that. Here we see the centrali­
zing tendency of the corpuj-variant of the organologica! vision61. Characteristic is the 
lengthy quotation above from Immortale Dei: there is no freedom in the modem sense 
of the word. 
From Rerum novarum we get a different vision. There is still talk of society and state 
as a body, but in the relevant texts this vision no longer serves to indicate also the 
essentially social nature of individual persons. They are about the inequality and 
complementarity of individual groups. Nature dictates that the two classes (poor and 
rich) live together harmoniously and keep the right balance just as the members of a 
body. Because these classes are not, as others say, intended to fight against each other, 
labor and capital need each other (RN 15). In another place we read that the proletariat 
and the rich are citizens, true members of the body which is the state (RN 27). But 
nowhere in the quotations, which use an organologica! terminology, do we find 
anything about a mutual constitutive relationship between people, or about an essenti­
ally social nature. 
There seems to be a difference in emphasis at least. The older encyclicals see man 
primarily as a communitarian being, which is expressed as an example in the sentence: 
"that which is necessary to maintain life and to live a good life and what can perfect 
intellect and spirit, cannot be obtained by a lone individual"62. Such a sentence will not 
be found in Rerum novarum. There we read that man earns his livelihood in his own 
work and the proceeds belong to the worker (RN 7-8 and 34). Sharing with the poor of 
what is left over is not a demand of justice but of charity63. The emphasis here is on 
individual merits more than on the idea of a common responsibility for each person's 
life. 
6 ,CfI,4. 
62
 Immortale Dei 147, Diutumum 213 and Libertas 109. 
63
 RN 19: "Non iustitiae, excepto in rebus extremis, officia ista sunt, sed caritatis christianae, quam 
prefecto lege agendo petere ius non esL" 
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It is too easy to speak about contradictory visions. One would need a broader research 
in the texts for thai. But there is every indication of a difference in emphasis. It is 
remarkable that persons suddenly are no longer directly part of "the body of the state" 
but that the family is seen as an intermediate link; later, families become the compo­
nent parts64. This was unheard of in the earlier encyclicals. There we find that man is 
by nature part of associations: family and state or society65. It is also remarkable that 
Leo (in RN 6) accepted the classical liberal principle that "man is prior to the state": 
that is (among others) Locke's uniquely own basis for "individual natural rights"66. In 
an earlier time he rejected this forcefully67. 
That can only be the result of the liberal-individualistic influence, which we proved, via 
the thinking about labor and private property, which led to the acceptance of the status 
quo under the capitalistic system. Leo left room for individualism which was not 
condemned in the text while socialism is being rejected forcefully68. 
Somewhat more pointedly one can say that in Leo's earlier and more political-philosop­
hical encyclicals such as Diuturnum, Immortale Dei, and Libertas we do not find 
space for freedom and private initiative in the modern sense of the word and that he 
shows himself as a virulent anti-liberal (cf Libertas 102-107). That freedom can be 
seen in the socio-economic attention in Rerum novarum. But with the position that 
man is "prior to the state", and the recognition of a natural right to private property, the 
liberal-individualistic influence on this phase of the social doctrine of the church is 
established. 
We can prove with arguments that for Leo the basis for the ideas contained in the 
principle of subsidiarity do not find their foundation in his organologica! vision69. This 
" RN 11: "... proprie loqui si volamus, non ipsi per se, sed per communitatem domesticara, іл qua 
generati sunt, civilem ineunt ac participant societatem"; cf 27; and Au milieu 37-38: "Quand 
diverses familles, sans renoncer aux droits et aux devoirs de la société domestique, s'unissent sous 
l'inspiration de la nature, pour se constituer membres d'une autre famille plus vaste, appelée la 
société civile,...". 
aDiutumum 213-214; Immortale Dei 147; Libertas 109; Sapientiae 6 and 25-26; in this last text 
the new vision is prepared seeing the family as "germ-eel" of the state: "Initia reipublicae familia 
complectitur,...". 
" Sorgenfrei 1970,109-115; cf nt 21. 
67
 Leo does this very explicitly in Diuturnum 214: "Sed magnus est error non videre, id quod 
manifestum est, homines, cum non sint solivagum genus, citra liberam ipsorum voluntatem ad 
naturalem communitatem esse natos ...". Minnerath 1982, 129 therefore speaks of "amorces de 
changement de perspective... spécialement dans Rerum novarum". 
β
 Sorgenfrei 1970,151-152; cf nt 4. 
69
 According to van Eupen the principle of subsidiarity is the product of the withdrawal of the 
spheres of family and the associations from the influence of the state: these spheres are then brought 
under the influence of the church (cf nt 53). According to van Eupen the beginning of the principle 
of subsidiarity lies precisely in organologica! tho ught which sanctions this withdrawal of family and 
other associations from the influence of the state: Eupen 1989,43 and 54-57. He does not pay any 
attention to any possible traits of centralism of the organologica! vision nor to what we mentioned 
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vision on the social nature of man and especially his vision on authority in church and 
society made him see man primarily as an object for authority. Where there is freedom, 
namely in the socio-economic sphere and in the first steps towards the principle of 
subsidiarity, he arrives at a liberal-individualistic vision which (as will become clear) 
does not fit in with the vision on the person which goes with the principle of subsidiari-
ty-
7 Leo and von Ketteler 
Traditionally one says that Leo saw von Ketteler as his predecessor in the area of social 
questions70; yet the question is whether this is correct when we look at the content. 
There are definite similarities between their ideas. An important common viewpoint is 
the recognition that the capitalistic system is a given and should be accepted: therefore, 
both opted for concrete socio-economic politics and measures because corrections 
were certainly needed71. Both agreed on the inviolable rights of the family, on the 
family as a building block for state and society, and on the independence of associati-
ons. They agreed also on the need to find a basis for legislation which was independent 
of man and which could not be found in a (parliamentary) majority. Both had problems 
with democracy but accepted its existence72. 
But there is a deep division in thought between them regarding a subject of this book, 
on two related points. First of all there is a difference in understanding of the or-
ganologica! concept. For von Ketteler it was the antithesis of absolutism, governmental 
centralism and liberal individualism and, more generally, it was a structure where 
freedom flourishes. Self determination becomes possible so that people can give form 
and substance to their own personal, political, and social life. Consistently he applied 
this organologica! vision to the church itself73. For Leo the organologica! concept was 
authoritarian and centralistic. 
With this first difference, the second is indicated: because von Ketteler emphasized 
"Selbstverwaltung", ideas, which can now be indicated as (part of) the principle of 
subsidiarity, were the basis for his thinking and for his organologica! vision74. In Leo's 
earlier, the importance of the uberai tradition accepted by Taparelli and Liberatore. Isensee 1968, 
25 calls the beginning indicated by van Eupen: "pragmatische Begleitmotive der kirchlichen 
Annahme des Subsidiaritätsprinzips wie überhaupt des Umstandes dass sie sich 
liberal-individualistische Forderungen zu eigen gemacht hat (Elternrecht)!". 
70
 Recently also: Joblin 1982,96, nt 12; Aubert 1991,13. 
71
 Ш, nt 42-43; cf Camp 1969, 26-28. But, their ideas about private property are not entirely the 
same. Ketteler remains in the beginning close to St. Thomas' point of view but later on he comes 
closer to that of RN: Ketteler Schriften 1,1, 26-33, where he gives an extensive commentary on S 
Th Π Π, q 66, a 2 in his first Advent-homily in the Cathedral in Mainz on November 19,1848; cf 
Arbeiterfrage 409-414. 
"СГШ, 2.3,2.4 en 4.1.1. 
73
 Ш, 2.1-2.3 en 3. 
74
 Ш. 5. 
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writing one can find the first steps towards the principle of subsidiarity but it is 
certainly not an integral part of his vision on state and society. 
Leo did not succeed in bringing together the organologica! vision and the liberal vision 
while von Ketteler managed to do that. He placed the individual person in a central 
position but always in relation to others and in the context of (larger or smaller) 
associations; and he used the organologica! concept in favor of social and political 
freedom and against centralism in church and state. 
8 Again: the Hypothesis of bensee 
One could say that Leo did not go beyond the first steps towards the principle of 
subsidiarity because there was no integration of liberal thought and the organologica! 
concept. Isensee's hypothesis has been negatively confirmed so to speak; because there 
is no integration Leo could not yet arrive at a formulation of the principle of subsidiari-
ty. For Isensee the principle of subsidiarity is unthinkable without taking the individual 
person as the point of departure for the vision on state and society and without the 
primacy of freedom, which replaces the primacy of authority75. L too, pointed to these 
tendencies in Leo as the places where the principle of subsidiarity begins to obtain its 
outlines. On the other hand, for Leo the person remained an object for authority, as we 
already stated. 
It is precisely this choice for a vision on man with the corresponding preeminent place 
for central authority in state and society which seriously hindered the development of 
the principle of subsidiarity. 
The questions of the next chapter are whether and how people arrived at the principle 
of subsidiarity, which is an integrated part of a coherent vision of society, something 
which cannot be found in Leo. And also whether Isensee's hypothesis is then still true. 
"isensee 1968,25: "Das moderne Subsiriinritätsprinzip aber geht vom einzelnen aus. Es begründet 
die Legitimation von unten nach oben und löst den Primat der Autorität durch den Primat der 
Freiheit ab. Das theozentrische System wird durch ein anthropozentrisches ersetzt, die transperso-
nale Ordnung wird personalistisch umgepolt. Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip ist also das Ergebnis einer 
geistesgeschichtlichen Synthese zwischen dem gesellschaftsorganischem Ordnungsdenken 
(scholastisches Erbgut) und der liberalen Staatslehre (Adaptierung neuzeitlicher Denkweise). Die 
Synthese besteht darin, dass der föderale Sozialbau liberal legitimiert wird." Cf Ш, nt 3. 
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V. Quadragesimo Anno and the Principle of Subsidiarity' 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Status quaestionis for this chapter 
In chapter IV we stated that Leo's ideas about the bonum commune and authority in the 
state on the one hand, and his ideas about personal freedom on the other do not match. 
We found a centralist tendency in the political sphere and we found individualism in 
the economic sphere. 
This chapter seeks to answer the question how in Quadragesimo anno the magisterial 
vision went a step further compared to Rerum novarum. How is it possible to integrate 
the vision on the human being in the political sphere with that of the economic? In 
answering this question it will become clear that Isensee's hypothesis, that (he principle 
of subsidiarity is the result of a synthesis of the organologica! and the liberal-individua-
listic vision on state and society, is confirmed2. 
In this chapter we concentrate on one encyclical only, Quadragesimo anno (1931). 
We accentuate this for two reasons: first of all, the principle of subsidiarity is formula-
ted in this encyclical. And further, the encyclical is for the time being an end result 
because there is a balanced vision on a question which played a role in the preceding 
chapters, the relationship between the individual person and the smaller or larger 
associations. 
This question was resolved originally in the first half of the 19th century by catholic 
intellectuals in their choice for "corporatism". In the German states they developed in 
this context an organologica! vision, which meant a resistance to social monism, 
governmental centralism and liberal individualism. In this vision they did not make an 
issue of the position of the individual person. 
Ketteler did, in his resistance against these same adversaries. He also opted for an 
organologica! vision but he left the individual person his own proper space. He based 
this space on the task which each person has: to realize self in freedom. In this he was 
influenced by liberal ideas: the individual person has his own irreplaceable position but 
cannot exist without various associations with other people. 
1
 The text of Quadragesimo anno can be found in AAS 23 (1931) 177-228. The numbering we 
have used is the same as Gundlach's 1931/1. A (loose) translation in English can be found in: Five 
Great Encyclicals, New York 1939, 125-168. 
ICfIV,nt75. 
58 
This liberal influence existed partly in Leo, but partly it did not as we showed in 
chapter IV. Leo rejected liberalism in the political sense, but accepted it in the 
economic sphere. Our conclusion was, therefore, that Leo did not present a systemati-
cally coherent vision of society. 
1.2 Immediate history prior to Quadragesimo anno 
CURRENT QUESTIONS 
The fact that an encyclical (Rerum novarum) had been published forty years before 
was not per se a reason to examine it extensively and broadly. Which were the motives 
for Pius XI to bring out again an important social encyclical in 1931? What motivated 
him to look for the "authors"? 
The economic crisis which began in 1929 was still in full stride in 1931; in Europe and 
the United States there were a large number of unemployed (cf QA 74). Politically, 
fascism and communism fought against liberal democracy in Europe and many, on the 
right and on the left, doubted its value3. 
In catholic circles there were questions about certain passages in Rerum novarum. The 
historical development demanded a new exposition of the position with regard to 
capitalism and socialism and demanded also a proper catholic position on the social 
order which had come under discussion and for which Rerum novarum did not supply 
an answer (QA 15 and 40). Aubert presents the most important points of discussion in 
the years between the two world wars: 
- the dilemma corporatism-syndicalism: some catholic circles thought that unions could 
not be combined with Christianity because they were founded on class-struggle and this 
was considered contrary to christian charity; 
- the relations between the individual person and the community: one sought a balance 
between the defense of the rights of the human person and the demands of the bonum 
commune, against the emphasis which many, also within the church, placed on the 
liberal vision of society; 
- does the state have a role to play in directing economic and social life or should the 
state entrust as much as possible in this area to the corps intermédiaires, to prevent the 
state from absorbing the economic sphere or vice versa; 
- some other questions such as: limits to the right to private property, the christian 
vision on labor, and questions regarding the level of wages and prices4. 
These questions, mentioned by Aubert, are the subject matter of Quadragesimo anno. 
Pius did not want to solve these questions in Rome, but asked some German Jesuits to 
prepare a concept*. In this way he chose the German speaking countries where the 
1
 Bracher 1984,121-267, especially 146-147. 
4
 Aubert 1984, 34-35; cf Jostock 1961,105 (nt 29). 
5
 The assignment came to O. von Nell-Breuning sj (1890-1991) through the Superior Genera] of 
the Jesuits. Nell-Breuning made use of the fact that he belonged to the "Königswinterer Kreis"; he 
described the history of the redaction extensively: Nell-Breuning 1968; id. 1971/1 and 1971/2; cf 
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views had been well-thought out and were clearly defined in the systems of solidarism 
and universalism. 
A lively battle was being fought in the German speaking countries about some of the 
questions which Aubert mentions. Following K. von Vogelsang (1818-1890) the 
capitalist system was, especially in Austria, subject to a fundamental discussion by 
what Jostock calls the romantic-feudal-conservative wing: "they want to stand on the 
right but think on the left". Universalism is the most all encompassing social-philosop-
hical theory in this anti-capitalist movement6. Over against this universalism we find 
solidarism which, following HPesch sj, had been further elaborated in Germany7. By 
choosing von Nell Breuning Pius opted for the solidarist school and against universa-
lism. Why did he make this choice? Both systems were clearly opposed to liberalism 
on the one side and to communism and socialism on the other, and were not these the 
real adversaries'? 
TWO IMPORTANT MOVEMENTS 
Universalism9, developed by O. Spann (1878-1950), is meant as a doctrine about the 
essence of society. Only two answers are possible if one asks for the essence of society: 
the contradictorily opposed individualism and universalism. In individualism, so they 
say, society is composed of a mass of independent individuals: they are the original 
elements and society is derived from them, is accidental. In universalism the individu-
als exist only as elements of society and they exist because of society. These possibili-
ties are mutually exclusive: the parts are first and they form the whole, or the whole is 
first Universalism holds: tertium non datur. 
In universalism persons are only parts of a whole, which encompasses the individual. 
As a part the person has a certain individuality, and universalism, therefore, does not 
consider itself collectivism: the full development of the individuality of the parts means 
also the fullness of life for the whole. Therefore, what is important in society is not the 
development of the potential of the individuals as such, but the furtherance of those 
potentials which are directed towards a well-functioning society. A person is he who 
Schwarte 1975,3643 and Habiger 1990,67-91. Nell-Breuning mode no secret of the fact the ideas 
of his confrere G. Gundlach sj (1892-1963) had a great influence on the content of the encyclical: 
cf Nell-Breuning 1963, 387. 
"Jostock 1932,183-193; Arnold 1932; Hentzen 1933,99-111. See for Vogelsang: Kliiber 1968, 
229-235. 
7
 See for the life and works of Pesch: Ruhnau 1980. There was already in the 19th century a 
systematic way of thinking about "solidarity" in France: Grimm 1987, 3145-3146. 
' The rejection of liberalism through iustilia socialis is elucidated further in nr. 2; the rejection of 
communism and socialism can be found especially in QA 118 and 119. The main arguments are 
that the socialist vision on society is primarily a materialist and utilitarian vision, which does not do 
justice to human freedom, because the position of the individual person is subjected to the interest 
of the efficiency of production; cf Nell-Breuning 1932,197-204. This second reproach is repeated 
in Centesimus annus 13 and 39; the first in CA 19, where it is applied also to states which leave too 
much room for "free market forces"; cf CA 29 and 36. 
' Heinrich 1929; Spann 1934,12-14 for some central principles; Stegmann 1969,436-443. 
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hands himself over to the interests of the whole, because "the whole is the tme and 
higher existence of the individual". 
Universalism sees itself as the revival of German idealism and the philosophy of 
Romanticism (Baader, Müller, Görres a.o.) of which we said above that this way of 
thinking does not see the position of an individual person as an issue. They blame 
solidarism for rejecting the contradictory opposition between individualism and 
universalism10. 
H. Pesch sj (1854-1926) is the founder of solidarism. This socio-scientific system 
sought to mediate between individualism and collectivism. He saw solidarism as that 
vision of society where justice is done to the rights of the individual and those of the 
social whole, to freedom and order, to individual as well as social responsibility; its 
goal is the wellbeing of all those involved". 
Gundlach12 developed more precisely the idea that solidarism is the social system 
which "makes solidary alliance of each association with its members and of the 
members with their association into the dominant principle of human co-existence". 
This solidary alliance points to the typical mutuality of the alliance: individual persons 
and groups realize their own goals within the community and largely through the 
community, but the community realizes itself only when the individual persons are 
linked together by "common responsibility" (in the sense of solidarity) for the bonum 
commune. Community is based on this "common responsibility". Community, and the 
bonum commune, are not an end in itself, but the community and the bonum commune 
exist for the goal of all members together, and not for that of individual members as 
such, because then the community would only be in service to this individual, and that 
would be contrary to the "solidary" character13. 
The principle of solidarity is seen as an ontological principle. The reason for existence 
of social reality is the real social nature of man which realizes itself in history. Here we 
see the difference with individualistic views, which take as point of departure the 
individual who must be self reliant; the difference also with collectivistic views which 
take as point of departure the community as a whole. Solidarism takes as its point of 
10
 In Heinrich 1929,542 solidarism is being addressed on this directly. 
11
 Pesch 1,414-430; Pesch 1902,38 and 322. Habiger 1990,62-65 describes solidarism and says 
that the concept in Pesch is derived from in solidum obligare, to be obliged jointly and severally, 
which corresponds to the old adage "all for one and one for all". 
12
 Gundlach 1931/2 (cf Gundlach 1929, 351-353); Nell-Breuning 1990, 15-57; see for the 
"solidarist school": Stegmann 1969, 453-462. For an overview of Gundlach's life and work see: 
Schwarte 1975. Gundlach contributed heavily to the statements of Pius ΧΠ on social doctrine: 
Schwarte 122-130 and 187-196; cf Krebs 1992,11-13. 
13
 In this vision there is a distinction between the sum total of individual interests and the bonum 
commune: the first can mean that each adult person has his own car, the latter that the use of the 
car is limited, c.q. that alternatives are subsidized by the government 
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departure both the individual person and the community. For Gundlach this was a 
philosophical given as well as an experiential truth. The principle is also an ethical 
principle because the will of the person must start from this structure of society which 
is ontologically given. Gundlach did not waste much time on the often discussed 
relation between "Sein" and "Sollen": the principle of solidarity can be an ethical 
principle only because it is in first instance a principle of being14. As such it must be 
concretized in society and that is the reason it is also & principle of organization and 
¡aw in the sense of "common responsibility". This meaning makes the principle into the 
element which builds and unites society. As legal principle it is not part of any of the 
traditional forms of justice, but it is part of iustitia socialis. 
We will develop this further on but it is important already now to state: solidarity 
between people is not only a question of attitude, but it must be defined in structures in 
society juridically and organizationally15. 
The principle of solidarity emphasizes the freedom and equality of the citizens, but 
these are not above the demands of the community in the bonum commune, because 
then they would become subjectivist. It should stand over against (socialist) collecti-
vism as well as (liberal) individualism: it takes as point of departure the individual 
person as well as the community. Solidarism is, according to Gundlach, not a construed 
middle ground between individualism and collectivism, even though it has a mediating 
role, because it has its own ontological foundation. With that it resolutely rejected the 
contradictory opposition which Spann saw in it16. 
Universalism attracted catholics and could have become the base for a further develop-
ment of social doctrine'7. But conclusions were drawn from the still rather abstract way 
of thinking as we sketched it, which were irreconcilable with that. 
1. Universalism rejected the liberal vision of the state, a vision which wanted the 
state to have as few functions as possible ("the night watch state"), while it 
14
 Gundlach 1942, 591 formulates his position in this way: "Die Beurteilung des konkreten 
sittlichen Handelens nach abstrakten Prinzipien -primären und abgeleiteten- geht von der 
philosophischen Erkenntnis aus, dass die Sollensordnung auf der Seinsordnung aufruht, und zwar 
aus den Wesensbeziehungen des physischen und metaphysischen Zusammenhangs im Seienden, 
mit anderen Worten: aus seinem objektiven Wahrheitsgehalt". About the relation "Sein-Sollen" 
Nell-Breuning 1987, 353 says: "So lassen sich Sozdalontologie und Sozialdeontologie überhaupt 
nicht trennen". This idea is a principle of the (neo)scholastic way of thought pithily expressed in: 
"ens et bonum converaintur"; cf Kroh 1982,121-124. CA 46 says in this line: "But freedom attains 
its full development only by accepting the truth. In a world without truth, freedom loses its 
foundation and man is exposed to the violence of passion and to manipulation, both open and 
hidden". 
" It does not seem correct that CA 10 identifies it with caritas socialis; cf nt 53. 
"Schwarte 1975,339-341 summarized Gundlach's vision on man: every human being is an image 
of God, a spiritual individuality, a person; people are oriented from within to live together, to work 
together, and in this way, in mutual giving and receiving, constantly to realize the values of their 
humanity. 
" Stegmann 1969, 443-444. 
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considered the state to be the ultimate organization of people. The state should not 
think in terms of external order, but rather in terms of building a community of its 
members which is intensely spiritual. In society there are parts-of-a-whole, orders 
(such as church, army, the economic order), but the state leads and furthers their 
functioning. 
That was clearly in opposition to Leo's Rerum novarum where he allowed the state 
only a limited sphere of influence and where he saw society functioning indepen-
dently. A conclusion which was even more difficult to accept for the church is that 
the state organizes or influences the other orders, including the church. Spann later 
added a subtle nuance by saying that in a rightly ordered society the state has a 
formal supreme authority, but that the church has a spiritual supreme authority, as 
a surreptitious theocracy. But even then, the state encompasses all of life. For a 
church which sees itself as a societas perfecta this is clearly unacceptable". 
2. In universalisai the economic order was a service to society as a whole: the liberal-
individualistic order of capitalism was rejected. That too was opposed to Leo's 
vision in Rerum novarum. 
In the formulation of the principle of subsidiarity and its motivation, later on in this 
chapter, it will be clear that universalisai and any other opinion, which does not give 
first priority to the function of service to the individual person in the bonum commune 
and in the totality of society must be rejected". 
1 J First reception 
The choice of authors, which was also a choice in favor of solidarism meant that people 
outside the German speaking countries had real problems in understanding the 
encyclical. That was true even for the Vatican itself; in the summary of Quadragesimo 
anno (as a press release) there was not even a hint of the principle of subsidiarity20! 
The reaction of La Civiltà Cattolica saw Quadragesimo anno as underlining the 
importance of Rerum novarum. Indicative is the remark that the new encyclical was 
needed to bring clarity in the obscure situation which had been created "on the other 
side of the Alps" in relation to some concepts in christian social philosophy21. This is 
true especially for the right to property, for the relation capital-labor, and for the 
question of a just wage. There was a short exposition of the dominance of the economic 
order over the political, and of necessary moral changes. With that, they said, the most 
important elements had been mentioned22. There was not a word about iustitia socialis, 
about the redemptio proletarium, about the principle of subsidiarity and the ordines. 
" Spann 1934, 103; cf Gundlach 1928, 358. 
" Rosa 1962, 606; Bertrams 1955, 390; Calvez 1961, 177. 
20
 Nell-Breuning 1932, 239-242. 
21
 Civiltà Cattolica 1931, 504. Nell-Breuning 1971/1, 135 also points out that people in the 
Vatican and in Italy did not understand Quadragesimo anno; Vatican documents to do not refer to 
it until Gundlach starts his work for Pius XII (cf nt 12) according to Nell-Breuning. But he seems 
to forget Divini Redempioris nr 31 ff. 
22
 Civiltà Cattolica 1931, 504-508. 
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or about the discussion with Italian fascism, except in the last few lines of the article 
where it said that "corporatism and administrative decentralization are ways which 
bring salvation". 
The reaction in Etudes was similar, albeit somewhat longer. The author summarized 
part I and from part II the passages about property and wages and showed a good 
insight in the encyclical's proper nuances. He showed that the encyclical spoke about 
the importance of organizations which have disappeared because of individualism, and 
about the importance of the orders. He saw iustitia socialis as a guide-line and pointed 
out that it is better for the state to play a more aloof role rather than one of "direct and 
misplaced intervention". He also mentioned Pius' objections against the "corporate" 
system which had been introduced in Italy. And then he discussed part Ш. In the first 
as well as in the last part of the article du Passage complained that this catholic vision 
is not heard often enough in the public debate in France23. 
As with the article in Civiltà we can say also here that the fundamental passages of 
Quadragesimo anno have not been understood and yet, these are representative 
magazines. Issues like iustitia socialis and the right relation between person and 
society apparently did not play such a penetrating role as in the German speaking 
countries. 
It remains remarkable that the principle of subsidiarity was not taken aboard right 
away, even in the circle around von Nell-Breuning, which advised him in difficult 
questions, though unknowingly, and which was well aware of this whole subject 
matter24. 
2 Central Concept: Iustitia Socialis 
A central question for this chapter is (as we already said in 1.1) how Pius shades Leo's 
division between the sphere of influence of the common welfare (the sphere of the 
state) and that of individualism (society as economic order). It appears that a more 
coherent vision on society develops and that the relation between bonum commune and 
23
 Passage 1931. The French translation of the encyclical in Nouvelle Revue Théologique 58 
(1931) translates on page 635 "subsidium" as "aider" in QA 79 and "subsidiaria officii principium" 
in QA 80 as "le príncipe de la fonction supplétive de toute collectivité": this makes it clear that they 
do not yet know the technical term. 
24
 Nell-Breuning 1968,112;Gundlach 1932/2, 310 does not mention it in his explanation of the 
encyclical! This is the more remarkable because Nell-Breuning says here that Gundlach formulated 
the principle of subsidiarity as it appears in QA (cf Habiger 1990, 141) and because Gundlach 
already used the adjective "subsidiary" in 1928 (Gundlach 1928, 358) and stated it as a concept in 
1929 (Gundlach 1929, 352). In a couple of passages he outlined the principle of subsidiarity in 
connection with the principle of solidarity and with iustitia socialis. In his article "Ständestaat" in 
1932, where QA is taken up he spoke twice about the "subsidiary" task of the state: Gundlach 
1932/4, 248-250. These texte are not mentioned in the Sachregister of Gundlach 1964/Π, 693 
("Subsidiarität, Subsidiaritätsprinzip"). 
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the individual person becomes clearer the concept of iustitia socialis offers that 
coherence! 
Different from Leo, Pius gave the concept of bonum commune a clear content: iustitia 
socialis; or rather, the bonum commune is easier to formulate as the goal and as the 
social-ethical norm in terms of iustitia socialis0. 
2.1 A new concept 
Iustitia socialis is a relatively recent concept in moral theology. Traditionally there was 
a distinction between: 
- iustitia generalis!legatisi the duties of the individual in relation to the bonum com-
mune, in relation to the whole of society, concretely in relation to the state 
- iustitia distributiva: duties of the whole in relation to the individual 
- iustitia commutativa: duties of the individual persons in relation to one another26. 
Pesch, whom we mentioned already, developed the idea of iustitia socialis. Around 
1900 he described it in general terms as an innate sense for justice, as the foundation of 
society, and as a framework for legislation about property, about trade and econo-
mics27. Later on it became a central idea in his theory and he summarized it in this way: 
social justice is about a right to social welfare. All who are active in the social order 
must work to create this and to maintain it; every citizen and the various classes have a 
right to it. Social justice is not accepting the peace of an existing order, but it is a 
dynamic principle for the reformation of existing relationships. Parts of society should 
not only exist for their own interests; social justice demands a balance of interests2*. 
Not only the state has a responsibility in this, although the state has a specific task to 
fulfill: create the conditions and institutions so that the members of the state are in a 
better position to take care of their own material welfare freely and actively29. Very 
15
 Kliiber 1968,330; he bases himself on DR 51, especially: "Atqui socialis iustitia est id omne ab 
singulis exigere, quod ad commune bonum necessarium sit" .But this is only part of the description: 
cf nt 40. Habiger 1990,101: The "common good is ultimately to be identified with the just social 
order". 
^Giers 1956,63; Hentzen 1933,258. Calvez 1961,193-194 and 543-557 gives the history of the 
concept of iustitia socialis in catholic circles up to 1931; Höffner 1935, 9-22 does the same. It is 
remarkable that Calvez (543-544) as well as Höffner (10) point out that Taparelli already knew the 
expression (cf Habiger 1990,103) and it appeared already in the preparatory documents for Vatican 
I but apparently it was still too unclear or too much open to discussion to be used already in Rerum 
novarum. Zagar 1991, 167-170 shows that one can speak of an "anticipation of social justice" in 
this encyclical. 
"Pesch 1898,123-135 and 164. 
M
 Pesch Π, 225. 
29
 Pesch 1,167; and Pesch Π, 244-255; in this context Pesch uses "subsidiary" in the same way as 
once Ketteler did: even though public care of the poor in principle and originally "nur subsidiair, 
lediglich zur Ergängzung der privaten Liebestätigkeit berufen erscheint", it does not follow that this 
should, therefore, only become operative when private care runs short, because public care still has 
in its possession the income from "pious foundations": Pesch I, 169. That is the same argument 
Ketteler used for public help to the disabled, who have a "subsidiary" right to church property: Ш, 
nr4,2! 
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broadly, social justice is, for Pesch, the harmony between the actual social situation and 
the ideal social order. It appears as a natural law category which dynamically leads to 
change in existing relationships30. 
2.2 lustitia socialis in Quadragesimo anno 
With Quadragesimo anno the concept became a household word in ecclesiastical 
documents31: what is the meaning in this encyclical32? 
It appears for the first time in the part about the relationship capital-labor (QA S3-S8). 
Pius posited in general, with a text from Rerum novarum, that capital and labor need 
each other and that, therefore, the fruits of the cooperation do not belong, in toto or for 
the largest part, to one group only (QA 53-55). The earth is for all people, he said, 
without regard to who owns what. Therefore, growth in wealth must be distributed 
among individual people and classes according to the bonwn commune: iustitia 
socialis demands that one class does not exclude another from its proper share. In the 
long term the distribution of material goods must be brought in line with the "boni 
communis seu socialis iustitiae normas", so that each person will receive his fair share 
of earthly goods; the existing situation is not in line with those norms. There is no 
definition of iustitia socialis in its content, but it is clear that it is closely related to the 
bonum commune and that it is about the distribution of wealth33. 
A fair distribution will bring about the abolition of the situation where the proletariat 
lives in a continuous situation of uncertainty; they can then determine their own life and 
that of their family in an active and future oriented manner, and they will no longer be 
totally dependent (QA 61). That led him to the problem of wages, especially the wage 
of the fathers of families. Iustitia socialis demands that it be sufficient to provide 
decently for the needs of the family, or a way must be found that it become sufficient 
for that (QA 71). He further clarified this by saying that wages should not be too high 
or too low, in view of the socio-economic effects. The bonum commune demands that 
laborers should be enabled to build up property, but it demands also that as many 
people as possible will have a job: iustitia socialis demands that both elements be 
reckoned with in the determination of wages (QA 74-75). 
Again, it is clear that there is a relation between iustitia socialis and the bonum 
commune, and also that iustitia socialis is about the distribution of wealth. The first 
responsibility for social justice is with laborers and employers who should be suppor­
ted by the state. Iustitia socialis appears as a dynamic concept: it demands social 
30
 Pesch Π, 224-225; Schuster 1936 recalls this natural right character and concludes that Pesch 
did not indicate precisely in what relationship iustitia socialis stands to the three traditional forms 
of justice: 225-230; cfRuhnau 1980,139-140. 
31
 Calvez 1961, 201; Giers 1976, 93. 
32
 Habiger 1990,106-111 indicates precisely where the word appears in QA. 
33
 QA 57-58 and 60: the Latin text in 58 underlines the righteousness of a different distribution by 
the choice of words which reminds one knmediately of the classical definition of justice: "Sua igitur 
caique pars bonorum attribuendo ... " (italics mine; AL). 
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reforms which up to now had a bearing only on the economic order34. The goal of that 
sphere is ideally that all people and each individual person will have the use of those 
things which nature, technical ability, and organization of economic life create, so that 
people can achieve a certain level of well-being (QA 75). 
The central part of the encyclical (QA 76-98) deals with a new social order and iustitia 
socialis is here further defmed. Pius' main objection to the existing order was that the 
opposition between capital and labor rules society: the conflict of interests between 
both classes makes society shaky and unstable. A real social order can only come into 
being when the ordines work harmoniously for the bonum commune?*. In this common 
goal social order finds its unity, not through a strong political authority36! 
This new social order demands a social legislation which will influence also the 
economic order which, up to now, was determined mostly by free competition. This 
was not necessarily bad but it had led to individualism, which, in its turn, brought 
about the disappearance of all kinds of associations (QA 78 and 97). And often, this 
free competition led to its opposite, an economic dictatorship of capital and cartels. But 
iustitia socialis should be the "principium directivum", the guide-line for all public 
institutions (state and ordines); it must determine the economic order (QA 88-90). 
In relation to what went before in the encyclical (QA 81-84) iustitia socialis leads to a 
state and social order which become just because the bonum commune is the goal, and 
they are not determined by individualism, which is no longer the actual structural 
principle of society as a whole or of the economic order. Ultimately it is the state which 
is responsible for social legislation. 
This does not mean that Pius saw capitalism as a despicable system. What he did 
condemn (and that can be seen all through the encyclical) was the actual consequences 
of this economic system: that wealth and (political) power were in the hands of a few, 
because then there would be no social justice37. 
He summarized his position succinctly. The primacy of economics must be exchanged 
for a primacy of the state which has as its goal the bonum commune (QA 109); all 
public institutions, state and ordines, are charged to make human society conform to 
34
 Calvez 1961,196-198 says that Pius uses the concept iustitia socialis "à propos de l'harmoni-
sation des droits respectifs du capital et du travail". Cf nt 49. 
35
 QA 78 and 81-87. See also nr 3 below. 
*QA84;cfnt64. 
17
 QA 56-57, 82, 88, and 101-109; cf Dorr 1983, 62-64. If one looks at capitalism as a system in 
which the property of land and the means of production are mostly in private hands, in which labor 
and capital cannot function one without the other (cf RN 15) and in which there is "free enterprise" 
then one can say that Pius does not condemn it, but that he accepts it as an existing system which 
influences all the world. In this sense CA 39-43 says that the primary object of criticism should not 
be an economic system, but the absolutizing of the economic order. 
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the "demands of the common interest or the norm of social justice". That norm defines 
more precisely what bonwn commune isM. 
Pius did not define iustitia socialis in Quadragesimo anno as to content, apart from 
the fact that he closely linked bonum commune with it and named some matters which 
are in harmony with it or which are not. Some years later he would do that, maybe 
because of the developing discussions, in his encyclical Divini Redemptoris*9. There he 
said that iustitia socialis is characterized by the fact that it demands from individual 
persons all that is necessary for the bonum commune. It also demands that individual 
persons receive what is necessary so that they can function in society40. A just 
(re)distribution of wealth and property is thus a central demand of social justice. 
Is this emphasis on social justice an advance with regard to Rerum novaruml I believe 
it is. Leo saw it as the task of the state to assure iustitia distributiva (RN 27); that is a 
limited social political norm. Beyond that the state had to promote the bonum commu-
ne, as a varied collection of conditions for personal development. 
For Pius the task of the state is wider: the state must, even if not alone, promote social 
justice - what is important is a just order in society! The bonum commune is not only 
about the preconditions. As social justice it is to make sure that everybody receives as a 
person what is needed for his economic and social functioning. 
The individualism of the economic order, which still existed in Leo, was now abolis-
hed. For Leo the state was first (and exclusively) responsible to create the bonum 
commune, which, politically, will be realized by the state in a centralist manner. Pius 
broke with this opinion radically: no longer the state, but state and the whole of society 
carry responsibility for the bonum commune, even though the state retains final 
responsibility. 
This bonum commune gives to the poor, as social justice, a good share in the (increase 
of) wealth. Furthermore, the individualism of the economic order was explicitly 
rejected in the concept of social justice because property was no longer "sanctified" as 
it was under Leo41 and because wages were not only longer determined by iustitia 
M
 QA 110: "Ipsa vera populorum publica inslituta ad boni communis necessitates seu ad iustitia 
socialis normam totam humanam consortionem conformare debent;...". Cf CA 40-49. 
"DR d.d. March 19,1937 (AAS 29 (1937) 65-106) was directed against communism and at the 
same time Mit brennender Sorge was published (March 14; AAS 29 (1937) 145-167!) against 
national-socialism. A few days later (28 March) followed Firmissimam against the leftist 
government in Mexico (AAS 29 (1937) 189-199); cf Dorr 1983, 70-74. 
40
 DR 51: " Atqui socialis iustitiae est id omne ab singulis exigere, quod ad commune bonum 
necessarium sit. Ut autem, ad quamlibet viventis corporis compagem quod attinet, in universum 
consultum non est, nisi singulis membris ea omnia tribuantur, quibus eadem indigeant ad suas partes 
explendas; ita, ad communitatis Constitutionen! temperationemque quod pertinet, totius societatis 
bono prospici non potest, nisi singulis membris, hominibus videlicet personae dignitate ornatis, illud 
omne impertiatur, quod iisdem opus sit, ad sociale munus cuiusque suum exercendum". 
41
 In QA 47-49 about social obligations attached to property and about the competencies of the 
state in relation to private property there is already a prelude on iustitia socialis: there is mention of 
the demands of the bonum commune in relation to property and its use (cf Gundlach 1932/2,299-
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commutativa, but other aspects had to be taken into consideration. That is the attack on 
economic individualism. 
After that comes the attack on social and political individualism, which follow from the 
economic individualism. Characteristic is the statement that society should not be 
characterized by class conflict but by the cooperation of the ordines. The bonum 
commune is thus seen again as the responsibility of society, not only of the state. 
The separation of the political and economic order is abolished: the bonum commune 
is the common social task and individualism has lost its "play-ground"! Common 
responsibilities must be realized in common: the state must take a real step back if seen 
against the background of what Leo still wanted for it42! Its field of operation becomes 
wider: there is no longer any mention of (a cautious opening for) limited intervention, 
but the whole of the socio-economic order and the whole of society can be called to 
account by the state to realize the bonum commune, even if the state retains final 
responsibility, however with a certain distance. Individual people and their organizati-
ons are directly responsible, no longer the central authority of the state! 
23 Interpretation of iustitia socialis 
Now that iustitia socialis had been given such an important position in Quadragesimo 
anno, the debate about its interpretation began: was this something new if compared to 
the traditional tripartite division? Is it a fourth kind of justice or can it be subsumed in 
one of the three? The encyclical did not seem to offer any basis for this where it stated 
that iustitia socialis must characterize the whole order of state and society43. 
Gundlach earlier spoke about iustitia socialis in this sense already : it is solidarity as 
norm, as a claim of society on the individual person. As such it creates legal relations-
hips between people and it becomes concrete in the three traditional forms of iustitia4*. 
Von Nell-Breuning spoke in a similar vein: iustitia socialis is the law as well as the 
moral virtue to act according to the demands of the bonum commune4*. He remained 
301). CA 30-42 reiterates this theme of the relation between "private property and the universal 
destination of material goods". 
42CfIV,nr2. 
"Explicitly stated in QA 88: "Quapropter ipsa populorum atque deo socialis vitae totius instituía 
ea iustitia imbuantur oportet maximeque necessarium est, ut vere efficiens evadat seu ordinem 
iuridicum et socialem constituât, quo oeconomia tota veluti informetur". See for an further 
distinction in QA: Schuster 1936, 230-242. 
44
 Gundlach 1929, 352: "Da die Gesellschan ein "intentionales" Sein hat, kommt auch ihrem 
Aufbauprinzip, der "Solidarität", der Charakter der "Norm" zu. Sie erscheint, wenigstens begrifflich, 
vor allem positiven Recht, ja sogar vor allen konkreten Einheitsformen der Gesellschaft, als 
Lebensanspruch der "Gesellschaft" gegenüber dem einzelnen. Dies ist es, was man als "soziale 
Gerechtigkeit" bezeichnet. Sie durchzieht als gestaltendes Prinzip die Dynamik der 
Rechtsverhältnisse unter den Menschen und verwirklicht sich in den Bekannten drei Formen der 
iustitia legalis, distributiva und auch der commutativa" (italics in the original); cf Gundlach 1931/2, 
1616 and nr 1.3.2 above. Gundlach became well-known because of this address in 1929: Schwarte 
1975, 28. 
45
 Nell-Breuning 1927, passim; Nell-Breuning 1932, 245. 
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true to this idea because years later he said that the principle of solidarity as a legal 
principle makes demands on society in the name of justice: which laws should be 
enacted and what the content should be. And in the name of justice it demands of the 
members of society not to wait until matters are settled legally, but to do what the 
bonum commune demands out of conscience, also without legal or other rulings of 
authority: that is iustitia socialis. It is a dynamic principle: time and again what is just 
needs to be indicated and concretized44. 
Iustitia socialis cannot be identified with any of the three traditional forms in the usual 
interpretation.' Giers showed that already47. That is why is seems reasonable that it is 
not mentioned by Pieper,v/ho takes St Thomas' idea about iustitia as point of departu-
re and framework. The traditional tripartite division is a complete whole in itself, 
which does not allow new divisions48. Calvez and Petrin and Habiger want to stay 
within that schema and see iustitia socialis as the concrete form of iustitia generalis 
and ¡egalis for the economic order49. The way H offner interprets St Thomas does not 
leave him any room for a juridical obligation which is not a legal obligation. Iustitia 
socialis is for him a totality of legal demands which the state makes on the citizen; and 
he says that it cannot be distinguished from iustitia legalis50. 
When Giers later on gives an overview of the whole debate he says that social justice 
has become a general social ethical postulate which has never been defined precisely: 
as postulate it encompasses the "demands which have their foundation in the natural 
rights of social groups and persons"31. 
46
 Nell-Breuning 1990,49-51. 
47
 Giers 1956, 61-74. In recent english language literature there is no evidence anyway that they 
are aware of the eventful history of the idea of iustitia socialis: Curran 1987,51-52 names three 
kinds of iustitia: commutative, distributive, and social justice; and in Curran 1985 (passim) the 
concept is used in an unproblematical way: this is true also for Dorrv 1983. Habiger 1990,103-126 
is clearly an exception. 
41
 This is clear in Pieper's schema 1954,139 and in his expositions esp. in the chapters "Grund-
formen der Gerechtigkeit" (57-65) and "Die Gerechtigkeit des Regierens" (75-111). There is no 
room for a "principium directivum" which would oblige and/or favor all social agents in view of 
the bonum commune (cf Gundlach 1931/2, kol 1616). 
4
* Calvez 1961, 202-203; cf nt 35; Habiger 1990,120-122. This limitation of iustitia socialis to 
the economic order is not in line with my research. 
50
 Höffner 1935, 32-34, 38, 63 and 74-80; cf Giers 1956,70-71. Vonlanthen 1973, 37-38 opts 
for this position too arguing that iustitia generalis as such only becomes concrete in a large volume 
of positive legislation. St. Thomas expresses this sentiment also in S. Th. Π-Π, q 58, a 5 and 6; cf 
Calvez 1961,191. Vonlanthen ultimately rejects the concept of iustitia socialis because he believes 
it would lead to a "messianic task" for the state: 265-267. 
51
 Giers 1976, 94-97. GS 29 links iustitia socialis and fairness; and so St Thomas' idea is back: 
that justice is more than what the law requires: S.Th. Π-Π, q 120, a 2, Resp and ad 1; as far as I 
know only the Dutch authors explicitly refer to the relation with epikeia: Hentzen 1933, 267 and 
Keulemans 1937, 321. 
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Justice is the attitude to give to each what is his due: its aim is to assure each person a 
just position in society so that everyone will be enabled to reach the ultimate goal of 
life within the community32. Starting from this basic principle Haring states that 
iustitia socialis is an expansion of the obligations based on justice, if compared to he 
traditional tripartite division. This iustitia demands that also the individual must, 
without waiting for a law to be enacted, give to one who needs help, from his 
superabundance, to which he has a natural right; i.e. he must give what the person 
needs to live a life worthy of a human being. What used to be seen as an obligation of 
charity is now seen as an obligation of the virtue of justice. These are rights which are 
not based on laws; they are based on the natural rights of society and its members". 
Haring affirms the tendency of the ideas of the solidarist school. But he concludes quite 
rightly that the true vision of social justice presupposes that man is prepared to accept 
happily the consequences of his responsibility and that he is "a morally mature man"54. 
With that a decisive step has been taken in relation to Leo's ideas such as I presented 
them in chapter Г , because there was as yet no mention of "maturity in the moral 
sense". Based on the way I read the encyclical and based on the intentions of the 
authors from the solidarist school I accept Häring's interpretation. 
Iustitia socialis demands of all social and political agents, demands of individual 
persons and their associations, that they do justice to individual people in their social 
functioning and that they take the bonum commune as guide-line for social activity, if 
need be even without being forced to do so by legal sanctions. It means a constant 
search by man and society in an ever changing social reality, from a sense of justice 
which is deeply rooted and apparently ineradicable: a search for what it means 
concretely and for what it demands in legislation, policy, and personal action so that 
social relationships and institutions can be such that they give everyone the best 
possible chance for development55. It demands a redistribution of property and power 
52
 S Th Π-Π, q 58, a 1; Zagar 1991,158-159. 
55
 Haring 1961,518-521; cf nt 15. Not for nothing QA 4 and 137 make the distinction between 
caritas and iustitia, based on the traditional adage "Caritas non obligat cum gravi incommode 
ideoque caritas non obligat cum tanto incommode ас iustitia": Kol 1953, 400. See for the relation 
between coritos socialis and iustitia socialis also Höffner 1935, Link 1955,108-112, andHabiger 
1990,111-113; however, what is said in nt 49 remains true. 
54
 Häring 1961, 523. This opinion is confirmed in CA 13: it is the error of socialism that "...the 
concept of the person as the autonomous subject of moral decision disappears, the very subject 
whose decisions build the social order." 
55
 Giers 1976, 108-110 points out that iustitia socialis is understood ever more "institutionally" 
after the second world wan it refers to the personal decisions as well as the socio-economic-political 
situation which needs to be organized by state and society so that individual persons and groups can 
satisfy their justifiable demands. It remains true that catholic social doctrine, also in iustitia socialis, 
does not lay down concrete norms. The concretization is left to (personal) political assessment and 
individual moral judgments: Kroh 1982,124-126. See also Nell-Breuning 1987, 362 about social 
doctrine as "System offener Sätze", as a consistent and coherent hierarchy of truths, which does not 
provide rigid and detailed norms, but which rather indicates a direction. This is in line with the 
choice of Vatican Π that the church does not "semper de singulis quaestionibus responsum in 
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tending towards their proportional distribution among associations and individual 
persons56. 
And so the individual person gets a central position: iustitia socialis expects something 
from him and/or gives him something. This interpretation implies that the principle of 
subsidiarity is firmly rooted in Quadragesimo anno: it fits in the framework of the 
encyclical as a whole, which is also the encyclical of iustitia socialis (QA 126). The 
principles mutually refer to each other. 
3 The Organologica! Vision 
Quadragesimo anno is based on an organologica! vision of society: that is clear not 
only because it refers to society as a body, but especially because of the vision on 
which this is based. The encyclical even speaks about a "real social body" ("corpus 
vere sociale et organicum") in which a social legislation and the cooperation of 
industries (and of intellect, capital, and labor) are preconditions for successful human 
action (QA 69). In this way we see a special use of the organologica! concept. 
But first I want to show the usual application, the more often used interpretation and 
use of the organologica! concept in catholic social philosophy at the end of the 19th 
century and the first half of this century37: we can find this in Quadragesimo anno 83-
85. "Order" is defined as a "well-ordered multitude": as an a priori it is stated that 
social order demands elements which can build that order58. "A right order" means for 
society that "a multitude of members of the social body are joined together by a strong 
bond". The unifying element in society is especially the profession or the sector where 
one works, just as the fact that people live close to each other makes the municipality 
promptu habeat", but "lumen revelationis cum omnium peritia conjungere cupit" (GS 33); this is 
in line with the desire of "adult believers" to make their own (moral) choices. The Dutch bishops 
suggested that this point of departure of social doctrine be used in the "moral doctrine about 
marriage and family": bishop Ernst proposed this in the Synod about the family in 1980 and the 
Bishop's Conference did it in its contribution to the Extraordinary Synod (1985): Synode 1985,269 
(where there is an incorrect reference to GS 22). 
5 4
 It is a pity that CA does not systematically develop the mutual relationships between bonum 
commune and iustitia socialis and their meaning as it had been arrived at in QA. The term iustitia 
socialis is hardly mentioned (we find it in CA 19 where it is linked with democracy). The concept 
of bonum commune is explained in CA 40 (as "common goods") and in CA 47. 
5 7
 Giers 1966, 58-61; Ziegenfuss 1956. 
5 1
 This is stated in QA 84 with an appeal to S t Thomas. Nell-Breuning 1932, 159 states that 
"order" in S t Thomas does not mean uniformity: in a mountain of sand there is no "order" in the 
strict sense of the word, because it does not make any difference where the individual grains of sand 
are. "Order" asks for a structure of parts with defined functions. To prove this in St. Thomas he 
refers to M. Grabmann's study Kulturphilosophie des hl. Thomas (Augsburg 1925). The references 
in QA 84 to Contra Genies Ш, 71 and S Th I, q 62, a 2 do not seem to be chosen very well: those 
texts deal rather with the meaning of the difference regarding the "gradus bonitatis", and not about 
the unity in harmonious (organical) linkage. Even though the literal content of the idea which is here 
ascribed to St Thomas does not appear in i t a reference to Contra Gentes Π, 39 ("Quod dislinctio 
rerum non est a casu") or to S Th, q, 47 a 1 and q. 15 a 2 would have made more sense. 
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an important element to bring order in the administrative-political sphere. Social order 
as a whole exists in the unity of the various parts through the bond of unanimous 
cooperation for the bonum сошлите. Such a unity is not built up by organizations 
which are based on opposite interests; therefore, not by the classes". Such unity is built 
up by the ordines: the organizations of the branches of industry which have an 
important and lasting function in society (one can think e.g., "the oil industry" or "the 
agricultural business"). There is an internal unity because of their specific task in 
society, and this task exists for the bonum commune. The ordines lend a structure to 
the corpus sociale, they are its membra. 
The first intention of the vision with these ordines or "vocational groups" and their role 
in society60 can be summarized this way: important are the possibilities for develop· 
ment of the social forces so that they can themselves organize and govern the various 
areas of human culture, including the economic order. The encyclical wants to stress, 
against liberalism and as a conclusion of the ideas about iustitia socialis, that society 
and the economy need ordering; it wants to stress against socialism that this order must 
be realized in society itself and not in a centralistic way by the state61. But at present 
there are no organizations which can take on this structuring of society and play an 
* For the rest, the encyclical does recognize that there can be different interests within the various 
ordines: QA 85; cf Nell-Breuning 1932,162-163. The encyclical does not demand the abolition of 
unions (cf QA 36) and sees a possibly positive role for class struggle as a "honest discussion of 
interests, based on the desire for justice" (QA 114). Pius' ideas are different in this of the ideas from 
the corporatist trend; that is why he uses the term ordines rather than corpora according to Calvez 
1961.514. 
60
 For an overview of the development of the line of reasoning before QA: Lelieveld 1965; for the 
real importance which was attached to the ordines, e.g., in the circle of the solidarists: Gundlach 
1957; Rauscher 1958; Schwarte 1975,513-527; Ruhnau 1980,163-173. The discussion about the 
berufsständische Ordnung existed concretely in the practical economic and social politics in the 
timeof the Weimar Republic (1919-1933): Stegmann 1969,462-464; id. 1974,157-162 and 174-
187. The theoretical defense of this position had been done by Gundlach in the years before QA 
(Schwarte 1975,494-507; cf Gundlach 1932/3, 238-240) and had been briefly formulated by the 
then Nuncio Pacelli in 1929: "uns aus der Auseinanderstezung zwischen den Klassen zur 
einträchtigen Zusammenarbeit der Stände empor zu arbeiten". Gundlach preserved this formulation 
in his translation of QA 81, even though it is not a literal translation: Nell-Breuning 1932,148; cf 
Gundlach 1931,113 (=QA 81); cf Nell-Breuning 1971/2,121 and id. 1971/1,133. 
61
 QA 81-87. Gundlach summarized the meaning of this vision on the task of the ordines in society 
in this way: "Was die katholische Lehre vielmehr will und neuerdings durch de Enzyklika 
Quadragesimo anno wiederum laut verkündet, ist die Entfaltung der gesellschaftlichen 
Eigenkräfie zur Selbstordnung und Selbstverwaltung der einzelnen Bezirke menschlicher Kultur, 
also auch des Wirtschaftslebens. Darin liegt der staatspolitische Sinn der berufssländischen Parole 
des Heiligen Vaters, dass er einerseits gegenüber dem individualistischen Liberalismus daran 
festhält, dass die Entwicklung gesellschaftlichen Lebens, auch des Wirtschaftslebens, durch 
gesellschaftliche Einrichtungen stetig geordnet werden müsse, dass er aber anderseits gegenüber 
dem Staatssozialismus diese Ordnungsaufgabe in erster Linie den Selbstverwaltungseinheiten der 
Gesellschaft und nicht den zentralistischen Spitzen des Staates zuweist": in Gundlach 1932, 
305-306 (italics in the original); cf Schwarte 1975,517-524. 
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important role therein, directed towards the bonum commune, because the two large 
classes have opposite interests. Their social role must be taken over by the ordines. 
The second intention of the vision is to underline that conflict and division of the 
classes and of the various partial interest groups (e.g., industry and agriculture with 
respect to each other and to the environment, if I may call that a partial interest) should 
not be the final characteristic of society62. Furthermore one can see in a social order, 
which is organized in this way, the advantage that people are given their own proper 
place in society much more clearly than if they were seen as members of a class63. 
If the ordines function and iustitia socialis plays its role in society, then it is a "cor-
pus", and it can even be compared to the mystical body of Christ (Eph. 4,16) where 
each member has its own role and where cooperation leads to growth and the building 
up of the whole64: the parts play a constitutive role for the whole. 
In all these passages the interest of society as a whole is central, in what we called the 
then generally accepted interpretation of the organological concept. But this interpreta-
tion is not the only one possible. The solidarist school always used the organological 
concept for society in an analogous and very careful way. Gundlach had fundamental 
questions about it because of the collectivist tendencies present in it65. Looked at from 
62
 Calvez 1961, 530-536: where it is added that the interest of the national economy must have 
priority. It should not be dependent on anonymous processes but must be based on "co-operation 
et co-responsabilité". The interest of the national economy is also the interest of the bonum commu-
ne; this provides a basis for possible intervention of the state in the economy. That is the position 
also in CA 48. In CA 37-38 attention is given to the importance of the environment 
"NeU-Breuning 1932,166. In this way we have the elements for an answer to Aubert's question 
(Aubert 1970,17-18 (+nt 23): why in catholic circles corporatist ideas are received so benevolently 
(cf Π, nt 49). They offer a model for the structuring of society which leaves room for individual 
persons, but does not leave him a solitary being: GS 26. And in this way CA 13,15 and 48 underline 
again the importance of intermediary groups and in CA 49 their function is described. 
ы
 See the summary of QA 90. NeU-Breuning 1972, 120-123, and 130-134 regrets that the 
important social function of the ordines in QA has been explained often as preparation for or 
support of the fascist order in Italy, Austria, Portugal, and Spain; it is clearly a wrong interpretation: 
Gundlach 1932/2, 313; Isensee 1968, 27. The passages are directed against the (upcoming) 
totalitarian states and the idea is to safeguard the function of a free society, with a minimal role for 
the state. QA 84 is very clear about this: as unifying force in society is indicated not a strong state 
authority, but common activities (as basis of the various ordines) and the direction towards the 
bonum commune. Numbers 91-96 clearly reject Mussolini's politics, however carefully formulated: 
Nell-Breuning 1932,173-177; Jostock 1961, 141; Calvez 1961, 522. However, Dorr indicates a 
possible divergence of interpretation between Nell-Breuning and Pius (Dorr 1983,61, nt 30) but 
he does not seem to know that these passages in QA are the only ones which Pius himself wrote 
(NeU-Breuning 1971/1,119-120). 
" Giers 1966,54-58; Ruhnau 1980,155-163; Gundlach 1932/2,1614; Gundlach 1942/2, 110: 
"Die menschliche Gesellschaftlichkeit kann nicht auf eine ursprüngliche Struktur nach Art eines 
lebendigen Organismus zurückgeführt werden, die das natürliche oder übernatürliche Leben der 
menschliche Gattung besasse; und zwar so, dass die einzelnen -ganz und gar Glieder des 
Organismus-mehr passiv von der Ganzheit des Organismus getragen würden, als dass sie aktiv in 
personaler Selbstbestimmung das Gesellschaftliche Leben begründeten (organizistische Schulen in 
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the viewpoint of the traditional interpretation - but not from the solidarist one - it is a 
break-through to find also the following application of the organologica! concept. 
Without "corpus sociale verum", human activity cannot function optimally (QA 69). 
But that one body is not the goal; it is the underlying complement and reinforcement of 
the "members", the various branches of industry, needed for man to reach his 
wellbeing. The economic order must be in service to the welfare of individual persons 
(QA 75). We see here the "mutual constitutive relationships with each other and with 
the whole", about which we spoke before66 as a refinement of the organologica! 
concept The awareness of the danger of centralism in the organologica! concept 
resounds in the encyclical: the ordines are, therefore, indicated as being "autonomous" 
("consortia iure proprio utentia")"7. 
This tendency is consistently continued in the formulation of the principle of subsidiari-
ty (QA 79-80). The organologica! concept is used here too. Literally it is said that the 
"membra socialis corporis" must be supported by the functioning of state and society: 
they should not be absorbed by it or eliminated. The whole and the unity are not central 
as the goal of the concept, they are only means. Normally the members build the body, 
but here it is stated that the body does not exist for itself: it exists for the edification of 
the members! 
That is the difference with the vision of Leo: in his way of thinking we did not find a 
mutual constitutive relationship between the parts and the whole. That is why we 
concluded that Leo's organologica! vision does not give a foundation for the principle 
of subsidiarity. For Pius it is the opposite: in a central part of his encyclical his vision 
on society, which must be seen as an organologica! concept, leads directly to the 
principle of subsidiarity. And so we see here, as we said in other chapters, that the 
organologica! concept can be an instrument for an anti-authoritarian and anti-centralis-
tic vision on man and society. 
4 The Principle of Subsidiarity 
4.1 A new term 
The central subject of this research appears to be relatively new, as a formulated 
principle. Even though for example Höffner and von Nell-Breuning try to prove that 
der Soziologie; gewisse theologische Lehrmemungen über den mystischen Leib Christi, die 
Kirche)"; cf Gundlach 1945, 426 and Gundlach 1964/Π, 203-204; see also I, nt 12. 
"CfLÖ. 
" Nell-Breuning 1986,112 (and id. 1971,132-134) continuously underlined the importance of 
the ordines and the berufsständische Ordnung, notwithstanding all the problems of the past with 
the exact meaning and the concretization. Fiercely he states that he sees the intentions with regard 
to the "berufsständische Ordnung für fortschrittlich, freiheitlich, ausgesprochenermassen demokra-
tisch, für antiintidivualistisch, kurz und gut für richtig". He distances himself somewhat from the 
concrete society model of QA by describing it as an ideal, but he says that he did this already in 
1931: Nell-Breuning 1971/1, 132 and 1971/2, 122. 
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the concept is very old and really already appears in St. Thomas68, this idea does not 
seem to be historically correct. The issue of the principle of subsidiarity, i.e., the 
relation between the individual person and the associations in which he lives, and then 
their mutual relationships, develops in the course of history. This goes together with 
the formulation of basic human rights and with the liberal-individualistic vision of 
man69. AP. Utz made the modem character of it clear70. Older reference works do not 
know the principle of subsidiarity: one can find it only after 19457'! It seems that after 
Ketteler and Buss, a continuing line of Jesuits beginning with Taparelli and 
Liberatore72 and continuing with V. Cathrein (1854-1931) laid the foundations for it73. 
" Höffner 1956,60 (nt 8) reacts to Utz 1953/2,7 who says that liberalism creates the precondi-
tions in relation to the principle of subsidiarity. Höffner believes that the principle of subsidiarity can 
be found already in St. Thomas (in Pol. Π, lect. 5), in Dante (Monarchia 1,14), and in the curialists 
of the 14th century. Nell-Breuning 1990, 87-88 names these people also. Linnan 1989, 419-421 
makes the enlightening distinction in this difference of opinion, between the principle of subsidiarity 
as an explicitly formulated principle of social philosophy and as a (much older) "rule of common 
sense". 
"Herzog 1987, 3564; Listi 1987, 3374; Kaufmann 1988, 280; Komonchak 1988, 298, nt 1. Cf 
Г , nt 21. 
1 0
 Utz 1953/2,7 and Utz 1956/1,52 sees the modem roots of the principle of subsidiarity clearly. 
He sees the first signs in Taparelli: "Es ist ein gefahrlich individualistisches Unterfangen, die 
Sozialphilosophie mit absoluten und aprioristischen Individualrechten beginnen zu wollen, wie dies 
in der christlichen Gesellschaftslehre nun seit dem -an sich grossangelegten und epochemachenden-
Werk Luigi Taparellis Brauch geworden ist": Utz 1956/2, 18. A new dement enters in catholic 
tradition with the principle of subsidiarity: the basic human rights which are prior to the state. Utz 
believes that a "contra-distinctio" between the individual person and community, viz., the state, 
based on this, does not fit the christian ethical tradition. The same is true in the idea that the bonum 
commune is at the service of the development of the individual person. In this he shows himself to 
be opposed to the fundamental options of Leo ХПІ, Pius DC, and Pius ХП, according to Bertrams 
1955,544, id. 1957/1,546 and id. 1957/2,608-610. Utz tries ingeniously to nuance the opposition 
by stating that the papal declarations must be understood in their historical context and in view of 
the fact that human nature is affected by original and personal sin, and that they should not be seen 
as scientific statements: Utz 1956/2,21. Cf nt 108. 
7 1
 "Principle of subsidiarity" or "subsidiary" in the meaning these terms receive in QA do not 
appear as independent subjects in the 5th edition of the Staatslexikon, which does contain 
GundOach's article about solidarism (Gundlach 1931/2, where he himself also does not mention the 
principle of subsidiarity); G.Eibers formulates the principle in his article "Staat" (Bd Г , kol 1831). 
One does not find it either in the Dictionaire de Theologie Catholique (E.Amman, ed), Paris 1941, 
or The Catholic Encyclopedia, New York 1912. "Principle of subsidiarity" appears in the 6th 
edition (1962) of the Staatslexikon Bd П, an article by Nell-Breuning, kol 826-833; in the 3rd 
edition (1962) oiDie Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart Bd VI, an article by W.Weber, kol 
455-456. 
n
 Wallenstätter 1976,58-60; cf Г , 3 for the liberal influence on both of them. 
n
 Wallenstätter 1976, 60-66; Cathrein 1897, kol. 239: "Die jeweilige höhere Organisation 
(province or state; AL.) hat nicht die Aufgabe die vorhergehenden aufzuheben oder überflüssig zu 
machen, sondern zu unterstützen, zu ergänzen und mit allen übrigen Elementen in Eintracht und 
Frieden zu erhalten." 
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Th. Meyer sj (1821-1913) and Pesch frequently used the idea of the principle of 
subsidiarity as well as the adjective "subsidiary", and they are the first. 
Meyer uses the adjective "subsidiary" in two problems74. First was the eventual 
intervention of the state in the economic order. Connecting with Rerum novarum, he 
said that the state has an additional and subsidiary role when private "caritas" is not 
sufficient to meet existing needs75. The second problem was that of education: the 
primary responsibility for it lies with parents and church; a possible support for 
education by the state plays a secondary, subsidiary role which does not limit the 
primary right to take care of education but rather supports it. In the text concerned 
Meyer also explained what he understood the subsidiary role in general to be: a 
supporting role, where individual activity falls short76. 
Pesch too knew the concept and the theme of the subsidiary role of the state77. 
It would lead us too far to examine why (motivated in history and as to content) both 
began to use the adjective "subsidiary", more or less at the same time, in the new socio-
philosophical meaning78. We could posit as an hypothesis that they gave the state an 
74
 Meyer's role has not received any attention in the literature as far as I know: Link 195S and 
WaDenstätter 1976, who both treat the historical development of the principle of subsidiarity, do not 
mention him! Cathrein and Meyer stand at the origin of the systematic founding of social ethics on 
a neo-scholastic basis in the German speaking countries according to Langner 1974/1,73. 
75
 Meyer 1900,640-650. 
76
 Id., nr 665, especially: "Ad finem naturalem societatis civilis pertinet non solum iuris ordinem 
'efficaciter custodire, sed insuper communem prosperítatem civUem positive promovere, id vero 
tantum intra limites Alius ordinis, Le. ñeque légitimant privatorum libertatem et socialem activitatem, 
neque ulta quae in societate organice exstant et vigent iura absorbendo, sed condiciones publice 
necessaria* compiendo, quibus prosperitatis civilis assecutio, quantum fieri possit, cunctis vel 
possibflis vel expedidor et facüior leddatur. Omnis igitur cura publica communem civium prosperíta-
tem positive promovendi subsidiaria sit oportet, nempe spontaneam privatorum activitatem 
socialem ad commune bonum publico succursu in iis rebus complens, in quibus ilia per se sola 
viribus impar aut quomodocumque insufficiens apparet": that is the "principium generale" (italics 
in the originai, AL·). The word "subsidiary" can be found also in Meyer 1885, 316, where he posits 
that government and policy must be directed first of all to convince people rationally "nee nisi 
secundario et quasi subsidiarle tantum ad ignorabiliora psycho logica momenta recurratur, puta vel 
ad fomenta passionum,..., vel ad inclinationes ..., vel denique ad timorem poenarum et coercitivi 
apparatus." Hentzen 1935,667, says that Meyer calls state authority "próvida institutorum socialium 
promotrix aut suprema et subsidiaria directrix", but there is no reference given and I have not been 
able to find this beautiful formulation (more is the pity). 
77
 Link 1955, 34-38, Mueller 1980, 89-90, 93 and 174; Ruhnau 1980, 115,117-119, 157, 167 
and 213; WaUenstätter 1976, 66-68; cf nt 29. 
71
 "Subsidiarisch" was a word which was used in German before: Brockhaus Konversationslexikon 
(14th, 1908/1920) mentions it in Bd 15: "subsidiarisch: zur Aushilfe dienend", serving as a help. 
The same meaning is given by Duden, Rechtschreibung der deutschen Sprache (9e, 1919) 470 for 
"subsidiary". Meyers Konversationslexikon (5th, 1897) Bd 16, 554 gives: "subsidiaire Haftung: 
Haftung dritter Personen (Eltern, Dienstherrschaft u. dgl.) für die durch den Schuldigen verwirkte 
Geldstrafe": accountability of third parties (parents, employers) for an incurred fine. Der grosse 
Brockhaus 1980 (18th), Bd 11, ρ 165 gives: "subsidiäres Recht": "Recht das erst dann angewendet 
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important role in society, but that it is a supporting role, a representative role (the 
juridical meaning of "subsidiary"); but always with the recognition of an original right 
of individual persons or associations. This demands of the state a certain reservation in 
its important role (the socio-philosophical meaning). For the moment we only want to 
show that the use of the concept was known to Gundlach and von Nell-Breuning from 
the writings of their confreres. Before 1931 they seem to have used it rarely79. 
42 Subsidiarity in the text of the encyclical 
The encyclical formulates the principle of subsidiarity in nrs. 79 and 80.1 want to make 
an analysis of these passages but we need to look first at their place within the encycli-
cal. First come the reflections on the distribution of goods and on a just wage and that 
relates mostly to individual persons, according to Pius; then he wants to speak about 
the order of society as such. And so begins the central part of the encyclical, because 
the sub-title of the encyclical appears here in the text (QA 76). The aim is "to found an 
order according to sound philosophical principles and its perfection according to the 
principles of the Gospel". Needed for this is a reformation of institutions, of structures 
but also an improvement in morality (QA 77). The moral changes will be treated Jater 
(from QA 128 on) but first Pius proposed structural changes. 
These touch three questions: the role of the state, the task of the ordì nes and social 
justice as the "principium directivum" of the economic order. The guilty party of the 
present "disorder" is indicated at the beginning and at the end of this part (QA 78 and 
97), individualism. That brought about the loss of the former ordering of society which 
was based on a multitude of associations (such as guilds and orders) which integrated 
the individual person in the whole of society. The inability to give the growing masses 
a place in this system and the desire for economic freedom killed this system. 
If one objects that there are still many organizations, one does not realize, according to 
the encyclical, that these organizations are mostly involved in defending one's own 
interests and lack a community-building function; they do not create bonds between 
persons80. Imaginarily one could say that society is no longer a symphonic totality, but 
wird, wenn eine best andere Rechtsquelle keine Vorschrift enthält", a law which is applied only 
when a different source of law does not provide a ruling; and "Subsidiarität: Forni des Gesetzes-
konkurrenz: eine Norm beansprucht (ausdrücklich) Gültigkeit nur für den Fall, dass eine andere 
Norm nicht zum Zug kommt", a nomi is applicable only when another one is not In English (legal) 
language "subsidiary" means: acting as a supplement, in a secondary or auxiliary capacity. 
The original Latin meaning of "subsidium" is "help" in general, but especially used for auxiliary 
forces which are kept in reserve: Oxford Laiin Dictionary, Oxford 1976, Fase. 5, 1849. With the 
meaning of "auxiliary" the word is used also in the Code of 1917, с 916; the chapel which is used 
as "auxiliary" church for the parish church. 
19
 Cf nt 24. That NeD-Breuning does not refer to these confreres may be caused by the fact that he 
no longer possessed a (personal) archive of things from before the second world wan Nell-Breuning 
1968,100 and id. 1971/2,116. 
'° Camp 1969, 39 says that Pius simplifies matters by saying in QA 78 that there is only "the 
individual and the state"; cf Nell-Breuning 1932, 144-145. 
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rather a cacophony: there is no more structure". There are only individuals, the masses, 
and the state and, therefore, the state must take over all sorts of community tasks which 
before were fulfilled in society by associations. The desire for freedom and liberalism 
of the 18th and 19th century led, paradoxically, to an omnipotent state. That is the 
encyclical's vision: one tried to eliminate all power and authority from the society in 
favor of the freedom of the individual, but, because of that, the central authority, the 
state, only became more powerful (QA 97). Then there is the danger that the state itself 
is subject to economic interests (QA 109). The individual person then falls into 
economic and political impotence! The individual is freed from many bonds, but the 
associations which have a task for society and possess their own authority are gone: the 
road to a totalitarian state is open*2. 
Pius seems to say that, in opposition to such a disorder and impotence, the freedom of 
the person, his integration in society and his own proper tasks in relation to the 
common interest, must be given a new form. The encyclical says: human freedom, yes; 
but not in an individualistic sense. 
How this freedom should be realized in society according to the encyclical follows in 
the next two paragraphs (QA 78 and 79) where the principle of subsidiarity is formula-
ted. Solidarism's vision on the human being is presupposed here because, if one looks 
for a philosophical or theological vision on the person in the encyclical one will not 
find any systematic exposition of it: it lies in von Nell-Breuning's, Gundlach's and the 
other members of the Königswinterer Kreis' solidarism as a common vision on society. 
The principle of subsidiarity is formulated in one long sentence". I will first discuss the 
different parts. 
Pius admits that, because of changed historical circumstances, certain activities can no 
longer be done by smaller associations; a larger group is needed. Yet, there remains an 
" QA 78: "... ut prostrata ас paene extincta locupleto illa et quondam per diversi generis consociati-
ones composite evoluta vita sociali, fere soli remanserint singulares homines et res publica, haud 
parvo ipsius rei publicae detrimento, quae amissa forma regiminis socialis susceptisque oneribus 
omnibus,...". 
M
 Jostock 1961,133; Nell-Breuning 1932,141-145. On ρ 142 Nell-Breuning refers to his own 
article which was (already then) entitled: "Zur Krise des Versorgungsstaates"; Schweizerische 
Rundschau, Mai 1932! 
" QA 79: "Nam etsi verum est, idque historia luculenter ostendit, ob mutatas rerum condiciones 
multa nunc non nisi a magnis consociationibus posse praestari, quae superiore aetate a parvis etiam 
praebebantur, fixum tamen immotumque manet in philosophie sociali gravissimum illud principium 
quod neque moveri neque mutari potest: sicut quae a singularibus hominibus proprio marte et 
propria industria possunt perfici, nefas est eisdem eripere et communitati demandare, ita quae a 
minoribus et inferioribus communitatibus effici praestarique possunt, ea ad maiorem et altiorem 
societatem avocare iniuria est simulque grave damnum ас recti ordinis perturbatio; cum socialis 
quaevis opera vi naturaque sua subsidium afferre membris corporis socialis debeat, numquam vero 
eadem destruere et absorbere". 
QA 80: "... quo perfectius, servato hoc "subsidiarii" officii principio, hierarchicus inter diversas 
consociationes ordo viguerit, eo praestantiorem fore socialem et auctoritatem et efficientiam, eoque 
felicioremque rei publicae statum." 
79 
inviolable principle in social philosophy. Traditionally it is named "the highest" or "the 
most important", even though the Latin word "gravissimum" could also be translated as 
"very important". But it is the only principle which is underlined in this way in the 
encyclical. "Gravissimum" is not used for the bonum commune nor for social justice, 
and that is significant84! 
The principle follows. First of all it is unjust ("nefas est") not to let individual people 
do what they can do on their own initiative and under their own power, but to entrust it 
to a community. This is stated without proof but it seems there are three motives for it: 
one can be found in the encyclical and has been mentioned already in Rerum 
novarum: the idea that man exists prior to the state, and the same is true for the 
family85. This is an historical right which has been given a political-philosophical 
formulation in the modem idea that "man is in himself subject of rights, not 
dependent on the state", that man has basic rights with respect to the state and that 
society and state have to be thought of with individual persons as the base on 
which they are built". 
Also in the encyclical, in the discussion about socialism, we find that man, with his 
orientation towards society, has been created by God in that society and under an 
authority which God has put over him, in order to grow towards the fullness of his 
potential for the greater glory of God and in order to reach his temporal and eternal 
happiness by faithfully doing his job and living his vocation87. 
The third one is the scholastic axiom omne agens agendo perficitur meaning that 
every self-active being develops in action and thereby realizes itself. If a communi-
ty, therefore, takes away tasks from individual persons, it takes away the possibility 
for them to develop, to become who they are to be88. 
Then Pius calls it unjust and a damaging disturbance of the right social order ("inuria 
est simulque grave damnum ac recti ordinis perturbatio") if activities are taken away 
"Rauscher 1958,16, nt4; Nell-Breuning 1968,113; Wallenstätter 1976, 21. Bertrams 1957/3, 
585 points out that the translation of "gravissimum" into "the most important" is based in the 
authorized Vatican German translation of QA and can thus be found also in Gundlach 1931/1,113. 
15
 QA 49; Nell-Breuning 1932,147. 
•*Utzl953/2,8;cflV,3. 
17
 QA 118: "Nam secundum christianam doctrinam homo, sociali natura praeditus, in his terris 
coDocatur, ut in societate et sub auctoritate a Deo ordinata, vitam ducens, omnes suas facúltales in 
laudem et gloriam Creatoris sui piene excolat evolvatque, atque artis aliusve vocalionis suae muñere 
fideliter fugendo temporalem simul et aetemam sibi compare! felicitatem". Küchendorf 1953, 75 
and Schasching 1988, 420-423 rightly see in these lines the foundation for the principle of 
subsidiarity in the encyclical itself, where QA 79-80 hardly provides one. 
n
 Klliber 868-869; Nell-Breuning 1990,82-83. 
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from smaller and "lower" communities and given to a 'larger and higher societas'*9. 
There is no elaboration of this but the argument seems clean 
first of all this is about activities where concrete persons are involved, where 
concrete persons give direction; thus, it follows from what has been said in the 
previous part of the sentence90; 
it is about the family which also has the same historical rights in relation to the 
state; 
it is about associations of which it has already been said that it is sad that they have 
disappeared in the course of time. 
This way the negative formulation of the principle of subsidiarity is given: what should 
not be done according to this principle. This negative formulation is often used as the 
formulation to defend individual persons and associations against central authority. 
The positive formulation, which in the text functions as argument for the negative 
formulation, has a more general vision and is stated in one concise part of the sentence: 
"every social activity must, by its very essence and nature, give support to the members 
of the social body" Ç'subsidium offene"). This is closed off with another negative 
determination: such an activity may never "destroy or absorb the members". The next 
paragraph (QA 80) underlines that especially the state must be aware of what is said 
and must leave many activities to institutions in society, and that the state will then be 
more capable of fulfilling the tasks which are proper to it and for which it is responsi-
ble. And then the principle is given its name: "subsidiara officii principium", the 
principle of the supporting role. 
What then is the meaning of the principle of subsidiarity in the encyclical? Von Nell-
Breuning says quite rightly that the principle of subsidiarity is a one-sided principle (in 
opposition to the principle of solidarity): it only speaks about how the whole should 
relate to the parts91! The relation should be such that the functioning of the society as a 
whole, of institutions and groups therein, and finally of the state is directed towards the 
development of the individual person. The point of departure is the development of the 
individual person, who yet does not have to rely on himself alone92. That same idea is 
"Kaufmann 1988,280-287 takes Üüs "higher" and "lower" literally as if the encyclical bases itself 
on a society which is totally hierarchically built-up in which an ever more enlarged association of 
peopfc takes on a status which is ever more qualitatively impressive. The encyclical bases itself on 
at least two ordos side by side: the ordines and the local association (like the municipality; cf nr. 3 
andGundbch 1957,1128). Furthermore, not all associations (cf QA 87) are in relation as "whole" 
and "part": soccer associations, mutuals, automobilist associations: they exist all within the one 
society (see also Nefl-Breuning 1990,110-111). But within one national football association (or an 
international one) it is possible for the principle of subsidiarity to function: the organizations exist 
in order that individual people in the context of their own team can play football. 
90
 KUchendorf 1953,71-73; Bertrams 1957,16-17. 
91
 NeU-Breuning 1972, 25. 
92
 QA 118. Kaufmann 1988, 280 says that "it is a matter for discussion whether this principle of 
the priority of the person to society is part of the principle of subsidiarity, or is instead one of its 
premisses". In the given argument here it seems mostly a presupposition, which is given specifically 
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the basis for the view on iustitia socialis in this encyclical and is broadly examined in 
solidarism. 
Pius was consistent in this and in 1937 he developed it further: society exists for man 
and not the other way around. Ibis should not be understood in an individualistic-
liberal way but demands mutual cooperation (in "organic" connection); the state can 
enforce obligations in relation to society, but must recognize basic rights93. 
In a positive sense the principle of subsidiarity means that the concrete person is the 
point of departure for all social activity: it is directed to his fulfillment. Therefore, he 
should be given all possible freedom. The principle of subsidiarity is "the refuge for 
freedom" ("Hort der Freiheit") says Jostock*4. It will be clear that all this is not 
intended in an individualistic way. The person may depend on the help of others and 
must himself be of service to others; in the encyclical the emphasis is on the structural 
via the various associations. For there is a common responsibility for society, and 
society itself must give a contribution to the fulfillment of the individual persons. 
It is clear that the principle of subsidiarity does not mean that every intervention of the 
state should be looked at suspiciously, and that the state, as in the liberal vision of the 
"night-watch-state", should do as little as possible. State activity is necessary where 
people, families, groups, or social institutions fall short in their abilities to fulfill their 
tasks. 
Summarizing one can also call the principle of subsidiarity a "Seins·", "Soilens-", and 
"Rechts-prinzip". It is an ontologica! principle because it starts from what man is95; it is 
an ethical principle because it indicates the way to act; it is a legal principle because it 
touches the question of who is responsible for what96. Such questions of competence 
are by their very nature legal questions97. The state is competent to judge the compe-
tencies because it is ultimately responsible for the bonwn commune, for which the 
individual persons and the associations are also accountable9*. 
In this context it can also be said that the principle of subsidiarity is the principle of 
competency to the principle of solidarity: subsidiarity presupposes solidarity. The first 
alone makes no sense; it can exist only within a society which is organized in solidarity. 
inQA118. 
93
 DR 27-30; cf Mit brennender Sorge 35: cf nt 98 (Kuylaars). 
94
 Jostock 1961, 135. 
91
 See the aforementioned three motives; cf Nell-Breuning 1968,113. 
94
 Gundlach 1957,1130-1131; Nell-Breuning 1987, 355. 
97
 Nell-Breuning 1990, 114-116. 
"QA 80; Nell-Breuning 1986,155-156; Nell-Breuning 1990, 111-113. Kuylaars 1957, 209-210 
rightly observes that the burden of proof for the justice of an intervention by the state is with the 
authority of the state, but also that the role of the state is to appeal to people and associations to take 
on their task in relation to the bonum commune when the case warrants iL The judgment about that 
is not left only to those involved because they can only have a limited vision of the bonum 
commune. He says, as does, e.g., Gundlach 1957, 1131, about the content of the principle of 
subsidiarity: "as much freedom as possible, as much authority as needed, as much society as 
possible, as much state as needed": o.e., 183-187. 
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Before one can speak about competency it must be clear that society is ready to assure 
the existence of the individual person and that there is "Gemeinhaftung'' and "Gemein­
verstrickung": man is directed to community and dependent on it The principle of 
subsidiarity formulates the content of the principle of solidarity for the structural-
organizational aspects of society99. 
As such it is a formal principle: it determines the presuppositions which are normative 
for the division of competencies. That does not yet say anything about who is compe­
tent100: is this person, this municipality, this association (already/still) able to fulfill a 
certain task or should a more encompassing whole do it? What is needed is a manageri­
al judgment, a process of weighing pros and cons, taking the bonum commune into 
consideration because there can be consequences for other people, municipalities or 
associations. The principle of subsidiarity is, therefore, not a formal principle which 
can be applied in all situations, but it presupposes the (organized) solidary will of 
people to support one another"". 
The principle of subsidiarity emphasizes the value of the individual person, of his 
fundamental rights and freedoms and also of the local and other associations in which 
this person is most directly involved: the modem bureaucratic and efficiency-oriented 
society, where pure financial-economic principles play a (too) large role, could too 
easily forget that interest and in fact often does so if we look at social and political 
alienation102. 
5 Conclusion 
Punt says that the positive acceptance of human rights begins with Pius XI and that 
there is a change in the way of thinking: 'It had to become clear that in the modem, 
pluriform 'Massengesellschaft' the value of the individual person can no longer be 
protected from the top down (through the alliance of the authority of the state with 
christian anthropological doctrines) but only from the bottom up (through the rights of 
the individual person with regard to the authority of the state)"103. The principle of 
subsidiarity must be understood against this background. I already said in the begin­
ning of this chapter that I think that Quadragesimo anno is the temporary end result of 
a development which began in the last century: the change can be seen there. In this 
encyclical the human struggle for freedom in this modem time is recognized: this 
recognition and the appreciation of the individual person are further developed in the 
coming encyclicals and in Vatican Π. But it is for the time being an end result because 
"Rauscher 1958,54-55; 101-103; 141-142. Cf Link 1955, 84-102, and Pfflrtner 1980,140. 
""Pfiirlner 1980,142. 
1,1
 Küchendorf 1953, 80-81; Wallenstatter 1979, 24-27; Isensee 1968, 28, 92, 103, 107. For a 
systematic and a somewhat formalized exposition, see: Schneider 1985,18-47. 
'
w
 In this context CA 47: "...distortions of political conduct create distrust and apathy, with a 
subsequent decline in the political participation and civic spirit of the general population, which feels 
abused and disillusioned. As a result, there is a growing inability to situate particular interests within 
the framework of a coherent vision of the common good". 
m
 Punt 1987,176 and 188-190. 
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it is not yet clear what this struggle means for the church with regard to her internal 
organization. 
The principle of subsidiarity presupposes the preponderant rights of the individual, 
which only developed since the 16th century. A decisive step in this development was 
the Copemican change in knowing and thinking which I. Kant succinctly stated and 
which brought man to see himself as an autonomous being whose freedom holds a 
central position. In an individualistic vision this leads to a vision of man who is lonely 
and feels himself responsible for his own development and the realization of his 
existence. This does not happen in catholic social doctrine. In the various 19th century 
authors we saw how problematic the liberal struggle for freedom was for them, how 
they rejected it because it was too individualistic in their eyes. Ketteler succeeded in 
integrating it in the catholic vision by eliminating its individualistic tendencies. Leo 
could only see it as characteristic of the economic order. For Pesch and Gundlach the 
emphasis in society was on the initiative and the responsible creativity of the individual 
person and the individual ordines; the state is given a supporting role. 
The principle of subsidiarity safeguards the position of the individual person without 
seeing him as an individualistic subject. That is the thesis of Quadragesimo anno. 
Society is directed towards the individual person, his development is central, but he 
may expect the support of larger and smaller associations in his development. Through 
these associations he must contribute his share and play a supporting social role for 
other people104. Here we see the second influence, after the liberal influence : the 
organologica! vision on society (in QA based on St. Thomas)105. That is why the 
associations, and especially the ordines, play such an important role in the encyclical. 
They prevent the "massification" and the individualization of society: their role is to 
push back the state'06. 
The vision of the accentuated role of the state could already be seen in our presentation 
of iustitia socialis. Because of the encompassing commission to bring about the bonum 
commune, the state should not involve itself in details; it is "the final guarantee of the 
unity and the permanence of society"107. 
The hypothesis of Isensee and the thesis of Utz seem to be confirmed: there has been a 
fundamental change in ecclesiastical thinking. The modem ideas about the value of the 
individual person characterize from now on the social doctrine of the church, starting 
,M
 A verbalization of this idea in a new theoretical context, namely, in dialog with J. Habermas, 
can be found in Höhn 1989,187-192. 
105
 Cf nt 58. 
106
 Rauscher 1963, 129 formulates: "Wo der Staat nicht mehr der notwendige organisatorische 
Koordinator der Gesellschan ist, sondern zum universalen Träger aller gesellschaftlichen Lebensäus-
serungen wird, ist es um die Freiheit des Menschen geschehen". 
""Gundlach 1932/4, 250. 
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from the irreplaceable value of the individual person and seeing in him also the final 
goal of society108. 
The position of political authority especially is really relativized in this encyclical in 
comparison to the political encyclicals of Leo ХШ. The primacy of authority is 
replaced by the primacy of freedom. The strong ethical authority which in Leo was so 
needed to bring all to the common goal, finds in Pius its role in the support for the 
development of the individual person, who (in Hänng's terminology) is "morally 
mature". In this way there is a distinction made between the ethical order and the legal 
order. That makes it possible for the free initiative of individual persons and associati-
ons to realize the moral and cultural goals of society on their own authority109. In this 
way we can say that every social order is built on the awareness of the responsibility of 
the individual person, who can develop, in free self determination, his own potential 
and talents, which are rooted in the security of his immediate surroundings110. 
101
 GS 25 posits: "Principium, subiectum et finis omnium institutorum socialium est et esse debet 
persona humana"! Gundlach says that for solidarism it is possible "dem gesunden Kern des in der 
Neuzeit aufkommenden Individualismus gerecht zu werden": Gundlach 1964/1,102. 
m
 Kuylaars 1957, 260 translates in this way in a positive manner the status quaestionis that the 
"present day liberal society, which proclaims a freedom of conscience and religion without giving 
it a content, is not able to form a common moral consciousness": Utz 1954, 281. 
110
 Kuylaars 1957, 301; cf the quotation of CA 13 in nt 54. 
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PART TWO: The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Structure 
of the Church 
VI The Principle of Subsidiarity Valid for the Church 
Itself? The Arguments 
1 Hierarchical Teaching Authority 
1.1 Pius ΧΠ 
The principle of subsidiarity is a constant reality in the vision of Pius ХП on state and 
society'. It can be found in several texts such as, e.g., his first encyclical letter Summi 
pontificatus (1939) and in the pithy formulation of 1956: "Civitas propter cives, non 
cives propter civitatem"1. He stated twice that the principle of subsidiarity is applicable 
to the church itself. 
First comes the important discourse of February 20, 1946 to the College of Cardinals'. 
Pius wants to show what the church's contribution is to a well-ordered society. The 
church aims at the formation and development of the concrete person. The church 
emphasizes the irreplaceable value of every person and is aware of his concrete 
historical situation. 
Modern imperialism is not interested in concrete persons but makes man subject to its 
aims. However, in line with the church's contribution to society, it is important that this 
concrete person is seen as the origin and the goal of society: that is why in Quadrage­
simo anno the principle of subsidiarity was given a place. And Pius then said that the 
principle of subsidiarity is also applicable to the church itself "without infringing on its 
hierarchical structure"4. 
This thesis is an integral part of his reasoning: the church takes care that the faithful 
will be responsible citizens in society and offers a lot to form and develop them, and 
1
 Kliiber 1968, 335-342; Weber 1977,337-342. 
1
 Summi Poniificatus: AAS XXXI (1939) 432-433; Nuntius radiophonie us to catholic 
physicians: AAS ХХХХ ПІ (1956) 679. 
3AAS ХХХ Ш (1946) 141-151. See for extensive commentaries on this address: Gundlach 1946; 
Nell-Breuning 1957; Nell-Breuning 1977; Krebs 1992,25-82. 
*AAS Lc. 144-145: after quoting QA 79 he says: "Parole veramente luminose, che valgono per la 
vita sociale in tutti i suoi gradi, ed anche per la vita della Chiesa, senza pregiudizio della sua struttura 
gerarchica". 
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the church finds its own goal in their fulfillment as believing people. Further on he 
added that lay people do not just belong to the church, but that they are the church1. 
It cannot be, therefore, as some interpreters say, that Pius was very reserved and 
hesitant about the validity of the principle of subsidiarity as applied to the church, 
because he uses the expression "without infringing"6; the thesis just fits too well in the 
structure of the discourse. One can say just as well that "without infringing" is a 
presupposition rather than a condition, as it is usually understood7. If Pius were not so 
convinced that the principle of subsidiarity is valid also for the church, he would "not 
be able to contrast the Church to imperialistic tendencies which deprive people of all 
responsibility and initiative"*. 
The second time he spoke explicitly about the validity of the principle of subsidiarity 
for the church was in his address to the Second World Congress of the Lay Apóstol ate 
in 19579. In the interpretation one can easily limit oneself to the passage which posits 
that the principle of subsidiarity means for church authority that it must entrust to lay 
people the matters which belong to the relation between church and world. They can 
do this just as well if not better than priests; one must recognize their own proper 
responsibility in fulfilling this task10. 
But this passage belongs in a wider vision, which is the same as that in the discourse of 
1946. All members of the church should be active: lay people are not a passive 
element The church is not a goal in itself because, just like other associations, it exists 
5
 O.e., 149. Gundlach 1946, 378 notes that this changes a concept of the church which is one-
sided. With that the application of the principle of subsidiarity was accepted by Pius as it was 
formulated by Gundlach in 1934: see 2.1.5. The influence of Gundlach on the address by Pius in 
1946 (which is certain now: Krebs 1992, 28-29) is affirmed quite clearly here; Nell-Breuning 
already showed that because of the thematic statement that the church is the "life-principle of 
society": Nell-Breuning 1977,263; on the importance of this theme in Gundlach: Schwarte 1975, 
199-245 and Krebs 1992,71-74. 
' Alberigo 1973, 43, nt 15; Mucci 1986, 434-435. Beyer 1986, 803 speaks wrongly about the 
"hypothesis" of Pius ΧΠ. 
7
 Nell-Breuning 1975,378 states about Pius' remark (and Klüber 1968, 896 repeats it): "Hierar-
chische Struktur der Kirche und Subsidiarität sind nicht Gegensätze, die sich ausschliessen, sondern 
einander ergänzende Wesenszüge der Kirche." Krebs 1992,56-57 posits comparable to this: "Wenn 
Pius ΧΠ feststellt dass das Subsidiaritätsprinzip für das Leben der Kirche 'ohne Nachteil fur deren 
hierarchischen Struktur gilt1, so wird aus den voraufgegangenen Erörterungen deutlich, dass die 
hierarchische Struktur der Kirche hier nicht den Ausgangspunkt der Betrachtung, sondern ihren 
komplementären Aspekt bildet". Gundlachs' own position in this is similar with that of 
Nell-Breuning: cf nt 5 and Krebs o.e., 75. 
* Komonchak 1988/2,306; cf Kasper 1987, 236. 
'AAS IL (1957) 926-928. 
10
 "Que l'autorité ecclésiastique applique ici aussi le principe général de l'aide subsidiaire et 
complémentaire: que l'on confie au laïc les taches qu'il peut accomplir, aussi bien ou même mieux 
que le prêtre, et que, dans les limites de sa function ou celles que trace le bien commun de l'Eglise, 
u puisse agir librement et excercer sa responsabilité." Klüber 1968,895-910 sees the importance of 
the principle of subsidiarity for the church precisely in a better division of work between clergy and 
laity. 
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in service of the individual members. That is why the lay person has the right to receive 
spiritual goods so that he can realize his salvation and can find fulfillment as a 
christian". These lay people can take on their responsibility as inviolable images of 
God, "as persons who are proud of their personal dignity and their healthy sense of 
freedom". This is the church's ideal of humanity (corresponding to QA 118). The 
church makes its contribution to this and it is the basis for giving the lay-people their 
tasks. 
Here too the validity of the principle is an integral part of Pius' vision12. 
Pius referred in this passage to Mystici corporis (1943) where it was stated that all 
members are called to cooperate in the building up of the church and in its fulfillment. 
The validity of the principle of subsidiarity for the church was already stated here 
implicitly. In the discussion so far this has not really been given attention. Pius posited 
that every human community has as its final goal the interest of all members and of 
every individual member because they are persons. And that is true for the church 
too"! 
As we already said, the validity of the principle of subsidiarity for the church is 
integrated in such a way in the texts of Pius XII that there can be no doubt about the 
fundamental importance he gave iL For society as well as for the church it holds that 
associations are intended to help individual persons in their self development The 
individual person retains, also in the church, his own responsibility: that is the meaning 
of the principle for the church itself14. This, obviously, does not give a total vision of 
Pius' ecclesiology and we do not intend to do that here. But anyone who would express 
reservations about Pius' vision in relation to this principle because of his vision of the 
church, would only be able to do so if he would take away an essential element of that 
vision. 
1.2 The period of Vatican II 
John XXIII pointed to the importance of the principle of subsidiarity for society in 
Mater et Magistra (1961) and Pacem in terris (1963)15. He referred to it implicitly in 
relation to the church itself when he attributeed a reasonable freedom to persons and 
" Pius refers to the Code of 1917, cc. 87; 467,1; 682; and 892,1. This thesis returns in a funda-
mental way in Code of 1983, cc. 213-215, and in a more applied form in cc. 216-221. 
a
 Komonchak 1988/2, 308. Komonchak explains here (302-308) the relevant passages of both 
addresses. With him (308) I posit there is no clear proof that Gundlach also prepared the address of 
1957 (also Krebs 1992,78 does not say that), but the way of reasoning and the quotes from 1947 
do point in that direction. 
" MC nr 60: AAS XXXV (1943) 221-222; cf Klüber 1968, 864. 
M
 Krebs 1992,59, 73 and 78. 
"Rosa 1962,594-596; Komonchak 1988/2,300 nt 8; Nell-Breuning 1990,91-92 and 101-102. 
In Mater et magistra see nrs 51-58,117 and 152 and 219; in Pacem in terris nrs 140-141. 
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organisations in the church, and said that this freedom is the source for abundant 
energies and initiatives in society'6. 
In the Constitutions and Decrees of Vatican Π the principle of subsidiarity was not 
applied to the church itself17. It was mentioned in the preparatory phase and was 
mentioned when the decentralization of church government is treated". Everyone 
knows that the Council did underline the importance of the principle of subsidiarity for 
society. This was done explicitly in Gravissimum educations and in Gaudium et 
13 Synod of Bishops 1967 
Already when the Council was announced there was mention of a revision of the Code 
of Canon Law of 1917. John ΧΧΙΠ set up the 'Pontificia Commissio Codicis Iuris 
Canonici recognoscendo" in 1963. The Commissio started its work in 1965. They 
prepared the Principia quae Codicis Iuris Canonici recognitionem dirigant. These 
were approved by the Synod in 1967м. Of the 10 principles some are important for our 
research. 
Principium I stated clearly that the new Code should retain a truly juridical character 
because the nature of the church as a society demands that, based on the "potestas 
iurisdictionis". What is meant is that church authority has received power from Christ 
to govern the church. More generally it is a fact that, if a community of people wants to 
maintain itself and wants to fulfill its tasks, there is a need for authority, which orders 
"Komonchak 1988/2,308-309; Komonchak refers to the statement of John ХХШ (d.d. January 
10,1960) that Catholic Action is "subsidiary to the hierarchical apostolato"; this statement cannot 
be understood, as far as I can see, in the sense of the earlier quotes from Pius ХП, but more as we 
see "subsidiaria" in can. 916 of the Code of 1917: cf V, nt 78. 
17
 GS 76 comes very close to such a thesis where it states that church and state " Ambae au tern, licet 
in diverso titulo, eorumdem hominum vocationi personali et sociali inserviunt". 
" Kaiser 1964, 5 refers to debates in the second session: cf Herder-Korrespondenz 18 (1963-
1964) 190 and Morsdorf 1967/1,131. Gumérez 1972,789 says in general terms that a number of 
texts of Vatican Π can only be understood as real applications of the principle of subsidiarity, which, 
therefore, must be seen as "un elemento soggiacente ed informatore dell'intera struttura della 
communità ecclesiale". Komonchak 1988/2,309-312 gives some first results of research and rightly 
expresses the hope that tine Acta Synodalia can be studied more extensively. ButBassett 1971, 250-
259 points to a number of places in the textst of Vatian Π where (according to him) the principle of 
subsidiarity is given form and substance. Some examples are SC 22 and 37; LG 13 and 27; AA 2 
and3. 
19
 GE 3 and 6 and implicitly 25, 26, and 63. GS 25 discusses the content of the principle of 
subsidiarity and the principle of solidarity quite well in their mutual relationship: "Esse sociali.... 
responderé potest" See for the exemplary character of this text: Nell-Breuning 1971/3, 23. 
20
 Schmitz 1979/1, 9-15; Schmitz 1979/2, 30-32. But the approval of the Synod did not go 
smoothly: Provost 1981,16-17. Johnson 1990, 491-497 gives more detailed information about the 
discussion during the Synod. For the text of the Principia: Principia 1967 or Ochoa Ш, 5253-5257. 
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the life of the community21. The statement in this Principium is important in view of the 
discussion which will follow in the years to come about the foundations and the 
character of church law22.1 will return to this later. 
Principium IV referred to an important position of Vatican Π, succinctly formulated in 
Christus Dominus 8a: as successors of the Apostles the bishops have, in their own 
diocese, in virtue of their office such "potestas ordinaria propria ac immediata" as is 
needed for the exercise of their pastoral function. The Principium demanded, therefore, 
a positive description of the office of bishop. 
The Principium then stated that the Pope can reserve to himself certain faculties or 
attribute them to another authority. And the general practice became that every bishop 
can dispense his own diocesans from general church law, with that the pre-Conciliar 
relationships were reversed23. 
Principium V dealt with the application of the principle of subsidiarity. It is said that 
Principium Г implied that it will become part of the Code of Canon Law but this does 
not mean that the principle truly influenced church legislation. Then it is said that the 
principle supports the unity of legislation regarding the foundations and the more 
important legal texts in every "societas completa et in suo genere compacta"2*. On 
that basis it may sometimes be possible, sometimes necessary, in conformity with the 
principle of subsidiarity, that individual "institutiones" enact their own laws and that 
they enjoy a "sana autonomia" regarding the "potestas regiminis exsecutiva"\ That 
gives the bishops a broad spectrum of freedom to make policy although within definite 
limits. 
This general vision was then explicated and there was again a reference to Christus 
Dominus 8. The unity in the main points of canon law was underlined once more. In 
the Latin church there should not be several separate legislations but there can be 
individual determinations which show the proper nature of a particular church. That 
was to be so especially with regard to the administration of temporal goods where one 
21
 The Code of 1983 uses by preference "potestas regiminis'': can. 129. See for our interpretation 
Mörsdorf 1964, 306; for some remarks about this and similar concepts: Torfs 1988. Sacrae 
disciplinae leges (AAS LXXV (1983) П-ХГ ), the apostolic constitution which presented the 
Code of 1983 posits that the church needs norms (i.e., the Code) because it "ad modum etiam 
socialis visibilisque compaginis sit constituta" (paragraph "Ac revera ...."). 
22
 Conexo 1985,343 says that the idea that the nature of the church as societas is the base for the 
juridical order in the church has long been left behind even though Vatican Π still held it According 
to him, this wrong idea led the Synod of 1967 to accept too quickly as Principia the principle of 
subsidiarity and the juridical protection of the rights of the faithful. 
23
 See for the interpretation of ChrD 8: Mörsdorf 1967/1,158-161 and 166-171; and for a short 
remark about the pre-conciliar relationship: Mörsdorf 1964, 161-162. See for Principium Г : 
Schmitz 1979Д, 19-20, where he points out that Paul VI had already taken some measures: Motu 
proprio "Pastorale munus" (1963) and Motu proprio "De episcoporum muneribus" (1966). 
24
 The term is equivalent with societas perfecta according to Beyer 1986, 808. Felici 1967, 90 says 
that the church is not only "spiritualis" but also "visibilis, organica, hierarchica, socialis et ordinata", 
but he does not use societas perfecta either. Cf П, 2.1. 
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will have to follow civil legislation. It was also to be true for procedural law, although 
a certain unity in that will be necessary which will always leave open the possibility to 
appeal to the Holy See. 
In his explanation Cardinal Felici gave the reason why the principle of subsidiarity 
belongs to the Principia. The hierarchical structure of the church and especially the 
divine institution of the primacy and the episcopacy demand that hierarchical instituti­
ons operate in such a way that the unity and diversity of ecclesiastical organs be 
ordered in their mutual relationships and can be of service one to the other. The 
principle of subsidiarity is seen as very important in this, Felici said, and it was 
mentioned in this light during the Council. He did not quote the text from Quadragesi­
mo anno 79 which is (more) fundamental for the meaning of the principle of subsidia­
rity (on which Pius based himself), but he quoted Quadragesimo anno 80 and 
apparently wanted to show the meaning of the principle of subsidiarity: "the more 
perfectly the priorities ('ordo hierarchicus') between the various groups are observed 
through the maintenance of principle-of-subsidiary activity, the better social authority 
and the activities of society will function and the happier and more prosperous the 
situation of the state will be". And then he mentioned the statement by Pius ΧΠ from 
1946, that the principle of subsidiarity is valid also for the church23. 
If we try to get a clearer view of the meaning of this Principium we get the following: 
apparently they wanted to make the central text of Christus Dominus 8 about the 
proper position of the episcopacy into ecclesiastical law; that is the point of departure. 
The text is very clear in its brevity: the bishop has the power which he needs to 
exercise his office, and the papacy has the power to reserve certain matters to itself or 
to entrust them to another authority. One could say that the papacy exercises the 
competency-over-competencies2*. 
But the Principium then quotes Lumen gentium 27 (without reference to it): the 
highest authority ultimately orders ("regit") the exercise of power by the bishop. That 
can be more than competency-over-competencies. To be able to say how the whole of 
the exercise of power should happen is more than the competency to authorize. And 
the Principium does not quote here (from LG 27) that the bishop is not a substitute for 
the Pope but that he has his own proper authority. Then it is clear that one does not 
want to harm the unity of legislation. 
It seems that is not possible to combine the theological point of departure (from ChrD 
8) with the prudence in the demand for unity of legislation in a church which is 
universal. It is presupposed that there is a unity of legislation in one "societas completa 
et in suo genere compacta", not in a number of more or less independent local 
churches, although an exeption is made for the Eastern (Catholic) Churches27. It is 
2 5
 Felici 1967, 89. 
2 4
 Cf 2.1.2. 
2 7
 Schmitz 1979/1, 20-22 sees a relation between the idea of communio and the principle of 
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clear that any attack on the current central power of the papacy is rejected. Is Princi-
pum Vs understanding of the principle of subsidiarity anything other than only 
"decentralizatio"! That word is found in the passage on procedural law and that is 
possible if one uses only the quotation of Quadragesimo anno 80 as Felici did. 
Methodically one did not start from a research into the practical or theological limitati-
ons of the power of the individual bishop in a universal church. One could start such a 
research because the Principium states that the system of ecclesiastical law must be 
one (because of the general bonum commune) as far as the highest principles are 
concerned, namely, where it deals with fundamental institutions, the proper means of 
the church to reach its goal, and the method of legislation. 
Felici quoted Quadragesimo anno but one could ask whether he really meant to say 
that the relationship papacy-episcopacy is the same as the relationship between the 
state(govemment) and the institutions and associations in the vision of society, which 
this encyclical proposed. One can ask from social organizations that they respect the 
constitution, but for the rest the state should be very reserved in relation to their 
internal rules and laws. 
The meaning of the principle of subsidiarity for the church remains rather ambivalent2*. 
But what is not ambivalent is the fact that the principle of subsidiarity has been 
declared valid for the relation between the papacy and the episcopacy. Pius was not yet 
thinking of that when he said that the principle of subsidiarity is valid also for the 
church itself19. 
It is remarkable that Principium VI has not yet become part of the discussion about the 
validity of the principle of subsidiarity and that the text itself does not make that 
connection! The Principium confirmed that a presupposition which is important for the 
principle is valid also in the church. The rights of the faithful which are contained in 
natural as well as in divine-positive law30, as also the rights which are derived from 
these, must be recognized and protected. That gives a foundation for the position that 
the use of power in the church may never be arbitrary. 
subsidiarity (cf 1.4.3) already in connection with the Principia: the theological relevance will be 
discussed, but we need to say that neither the Principia nor Felici 1967 give cause for that 
a
 According to Johnson 1990,497-499 the discussion about the formation of priests in the Synod 
was earned on as if the principle of subsidiarity was valid for the church and as Opt atom Tonus nr 
1 proposes: there will be a Ratio fundamental is from the competent Congregation and the Bishops' 
Conferences wffl make a concrete program adapted to their region. C. 242-243 moke this concrete. 
The question is only whether the Holy See in approving these concrete programs only tests them 
on the Ratio fundamentalis. 
MCfKrebsl992,82. 
30
 According to Mörsdorf 1964, 22-23 tus divinum positivum is revelation law; together with the 
l'iti divinum naturale, what intellect can know as natural law, it forms the ius divinum. Together 
with die ius humanum or mere ecdesiasticum, this again forms canon law. Cf Demmer 1987,1312 
and Aymans 1991, 27. 
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Felici underlined the reasons for the Principium: the Council has spoken clearly about 
the dignity of the human person and about his inviolable rights which must always and 
everywhere be respected: they are rooted in human nature and they are certainly in 
force in the church31. Principium VU draws the conclusion that there is need for 
administrative justice in the church to protect personal rights32. 
The image which arises from the significance of the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity remains somehow vague. It is seen as useful in order to formulate the 
relationship between the papacy and the episcopate juridically, but concretely that does 
not happen and what is being said leaves a number of questions. And the inalienable 
rights of the faithful are not seen in relation to the principle of subsidiarity. 
It is important for this research to see that the Principia saw the church as one societas, 
but the use of the term societas perfecta was avoided. 
1.4 The Synod of Bishops 1969 
The second Synod after Vatican Π in 1969 had for its subject matter the Bishops' 
Conferences and the collegiality of the bishops. That was one year after 1968, a year 
which makes people tremble for various reasons. It was also one year after Humanae 
Vitae, an encyclical which is still being discussed. These years, 1968 and 1969, are 
years of crisis for the church, and having extensively discussed the situation Laurentin 
said that the position of authority in the church is a key question33. 
In the period before the Synod two events brought their influence to bear, each in its 
own way. 
The Belgian Cardinal Suenens expressed clearly and repeatedly his opinion that the 
governmental structure of the church should be characterized by co-responsibility on 
all levels and not by a uniform centralization. The coming Synod should show the way 
how in practice the collegiality between primacy and the episcopate should be seen, 
because collegiality was laid down programmatically in Lumen gentium 2234. 
In the period of preparation the Motu proprio"Sollicitudo omnium Ecclesiarum" 
appeared, about papal nuncios and especially about the functioning of their offices. 
According to the document, the most important task of the nuncio is to strengthen the 
bond between the Holy See and the local churches. He is also needed to give (non­
partisan) information about the local church, propose candidates for the episcopacy. 
31
 Felici 1967, 89. In the text of the Principia 1967 as well as in Felici it then says that in the 
church all do not have the same status or function, but that the fundamental equality of all the 
faithful demands a "statute" which is the same for all because of their human dignity and because 
of their baptism. This is concretized in Code of 1983: cf 1.7. ("The protection of personal rights"). 
12
 Schmitz 1979/2, 34 
33
 Laurentin 1969, 248: "la dernière question ... celle de l'autorité, est bien la question clé"; and 
Laurentin 1970,13-37. One only has to think of the so-called Cologne declaration (d.d. January 
1989) of German speaking theologians in order to be aware that the question is still a central one. 
34
 Katholiek Archief 7A (1969) 912-923; Caprile 1970, 376-378; Uurentin 1970,13-17. Broucker 
1970 gives an extensive overview of Suenens' intentions, the context and the interview itself. 
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and maintain contact with the Conferences of Major Superiors35. Considering the 
subject of the Synod, the publication of this document immediately prior to the Synod 
is remarkable: about the functioning of the nunciatures in relation to the Bishops' 
Conferences, in the light of the question of collegiality, the Vatican did not seem to 
want any discussion! Yet, one can ask whether the named tasks are not functions of the 
(president and/or secretary of the) Bishops' Conference, especially in countries where 
the freedom of the church is juridically and factually guaranteed. 
Paul VI said in his opening address, to which people must have looked forward with a 
certain expectation considering these events, that collegiality becomes concrete when 
bishops receive privileges and competencies in line with the sacramental character of 
their pastoral task and with their communion with the Apostolic See. That is a demand 
of the principle of subsidiarity according to Paul VI who in this way reformulates 
Principium V. If this is done prudently, the bonum commune of the church will not be 
damaged. There will not be too much autonomy nor will particular interests prevail 
which could damage the unity. Pluralism, another principle than subsidiarity, needs, 
therefore, to be limited; faith itself does not leave room for pluralism and neither does 
the general discipline of the church because pluralism affects the necessary awareness 
of norms of behavior in the church as also the necessary agreement on them, and in the 
same way it affects collegiality36. 
The Synod had as its subject the theme of closer contact between the Bishops' Confe­
rences and the Apostolic See, and between the Conferences themselves. The relation 
between primacy and episcopate came through all the time. During the Synod the 
validity of the principle of subsidiarity was clearly a subject for discussion. The 
discussion notes of a synod obviously do not have a theological or juridical status but 
that does not deny that, historically, they can be very interesting from a theological 
point of view. 
The discussion note which was sent out before the Synod37 spoke about the principle of 
subsidiarity, in the part about the relation between the Bishops' Conferences and the 
Apostolic See. "The legitimate diversity of the local churches and the need to give a 
timely response to problems demand a wider application of the principle of subsidiari­
ty", but the unity of the church can demand that a problem, which would normally fall 
under the responsibility of the bishop(s), is reserved to a higher authority for the good 
of the church; that is the interpretation here of Christus Dominus 8 and of Pius' address 
35
 AAS LXI (1969) 473-486; Waif 1969 gives a summary and commentary. Indicative for the 
relationships as the Motu proprio sees them (and which are characterized by the societas perfecta 
concept ρ 476), is the rule that the nuncio according to protocol must be given precedence before 
archbishops and bishops! In this light it is understandable (and right) that archbishop Simonis was 
created cardinal a few days before the visit of John Paul Π to Holland in May 198S. 
36
 AAS LXI (1969), 719-720. 
57
 £4 24 (1969) 885-899; Caprile 1970,447-448; see for a summary and commentary Laurentin 
1969, 27S-278. Thils 1972, 185-186 calls this document centralistic, the same judgment that 
Suenens gave: Caprile 1970, 78 (nt 11). 
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in 1946. It is then stated that the meaning of the principle of subsidiarity needs to be 
more clearly defined. 
It is remarkable that here, and during the Synod, the link between the principle of 
subsidiarity and the principle of solidarity is given expresses verbis. That does not often 
happen in this debate. The principle of solidarity is seen as an expression of the care of 
the bishop for other particular churches and for the universal church". In the Synod the 
connection is made between the principle of subsidiarity and the pronouncement of 
Lumen gentium 23 (so important for the communio ecclesiology), that the one church 
exists in and is formed by the particular churches. This pronouncement is one of the 
"certain principles", the principle of subsidiarity is one of the (still to be determined) 
ways of thinking to make the principles concrete39. 
It becomes really interesting when mgr. Philips said that the principle of solidarity 
expresses the "fundamentally organic communio of the church", but I have no data to 
see whether and how he developed this40; that does not happen either in this ecclesiolo-
gical question with regard to the relation between the principle of solidarity and the 
principle of subsidiarity. 
The end of the Synod saw a vote about the thesis whether, in line with the principle of 
subsidiarity, the competency of the bishops as pastors of particular churches needs to 
be more clearly determined, either individually with regard to specific problems in 
governing particular churches, or in the synods of the Eastern Churches, or in the 
Bishops' Conferences with regard to problems which demand common norms for a 
whole area. The competency of the Pope covers questions which belong to the defense 
of the unity of faith and community {"communio"), and questions which according to 
the highest authority demand uniform solutions for the whole church. This thesis was 
accepted with a large majority41. 
In itself this position does not take us much beyond the Synod of 1967, because what is 
stated is (only) that the local bishop must be left to do what he himself can do, that the 
Bishops' Conference should be allowed to determine a common approach to questions 
which are best handled in the same way in a given region, and that the Holy See must 
intervene only when there is a necessity to keep the unity of faith and the "commu­
nio"*1. It is much more important that already during the Synod it was stated that the 
meaning of the principle of subsidiarity needed to be studied because one was aware of 
" Caprile 1970,448 and 467; Ochoa Г , kol. 5667: in this way the connection is made between 
care ("cura'') of the bishop for his diocese and the care ("sollicitudo") for other churches and the 
church as a whole. This leads to the conclusion: "Episcoporum responsabilitatem in bonum 
Ecclesiae tam universae quam Ecclesiarum particularium procurando per recte applicatum 
principium "subsidiaritatis" magis ad effectum adduci". Cf Caprile 1970,484. 
" Caprile 1970,476; Ochoa Г , kol 5666-5667: "Principia quidem certa sunt, rationes vero quibus 
ad effectum adducenda sunt haud raro incertae, ut ipsae quaestiones huic Synodo positae aperte 
demonstrant". 
40
 Laurentin 1970,191 mentions this intervention in one of the circuii minores. 
41
 KA 24 (1969) 1113; Caprile 1970,270-271; Komonchak 1988/2,316-317. 
42
 Johnson 1990,512. 
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the problems to balance the authority of the Bishops' Conferences with the interests of 
the Holy See and the proper responsibility of each local bishop. One said that the 
principle of subsidiarity should be applied in a special way to the church43. Thoughts 
have been developed way beyond the point where Felici was in 1967 (when he quoted 
only QA 80). 
Further progress in content was made in relation to the concept of "collegiality" which 
is placed in the wider context of "communio"4*, and that was seen in relation with the 
principle of solidarity and the principle of subsidiarity. 
We see the origins of a vision where communio as theological principle and the 
principle of subsidiarity as a structural principle are linked. Is this emerging vision 
taken up later45? 
In his closing address Paul VI mentioned that there will more synods in order to give 
collegiality form and substance and that there will be a permanent Synod-secretariat. 
This and the fact that the Synod said that the Bishops' Conferences should from now on 
be involved in the study of the more important problems and the preparation of decrees 
for the whole church is seen as a "gain" considering the events in the period prior to the 
Synod46. 
But the synod should not cause a power struggle nor should it make efficient govern­
ment in the church more difficult. The Pope wanted to respect the position of the 
bishops, but he pointed out that the primacy has its own special place in the order of 
things. He added that he was open to recognizing the proper character and needs of the 
local churches as a true recognition of the principle of subsidiarity. He recognized it, 
but it still needed further theoretical and practical study. The principle of subsidiarity 
should not be confused with pluralism which damages faith, morals, and the main 
reality of the sacraments, the liturgy, and canonical order, these are needed to maintain 
the unity of the church47. 
4
'Johnson 1990, 504-513. 
44
 Card. Seper did this in a long introductory development of thought at the beginning of the Synod: 
Ochoa Г , 5659-5663 and Caprile 1970, 70-71 and 455-473. These texts by Card. Seper were 
positively received by Cardinals Alfrink and Suenens: Caprile 1970,77-78. 
4 5
 See for an evaluation of this Synod: Laurentin 1970, 190-193; Grootaers 1982, 286-289. 
Anyway, the whole first part of Grootaers' article gives an insight into the machinations behind the 
scenes during a synod. It is remarkable that the Vatican document put together on the request of the 
Synod in 1985 (cf 1.8) about the "theological and juridical status of Bishops' Conferences" (d.d. 
January 12, 1988) does not even mention this Synod Card. Danneels referred to it during the 
Synod: Synode 1985, 468-469. A further study of the statements from the Synod 1969 and that 
document would be interesting, certainly a study of the reactions of the Bishops' Conferences to iL· 
is there similarity between the Synod of 1969 and those reactions? During the Synod of 1990 Card. 
Gantin, prefect of the Congregation for the Bishops said that there is a need for much further study, 
or, the document had been rejected in the reactions to iL See for reactions of theologians on the 
document: MUUer 1990. 
46
 Caprile 1970,338-340; KA 24 (1969) 1128: the judgments by Cardinals Alfrink and Suenens. 
47
 AAS LXI (1969) 728-729. 
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IS Paul VI in 1971 and 1972 
Erecting the Council of European Bishops' Conferences (March 25, 1971) Paul said 
that the church is also an institution (and not just charismatic) but that it should not be 
ordered as economic or political institutions which often leave no room to the parts out 
of which they are built up. That would not be according to the principle of subsidiarity 
nor in line with the nature of the church. In the church the diocese is a primary 
structure. In this way Paul suggested that there is a relation between what the principle 
of subsidiarity proposes and the place of the diocese in the universal church4*. In the 
same year he underlined the meaning of the principle of subsidiarity for state and 
society4*. 
But a year later the same Paul VI spoke about negative criticisms within the church 
which touch the magisterium in its very being. This criticism bases itself on pluralism, 
on the principle of subsidiarity seen as autonomy, on a free and conceited position for 
the local church; it does not pay attention to established doctrine. A possible positive 
interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity was not mentioned50. 
1.6 Synod of Bishops in 1974 and 1977 
In both these Synods the principle of subsidiarity was termed important for the church 
itself. In 1974 its application was called for in line with decentralization so that the 
proper place of the particular church would be better recognized. In 1977 it was 
mentioned as an inducement for the local bishop to give experts real co-responsibility 
in the development of catechesis".1 no more than mention these texts because they 
hardly have a formal status and they do not really contribute to the argument about 
content 
1.7 Code of 1983 
SOME GENERAL REMARKS 
As we said above (1.3) it was determined in 1967 that the principle of subsidiarity 
would be one of the leading principles in the revision of the Code of Canon Law. One 
can ask whether in the process of revision and in the final result (the Code of 1983) the 
principle of subsidiarity has been applied. 
Green did some research about the role of the principle of subsidiarity in the process of 
revision. His conclusions are (among others): 
1. in the process of revision attention was given to the principle of subsidiarity as an 
important guideline. 
"AAS63 (1971) 292-294: "Quemadmodum...mystici".CfThiede 1991, 57-61. 
49
 In Octogésima adveniens 47 AAS ЬХШ (1971) 401-441) he describes the principle of 
subsidiarily and refers to the relevant passages in QA, Mater et Magistra and GS. Earlier he referred 
also to the principle in Populorum progressie ( 1967) nr 33. 
я
 AAS LXrV (1972) 498-499. More generally Menozzi 1985,440-448 remarks that more or less 
since 1970 Paul VI began to worry about the effects of Vatican П: that was apparent already above. 
51
 Komonchak 1988/2, 318-319. 
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2. it is remarkable that no attempt was made to formulate a canonical definition of the 
principle. It was mostly used in designing the relationships between different 
authorities and especially for the direction of greater decentralization in the area of 
legislation, government, and the administration of justice. Important was then the 
proper responsibility of the local bishop in relation to the primacy and the Bishops' 
Conference. This last body was often seen as a threat for the inalienable rights of 
the bishop without indicating the reason why this is so. 
3. the correct application was often discussed, e.g., in relation to the legislation for the 
institutes of consecrated life and the societies of apostolic life, in relation to the 
administration of temporal goods, and in procedural law, because one was looking 
for a nice balance between general and particular law52. 
The Code of 1983 summarizes in the Praefatio the Principia of 1967. It says that 
Principium V states that "the principle of subsidiarity should be applied in the church 
in greater measure because the episcopacy with its prerogatives is of divine law"". 
Then, the principle of subsidiarity and decentralization are seen as equivalent. The 
point of departure is the maintenance of unity in legislation and of universal law: what 
is not necessary for this can be "decentralized". In line with that the individual institutes 
can have their own particular law and the "potestas exsecutiva particularis" has a 
"sana autonomia". 
One might have expected that in the Praefatio there would be evidence of a progress in 
thought as to content on this subject, but the contrary is true. Neither in the summary of 
Principium Г nor in that of V does it appear that one sees in a positive way a causal 
relation between the principle of subsidiarity and the position of the local bishop, 
which was stressed by Vatican Π. If before I could still be doubtful, here we find an 
identification between the principle of subsidiarity and decentralization; yet these are 
really different things. In decentralization the position of the centrum or the highest 
authority prevails; according to the principle of subsidiarity in this concrete context the 
position of the bishop or of the particular church should prevail. And decentralization 
is a concession but the principle of subsidiarity originates from an original right, here 
of the bishop or of the particular church. 
Now it is said that the idea was only "that the function of the pastors would be seen 
more positively", where in 1967 it was said that the function of the bishops should be 
positively defmed; that is more definite. "Sana autonomia" belongs (only) to the 
"potestas exsecutiva" where originally it was part of the whole "potestas regiminis". 
The suggestion is (at least) that the "potestas legislativa" and the "potestas iudicialis" 
are under the immediate supervision of central authority. 
The summary of Principium VI compares also unfavorably with the original text of 
1967. There is no mention of the basis for the fundamental equality of all the faithful 
a
 Green 1988, 775-777 and 797. 
" It is strange to read here that the principle of subsidiarity is deduced trom ("eruitur") what is 
stated in Principium IV! 
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and their rights. There is a new element here; authority should be recognizable as 
service where originally it was only said that it should not be arbitrary. The character of 
service fits in the vision of the principle of subsidiarity and has been underlined by 
Vatican II s 4. The summary of Principium П is only a shadow of the original; no 
words about administrative law, but it speaks about "regulations of a procedure in 
relation to the protection of subjective rights"55. 
There is no evidence of a deeper understanding of the validity and the consequences of 
the application of the principle of subsidiarity in church law, not in the Praefatio, nor 
in the process of revision. The question is then where is it applied in the Code and 
how: can it be traced? The term is not used. In the context of this study it is not 
possible to look at the whole of the Code, but we can look at some salient points which 
are directly connected with the desiderata of the Principia of 1967. 
THE RELATION BETWEEN PRIMACY AND EPISCOPACY 
The central text about the diocesan bishop, canon 381,1 repeats the text of Christus 
Dominus 8a literally. No longer do we find here or in canon 369 about the diocese as a 
part of the People of God which is entrusted to the bishop, what was still in the Code of 
1917 (c. 329,1): that the bishop governs his diocese "sub auctoritate Romani pontift-
cis"i6. The diocesan bishop can normally dispense of disciplinary laws (c. 87). At first 
sight it seems that the demands of Principium Г and V are met. Collegiality as 
mentioned before (in 1.4) seems also to have been taken care of in canons 330 and 
333,1. The first canon says that the Pope and bishops form one college just as Peter 
and the Apostles did. In the latter canon the power of bishops is mentioned immediate­
ly with the power of the papacy (the latter supports the first) which did not happen in 
the Code of 1917 (C.218)57. 
But if we look more closely it appears the position of the primacy is more heavily 
accentuated in the Code of 1983 than it was in 1917: the Pope is, according to canon 
331 "Vicarius Christi" and "pastor of the universal church on earth" and a number of 
epithets are brought together to indicate his power58. In canon 333,1 something 
M
 Sacrae disciplinae leges (cf nt 21) states that "authority as service", "the church as People of 
God", the "church as communio', the doctrine that all members of the people of God participate in 
Christ's threefold ministry, and the zeal for ecumenism are the main elements which give expression 
to the proper image of the church. It is remarkable that for the first two elements there is a reference 
to LG Π and Ш, but that for the other elements there are no references. It is equally remarkable that 
the service character of authority is concretized only for religious Superiors in с 618! 
1 5
 In the process of revision there were already doubts about the administrative justice: Schmitz 
1979/1,24-25. It is interesting to note that the Praefatio says that there should be a clear distinction 
betweeen the legislative, administrative, and judicial functions of the church's authority. 
5 6
 "Sub auctoritate" can still be found in can. 519 (cf Code 1917, can. 451,1) where the Code deals 
with the relation between bishop and parish priest 
5 7
 The text of can. 331,1 goes back directly in this matter to LG 27 and from there to Vatican I, 
Pastor Aelernus cap. Ш: see Houtepen 1973, 223-330. 
a
 These epithets, namely, full, the highest, immediate and universal can be found in the Code of 
1917, с 218 and appear also in LG 22,2. 
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remarkable has happened: there is mention of "primacy of ordinary power" for the 
papacy. One can refer to Lumen gentium (22 and 27; cf ChrD 2), but there such 
terminology is seen in a more balanced relationship with the independence of bishops. 
The bishops are in Lumen gentium 27 called "vicarii et legati Christi": the Code does 
not refer to them in those words (e.g. с 373 or 381). 
The old question remains, then, how a bishop obtains his power of jurisdiction. Canon 
131,1 does not determine whether Úicpotestas regiminis is transferred in the appoint-
ment or is inherent in the function. The general canon 375,2 about diocesan and other 
bishops does not give a final answer19. 
Canon 333,2 is completely new: it states that the papacy is always in communion with 
the other bishops, but the Pope himself can determine the way he exercises his office, 
whether collegially or personally60. 
In effect, the Code of 1983 opens all the doors to a centralist exercise of primacy. One 
could make more comments on this from the viewpoint of Vatican Π but one thing is 
certain: it is not in line with the demands of the principle of subsidiarity as stated in 
Principia IV and V. There would have been a closer similarity without canon 333,3 if 
the primacy had been obligated to justify the exercise of its competency-over-compe­
tencies. 
We can say, with Komonchak, that the bishop, in the daily governing of his diocese 
possesses a good deal of autonomy as far as teaching (c. 753), the task of sanctification 
(с. 838,1+4), and government (cc. 391 and 1276) are concerned and that there is a 
good deal of openness in the Code for particular legislation61. The Bishops' Conferen­
ces limit this governing freedom of the diocesan bishop only marginally, but the 
individual bishop is given an "episcopal individualism" which can lead to strange 
situations62. 
THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL RIGHTS 
Principium VI demanded the protection of the rights of persons whether these 
originate from natural law or from divine positive law; it also demanded a juridical 
statute for all the faithful together. The statute is formulated in canons 204-233". 
"Waif 1988,66-67. Thils 1972,201 ff defends that Vatican Π ended the discussion considering 
LG 22 and Nota E J*. 2 and 3, because : "tous les pouvoirs sont conférés, quant à l'essentiel, par la 
consécration sacramentelle; mais une détermination canonique doit être ajoutée par l'autorité 
hiérarchique pour qu'ils soient aptes à être excercés". Cf Ш, 2.2. 
60
 The analysis of these canons I have laken from Waif 1988,72-7S. Anyway the text of с 333,2 
can be found literally in Nota EJ\, nr 3: cf Ш, 2.2. 
61
 Komonchak 1988/1, 7-8; cf Green 1986,646-652. 
a
 It remains strange for many of the faithful in the diocese of Roermond that it formally does not 
have any pastoral workers (men or women) as distinct from the other Dutch dioceses and that, until 
a few years ago, only this diocese did not entrust the scientific-theological part of the formation of 
its clergy to a theological acuity. 
6 1
 Yet, с 212 seems a bit out of place because already a distinction is made between the faithful 
and the "ordained pastors"; what is said in cc. 213-214 is applicable also to the "ordained pastors". 
Coriden 1990, 40 points to the fundamental character of the statute of the Code of 1983: "Die 
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Yet, we want to make the following observations looking at it from the point of 
departure of the Principium: 
- What happened to the rights, in fact the human rights, based on the natural law? 
The equality in dignity and action is based only on "rebirth in Christ" and not on 
human dignity as it was in the Principium). At the start of the process of revision of 
the Code that was still the point of departure64. 
- Komonchak points to another gap in the statute (or in the next part: cc. 224-231): 
the lack of a general statement based on Apostolicam actuositatem 3 (at the end, 
which itself refers to LG 12). Apostolicam actuositatem 3 states that the faithful 
receive from the Spirit special gifts and that this gives them the duty and the right to 
use them in the church and in the world for the well being of people and the 
building up of the church. Church authority must order these gifts but "not in such a 
way that the Spirit will be extinguished, but by examining all and keeping what is 
good (cf 1 Thess. 5, 12.19.21)"". This too involves an idea which is essential for 
the principle of subsidiarity; the person must be given the opportunity to develop 
himself with all his gifts (QA 118). 
Principium П stated that there was a need for administrative law. That never 
happened even though (laborious) work was done to write this completely new section 
for the Code66. A first step is made in canon 1733, even though this is not about 
administration of justice but rather about a mediating function67. 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusion must be that the intentions of the Principia with regard to the principle 
of subsidiarity have been neglected6*. If one seeks the reasons for this, it could be the 
Grandrechtserklarung des Codex hat genuinen Verfassungsrang". He develops also the relation with 
social doctrine and then he makes proposals to have the rights recognized in a practical way or to 
make them enforcable. I will return to that in line with the meaning of the principle of subsidiarity 
for the church itself. 
"Komonchak 1981,47 and 52: he refers to Communcationes 2 (1970) 91 and 93. He points out 
that this element was still present in the project for a LEF: cf IX, nt 204. Swidler 1990, 26-31 gives 
amore encompassing Charta der Katholikenrechte in der Kirche. It remains strange that church 
authority has retained for itself the right to allow public organizations to be erected: с 301. Why did 
they not limit themselves to с 300 and why did they not minimize the distinction between public 
and private organizations? 
6 5
 Komonchak 1981,51; cf Corecco 1985, 350 and Corecco 1986, 90. 
6 6
 Schmitz 1979/1, 23-25; Green 1988, 794-796; cf nt 55. 
4 7
 Stígl 1983; Waif 1984, 246-247. In Holland two dioceses erected a "Diocesan Office for 
Arbitration" based on с 1733: in Breda on October 8,1990 and in Utrecht on October 15,1992. 
Bishop H. Ernst motivated it as follows: the importance of safeguarding human rights in the church 
and the setting up of an office in the ecclesiastical administration which in case of conflict in 
administrative decisions can arrive at an amicable settlement through dialog: Analecta Bisdom 
Breda, 4 (1990) 175-186. 
" Komonchak 1988/1,8 is more positive because he says, summarizing, that the Code of 1983, 
different trom the Code of 1917 "ne vise pas à ordonner de facon exhaustive la vie catholique". This 
Code directs itself mainly to "les niveaux 'subsidiaires' de l'Eglise -diocèses, paroisses, instituts 
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identification of the principle of subsidiarity with decentralization so that the principle 
loses its fundamental status; it becomes a rule of government which can be wise but 
which cannot be enforced. The cause of this identification lies in the fact that they have 
neglected to determine (precisely) what the meaning of the principle of subsidiarity 
could be for the church. It is not enough to point to Quadragesimo anno 80 as Felici 
did. The reason could also be that people were simply afraid of any "erosion" of the 
central authority in the church: even without being defined though, the principle was 
used in the Synod against centralization. 
And so the question about the precise meaning of the validity of the principle for the 
church is still open. 
1.8 Synod of Bishops of 1985 
This Synod discussed the consequences post et propter Vatican II now that the Council 
was 20 years past69. In the written reports of the Bishops' Conferences in preparation 
for the Synod and in the discourses of the participants at the beginning, the principle of 
subsidiarity was mentioned a couple of times. It was used mostly (again) to criticize 
Roman centralism, to emphasize greater proper responsibility and the diversity of the 
particular churches and the competency of the Bishops' Conferences, and to plead for a 
greater role for the laity70. 
In his intermediate report Cardinal Danneels proposed to the Synod that the idea and 
the realization of "communio" demand further clarification. "Communio" in the broader 
sense is a fundamental anthropological reality. Man is created as a social being and 
man today longs for "communio", which often is absent. For this "communio" or rather 
for the human community or for society the principle of subsidiarity is very important. 
"But the question is whether this principle is also valid for the church as a human 
reality, because the ecclesia! communio, in a strict and theological sense, has a 
sacramental basis"71. 
Five of the nine circuii minores then paid attention to the principle of subsidiarity. 
Considering the reports it did not play an important role: there is a request for further 
study (from the German language group), or one does not see much in this (half the 
English speaking group and the majority of the Spanish speaking group), or one rejects 
religieux et associations de fidèles- et sur les activités essentielles à la vie chrétienne". Huizing 1986, 
106-107 is positive too: dioceses and parishes are no longer seen as administrative parts of the world 
church, but as independent subjects of ecclesial life and law, as communities in which and from 
which the church exists and comes into being. Already, during days of study on the Code of 1983 
about Institutes for consecrated life (in September and October 1983 in 's Hertogenbosch) Huizing 
said that the principle of subsidiarity is applied in this section of the Code. A magnificent example 
is с 708! 
<9
 See for the preparation and the progress of this Synod: Synode 1985, Kasper 1986/1, and 
Johnson 1990, 513-522. 
70
 Kasper 1986/1, 88; Granfield 1987, 125-127; Komonchak 1988/2, 321, Synode 1985, 31. 
71
 Synode 1985, 30 and 466-469; Komonchak 1988/2, 322-323; the other questions Danneels 
introduced in line with the concept of "church as communio" are: unity and plurifbrmity, collegality 
of the bishops, Bishops' Conferences, relation between the magisterium of the bishops and the 
theolgians (N.B. not "that of the theologians"; cf nt 97), and ecumenical dialog. 
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the validity of the principle for the church (the French speaking group); the arguments 
given are too short to be clear72. It appears from the reports that only the Latin speaking 
group paid more attention to i t They accept that the principle of subsidiarity is indeed 
valid for the church but they say that it is often understood as the autonomy 
("indépendance") of the local churches in relation to the primacy, which is impossible 
because of the "highest, full, direct, and universal power" of the primacy and conside-
ring the primary task of the bishops, which is to guard the unity of faith and the unity of 
common discipline. What the principle of subsidiarity then could mean in the church 
they did not say73. 
If one looks at this discussion, one can be surprised that the final text of the Synod still 
recommends that a study be made about the "if' and the "how" of the applicability of 
the principle of subsidiarity in the church. There is a reference to Pius XII's statement 
of 194674. 
Could it be that this is thanks to W. Kasper, special secretary for the Synod75? He said 
that there was confusion in the Synod about the validity of the principle of subsidiarity 
for the church itself and that they wanted to solve the problem of unity and diversity in 
a purely theological way from the viewpoint of the communio ecclesiology. The 
confusion could not be solved in the Synod itself, according to Kasper, but it is not that 
difficult In as far as the church is a human reality (cf LG 8) all the principles of human 
society apply to it too7*. After the Synod he wrote several articles about this subject, 
especially in a discussion with J. Beyer sj77. 
That the principle of subsidiarity has found a place in the end-text will not be thanks to 
Archbishop Schotte, the synod general secretary; he did not see a function for the 
principle in the church itself, because it is not a theological principle7*! 
Cardinal Castillo Lara (president of the Pontifìcia Commissio Codici Iuris Canonici 
aulhentice interpretando) also has problems because according to him the principle of 
subsidiarity was sufficiently taken care of in the Code79. 
72
 Synode 1985,486; 494; 510; 523; Komonchak 1988/2, 323-324. 
73
 Synode 1985,542-544; Komonchak 1988/2,324; this group blames the supporters of the vision, 
which they reject, that they look only at LG 27 and at ChrD 8a, and that they forget LG 18b, 22b 
and 23 b (and c.392,1), and ChrD 2. 
74
 Synode 1985, 563 (nr.S.c): "Est recommandée une étude pour examiner si le principe de 
subsidiante en vigueur dans la société humaine peut être appliquer à l'Eglise, et dans quelle mesure 
comme dans quel sens l'application pourrait ou devrait être bit (cf Pie ХП AAS 38, 1946, page 
144)". 
75
 Synode 1985, 44. 
74
 Kasper 1986/1, 58-59 and 88-89. 
77
 Beyer 1988 and Kasper 1987 and 1989. 
71
 Synode 1985,31. This statement shows the influence of Corecco's and other's thinking: cf 2.2. 
79
 Johnson 1990, 521. He says that the question of the Synod arose because some thought the 
application in the Code of 1983 insufficient, because it is so important That is doubtful, considering 
the discussion in the circuii minores and the fact that the validity of the principle is again doubted. 
But α seems to be a correct conclusion that they thought that the Code should not have the last word 
in this matter (p 522), otherwise Card. Castillo Lara would have managed to keep the question out 
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The question about the principle of subsidiarity can be found at the end of the section 
about the church as community or "communio" (with themes like communio itself, 
unity and pluriformity, collegiality, Bishops' Conferences and co-responsibility on 
every level, and immediately after the question about the status of the Bishops' 
Conferences). It should not surprise anyone that John Paul Π did not mention it in his 
closing address where he mentioned other concrete suggestions of the Synod: the 
"universal catechism", the study about the nature of Bishops' Conferences, and the 
quick promulgation of the Code for the Eastern Churches'0. 
For the rest, not much is known about the study which has been asked for81. 
Cardinal Hamer set the tone already in the meeting of Cardinals before the Synod*2. He 
stated that in appealing to the principle of subsidiarity the question is about the respect 
for the proper competency of the local church. He believes that the doctrine of Vatican 
II is sufficient" and there is no need to appeal to a principle from social sciences. 
There are problems to apply it in ecclesiology: 
a. the principle retains its socio-political connotations 
b. it gives the universal church a "subsidiary" role in relation to the local church and 
that is wrong: the universal church cannot be reduced to a simple supplementary 
function. 
One could question whether the negative remarks by Hamer show that he has a good 
understanding of the principle of subsidiarity. What are his problems with that "socio­
political connotation", what does he mean when he speaks about "supplementary" 
("suppléance"), and why does he translate "subsidiary" in this way? But his interventi-
on is really too short to be clear*4; he also forgets the Principia of the Synod of 1967 
of the final text 
" Synode 1985,573. But Kling I960,214-216 noted that Vatican I rejected a universal catechism 
because it would bring too much uniformity and would be too difficult to adapt; cf. Schatz 1991, 
52-54. 
" John Paul Π refers to it later (cf 1.9). The last mention I know of was made by Archbishop 
Schotte who, during the Synod of 1987 said that the question of the principle of subsidiarity is a 
difficult one and that a start had been made to describe the status quaestionis: Osservatore Romano, 
Wochenausgabe in Deutscher Sprache, October 16,1987, nr. 42,5. 
ю
 Synode 1985, 31 and 602-604. 
n
 Hamer refers to LG 27 (about the Bishops' proper and immediate authority), to LG 23 (with the 
"in quibus et ex quibus" which is so fundamental for the communio ecclesiology) and ChrD 22 
(where there is a description of the diocese and the function of the bishop). Anyway, Hamer had 
already had questions for a long time about the validity of the principle of subsidiarity for the church. 
He discussed Kiing I960 briefly (and negatively) in his "Bulletin d'ecclésiologie" in : RSPhTh 46 
(1962) 565. Hamer concluded, different from Kiing, that the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity on the church is questionable, also because the content of the principle itself, even in 
social philosophy, is not clear. The analogy between civil society and the church is very limited. The 
nature of ecclesial authority is in question here according to Hamer. 
M
 Beyer 1988,438 states emphatically that (Hamer and he) "nous étions en pleine consonance". 
The "socio-political connotation" of Hamer could thus be Beyer's. He says: "Le principe de 
subsidiarité est un principe de liberté par rapport au citoyens, un principe de non-intervention par 
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and the Praefatio to the Code of 1983. Maybe, his address had some "political 
connotations" itself? Huizing pointed out that he in fact defends the competency of 
"Rome" so that Hamer can attack liberation theology before people in Latin America 
had the chance to do whatever was possible to clarify the differences or to come to an 
agreement: to wait for that would mean to recognize the competency of the local 
church*5. Hamer's Congregado would intervene in 1989 in a controversial way in the 
CLAR, the Latin American Conference of religious*6. 
1.9 John Paul Π 
I know of two occasions when the present Pope has spoken about the validity of the 
principle of subsidiarity within the church. 
In an address to the College of Cardinals and to the cooperatore of the Curia in 1980 he 
spoke about the task of the bishops to protect the purity of doctrine. They must keep in 
mind the special function of the theologians who in this area participate in the office of 
the bishops. The theologians have an additional task, based on the principle of 
subsidiarity*7. This combination of "additional" and the principle of subsidiarity is 
strange: "additional" points towards a primary responsibility of the bishops, the 
principle of subsidiarity points rather to a proper inalienable responsibility of the 
theologians which is not derived from the bishops. It would be in line with the princi­
ple that the bishops as the governing authority would support individuals and groups 
where these cannot fully realize their own responsibility, because of a lack of means or 
talent. Can we see here a lack of understanding of the principle of subsidiarity? It is 
understood as "subsidium": theologians must support the bishops. This interpretation 
seems probable because of what is said further on, where it is stated that theologians 
must give "an authoritative and authorized affirmation to the doctrine of the church", 
must make the doctrine ever better understood. Implicitly the validity of the principle 
for ecclesiastical relationships is recognized! 
Later (on June 28, 1986) the Pope mentioned the request of the Synod in this regard. 
We notice an historical inaccuracy, but we notice also that the Pope does not answer 
the question: that is correct if he says that the question will be studied further in the 
Secretariat of the Synod of bishops**. 
rapport à Fautorilé" (this a correct description of the negative meaning). Taken in this way it would 
question the primacy and the collegiality of the Bishops' college and could suggest a separation 
between the universal and the local church: Beyer 1988,439-444. See on Beyer's vision: 22. 
11
 Huizing 1986,107-109: he bases himself on reports by P. Hebblethwaite. 
K
 See for some of the main points of this conflict: Herder-Korrespondenz 45 (1991) 194, where 
one can find also further references. 
"AASLXXII (1980) 658. 
** Komonchak 1988/2, 325 = AAS LXXK (1987) 189-199. The inaccuracy is that Pius XI did 
not pronounce himself on the validity of the principle for the church. It is remarkable that John Paul 
Π amplifies the "without interfering with the hierarchical structure": it should also not interfere with 
the 'natura о esercizio del Primato del Romano Pontefice" with in the note a reference to Vatican 
L OS 3060-3064 (also from cap Ш: cf nt 57). 
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It is remarkable that in the first great social encyclicals of this Pope the term "principle 
of subsidiarity" is not mentioned. What would have been more obvious than a reference 
to it in the closing chapter of Centesinus annus where the Pope links a central thought 
from his first encyclical -that "man is the way of the church"- with the tradition of social 
doctrine"? 
In Centesimas annus he does mention the principle of subsidiarity but then in the 
context that the state must remain in the background in relation to the economic order, 
or in the context of the relation between "higher" and "lower" communities90. But he 
does not speak about the deepest basis of it: the possibility for development of the 
individual person. It is remarkable also that in Redemptor hominis (1979) but especi­
ally in Sollicitudo rei socialis (1988) there is mention of the principle of solidarity but 
not of the principle of subsidiarity. The principle of solidarity is called "a virtue"91. In 
the tradition of the social doctrine the principle of solidarity and the principle of 
subsidiarity are seen not only as ethical principles but as ontologica! and legal princi­
ples92: this gives a much clearer commitment to make them operative socially and 
politically. 
My tentative conclusion so far is that the philosophical sharpness of earlier descripti­
ons e.g. in Vatican Π9* or even earlier ones in Pius XII, has disappeared. The insight 
into the fundamental nature of the principle of subsidiarity seems to be absent. That is 
not good for providing an adequate basis for the formation of an opinion about the 
validity of the principle for the church itself or at least to provide a feeling for this. 
1.10 Back to the status quaestionis 
It is strange that the Praefatio of the Code of 1983 says that the principle of subsidiari­
ty is one of the orienting principles for the revision of the Code and that the Synod in 
1985 asks whether the principle of subsidiarity is valid in the church. This change in 
" Cf Redemptor hominis 13-17 and CA 53-54 
* CA 15 and 48-49, thus again especially QA 80, just as Felici in 1967: cf 1.З.; in the same way 
it was used already in an address on 25.11.1978: Barberini 1980, 333-334. The special Synod of 
Bishops for Europe (1991) mentions the principle of subsidiarity in the Declaration of December 
14,1991 (in nr.10) in the same general sense as CA. 
91
 RH 16; Sollicitudo rei socialis 38-40, and in 40 we find the characteristic of the principle of 
solidarity: cf V, nt 53. Reading Nothelle 1991,561-767 I could not find a reference to the principle 
of subsidiarity in her extensive research into the social encyclicals of John Paul Π, ending with SRS. 
Even though this is not about words but about ideas (as the Pope in the afore-mentioned passage 
of his address in 1986 says: because Vatican Π and the Code of 1983, which avoid using the word 
"subsidiarity", "hanno incorragiato la participazione e la communione tra gli organismi della 
Chiesa"), к is still remarkable that one of the four classical main principles of social doctrine (Furger 
1991, 134-140) is not mentioned in the socio-ethical encyclicals of the first ten years of this 
pontificate. 
92
 NeD-Breuning 1990,114-116. Cf. V, 13. and 4.2. Nothelle 1991, 724-734 does not discuss this 
concrete relation to tradition in her extensive review of the principle of solidarity in SRS. 
"CfntW. 
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position does not come from a different vision on the principle of subsidiarity: its 
content and meaning are presupposed94. The question is whether this was justified. 
But it is remarkable that the certainty with which its validity seemed to be accepted in 
first instance, has disappeared in later years: the Synods of 1967 and 1969 asked (only) 
what the consequences of the application of the principle of subsidiarity could or 
should be; but the Synod of 1985 asks the basic question again. The change must be 
part of a change in vision of the church and one can trace that. Where there are several 
visions of the church in the texts of Vatican Π95, the Synod of 1985 opts for one: the 
concept of communio'6. What is the significance of that option? 
But, having seen the deliberations of the bishops I want now to look at the argumentati­
on of the theologians. How do they answer the question which the bishops finally came 
to again: is the principle of subsidiarity valid for the church itself? 
2 Theological Teaching Authority97 
What are the thoughts in the theological and canonical discussion about the validity of 
the principle of subsidiarity for the church? I will look at those texts which explicitly 
pose the question98. I will look at them precisely in that light and not in the light of 
concrete applications of the principle of subsidiarity to the church which most authors 
also provide. 
2.1 Positive answers 
CHURCH AS SOCIETAS 
A weighty argument for many authors who answer the question in principle positively, 
is the fact that the church is also a societas, a concrete, institutionalized, organized 
society with its own legal order". The fundamental character, the principle of sub­
sidiarity as ontological principle, which is rooted in the very nature of the person and 
his social relations, makes it valid for all associations of people and, therefore, also for 
" Schasching 1988,413. According to the report by Komonchak 1988/2, 323 (nt 65) and Johnson 
1990,517, Card. Castillo Lara already expressed his surprise during the Synod; see also nt 79. 
"CfVul. 
94
 "L* ecclésiologie de communion est le concept central et fundamental dans les documents du 
Concile": Synode 1985,559 (Π С 1). 
91
 Laarhoven 1981, following Congar, points to the distinction in St Thomas between the 
"magisterium cathedrae pastoralis" of the bishop and the "magisterium cathedrae magistralis" of the 
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the church, which is also a human society100. This "Ecclesia ut societas" as von Nell-
Breuning said, must do justice to the principle of subsidiarity101. Pampaloni summari-
zes this argumentation where he says: total man enters the dynamic of the order of 
salvation and, therefore, there can be no opposition between a norm of (divine or 
human) positive law and a norm of natural law and there can be no real opposition 
between the rights and duties as a human being and the rights and duties as a christi-
an102. This position is positively formulated in the classical thesis that grace presup-
poses nature and brings it to completion103. 
For those authors who support this argument it is clear that they do not give a complete 
description of the church when they say that it is a societas. Some (Bertrams, R.Metz, 
and Pampaloni) develop this idea104. They distinguish between the task and structure of 
civil society and the state on the one hand, and the church on the other. 
The fundamental problem for them lies in the very nature of the church: it is a societas 
sui generis. The initiative for the church and the main lines of its (authority) structure 
are not dependent on the faithful: the initiative lies with God. The church is at one and 
the same time a natural society of people and a supernatural society'10 which exercises 
salvation/grace activity: something which a purely human society cannot do. 
The real difference with civil society and the state lies in the fact that the structural 
order, the hierarchical structure, is a value per se in the church. Or, for these authors it 
is definite that God wants this ecclesiastical structure, but that he does not want any 
specific structure for society: that is a fundamental difference. Because the hierarchical 
structure is such a value in itself it cannot be reduced to the same subsidiary service 
function as the governmental structures in state and society106. 
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Schasching has a more reserved approach to the question. Appealing to Quadragesi­
mo anno 118, he says that people are called to realize values and that these values 
have their own social framework. The principle of subsidiarity underlines that it is a 
question of a personal realization. The principle of subsidiarity is valid also for 
religious values which find their meaning and framework in the church which, as a 
divinely organized institution, has it competencies and its constitutive elements which 
are not part of the subsidiary function107. 
He does not say that the principle of subsidiarity is certainly valid in the church (as do 
those authors mentioned earlier) but he says that the principle is important for the 
functioning of the church and for its ecclesiological self understanding. A good 
understanding of social developments and their acceptance furthers the self-awareness 
of the church and the realization of its task in society10*. Such an important social 
development is the fact that society functions ever more as the principle of subsidiarity 
intends109. 
COMPETENCY-OVER-COMPETENCIES 
That there is an element over which the church has no authority is for von Nell-
Breuning, Kasper, and Kaufmann more of an argument to say that the principle of 
subsidiarity must be valid for the church itself. They speak about the primacy of 
jurisdiction of the Pope110. 
The principle of subsidiarity is also seen as a principle of competency"1. The most 
important competency is the competency-over-competencies: the competency to assign 
competencies to various organs or to keep them for oneself. Every society needs a 
highest authority which is competent to judge other competencies. In the church this 
authority is by divine right institutionalized in the primacy. The question, therefore, is 
not -according to von Nell-Breuning- whether the principle of subsidiarity is applica­
ble to the church, but how the application can be ordered in a meaningful way. In this 
way he again answers the question how he sees the "reservation" of Pius XII: it is not a 
condition, it is a presupposition. 
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THE FUNCTION OF THE JURIDICAL STRUCTURE 
In his description of taking a stand in principle, in view of the church as societas, 
Kerber emphasizes its juridical character. He sees an affirmation of this in the task of 
the church: the church has a spiritual, religious-moral task. The religious and moral 
values, faith and formation of conscience, can only be realized by the person. They 
cannot be enforced by internal organizational rules, they can perhaps be supported by 
those. One can force someone to stick to norms but one cannot force someone to accept 
values and make them one's own. As a whole the church should provide the framework 
for this intemalisation of values and that is her supportive function in relation to 
individual persons and smaller associations"2; one can think e.g. of religious institutes, 
basic communities, "movements". Huizing says in this same sense that what is 
important in the church is that the meaning and purpose of pastoral leadership and the 
rules which should help this cannot be found in maintaining external public order, but 
rather in the support and the stimulus of a personal experience of christian faith, and 
the personal participation in ecclesial community life. That is for him the truly theolo­
gical meaning of the principle of subsidiarity in the church community' '\ 
Also Pampaloni says that canon law, of which natural law is partly the foundation, is in 
service to the development of the human person and that in this way the juridical 
structure of the church has a "subsidiary" function"4. 
Historically such a position is the first reaction to the statement by Pius ΧΠ about the 
validity of the principle of subsidiarity in the church. K. Rahner stated quite soon that 
all official organizational forms and orderings have a "subsidiary character": they exist 
to foster religious life and to foster respect for the personal, free area where moral 
decisions are to be taken. The christian has a proper inalienable responsibility in this 
area. More generally he rejects an "ecclesiastical étatism" which forgets that the church 
exists for people"5. 
Rauscher opts for a similar position"6. The continuity and the functioning of the church 
as a human society are dependent on the activity and the responsibility for it which the 
members take upon themselves. That is why, what individual christians can do on their 
own initiative and their own faith should not be taken away from them. The active 
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believing person has a task not just for his own salvation but also for the building up of 
the church and for the contribution the church can make to the world. Vatican Π stated 
this (esp. in LG 32, 33,35), based on the idea of the "People of God" and called church 
office, therefore, a service to the whole People of God (LG 18). 
THE POSITIVE ANSWER SUMMARIZED: CHURCH AS SOCIEJAS 
Even though the last two visions have their own approach it is clear that the are related 
to the first vision. The positive answer thus depends on the present status of societas as 
concept for the church: what is its value? If the church is indeed (also) a societas then 
the principle of subsidiarity is valid for it, at least in as far as it is a societas. We must 
then clearly distinguish between the idea "societas" and "societas perfecta": that is a 
form of it which is historically determined. 
Organized society, the societas, is in this vision important as the concrete human order 
in which the church can fulfill its mission and in which only some central elements are 
given about which the church cannot decide in her self understanding. As societas the 
church has a function to create conditions. 
The authors which take this position have given an answer to the "reservation" of Pius 
XII. Von Nell-Breuning makes it into an argument in favor, Bertrams, R.Metz, and 
Pampaloni have been discussed extensively above. Others deal with Pius' reservation 
in their argumentation"7. Kerber says that the key elements of the dogmatic vision on 
the juridical primacy and infallibility oblige the concrete juridical and organizational 
structure of the church only in a limited way: the task of the papacy to create unity, 
which is not at stake, can take diverse forms1". But with the discussion on who is the 
subject of infallibility, and the vision of Vatican Π about the primacy in jurisdiction, we 
would enter a discussion which we do not (yet) want to enter here"9. 
FROM SELF-EVIDENT REALITY 
Some authors see the validity of the principle of subsidiarity not as a question but as a 
fact. They hardly give arguments for it. 
Gundlach drew the consequences soon after the appearance of Quadragesimo anno . 
In 1934 he said that the church is not only "Anstalt", a foundation under hierarchical 
authority, but it is also "coetusfldelium", it also has the characteristics of an associati­
on. These characteristics can best be realized in a parish "without damaging the official 
position of the parish priest". Awareness of being an association can be evoked there, 
that every member is co-responsible for the whole. Every member of the church should 
get rid of the idea that he is only an object Only then can the parish fulfill its important 
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 Mosiek 1975 pays no attention to this reservation. 
'"Kerber 1984,670-671. 
" ' Bassett 1971,238-239 says that it is precisely the classical canonical theory about jurisdiction 
which is the main problem when we speak about the validity of the principle of subsidiarity because 
that theory presupposes that all authority in the church comes via/from the papacy. 
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objective which belongs to every small association within a larger whole120. Until the 
address by Pius in 1946 Gundlach was the only one who drew this consequence; and 
the scientific discussion only started again with Rahner in 1956. 
Gundlach returned to the meaning of the principle of subsidiarity for the church itself 
later on: dominating centralism is bad also for the church121. 
Kiing and Kloppenburg also take it as self-evident They plead for the application of 
the principle of subsidiarity as "decentralization" in favor of the position of the 
Patriarchates, the Bishops' Conferences, and the particular churches122. This same 
attitude can be found also in Rahner when he, also basing himself on the principle of 
subsidiarity, emphasizes the importance of the proper responsibility of the Bishops' 
Conferences121. Kelley indicates the importance of the principle of subsidiarity for the 
internal relationships within religious institutes124. 
Mörsdorf too finds the validity of the principle of subsidiarity apparently self-evident 
but he draws a different conclusion from it. The principle provides the argument that 
the papacy in extraordinary situations can interfere in the governance of a diocese: 
when the ordinary authority does not function sufficiently125. 
DOUBTS 
It is remarkable that in the specific literature on this question real doubts only emerge 
in 1969126. That is the year of the second Synod of Bishops where Paul VI pleaded for 
prudence in relation to the principle of subsidiarity. 
We find these doubts in Pampaloni and Salerno. Pampaloni pointed to the danger of 
individualism which could follow the application of the principle of subsidiarity in the 
church127. Salerno warned against democratization of the church as societas, present-
m
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ing this as an implication of the application of the principle of subsidiarity; the 
dogmatically unassailable position of authority must be safeguarded12*. The crisis in 
authority which we mentioned before influenced the theological discussion here 
politically. The apprehension that the position of ecclesiastical authority will be 
attacked is clearly present,M. 
12 Negative answers 
These authors emphasize the proper nature of the church and the special position of its 
authority. 
PLACE OF THE CHRISTIAN-FAITHFUL IN THE CHURCH 
The principle of subsidiarity is based on the insight that the person is prior to any form 
of association: therefore, associations in society and the state must recognize the 
dignity of the person and of his rights. 
The rights and duties of the faithful are not prior to the church, but originate in baptism 
and they are attributed by the church. That means that the church does not have to take 
into consideration the rights of the faithful in the same way as the principle of subsidia-
rity prescribes this for state and society130. This becomes concrete in the fact that 
human rights or the basic rights of the person are not, in the church, real sources of 
knowledge or criterion for the rights of the christian-faithful. These are not based on 
faith itself but on the ius divinum naturale or on a rationalistic modem natural law 
concept; they cannot be criteria for church law. The relation between these basic rights 
and the rights of the faithful in the church is the same as the relationship between the 
Decalogue and the Sermon on the Mount; the first one is valid for human society, the 
latter for the church. Ecclesiastical justice demands that faith, hope, and charity 
constitute the ecclesiastical community structure131. 
AUTHORITY IN THE CHURCH 
The structure of the church is dogmatically determined and official authority has been 
given a special place in iL For these authors this prevents the validity of the principle of 
subsidiarity in the church. The immediate and all-encompassing character of the 
primacy of jurisdiction may not be hindered in any way: the validity of the principle of 
subsidiarity would be a hindrance because the principle has everything to do with 
autolimitazione deD'esercizio dei propri poteri negli organi superiori, perchè il loro intervento viene 
a giustificarsi concretamente in tanto in quanto si renda palese la necessità di offrire un servizio in 
determinate situazioni di bisogno che mutano costantemente nel tempo e nello spazio" (269). 
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 Salerno 1969, 140-141 and 143-144. He sees the principle of subsidiarity as a sociological 
principle and does not really answer the question of its validity for the church. Alberigo 1979,37-38 
and nt IS take the same position. 
m
 Abo de Lubac does not really take position: he puts the application of the principle of subsidia-
rity on an equal footing with decentralization ("la decentralisation dans ITiglise ou l'application du 
principe de subsidiante); it is not to be confused with a "démocratisation de mode collectiviste" (!): 
de Lubac 1971,113-115 and 132-135. 
m
 Barberini 1980, 347; Ghirlanda 1984, 338-339 en 369. 
131
 Согессо 1981,447-449. 
113 
autonomy, democracy, and the rights of freedom. In the church, authority must always 
be able to maintain the substantial homogeneity of faith and discipline112. Ghirlanda 
even goes so far that he speaks of a "relatio subordinationis" of the local church to the 
Roman church113. 
THE DEFICIT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY REGARDING THE CHURCH 
For Beyer the content of the principle of subsidiarity means that citizens of a state, 
which respects human rights, can do themselves (alone or together) what does not 
belong to the direct competency of the state. The first priority of the state must be to 
guarantee and foster the autonomy of the citizens. The state intervenes on the level of 
the bonwn commune and helps the citizens where they cannot themselves realize what 
they need114. The principle of subsidiarity is not in first instance a principle of decentra-
lization, but signifies respect for the human person, his potential and activities115. 
This principle cannot be applied to the church and should be substituted by a principle 
of "rightful autonomy"136. Hidden in the explanation of what this "rightful autonomy" is, 
one finds the argument why the principle of subsidiarity cannot be applied to the 
church. He understands the principle in this way, that it presupposes the independence 
of parts of society so that they can maintain their own identity. The principle of 
"rightful autonomy" in fact restates specifically for the church the values of the 
principle of subsidiarity. 
"Rightful autonomy" points to the charismata which God gives to the individual 
christian and the individual ecclesia! group. These charismata give the person and the 
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group their identity, but they are also given so that the whole church may profit from 
them. 
That is where the difference lies between both principles and that is the argument to 
reject the principle of subsidiarity for the church. He sees the principle as individualis-
tic, different from "rightful autonomy". 
That is why Beyer cannot see that the structure of the church could be modeled on the 
principle of subsidiarity. In that structure there is continuous interference and imma-
nence, e.g., between the universal and the local church, as Lumen gentium 23 says ("in 
quibus et ex quibus"). The office of Peter is not a supportive function ("une aide 
subsidiaire") for the particular church, but is an essential element of it. The principle 
of subsidiarity, in Beyer's interpretation, places the primacy, the collegiality of the 
bishops as "communio hierarchica", and the link between the universal and the 
particular church in danger. Its rejection is for the church "un progrès doctrinal" in 
line with the vision of Vatican Π about the relation between the primacy and the 
College of bishops, between the bishop of Rome and the other bishops, between the 
particular churches and the universal church117. 
This argument sounds very dubious. His interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity 
forgets its relation with the principle of solidarity. The principle of subsidiarity should 
not be seen as individualistic and it does not presuppose (complete) autonomy'31. 
Perhaps the words "iusta autonomia" are a good equivalent for the principle of 
subsidiarity and it is remarkable that in the section of the Code of 1983 about the 
institutes of consecrated life, where Beyer found the word, the principle of subsidiarity 
has certainly had its influence139. Yet, with Kasper one can question whether it is 
sensible to bring into the discussion the term "autonomia". It is originally a political, 
juridical, and above all a philosophical concept with its own points of reference in 
which the idea of emancipation from given authorities is part and parcel. Whether that 
is the best word, even with the addition of "rightful" to express ecclesiastical govern­
mental relationships, is a real question. Considering the points of reference, the 
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concept of the principle of subsidiarity is rather simple140 and in its correct interpretati­
on it is not individualistic or particularistic. 
Finally, Beyer does not clarify what the meaning is of the relation between charismata 
and the totality of the church: is one ultimately more important than the other, is one 
subject to the other, or does a tensile relationship remain? It is significant that he does 
not see Principium VI in connection with the application of the principle of subsidiari­
ty in the church where he consciously discusses only Principia Г and Vм'. 
Beyer's position seems to me to be untenable because of his argument about the 
content and because of a terminological problem. In the best case "iusta autonomia" as 
an expression only clarifies the issue at stake in the debate about the validity and the 
importance of the principle of subsidiarity for the church. 
THE CHURCH'S PROPER NATURE 
Barberini points out that the principle of subsidiarity indicates the relativity and the 
instrumental character of organized society. The state is not a "societas necessaria"; 
the church, however, is, as "instrumentum" or "sacramentum salutis". I want to make 
clear that this argument does not hold up. From the doctrine of the societas perfecta as 
well as from the social doctrine it is clear that the state has an irreplaceable role142. 
SUMMARIZING 
In so far as these authors see a role for the principle of subsidiarity it is to be found for 
them only in decentralization143 or in the balancing of unity and diversity144; but then 
they do not see the principle of subsidiarity in the sense which it normally has. 
These authors arrive at their negative position about the question whether the principle 
of subsidiarity is valid for the church from their belief that the church has its own 
proper origin and nature in such a way that principles from the social teaching cannot 
be applied to it. They indicate that their position has everything to do with the changes 
1 4 0
 Kasper 1989,157. 
141
 Beyer 1986, 805-812: cf nr 1.3. 
142
 Barberini 1980,349. Minnerath 1982,92-93 draws the conclusion trom Ottavianis' definition 
of societas perfecta that it is a necessary society. CA 48 says that the role of the state in relation to 
the economic order is: "to give security about the guarantees of individual freedom and property as 
well as a stable currency and efficient public services". In this sense QA 80 already stated that the 
state has its own tasks "quae ad ipsam solam spectant, utpote quae sola ipsa prasestare possit". Leo 
ΧΠΊ said about the state "civili hominum communitati necessariam esse auctoritatem, qua regatur": 
Immortale Dei, ρ 147; cf I.D., 152. 
141
 Barberini 1980,359-360. Vararía 1968 discusses the question whether the principle of subsidia-
rity can be applied in ecclesiastical procedural law. He posits the thesis without any nuance: in civil 
and ecclesiastical legal systems "Salus rei publicae prima lex esto" (336-339) which for him means 
that the bonum commune must always have priority over particular interests. He can only see the 
principle of subsidiarity as another word for decentralization (341). One must underline the thesis 
of Guttierez 1972, 785-786 that the principle of subsidiarity as "caposaldo della dottrine cattolica 
sulla società (...) in nessun caso si può ridune ad un criterio meramente organizzativo in ordine alla 
maggiore efficienza di una società"; cf 1.7. ("Some general remarks") above. 
144
 Ghirlanda 1984,370. 
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in the self-image of the church. Barberini accepts that the doctrine of the societas 
perfecta allows the application but says that Vatican Π dropped this doctrine141. Mucci 
posits that the principle of subsidiarity fits quite well in the ideas of Pius XII, that the 
church is not only a (strictly hierarchical) societas perfecta, but that it is also the 
Corpus mysticum where pneumatological interdependence rules; the Pope sought to 
soften the rigid church vision in this way. That is what the principle of subsidiarity does 
also. But the vision of the "Ecclesia societas" has been replaced in Vatican Π by the 
ecclesiology of communio, according to Mucci144. Ghirlanda calls the concept commu­
nio the most fundamental in the ecclesiology of Vatican Π147. 
The systematic unfolding of the communio ecclesiology develops the thesis of the 
special nature of the church14* and from this follows according to one view the 
impossibility to combine it with the principle of subsidiarity. The relation of being in 
communio with God and with other people has its very own proper nature. The goal of 
canonical order is to bring about communio; communio is the formal principle of 
church law. Communio relativizes the juridical principle of legal security149 and of 
natural human rights very much. The principle of subsidiarity is the exponent of the 
emphasis on natural human rights: it sees them as absolute. That is why the principle of 
subsidiarity is heterogeneous in relation to communio; it leads to a juridical protection 
of the rights of the faithful in the same way as civil law does. But natural values are 
relative if seen in relation to the supernatural values and rights of the faithful in the 
church1". 
3 The Status Quaestionis Clarified 
The opposition is total. One concept of the church, societas, demands (especially in 
canon law) that the principle of subsidiarity will be respected because for the church, 
as societas, precisely as for other societates that principle must be valid. The other 
concept, communio, means according to some authors that the juridical order in the 
church cannot possibly accept this principle because the church is totally different. The 
question of the principle of subsidiarity is much more influential than it might seem at 
first sight because it is about the presuppositions and implications of different views of 
the church. Thils already pointed this out: because the principle of subsidiarity is a 
formal principle, it can only be given form and substance in a developed ecclesiology. 
That is why the question about its validity is not a separate question; it must be seen in 
a broader ecclesiologica! context151. 
145
 Barberini 1980,347. 
146
 Mucci 1986, 431-435 and 442. 
147
 Ghirlanda 1988,264. 
,4,CfVm,2.4. 
'^ Corecco 1980,100. 
150
 Corecco 1981,449; Corecco 1985,343. In IX we will extensively discuss this conception of 
communio and its validity. 
151
 Thus 1972, 243; cf Gutiérrez 1972,794 and Komonchak 1988/2, 309-312, 339 and 342. 
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The two concepts seem to be mutually exclusive: on the basis of each concept one 
arrives at different conclusions when the question is whether there is a fundamental 
difference between one's rights as a human being and one's rights as a believer. The 
concept societas believes that there is no fracture while the concept communio says 
there is. 
But I should not exaggerate the opposition. There are authors who see the principle of 
subsidiarity as an adequate instrument to structure the church administratively as 
communio*" and during the Synod of 1969 there were suggestions made in that 
direction, but they have not been developed. The question about the validity of the 
principle of subsidiarity can only be answered, rebus sic stantibus, if we study the 
current theological and canonical status of both concepts. It may be clear that the 
question of human rights in the church cannot remain outside this status quaeslionis: is 
it, according to the concept, true that canon law must guarantee them? This is a valid 
question when the church proposes itself as guarantor of these rights'". According to 
Kasper it is the most fundamental question: how can the always unique and irreplace­
able human person and the charismata given by the Spirit be protected in the 
church'54? 
There are enough reasons to study the more important concepts of the church. Each 
one gives a vision on a community of people. We spoke about this in a general way in 
the first chapter, especially about the organologica! variations. We posited that the 
principle of subsidiarity is the counter-balance against centralist visions which deny the 
irreplaceable value of the individual person without arriving at a real individualism. 
Are the concepts of the church organologica! visions? If so, one must pose the questi­
on, certainly in relation to the concept of communio or as the case may be, certain 
concretizations of it, whether there is not a danger of totalitarianism if one denies the 
validity of the principle of subsidiarity categorically. That is why in the church there is 
a constant appeal to the principle of subsidiarity. That appeal is always a protest 
against centralism and that is also the principle's function in society'". That became 
clear in the first part of our study because the principle of subsidiarity was in final 
analysis a position taken against centralism, collectivism, (and not to be overlooked) 
individualism after years of theorizing about the position of the church. 
Against this background we can take stock of the situation. The validity of the principle 
of subsidiarity for the church is not really in question. This is for two reasons: 
,BMoval968,314;TheJuristl970;Krucinal975,125; Granfield 1987,131-132; Kasper 1987, 
235; Tillard 1987,345-346; Curran 1992,101. It seems that Bertrams 1966/3,415-417 tends in 
this direction also. 
153
 Punt 1987,243-247. The yearly messages of John Paul Π on the occasion of January 1 are a 
good example of this. 
, я
 Kasper 1989,156. 
15S
 Komonchak 1988/2, 342-344. 
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- Pius ΧΠ and his successors affirmed the validity. This is true also for the various 
synods; only the Synod of 1983 leaves some doubt 
• Only a small minority of theologians and canonists who deal with the question 
believe that there is no validity for the church. But in this question it is not numbers 
or authority which provides the answer, but the force of the arguments of this 
minority. 
And it is precisely the arguments which link up with the doubts of the Synod of 198S. 
Where the Synod of 1969 was still searching for the relation between a communio 
ecclesiology and the principle of subsidiarity, this is now denied by some and the 
Synod of 1985 placed question marks around it. It is the concept ci communio which 
brings doubt. 
When we have studied the various concepts of the church, the question must be 
answered whether the road of the Synod of 1969 and that of some theologians is viable, 
namely, the road of seeing the communio ecclesiology and the principle of subsidiarity 
in line with each other. This is important because the communio concept for the church 
is being emphasized so much nowadays, and is sometimes seen as the only acceptable 
concept. 
We cannot evade the question about the canonical meaning of the principle of subsidia­
rity and the question about the meaning of canon law as such. It is precisely on the 
administrative-juridical level that the principle of subsidiarity must be concretized. 
And then we automatically come to two applications which we have seen time and 
again in the foregoing: the relation between ecclesiastical administration and the 
christian-faithful, and the relation within the administration itself between primacy and 
episcopacy15*. The papal Commission for the Revision of the Code and the Code of 
1983 (including the Praefatio) did not satisfy the intentions of 1967. Further study will 
make clear whether in the church it is a question of an "analogous" application. 
And thus there will have to come an answer as to the content of the question why the 
validity and the application of the principle is so important; because in fact the life of 
the church demands it now. With Losada one could think of the following examples: 
the laity is becoming ever more aware of their responsibility as christians in church and 
world; there is a growing demand that human rights be respected in the church; we see 
a growing number of various groupings arising from an active grassroots-base in the 
church; there is more attention for the situation of the particular churches, the situation 
of the Bishops' Conferences, and the situation of encompassing associations: Europe 
after the disappearance of the Iron Curtain, Africa, Latin America, for which areas 
separate synods are being organized157. 
156
 Both applications were mentioned in the Synod of 1967 according to Gutiérrez 1972,79S (nt 
46: press conference by Card. Urbani). 
157
 This tendency and these questions, but somewhat differently formulated, were put in central 
position by Losada 1988 during the congress of Salamanca (January 1988) where also the texts 
Kaufmann 1988 and Komonchak 1988/2 were spoken. The report on this congress about the nature 
of Bishops' Conferences can be found, for example, in the second issue of 1988 of The Jurist. 
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VII The Important Ecclesiologica! Concepts between 
Vatican I and Vatican II 
1 An Obvious Question 
In the period between Vatican I and Vatican Π the church was described mostly as a 
societas perfecta and as corpus (Christi) mysticwn. In Vatican Π there was a break in 
ideas; the nature and the importance of this will be discussed later. 
But first we must put the obvious question whether in those two visions of the church, 
which are the most important in the period in which the principle of subsidiarity was 
formulated for state and society, consequences are drawn from the principle for the 
church itself. In this we must pay special attention to the administrative structure and 
the mutual relationships of the agents in these two visions. 
2 Two Distinct Visions 
2.1 The church as societas perfecta 
In the competition between civil and ecclesiastical authority in the 12th century "the 
roman law doctrine about the corporate structure of associations (...) this sociological-
juridical content of the idea of corpus is applied to the church". In the 13th century the 
church was seen as the "corporatio Christi" and it "no longer distinguishes itself from 
any other medieval corporation, to which roman law is applied"1; the church as corpus 
was seen as one moral person2. It is clear the theologians and popes introduced the idea 
1
 Weiler 1965, 18-20; Bassett 1971, 227-229. Mörsdorf 1964, 201 gives for "corporatio" or 
"Körperschaft": persona moralis collegialis = a group of persons united to achieve common tasks. 
This is one form of a moral person. The other is "Anstalt" or "foundation": persona moralis non 
collegialis = an organization or fund composed of material things which, by the will of the founder, 
are destined to serve the goals of the community. 
2
 Aymans 1972, 328; Dohm 1978, 538-542. 
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of corpus in order to place the papacy at the head of it3 even though the concept of 
"corpus " remains unclear for a long time, according to Congar4. 
In the following period of competition, in the Counter-Reformation, the idea of the 
church as "a visible, hierarchically organized, and indestructible human society" was in 
an exemplary way defined by R. Bellarminus5 and the direction was set for the 
following centuries. For Bellarminus the church as corpus was the visible, the external, 
the hierarchically organized association6. 
In the struggle for freedom of the church in its relation to the modem states, the church 
was then defined in the course of the 19th century as "societas perfecta". That had 
been done before in ecclesiology and canonical science, but from 1839 on it became 
official terminology. Kus ΓΧ used the term several times as e.g. in the Syllabus of 1864 
(Propositio 19). Two preparatory Schemata for Vatican I also used the term7. 
Leo XIII then definitively formulated the doctrine of the church as a societas perfecta, 
specifically in his encyclical Immortale Dei'. Until Vatican Π there was no uncertainty 
about this term in the church9. But it is remarkable that the term was not used in the 
3
 Congar 1961, 26; Congar 1970, 472; cf Schatz 1990,116-120. An example of this is the text 
in the Bulla Unam Sanciam (1302) by Boniface Ш: "Igitur Ecclesiae unius et unicae corpus, 
unum caput, non duo capita quasi monstrum, Christus videlicet et Christi vicaríus Petrus, Petríque 
successor...". St Thomas saw this differently: Congar 1969,139. 
4
 Congar 1961, 27; Congar 1969,140-142. He quotes St. Thomas' Summa Theologiae, ΓΠ, q 8, 
a 1, ad 2: "corpus similitudinarie dictum, id est aliqua multitude ordinata". Congar adds that "cor­
pus" was for St. Thomas a spiritual whole; visibility and historicity are not aspects of it. One should 
not look for an ecclesiology in SL Thomas. See about this also H. de Lubac, Corpus mysiicum. 
L'Eucharistie et l'Eglise au Moyen Age, Paris 1949 (2e); Kehl 1976, 77-78 summarizes this suc­
cinctly. 
3
 Kehl 1976, 76. He quotes R. BeUarminus (1542-1621), Controv. TV, lib. ΓΠ, cap Π: "Nostra 
autem sentencia est Ecclesiam unam tantum esse, non duas, et Ulam unam et veram esse coetum 
hominum eiusdem Christiana fidei professione et eorumdem Sacramentorum communio colligatum, 
sub regimine legiümorum pastorum, ас praecipue unius Christi in terris Vicarii Romani Pontificis". 
6
 Congar 1969, 142-148, who quotes BeUarminus on ρ 147: "Ecclesia est coetus hominum ita 
visibilis et palpabilis ut est coetus populi Romani vel regnum Galliae aut respublica Venetorum". 
Bellarminus is aware that he has not said the last word about this because the church as corpus 
possesses this "anima": the inner grace-elements and the Holy Spirit as principle of unity; cf Kehl 
1976, 77-80. 
'See for the slow development of the usage oí societas perfecta: Waif 1977,108 who mentions 
the earliest official use in 1839, and Waif 1988,115-118; Listi 1978,107-126 who indicates a first 
magisterial use only in I860; Zimmermann 1981, 26-39; Minnerath 1982, 27-60; Granfield 1982, 
8-11. ТарагеШ (cf Г , 3) and С Tarquini sj ( 1810-1874) play an important role in the development 
of societas perfecta as a useable word Listi o.e., 30 and 126-133; Minnerath o.e., 33-35 and 86; 
Waif 1988,117-118. Rjr Vaticanum L· Horst 1963,148; Zimmermann o.e., 40-45; Granfield 1982, 
11 ; Minnerath o.e., 44-48, who points out that the concept appears there only in rudimentary form. 
• Minnerath 1982, 49-60; cf Г , 5. 
9
 A clear exception is Klein 1947. 
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Code of 1917'° nor by Pius X or Benedict XV. Pius XI never used it in his three 
encyclicals against totalitarian systems". Pius XII used it again12. 
What is the meaning of societas? All definitions contain four constitutive elements: it is 
about people, it is about what binds them together, it is about the goal, and it is about 
the means to achieve the goal. The goal is the most important element {"societates sunt 
ut fines"), because the goal determines the means and the nature and juridical status of 
the societas". One can then define "societas" as "a lasting association of several 
persons who by their common activity try to achieve a common goal"14. 
The church is such a societas. Bertrams developed this canonically. The church is a 
true society; a great number of people are involved who unanimously strive for a goal 
in order to become an organized unity. It is essentially different from the sum-total of 
the individual persons. The church is a legal society; it has as its goal and as its duty to 
realize the religious bonum commune. Therefore, it has the right to achieve this goal. 
And in this way the church is a subject of rights. 
It is a given of natural law that the faithful are subjects of rights too. Man enters as 
subject of rights into any society, also the church: by baptism man becomes a person in 
the church while his being a natural person remains, and with that also the rights which 
flow from it. 
As in every society the relationships of the members to the church are juridical in 
nature: these are relations between subjects of rights and bearers of inalienable rights. 
The realization of the bonum commune in the church has to come about in a juridically 
organized way: all tasks and competencies are juridically determined15. 
The legal order of the church as society must be distinguished from the legal order of 
the members. They are persons and have their own goal; they are not subsumed by 
society. A baptized person has rights and duties as a person, which are natural and 
supernatural, and are inalienable16. The church has the right and the duty to order their 
exercise17. 
10
 "Societas perfecta" appears in the first paragraph of the Constitutie Apostolica "Providentis-
sima Mater Ecclesiae" which introduced the Code of 1917. Waif 1988,119 points out that, e.g., 
in с 100 of the Code of 1917 an occasion was certainly given for the use of societas perfecta. 
11
 Waif 1977,112-116 and Waif 1988,119; Listi 1978,190-203. Minnerath 1982, 61-70. For the 
three encyclicals of Pius XI: see V, nt 39. 
a
 See nr. 2.2 below; cf Minnerath 1982, 70-73. 
13
 Minnerath 1982,89-90. Ottaviani's definition 1947,33 (nr IS) is probably the shortest possible: 
"plurium hominum unio ad eundem finem communibus mediis consequendum". The following 
pages give a clarification of the four elements. 
14
 Listi 1978,126. 
15
 Bertrams 1948,49-50. 
16
 Bertrams 1944, 89; Bertrams 1956, 77; Bertrams 1957/2, 258: "Die Kirche bildet auch als 
Übernatürliche Gemeinschaft nicht ein totalitäres Kollektiv, das die Eigenständigheit und das 
Eigenleben seiner Glieder auflöst". 
17
 Bertrams 1960,222. Bertrams 1959 gives a synthesis of his ideas on this. 
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A socielas perfecta is, according to Oechslin's definition, a societas with its own law, 
which independently from other societates bies to achieve its own, special, goal and 
which for that purpose possesses its own necessary organization and means. The 
"perfect-ness" is in these three elements: its own goal, its own organization, its own 
necessary means". List! says that the perfect-ness of a societas is materially determined 
by the goal and formally by the fact that the societas has the necessary means to 
achieve the goal. As such it is not directed towards a still higher whole, but it is 
independent and self sufficient19. States and the catholic church as a whole are seen in 
this vision as societates perfectaé10. 
The use of "societas perfecta" brought about that people, inside the church and outside 
it, looked at the universal church as one large diocese under the authority of the papacy 
in which the bishops were only executors of this central authority21. lus Publicum 
Ecclesiasticwn, the system in which the terminology of societas perfecta was develo-
ped systematically22, placed a strong emphasis on unity and centralism. Ottaviani saw 
only one authority in the church, the Pope: bishops derive their authority from him and 
are subject to him23. And in this way, the universal church is one church where there is 
no place for independent parts or "several communities which would be similar but 
distinct"; these would, in this vision, quickly become subjects of the different states24. 
Contrary to the state, but understood in the same way, the one church is subject to one 
authority: "God founded the church, as a well organized state, so that there is a ruler for 
the sheep and a highest and most trustworthy master of the truth to whom it belongs, 
more than to the other shepherds, to bind or to loose, to govern the faithful authorita-
tively, in the same way as this belongs to the sheperds of the peoples"25. With this is 
linked the idea that the church is by divine right societas inaequalis, in which the laity 
has no power at all26. 
" Oechslin 1974,23; Minnerath 1982,91-93. 
"Listi 1978,126-127. 
20
 Leo ХШ says the same, using the same words: "Similiter intelligi debet, Ecclesiam societatem 
esse, non minus quam ipsam civitatem, genere et iure perfectam", in: Immortale Dei, ρ 161. 
21
 Legrand 1983,149; cf Congar 1984, 297. 
2 2
 Minnerath 1982,85-94. 
2 3
 Ottaviani 1947,40Ы02,412-413, 421 (nrs 213,219 and 227). 
M
 O.e., 177-178 (nr 101). Congar 1980, 298 says it this way: "Dans ces conditions, les Eglises 
locales - les diocèses - n'étaient pas societas perfecta, n'ayant pas la plénitude de pouvoir 
juridictionnel, bien qu'elles jouissent de toute la vie sacramentelle et mystique". 
25
 Ottaviani 1947, 161-162 (nr 90 Ш): "imo, ad modum bene ordinatae reipublicae, ita earn 
disposuit, ut unus ovium princeps et maximus certissimusque veritatis magister in eadem esset, cui, 
supra ceteros Ecclesiae pastores, competerei solvere et ligare, fidelesque auctoritative regere sicut 
competit populorum pastoribus, iis videlicet a quibus claves regni gestantur." 
26
 Ottaviani 1947,392 (nr 209): "Hic enim est Ecclesia docens illic audiens, hic pastores illic oves: 
in pastoribus regendi ius collatum ex Christi institutione, ovibus autem oboediendi officium panter 
indictum a Christo. Нас inter pastores et oves iure divino constituía distinctione. Ecclesia evadit 
societas iure divino inaequalis". 
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Pottmeyer envisaged this vision when he said that the church, in its reaction to the 
appearance of the modem state in the 19th century, took on the concept of sovereignty 
of that state; that is, an independent competency to legislate, which gives a base for its 
independence in relation to the states, and for its own internal exercise of authority. In 
this the government has the full and exclusive competency to exercise authority over its 
territory. In this same way the church should be an integrated and closed reality in 
which the possibility for conflict is contained as much as possible by a decisive central 
authority, which is accepted by all and which is always ready to intervene. Unity and a 
closed organization are the main goals of ecclesiastical (administrative) action and the 
dogma of infallibility fits into that scheme27. 
What kind of concept is "societas perfecta"! It indicates a social or political reality. In 
the definition of "societas", as well as the additional "perfecta", only philosophical (or 
maybe juridical) terminology is used. The idea developed in relation to the state28. In 
this way it is "a theoretical construction to show the independence of the church against 
unjust civil interference". One was forced to place the sovereignty of the church over 
against that of the modem state29. It is, therefore, a philosophical (possibly juridical) 
term which fits in a way of thinking, which is historically determined, about state and 
society, and which is given form in the ¡us Publicum Ecclesiasticum. The natural law 
basis is consciously chosen30. On the other hand it is true that those who saw the 
church as a societas (perfecta) were often aware of the limitations of that vision11. 
Does it still have value for the church today? The last time it played an important role 
for the self- understanding of the church was in the preparatory Schema about the 
church Aeternus Unigeniti Pater which was handed to the participants of the Second 
Vatican Council in November 1962 for the first phase of this Council32. But this 
Schema was rejected by the fathers of the Council as less useful33 and precisely chapter 
27
 Pottmeyer 1975,379,388421, especially 393 and 399; Minnerath 1982,94; Schatz 1990, 200; 
cf Houtepen 1973,344. 
21
 Listi 1978, 179 (in Leo ХШ). Congar 1970, 462: Ta manière de comprendre lEglise a été 
largement conditionnée par la façon de voir sa relation avec le monde". 
29
 Granfïeld 1982, 12; Legrand 1983, 147 speaks about "une telle construction, largement 
commandée par l'apologétique"; Pottmeyer 197S, 388-408, especially 397-401. It is remarkable that 
Pottmeyer 1975 has not been taken into account in Listi 1978, and does not even appear in his 
bibliography. 
30
 Minnerath 1982,88-89. 
31
 Bertrams 1948, 50-54; Listi 1978, 203. This is even more clear in Mörsdorf. He calles the 
church, just as the state, a societas perfecta but points then to the differences between church and 
state and underlines especially what is proper to the church as a "supernatural societas' and he does 
not emphasize the similarities as is usual: Mörsdorf 1961,195-197 and Mörsdorf 1966, 765-766. 
32
 Schema 1962; see also nr 2.2 below; cf Minnerath 1982, 80-82. 
33
 Philips 1967, 18. 
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IX about the relation between church and state, where both are called expressly 
societas perfecta, was never discussed again in the Council14. 
The term does not appear as such in the texts of Vatican Π, not even where one would 
expect it, namely, in Lumen gentium, in Dignitatis humanae (in 4 or 13) or in 
Gaudium et spes (76 and 89)35. The demand for the "libertas Ecclesiae" is defended in 
this way: the church needs a freedom to act such as her care for the salvation of people 
demands. This freedom is based on its divine institution by Christ as well as on the 
freedom which all religious communities should possess: in its tum this freedom is 
based on the freedom of religion of the human person56. The conclusion can only be 
that the Council consciously wanted to avoid the term. 
But in the literature one can find different opinions about its present-day value. We can 
give the following examples. Huizing rejects the idea of societas perfecta because it 
separates the juridical order of the church from the church as a sacramental communi­
on of faith37. Waif argues that it is better to reject it because it cannot be defended 
theologically or biblically and because it presents an unrealistic evaluation of the 
position of the church in the modem world38. 
Listi and Sebott on the other hand point out that there is still value in it considering the 
passage (from LG 8) that the church in this world is as a "societas constituía et 
ordinata"39. This formula found its way literally into the Code of 1983 (c. 204,2). This 
can be explained by saying that Vatican Π does not explicitly reject this vision of the 
church, but that it then sees the church as societas in its concreteness and 
*Pavan 1967,704; Listi 1978,211-212. Minnerath 1982, 94 calls this Caput ΓΧ "une excellente 
synthèse" of the lus Publicum Ecclesiasticum. 
35
 Listi 1978. 105; see for LG: Indices 1968, 205-206; for DH: Indices 1983, 70-71; for GS: 
Indices 1980, 368-369. In GS 76 about the relation between church and state one reads only: 
"Communitas politica et Ecclesia in proprio campo ab invicem sunt indépendantes et autonomae". 
In nr 89 about the active presence of the church in (he international community we do not find a 
trace: cf nt 46. 
M
 DH 13, in connection with DH 3 and 4. In the notes to DH 13 one cannot find a reference to 
the concept of societas perfecta either! According to Zimmermann 1981,163 John Paul Π defends 
in this way the libertas Ecclesiae. As an aside one can say that she rightly questions whether a 
concordat between the Holy See and a state to order the relations between the local church and the 
state "ne serait elle pas un appauvrissement pour église locale?" (p.160). 
37
 Huizing 1973,161: "Für eine Begründung der Kirchenordnung reicht diese Konstruktion nicht 
aus, zunächst weil sie die Geltung der Kirchenordnung auf eine abstrakte Rechts-gewalt stellt, die 
von der vorrangigen Sendung der Apostel als Zeugen und Verkünder des Herrn und Mittler seiner 
heiligen Kraft losgelöst ist; und damit wird die Kirchenordnung von ihrem Mutterboden, der 
sakramentalen Glaubensgemeinschaft, gelöst". Cf Di, nt 160. 
MWalf 1977,116-118. 
3
' Listi 1978, 224-225, nt 49: for him this is synonimous with societas perfecta; that is also 
Sebott's idea: 1978,408. 
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organization40. And in this way Sacrae disciplinae leges posits that the church "ad 
modum etiam socialis visibilisque compaginis sit constituía" and that it, therefore, 
needs juridical structures4'. Soujeole's research confirms this: where "societas" appears 
in Lumen gentium, it must be seen mainly to indicate that the church needs a hierarchy 
in order to realize the bonum commune and to determine who are members of the 
church42. 
Incidentally, the content of societas perfecta can be found in the texts of Vatican Π43. 
That is true too for the already quoted texts from Principium V, which states that the 
church is "societas completa et in suo genere compacta"', and more generally we 
already stated that the Principia see the whole church as one societas**. It is true also 
for the schemata of the Lex Ecclesiae Fundamentalis, but societas perfecta plays 
really only a minimal role. It is not used in passages where the church is defmed; it is 
used only incidentally in passages about the relation church-state and even then the 
term itself is not used45. Paul VI used it in specific instances, namely in the Motu 
proprio SolUcitudo omnium Ecclesiarum in 196946. 
Congar summarizes the situation perfectly as he says that the doctrine of societas 
perfecta is still present in the texts of Vatican Π because a. the Council assumes that 
the church possesses all means to realize its goal and b. the texts contain the theme of, 
and the demands for, the libertas Ecclesiae. But according to Congar, the theological 
context of the term has been changed in Vatican Π. The church looks for support for its 
freedom less in a juridical accord with the state, but rather in the emphasis on the 
dignity and the religious freedom of the human person. Furthermore, with Vatican Π 
there is no longer that "conceit" of the church which showed itself in the fact of closing 
40
 Coriden 1985,125-126. It is remarkble that in с 205 the same central elements can be found 
which are also in Bellarminus' definition (nt 5) and Ottaviani's 1947,157 (nr 88) where he gives 
the "theological définition of the church": confession of faith, sacraments, and ecclesiastical 
government, but in с 205 the papacy is no longer explicitly mentioned: it is mentioned in 
Bellarminus and Ottaviani! 
41
 Alinea "Ac revera...." (cf VI, nt 21). 
42
 Soujeole 1991,236 and 238-241. 
43
 Minnerath 1982, 177-187 points to DH 13, GS 76 and ChrD 19; cf Listi 1978, 213-214. 
According to Granfield 1982, 12-13 Vatican Π preserved some basic elements of the societas 
perfecta idea, especially that the church posseses the sacramental and organizational means to 
achieve its goal, and in relation to the "libertas Ecclesiae" in GS 76 (cf nt 35). 
44
 Cf VI, 13. 
45
 Herder-Korrespondenz 24 (1970) 280 (с 85,1) and 281 (с 94,1); Herder-Korrespondenz 32 
(1978) 628 (с 53,1 en с 54,1). 
44
 AAS 1965, 985 f.f.; AAS 1966, 801; AAS 1969, 476 (cf VL 1.4): these are texts about the 
nuntiatures. Cf Listi 1978,105 and 226-227, who states correctly on this last page that the church 
"an ihren Rechten und Prärogativen, die sie zur Verwirklichung ihren Sendung für notwendig und 
als mit ihrem Wesen gegeben betrachtet und die nicht restlos aus der Religionsfreiheit hergeleitet 
werden können, auch in der Gegenwart festhält". 
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itself off as a cultural and organized reality facing society at large. The concept of the 
church as sacrament helped to bring this about47. 
Societas perfecta is no longer used as an important element in the self-understanding 
of the church. We can say that the church sees itself as a "societas independens", an 
independent moral person with its own status, which guarantees its independence 
within society4*. For the rest, societas does not say anything about the structure of the 
association or about the (supposed) relations between the people in it, even though 
they are seen only from a juridical point of view. 
2.2 The church as the "Body of Christ"49 
In this aforementioned period it was not forgotten that the church is more than a purely 
human societas; the church is also "corpus Christi mysticum". This concept has had 
several meanings in history30, but the central idea is that the church is the way for the 
risen Christ to live on in people through the mission of the Holy Spirit. It expresses that 
Christ is not just at the origin of the church but that he is also the ongoing foundation 
and basis for its life. As mystical body it expresses the proper nature of the bond in 
"Congar 1982,19-23; in same sense also Huizing 1970,129-130. It is remarkable that Ghirlanda 
1990,49-50 still presents it as a term which can be validly used for the church with an appeal to two 
statements by Paul VI, but not the ones mentioned in nt 46! The most systematic of the two is an 
addres to the Roman Rota (AAS 61 (1969) 177-178). Paul's position resembles more Mörsdorf s (cf 
nt 31) than the traditional use of societas perfecta. Yet for Ghirlanda it would have been sufficient 
to indicate the church as societas. 
w
 Böckenförde 1982, 56: "...dass die Kirche Überhaupt eigenständige societas sei (societas 
independens). Es geht um die Selbständigkeit als Rechtsperson und eine eigene Verfasstheit der 
Kirche innerhalb der menschlichen Gesellschaft, die ihre Unabhängigkeit sichert; sie soll 'ut societas 
constituta et ordinata sein (Lumen gentium Nr 8)'". Cf nt 43. C. 1254,1 is a concrete expression of 
this. 
" In this vision of the church it is good to remember Rikhof s warning. He says about the ideas 
"People of God" and "Body of Christ" as they appear in Lumen gentium, that their linguistic status 
and meaning are not determined: Rikhof 1981, 65. Aymans 1972,321 calls them "Bildbegriffe" 
which have something of a metaphor and something of a clearly determined meaning; cf Aymans 
1991,20-21. It is, therefore, good to describe the meaning, because neither historically nor actually 
can one say that the meaning of several ideas for the church are determined. That is why I use 
"concept": that contains several related but different meanings and metaphorical elements; cf Eyt 
1992,323: "Ce concept (i.e. communio; AL), conformément aux règles générales de l'herméneu-
tique, ne peut être ni univoque, ni exhaustif, ni inconditionellement pertinent". A concept is not a 
scientific term, not a basic term for a systematical theological treatise. Such a term cannot be purely 
formal nor precisely determined, but needs to be developed within the system; it should be a clearly 
technical term and it should be chosen in relation to other (historical) ecclesiological terms: Rikhof 
1981,202-203, 225-229 and 232-233. 
"Tromp 1946,75-160. 
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Christ of the people. The church is a living unity, which is more than an institutional 
reality, more than a societal. The concept is a theological concept. 
This theological vision of "corpus Christi" can be found in St. Thomas. For him the 
basis for the unity of the corpus lies in failh52. But in the following centuries this 
changed rapidly and there was an emphasis on external, visible elements as we saw 
above. The doctrine of the corpus mysticum is not absent but it does not play an 
important role. 
In the beginning of the 19th century we find two visions: some saw the church mainly 
as the mystery of grace and the work of the Spirit, while others saw it mainly as a 
juridical structure of authority5'. The first vision grew stronger in this century under the 
influence of Romanticism; it is linked to the Tübingen School and J.M. Sailer (1751-
1832) and LA. Möhler (1796-1838)54. Also under their influence the Roman School 
developed anew the idea of the corpus mysticum" and via CI. Schrader sj (1820-1875) 
who belonged to that school, the concept found its way into the Schema de Ecclesia in 
the preparation for Vatican I5S. 
Leo ХШ in his encyclical about the church Satis cognitum" said that the church is "not 
a hidden and invisible institution nor a purely human one", but the "complexio 
copulatioque" of both. The church is the mystical body of Christ because its visible 
realities receive power and life from supernatural sources (Satis 158-159). But this 
affirmation of the church as mystical body is only the beginning of the reflections about 
its uniqueness ("unicitas") and especially the unity ("unitas") in its teaching authority5" 
as well as in its government. For the unity of government the subjection to the primacy 
is an essential prerequisite: as societas perfecta the church must have one final 
authority (Satis 174). How important this was for Leo becomes clear when a bit further 
on in the text it appears that the church is maintained in being (just like the states) only 
by the power of jurisdiction (Satis 175-176); decisive for the permanence of the church 
is not the unity in faith or the presence of the Spirit or the bond with Christ5'. 
51
 Rahner 1962,202; TDlard 1987,42: "non seulement nous sommes comme un corps, mais nous 
appartenons réellement au Christ et puisque sa vie est la nôtre, nous sommes vraiment des membres 
et le Christ est principe d'unité et de vie entre nous comme le corps vis-a-vis des membres". 
° Congar 1969,141; cfnt 4. 
* O.e., 148-149. 
54
 Brunner 1979,65-142; Congar 1970,417-424. Baader (II, 3.1) thinks along these lines too. 
55
 Brunner 1979,183-238; Congar 1970,429-433. 
54
 Congar 1969,149-151; Horst 1963,65-114. 
"CflV.ntl . 
" It is remarkable that Leo ХШ in Satis cognitum did not refer to the relevant passage in Pastor 
aeternus for papal infallibility; he described it on ρ 170. 
"Congar 1970, 451. 
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In the 20th century and especially after 1930, the idea of the church as corpus mys-
ticum gained importance60. This led to the encyclical Mystici corporis of Pius ΧΠ in 
1943". Our question for this encyclical is how it sees the mutual relationships and the 
structures of authority in the church. 
First of all it is remarkable that several times the church is said to be a societas 
perfecta (MC 222,224,226). But that is not the best term for the church. It has a basis 
which is uniquely its own and which holds the corpus together, the Spirit (MC 222-
223); it has a goal which is of a higher order than the goal of other societates perfec-
tae: "the continuous sanctification of the members of the body" (MC 226-227). These 
two realities make the church "the mystical body of Jesus Christ" and that is the best 
way to describe and define the church (MC 199). This "mystical body" has the 
characteristics which we indicated for the organologica! vision62: 
- this association receives it unity and wholeness because of the presence of the Holy 
Spirit in the whole and in the parts (MC 219-222); 
- one must be incorporated into this body and outside of it the faithful cannot exist63; 
within it the members help each other (MC 200-222) and build together the whole 
(MC 212-213). 
- this body is a structured reality because the unity comes into being from the correct 
and appropriate relation and from the coming together of the parts (MC 200 and 
212-213). 
Yet, the concept of the mystical body does not escape the danger inherent in an 
organologica! vision: the predominant position of the head (the imagery of the body 
invites this) so that it becomes a centralist vision64. The Spirit has an important role to 
play as "anima" (MC 220), but the one head, Christ, is the most important. Christolo-
gical and pneumatological aspects are not well balanced: "Christ" and "mysticum" 
might indicate that61. This is shown clearly when the unanimity appears not only 'Ъу 
the acceptance of the same faith and the participation in the same sacraments and the 
same sacrifice, but also by the active observance of the same laws. But most of all it is 
absolutely necessary that there is a highest head, visible for all to see, who can direct 
40
 Congar 1969,152-157; Congar 1970,464-466. 
61
 Mystici corporis Christi in: AAS XXXV (1943) 7, 193-247. 
°I,6. 
63
 MC 202-203 and 242-243; especially on this point the encyclical created commotion: Congar 
1969,156 and Congar 1970, 471. 
6 41,4. Thils 1972, 180-181 also points to this danger and quotes Congar, that the papacy is not 
only indicated as "head" but also as "source": "Rome est caput au sens d'une source d'ou tout 
découle". Strotmann 1964, 188-189 speaks about this as an "ecclésiologie de capitalisation, 
"l'évolution unilaterale et excessive de son régime de gouvernement". 
69
 Without directly referring to MC Kehl 1992,65 criticizes the main lines of the Western vision 
on the church in the second millennium: "ein Kirchenbild...das fast nur noch christologisch 
begründet wurde; allerdings in einer sehr enggeführten Christologie, die aus dem Gesamtrahmen 
der Trinilätstheologje und vor allem der Pneumatologie herausgelöst wurde. Sie sah in Christus vor 
allem den Stifter und Gesetzgeber der institutionellen Kirche". 
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the efforts of all to the one goal: the one who takes the place of Christ in this world" 
(MC 227). The one central authority is not called coordinating but stands above the 
other elements of unity. 
Such a predominantly christological ecclesiology has juridical consequences. In truth, 
the Pope has an all-dominant role as "vicarius Christi" in this corpus Christi which is 
also a societas perfecta. This is clearly shown. The divine Redeemer rules His mystical 
body visibly and in the ordinary way of things through His vican the Pope takes the 
place of Christ on earth. Immediately there is a reference to the statement by Boniface 
ІП, which we quoted above, that Christ and His vicar are one head only (MC 210-
211). The unique position is emphasized in the statement that the bishops are bound to 
the Pope's authority and that they receive their power of jurisdiction from him66. It is 
also remarkable that the Spirit does not work directly in all the members, but that He 
influences the lower echelons through the higher ones (MC 219-220). Within the 
church all the faithful must "submit fully in intellect and will"67. 
This concept of the corpus mysticum sees the church in Kehl's words as "Gnaden­
oder Heilsanstalt": the institutional church (the hierarchical structure, the tasks of the 
offices, the sacraments, the doctrine of faith, and church law) acts as the "vicarious 
active and forming power, in relation to which the individual persons are seen as 
mailable material, as the object that needs to be stamped and formed". There is no 
denial of the freedom of the faithful, but they are seen almost exclusively under the 
aspect of receptivity. It is precisely the institutional aspect which is given a unique 
6 6
 MC 211-212: "sed, ad propriam cuiusque Diocesim quod spectat, utpote veri pastores assignâtes 
sibi greges singuli singulos Christi nomine pascunt ac regunU id tarnen dum faciunt, non plane sui 
iuris sunt, sed sub debita Romani Pontificis auctoritate positi, quamvis ordinaria iurisdictìonis 
potestate fruantur, immediate sibi ab eodem Pontífice Summo impettita". Legrand 1983, 306 
mentiones two other statements by Pius ΧΠ: Ad sinarum gentes (AAS 47 (1955) 9, and Ad 
Apostolorum principes (AAS 50 (1958), 610. Here as well as in Satis cognitum (where one can 
read that one should not see bishops as "vicarii romanorum pontificum" because they possess their 
own proper authority and they are, therefore, called "antistites ordinarii": 182) it is clear that one did 
not know exactly how to handle what Mörsdorf calls the "salvatorische Klausel" of Vatican I. In the 
paragraph "Tantum autem abest" (in chapter Щ) of Pastor Aeternus the independence of the 
episcopacy is emphasized in relation to the papacy, which is underlined in a statement of the 
German episcopate, approved by Pius K: Mörsdorf 1962,241-246. Ottaviani 1947,412-416 (nrs 
219-222) does not even mention this text, but quotes with approval the passage from MC (cf nt 23). 
The 1875 statement can be found in Rousseau 1962; he gives the original text of the German 
episcopate and the two (approving) confirmations by Pius DC as well as the French translation. See 
about this passage also: Legrand 1983, 286-295. Cf Ш, 2.2 ("Lumen gentium 18"). 
6 7
 MC 224 and 243-244. This "submission" was based on a sentence from the dogmatic constitu­
tion "de fide catholica" of Vatican I (caput Ш): "Cum homo a Deo tamquam creatore et Domino suo 
totus dependeat et ratio creata increatae Ventati penitus subiecta sit, plenum revelanti Deo intellectus 
et voluntatis obsequium fide praestare tenemur". This is about an attitude of faith (as in MC in the 
second phrase) but not about the attitude of the believing person in general within the church as in 
MC in the first phrase. 
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theological value: as the external of the church it represents the inner reality, the 
pneumatic and divine in the church. The institutional is then the sacramental aspect6*. 
If we want to answer the question what kind of concept "corpus mysticum" is, it is 
clear that we have to involve the idea of societas perfecta. The originally theological 
Pauline concept of corpus Christi is modeled in the juridical expressions of the 
societas perfecta". Exegetically there are other interpretations possible70. One can say 
that the concepts are the two sides of the coin. The one side shows the value in the 
mutual exchange between nations; the other shows the Pope whose position in this 
vision of the church is so overpowering. The term of societas perfecta gives the church 
its place in society; the concept "corpus Christi" delineates the internal relationships 
and the self-image of the church in so far as it is a visible and hierarchically organized 
association. Centralism, "one and undivided" (MC 199-200), and "inaequalis" are 
essential to both even if we can remark that Mystici corporis nuances the latter71. 
This analysis is confirmed by Congar when he says that Mystici corporis supports a 
tendency to make the church, as hierarchical institute, an absolute72. 
The concept corpus Christi, in opposition to the term of societas perfecta, comes back 
as such in Lumen gentium. It is a question whether there has been a change in mea­
ning. 
The close relation between the concepts of societas perfecta and corpus mysticum in 
the ecclesiology in the period prior to Vatican Π is clear in the Schema which we 
" Kehl 1976, 80-85. For the Dutch reader this interpretation is especially interesting: the 
institutional church transfers the objective salvation to the subject which is to be formed. Manders 
used a similar terminology to analyse the Decisions of the Special Synod (1980): Manders 1980, 
67-77. See for "Anstalt": nt 1. 
"Congar 1970,470 mentions as one of the essential options in Mystici corporis: "la définition du 
concept paulinien de Corps du Christ comme réalité socio-corporative organique"; Congar 1971, 
127 repeats this. 
70
 Congar 1969,155-136. A concrete example is Auer 1961,28, who wants to let Paul's model 
speak for itself in order to see "welche Vorteile diese bildhaften Aussagen gegenüber den formalen 
juristischen Aussagen für das dogmatische Verständnis der Kirche und ihre Aemter haben können". 
One of his conclusions is that the episcopacy should be given a clearer place in relation to the 
primacy: ρ 36. See for a more recent research Tillard 1987, 40-41 who says (about 1 Cor 12, 21-27) 
that "chacun trouve sa singularité dans la communion du tout". Smit 1989 shows that Paul wants 
to teach the Corinthians the important place the Apostles have in the faith community. 
" See e.g. MC 200-201 and 212-213; cf Mucci 1986,434. 
72
 Congar 1970, 471: the encyclical "pouvait appuyer une tendance à absolutiser l'institution 
hiérarchique". Even more clearly Congar 1954, 68 formulates it when he calls older and more 
recent ecclesiologies "hiérarchiologie" but also sees that the idea of corpus mysticum in the theology 
after 1925 is a good correction to the ecclesiology which was then current: Congar 1971,124. 
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already mentioned, Aeternus Unigeniti Pater™. It was written by a commission of 
which Cardinal Ottaviani was the president and S. Tromp sj the secretary. Ottaviani 
was the spokesman of the societas perfecta idea and Tromp of the concept of corpus 
mysticum1*. In the Schema the thesis is no longer stated that "Mysticwn Christi 
corpus" is the best terminology for the church (as MC said), but it is placed on a level 
with "Ecclesia societas'm. Here too the juridical is what keeps the church together76. 
Here too centralism is remarkable: 
- bishops exercise their pote s tas iurisdictionis under the authority of the papacy. 
There was even an expectation that the Council would act in a "devota subordina-
tio" towards the papacy"; 
- the teaching authority, in the full sense of the word, belongs only to the papacy7*. 
There is even a special chapter in which obedience is glorified in view of the "present 
crisis in authority" in the world: fighting this was an important aim of the Schema and 
that is being said when the sixties, in the cultural-historical sense, were yet to begin79. 
Together with Acerbi one can only confirm that the Schema affirmed the importance of 
the institutional reality of the church for salvation and its supernatural value. Acerbi 
73
 Schema 1962. See for a description of how it came into being and for a commentary: Acerbi 
1975,107-149; cf Rikhof 1981,13-18 for an analysis of the first chapter of the Schema where we 
find a number of the central themes. 
74
 Acerbi 1975,107. Ottaviani's Institutiones appeared in 1958-1960 in the fourth edition. Tromp 
cooperated on the text for Mystici corporis: Congar 1970, 469. 
75
 Schema 1962, 15 (nr 6). 
76
 Schema 1962,18 (nr 9) and 25 (nr 13). 
"" Schema 1962, 25-27 (nrs 13-16). Acerbi 1975,129 says about nr 14 that it "ha una preoccup-
azione fondamentale: affermare la subordinazione della giurisdizione episcopale, nell'origine e 
nell'esercisio, alla giurisdizione del papa". Note 17 with nr 16 says that "Concilia Oecumenica 
absolute bquendo non necessaria sunt". Yet, just before this it is stated that the College of bishops 
together with its head, the Pope, posesses full and ultimate authority in the church. And it is in this 
situation we find the sentence (in nr 15): "Quoniam Episcopi singuli centrum et fundamento m et 
principium unitatis sunt in suis Ecclesiis parücularibus, prout in Ulis et ex Ulis, ad imaginem 
Ecclesiae universalis formatis, una et unica Ecclesia Catholica exsistìt, cuius centrum et funda-
mentum et principium unitatis est successor Petri..."; the sentence returns almost literally in LG 23 
and it is later given a fundamental meaning for the communio ecclesiology: cf Ш, 2.3 and IX, 22. 
7 1
 Schema 1962, 48-51 (nr 30). It is remarkable what is said in nr 31 about the organs of the 
Roman Curia: "Decisionibus ideo et declarationibus istorum quoque coetum, quamvis infallibili 
atque irreformabili sententia non muniantur, non externum dumtaxat obsequium, sed religiosa 
debetur et de se interior mentis adhaesio". That confirms what Congar 1970, 471-472, says that 
during the pontificate of Pius ΧΠ one can point to "une propension à étendre aux Congrégations 
romaines la qualité de soumission due au magistère papal". What the prelates in the Curia here say 
about themselves shows a peculiar relationship with what they say in other places in the Schema 
about the "devota subordinano" of the Council! 
79
 Schema 1962,60-63 (nrs 36-39); Acerbi 1975,110 (nt 14!). 
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also pointed out that the Schema showed a limited historical vision because it only 
confirms the doctrine of the papacy of the last SO years80. 
3 Chances for the Principle of Subsidiarity? 
In the last chapter it appeared that the the principle of subsidiarity can be applied to the 
church in two distinct ways: it can have meaning for the place of the individual 
believers and also for the governmental structure, especially the relationship between 
primacy and the individual bishop and the relationship between the universal and the 
particular church. 
From the description of both visions it appears that, in the relationships as they were 
seen in the 19th and 20th century until Vatican Π, there was really no place for an 
application of the principle to the governmental structure. Pius XII did not intend this". 
Centralism and the vision of "one and undivided" of the church did not create space for 
a certain independence and proper policy for the diocese and the bishop or for larger 
assocations of dioceses. 
Pius ΧΠ did offer space for the principle of subsidiarity in his addresses in 1946 and in 
1957 in the sense that the church is about the "fulfilment" of individual persons. 
Already in Mystici Corporis there was a first opening to the declaration of 1946 that 
the principle of subsidiarity is valid for the church, because it is true for the church as it 
is for other associations that it must serve the interests of the members, communally 
and individually82! There was no elucidation, neither structurally nor juridically. The 
question is whether that is possible if the task and position of church authority is based 
and emphasized in such a way and the faithful are not seen as subjects of self-develop­
ment. That is true also for the idea of societas perfecta, as societas inaequalis, with a 
large role for authority. 
On the other hand, the juridical character of the societas-idca. as outlined by Bert­
rams'
3
, makes applicability possible. It becomes understandable why Bertrams made a 
number of distinctions as he showed the importance of the principle for the church. 
The principle of subsidiarity in a positive sense - to help where people cannot cope 
themselves - is obviously valid because man cannot reach his ultimate goal with his 
own means. He has need for grace, for sacraments, because the supernatural and the 
possibility to live it are gifts. People fall short here and need the help of the church84. 
80
 Acerbi 1975,148-149; cf nt 34. 
"CfVI,nt29. 
'
2
 MC 222: "dum socialis quaelibet hominum compages, si tirado ultimum utilitatìs finem 
inspicimus, ad omnium et unuscu ¡usque membri profectum, utpote personae sunt, postremum 
Ofdinanrur": cf VT, 1.1. Schema 1962, nr 40 reminds us ofthat where it states that "tarn Ecclesiam 
quam Societatem civilem constituías esse ad hominis utilitatem" referring to Pius' ΧΠ address of 
20-2-1946 and the text in MC; there is no reference to QA! 
w C f 2.1, above. 
84
 Bertrams 1957/1, 48-50; Bertrams 1957/2,260-261. 
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But there are other tasks in the church which are rather more organizational, even 
though all the activities of the church have a supernatural as well as an organizational 
aspect. However, when the intensity of the supernatural becomes less, and a certain 
activity is more organizational, the principle of subsidiarity (as a principle of "aloof­
ness") must be applied. That is certainly true when we speak about the administration 
of temporal goods, about diakonia and charitable activities. The faithful have a certain 
freedom in their concrete living out of the faith". Then the principle of subsidiarity 
takes on the meaning of a plea against centralism and in favor of personal responsibili­
ty, also in theological matters. To give form and substance to ecclesiastical life in 
dioceses, in religious communities and in other associations should be left to them and 
to their own ministers, as much as possible". 
This last, cautious, criticism of Bertrams on the then current vision of the church is 
visible very clearly in other authors who speak about the applicability of the principle 
of subsidiarity on the church in the period before Vatian Π. They did not argue the 
consequences of the principle of subsidiarity within the concepts of the church, but 
these consequences brought them to their critique. Gundlach already pointed out that 
the church is not only "Heilsanstalt", but that it has the characteristics of an association 
in which each believer carries responsibility87. Rahner used the principle of subsidiarity 
to reject "ecclesiastical étatism" and Kting pointed to its importance in favor of 
administrative decentralization18. 
And so it is clear that in the period when episcopal teaching authority, theologians, and 
philosophers, slowly came to a final definition of the principle of subsidiarity, the 
principle hardly had a chance within the then current visions of the church. 
We must then ask the question whether the vision of the church of Vatican Π does offer 
chances for that, of which the principle of subsidiarity is the condensed reality. Does 
Vatican Π reject a centralism which govemmentally makes everything uniform? How 
does Vatican II look at the position of the individual believer? 
8 5
 Bertrams 1957Д, SI stales the principle Tidelibus in Ecclesia competit personalitas supematur-
alis, quam propria acuvilate personali perficere possunt et debent". Bertrams 1957/2, 2S6-263 points 
to the freedom to choose one's occupation and one's partner in marriage, the freedom to choose one's 
confessor, freedom in liturgical celebrations, the possibility to go to a school of one's choice. But the 
difficulty of a religiously lived moral life demands, according to Bertrams, a constant vigilance of 
the church. 
8 6
 Bertrams 1957/2,264-266. 
8 7
 Gundlach 1934,434-436. 
8 8
 Cf VT, 2.1. 
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VIII The Most Important Ecclesiological Concepts of 
Vatican Π and thereafter 
1 Lumen Gentium: Several Ecclesiological Visions 
It is generally accepted that Vatican Π and then especially the dogmatic constitution 
Lumen gentium (d.d. November 21,1964) proposes several visions of the church. We 
find the more basic concepts for the church, specifically the church as sacrament (LG 
1) and the pneumatological concept (expressly formulated in LG 4), which show their 
influence all through the Constitution'. Concepts with clearly administrative-structural 
aspects are the concept of the People of God (LG Π) as well as the hierarchical vision 
which reminds one strongly ei Mystici corporis and which is described in the chapter 
about the hierarchical structure (LG ΠΙ). 
An analysis of these two chapters shows real differences and one can say that the 
Council fathers did not arrive at a way to reconcile these concepts and that the relation 
between them is not indicated2. Lumen gentium itself does not propose one concept as 
the central one'. 
In this chapter we will begin with a short discussion of the two concepts which have 
clearly administrative-structural consequences. Then we will pay attention, under that 
same aspect, to the concept of "communio" as it appears in Lumen gentium. And then 
we will point out that this concept can be the bridge between the different visions. 
1.1 People of God: Lumen gentium 9-174 
This vision of the church is a break with the past, accentuated by the place it occupies 
in the text Chapters I and Π are like a program for the Constitution and they belong 
1
 See for some remarks on these concepts resp. 1.3 (3) below and Grillmeier 1966/2,160-161. 
1
 Pottmeyer, 1983, 277. Legrand 1983, 192-193 puts it this way: "Sans offrir une synthèse de 
l'articulation entre ministres ordonnés et ecclesia, Vaticanum Π a pris ses distances, de façon 
délibérée, aussi bien par rapport à l'autonomisation des pasteurs que par rapport à la disqualification 
religieuse des laïcs". Cf Rikhof 1981,37 and 48-49. 
' Congar 1971,133; Rikhof 1981,11 and 65. 
4
 In what is said below, it is clear that LG IV also stands within the framework of this concept; cf 
Acerbi 1975, 513: "La concezione dell' unita nella missione e nell' azione pastorale, pur nella 
diversità delle funzioni, domina il capitolo quarto: fideli e pastori sono insieme co-responsabili dell' 
attivila della chiesa, anche se aguno ha ricevuto da Christo doni e poteri diversi". Yet Acerbi, 520, 
remarks that "La Lumen gentium in tema di "laici" rimase prevalentemente ispirata alle tesi della 
"theologia del laicato": this emphasized the "secularity" of the laity. See for this also the remark of 
the Theologenkommission 1987,64-66 on LG 31. 
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together. There are two chapters only because otherwise the text would be too long: 
what is specific in chapter Π is that it describes the church "inter tempora", within 
history5. If the church can be seen as a societas inaequalis in the period between 
Vatican I and Vatican Π', this inequality has (largely) disappeared in the passages 
about the People of God. That is what the Council intended; in chapter Π it wants to 
see the church as a whole and all that the faithful have in common. The hierarchy is 
within that whole as a service to the community. 
What is important is what it means to be a christian "in the responsibilities for praise, 
service, and witness"; the organizational framework is secondary7. The concept is 
characterized by historical dynamism over against the static, supra-temporal visions of 
corpus mysticum and societas perfecta. The Kingdom of God is described as eschato-
logical so that any triumphalistic identification of Kingdom and church becomes 
impossible. There is then a place for sinfulness and lack of faith which can be found 
also in the People of God. The differences come after the common and equal dignity of 
all the faithful as a priestly and prophetic people. And the People of God encompasses 
more people than those who belong to the catholic church8. What is special in the 
concept of the People of God is succinctly summarized by Congar: it states the equality 
of the baptized and what distinguishes them9. The equality in principle which comes 
before the distinctions in the church, is underlined by the commentators. The specifica­
tion of office and so of the organizational structure of the church as service10 is 
important if we want to typify this concept. 
That is not a simple thing to do. If the characterization, as in our case, is based on the 
structuring of the church as the concept gives it, there is not much to be found in the 
text of LG Π. It shows the fundamental equality of the faithful but the service-character 
of office and institutions is not elaborated clearly. And LG 31 says that "these faithful 
are by baptism made one body with Christ and are established as the People of God. 
They are in their own way made sharers in the priestly, prophetic and kingly functions 
("murtera") of Christ. They carry out their own part in the mission of the whole 
Christian people in church and world". That is further elaborated in LG 33-37 even 
though, even there, we do not find the fullness of expression which one would expect 
5
 Acta Synodalia Ш/І, 500-501, where we find the text with which mgr. G. Garonne clearly 
indicated the intention of LG II, immediately before the vote. See also Congar 1971,132; Rikhof 
1981, 35; Theologenkommission 1987, 25. 
«CfVn,nt26. 
7
 Congar 1975,109. 
• Wiederkehr 1992,297. 
'Congar 1975,114: "La notion de peuple de Dieu telle qu'on la tire des Saintes Ecritures permet 
d'affirmer à la fois l'égalité de tous les baptisés dans la dignité de l'existence chrétienne qualifiée 
comme sacerdotale, royale et profétique et la diversité des services ou offices, qui entraîne, sous 
Tangle fonctionel, une inégalité" (italics in the original). For an overview of Congar's vision in this: 
Rikhof 1981,39-41. 
10
 Grillmeier 1966/1,232; Semmelroth 1966/1,462. 
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on the basis of the concept of the People of God. And in LG Π only the priestly and 
prophetic functions are mentioned"! 
Acerbi's careful analysis of the whole constitution (and the history of its origin) brings 
more clarity. In the second half of LG 13 it is clear that the individual parts, from 
particular churches to individual believers, contribute to the whole and support each 
other. Basic is the fundamental equality of all the members of the People of God, as is 
clear in LG 9 where being a christian and faith are the basic ecclesiologica! data and 
not authority or the institution. All the faithful actively participate in the priesthood, in 
the infallibility of the chuch, in the prophetic witness, and in the sacramental life. Such 
active participation in the church is based on the sacraments of initiation and has, 
therefore, a sacramental source and not a juridical one (LG 33). Once this equality is 
determined one can speak about the distinctions which also exist. But the role of the 
component parts can only be understood from the whole of the People of God12. 
More structurally we can see that there is, within the unity of the People of God, a 
variety of vocations, charismata, and ministries. Their interdependence in the coopera­
tion to give the community form and substance provides the structure for the communi­
ty. The hierarchical ministry is one among several and has as its specific task the 
ordering of the various charismata and services in view of the unity and the building 
up of the whole. And this ministry must respect all manifestations of the Spirit. In this 
way, the hierarchical office has its own specific mission within the People of God. But 
office is not the life-giving and structuring principle of the church: it is the Spirit who 
gives life and provides structures. Every member is called to recognize the work of the 
Spirit in the other and there is no place for subordination of groups or persons in 
relation to each other". 
LG 32 and 37 underline this once more: there is a fundamental equality, and inequality 
is functional and causes mutual dependence14. 
It is quite remarkable if we look from this point of view at LG 7, the paragraph about 
the church as corpus Christi", how there it is the sacraments which bring the faithful 
salvation. There is a fundamental unity in the church based on baptism and the 
Eucharist and on the work of the Holy Spirit. There is a variety of functions but they 
are always directed to the building up of the whole and to mutual support. At the end of 
this paragraph as well as in LG 9 the church is called "the bride of Christ" in order to 
11
 When Corecco says that in thee Code of 1983 the munus regendi for the laity has not been 
sufficiently elaborated, that problem makes its appearance here already: cf Corecco 1985, 331. 
a
 Acerbi 1975,509-514. 
11
 Acerbi 1975,516-521. The most important passages in LG, on which he bases his opinion are: 
LG 4, LG 7, LG 12, LG 18, LG 30 and LG 33. 
M CfP0 9andAA3. 
11
 Corpus mysticum as indication for the church is not literally used in LG 7, but: "Communicando 
enim Sputum suum, nutres suos, ex omnibus gentibus convócalos, tamquam corpus suum mystice 
constituit". 
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emphasize the distinction between Christ and the church16. There is a real difference 
with the encyclical Mystici corporis because especially the overbearing role of 
authority and of the institutional reality in the church are no longer found here. 
There are more differences with the pre-conciliar ecclesiology as described in chapter 
П. The faithful participate actively in the whole of the life of the church and this 
participation has a sacramental basis: the juridical no longer plays the prime role! 
There is a fundamental break in the visions'7. 
Discussing Mystici corporis I said that this concept had all the characteristics of the 
organologica! vision. The concept of the People of God fits in with that too" and one 
can very well illustrate that in the summarizing paragraph LG 32, which shows that all 
are equal in dignity but there is a distinction because of functions'9. The text contains, 
programmatically so to speak, a quotation from Paul as its second sentence: "For just 
as in one body we have many members, yet all the members have not the same task, so 
we, the many, are one body in Christ, but severally members one of another (Rom. 12, 
4-5)". Then it is stated that there is a fundamental unity and wholeness: "Therefore, the 
chosen People is one: one Lord, one faith, one baptism (Eph. 4,4-5). As members they 
share a common dignity from their rebirth in Christ...." (LG 32,2). Then it is clear that 
the members have a relative independence and have mutual constitutive relations with 
each other and with the whole: LG 32,3. Finally, the parts form a structure: LG 32,3 (in 
fine). 
12 A hierarchical ecclesiology: Lumen gentium Ш 
From the text about the People of God and the relevant passages from LG Г one 
cannot conclude to a predominant role for authority; the institutional does not have 
special value, it has its own proper function. But in the introduction we pointed out 
already that Lumen gentium gives two distinct visions with their own administrative-
structural consequences. The second vision can be found especially in LG Ш. 
It is remarkable that Philips says that LG 22 gives the basic structure of the church, 
with the complexity of its hierarchical supreme authority in the relation between the 
papacy and the College of bishops: that says something about the way the participants 
in Vatican Π experienced it because in the closing phases of Lumen gentium this 
subject, and apparently not the place of this hierarchical authority within the People of 
God, made the deepest impression on them20. 
16
 That distinction is more clearly emphasized in LG 8 than in MC: Congar 1971, 134; Acerbi 
1975, 496, nt 33; Rikhof 1981, 34; Koffeman 1986, 274; cf Grillmeier 1966/2,169-170 and the 
quote in nt 15. 
17
 Chenu 1979,94: "Avec la théologie, introduite comme second chapitre de la constitution Lumen 
gentium s'est vérifiée la révolution copemicienne de l'ecclésiologie chrétienne contemporaine". 
" Acerbi 1975,512: Trovava così applicazione, nella considerazione delle funzioni sacerdotale 
e profetiche, Mea organica dell'unita, che contempera nella totalità del popolo la diversità dei doni, 
tutti cospiranti all'unita della missione e della carità". 
"Kloppenburg 1974,158-159. 
M
 Philips 1966,155; Philips 1967,283 and 321. 
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A large part of LG Ш deals with the theme of the mutual relationships between the 
papacy and the College of bishops and the individual bishops. Neither in those 
paragraphs nor in the paragraphs which deal more concretely with the tasks of the 
(individual) bishops (LG 24-27) are mutuality and interdependence of those episcopal 
functions in relation to the other members of the People of God are mentioned. The text 
does not connect this with LG 31-36 which gives an exploratory interpretation of the 
consequences of the concept of the People of God, namely, the fundamental equality of 
al the faithful and the service character of office. 
Chapter Ш starts from the thought that only bishops have authority in the church. The 
position of the bishop is isolated and there is no link with LG Π (except in LG 18), 
where the hierarchy is a ministry among others and where the word "hierarchy" is not 
even mentioned. Here, the hierarchy is given a sacramental nature: the Lord is among 
his people in the person of the bishop. In this way the hierarchy is given a proper 
function so that it stands over against the People of God. Some say that the vision of 
LG III easily leads to the idea that those in office and ultimately the papacy carry the 
exclusive responsibility for the church; thus this can lead to monopolizing the Christ-
representation by those in office and ultimately by the papacy; and this leads to a 
concentration of all power in the Pope21. And so one is back to the vision which existed 
before Vatican Π. But, as will become clear later, this is not a completely correct 
interpretation. 
The question is whether the Council could not have taught the sacramentality of the 
episcopacy, but one of the main subjects of chapter IIL the relation between the Pope 
and the College of bishops, offers every opportunity for it; the importance of this will 
become clear further on in this chapter. The sacramentality indicates on the one hand 
that those in authority do not receive their power from the People of God or act in the 
name of the People of God, but on the other hand it indicates that each one acts in the 
name of Christ as his "vicarius et kgatus" as LG 27 says. This is a first step towards 
the idea that the juridical, the structural, and the administrative have a sacramental 
basis. 
The special status of LG ΠΙ was clear already in the introduction of the chapter by mgr. 
Parente: he spoke about a "subordinazione gerarchica" of the faithful to the priests 
and bishops, of the bishops to the Pope, and of the Pope to Christ22. Pottmeyer calls 
this a hierarchological vision, where the relation between bishop and faithful is seen 
unilaterally: instead of the "fraternitas" of LG Π we find here the "paternitas" of the 
bishops. He says that this is about the church as an absolute monarchy23 but that too 
needs to be nuanced (the same as the statement that LG ΠΙ is again the situation of 
before the Council). 
21
 Pottmeyer 1983,277; cf Acerbi 1975,522-524. 
2 2
 Acerbi 1975,523; cf Pottmeyer 1983,276. 
B
 Pottmeyer 1983, 276-277. Earlier Congar called the ecclesiology which preceded Vaticanum 
Π "hiérarchologie": П, nt 72. 
139 
I J The relation between the two concepts 
The diversity, even opposition, between the two concepts opens the way to ask some 
questions and make some remarks. 
1 Can the difference be explained from the history of the origin of Lumen gentium? 
The texts, which now form chapter Ш, come for the most part from the afore-mentio­
ned ScAe/na^while chapter Π was mostly formulated during the Council itself25. The 
text about the People of God came into existence relatively late and one could think 
that the Council, together with the "periti" did not see the twofold situation or oppositi­
on or, as Wiederkehr says, only partially recognized the systematic implications of the 
place in the text and of the concept itself of the People of God26. In itself this would not 
be so surprising; bishops and "periti" had been educated in a different system of 
thinking. That they did not uncritically accept this, however, was clear already in the 
first days of the Council27. But even so, it can happen that, as a group, they did not see 
immediately the consequences of the new concept. The earliest commentaries do not 
discuss the distinction between the two concepts and emphasize instead the service 
character of office28. It seems right that Kaufmann remarks that the ecclesiology of 
Vatican Π is too spiritualistic and is not sufficiently aware of the historical dimension 
and of the societas-aspcct of the church, the juridical-organizational form29. 
Apart from that, Waifs observation stands: the oppositions during the Council were 
occasions for compromise-texts30. The current ideas about the ministerial priesthood 
("sacerdotium ministeriale seu hierarchicum") and (doctrinal) authority were not 
thought through anew, but were placed next to the priestly and prophetic functions of 
the whole People of God, and were in this way safeguarded31. 
2 Or are we reading too much in the concept "People of God"? In a theological 
interpretation one can suggest that Vatican Π in this concepts (only) wanted to correct 
the idea of corpus (Christi) mysticum. This idea hardly gives rise to highlight the fact 
of human sinfulness in the church, nor does it open the way to create "space for the idea 
of historical growth, which is part of the actual church"32. 
As corrections these thoughts are certainly part of the concept of the People of God, 
but the analysis given above makes it clear that this concept points in the direction of a 
"CfVIL^infine. 
25
 Rahner 1966, 210-211; Acerbi 1975,524-526. 
2 t
 Wiederkehr 1992, 296-297. 
" Сі\Ъ,тАЪЪ. 
21
 See the various articles about the paragraphs of LG Ш in Barauna 1966/2. 
2 9
 Kaufmann 1982, 72. There are some beautiful words in LG 30 and 37 about the task of 
laypeople in the church and about the duty of the "shepherds" to recognise this task; but it remains 
all the more in the moral sphere without juridical obligation. See also 1.4 below. 
30
 Waif 1982, 198-199 explains the problems in interpretation and the canonical translation of 
conciliar texts mainly through the compromise character of a number of passages and through the 
fact that many ternis were not yet sufficiently clear. Rikhof 1981, 36-37 and Pottmeyer 1983, 273 
and 277 say this too. 
" Grootaers 1982,286-287; Wiederkehr 1992, 299-300. 
M
 Lescrauwaet 1988,40. 
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different structural vision! But it is true that a concrete form of the administrative 
structure as independent sacramental task is not so easily deduced from the concept33. 
3 In the texts of Lumen gentium these two chapters are not simply placed side by side 
and in opposition to each other. The title of chapter I is "De ecclesiae Mysterio" and 
LG 1 says what is meant by "mysterium": the church is "veluti sacramentum". That is 
the most basic statement of the Council about the church: it is like a program in the 
opening of the text Sacramentum is the Latin word for the Greek word mustèrion**. It 
does not indicate something mysterious, but a concrete, visible, divine, transcendent, 
and salvific reality33. 
Here we see the break which Vatican Π occasioned: the whole church is from now on 
sacramental and not only the leadership36. Then we must conclude with Kehl that the 
ministerial and the institutional do have their own sacramentality but that they are in 
function of the sacramentality of the church as a whole37. This relativizing, also in the 
sense of alignment with and rootedness in the church as a whole can be seen also in LG 
48: "... the pilgrim church in her sacraments and institutions, which pertain to this 
present time, takes on the appearance of this passing world"38. 
One should never see the two organizational concepts of the church separate from each 
other because they are both part of the framework which is given in LG 1: there is a 
relation in the designation "sacrament"39. Is there then indeed a mediation between the 
two? It does not seem to be that way, because in LG ΠΙ the hierarchical ministry seems 
to become the only guarantee of the sacramentality of the church. 
33
 Aymans 1972,326-327. 
34
 Theologenkommission 1987,68, calls both words "grundsätzlich bedeutungsgleich". In Latin 
mysterium is also used. 
31
 Acta Synodalia Ш/L 170: "non simplicite indicat aliquid incognoscibile aut abstrusum, sed ... 
désignât realitatem divinam transcendentem et salvificam. quae aliquo modo visibili revelatur et 
man if es ta tur". 
36
 LG 9: "Deus congregabbnem eomm... convocavi! et consti tu it Ecclesiam, ut sit... sacramentum 
37
 Kehl 1976, 87. 
31
 Philips 1968,182-183; cf Semmelroth 1966/2, 316-317 and Acerbi 1975, 492-494. 
"Koffeman finds precisely in this relation the reason for his (hypo)thesis why the People of God-
concept with its own impulseses to ecclesiastical structures has not really brought about change. The 
sacramentality of the church as a whole does not leave room for a dynamic vision on the proper 
vocation of the People of God, with their own responsibility for Revelation. The church can then 
never be the community-form of a common reaction to Revelation, a purely human community, 
which as such is free to organize itself. The fact that the church is constituted in a permanent 
ontological sacramental order is constantly part of its structure and its internal relationships. 
Koffeman seems to say that in this way the traditional mode of thought is sanctioned and what was 
new in the People of God-concept could not break through: the sacramentality and what is proper 
to it prevents that These passages in Koffeman 1986 result in the given interpretation: 218-220, 
266, 279, 291-297. 
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The hierarchical office does not find its origin in the sacramentality of the church as 
such, but it has its own source. That is announced already in LG 10 ("licei essentia et 
non gradu tantum différant") and is affirmed in LG Ш: the ordination to bishop is 
directly linked to the special function of the Apostles and gives the fullness of the 
sacrament of ordination. The ordination to bishop gives the tria muñera; the bishop 
fulfills "in an eminent and visible way the role of Christ himself, as Teacher, as 
Shepherd, and High Priest" and acts in His person40. And so the bishop belongs to the 
College which possesses the highest and fullest authority in the church (LG 22). The 
bishops are not "vicars of the Roman Pontiff, for they exercise an authority which is 
proper to them" (LG 27). In this way, Vatican Π took a decisive step and the doctrine 
of the primacy of Vatican I is amplified with this doctrine about the episcopacy. That is 
the step which LG Ш makes and the leading thought is the idea of the collégial 
structure of the episcopacy4'. One could say that the episcopate is lifted to the level 
where before the papacy in splendid isolation stood at the top; that signifies also the 
end of earlier ideas where the church was seen de facto as an absolute monarchy42. 
The mutual relations in the College will be discussed later. But also because of this 
step taken, we do not find the same relations as they are painted in the concept of the 
People of God. 
Pottmeyer explains historically the developments in a comparison between the 
developments in the church on the one hand and those in the state on the other hand. 
He sees a close relationship between the self-awareness of the church as subject of her 
own history and the self-consciousness of the modern state and its secularization. The 
modem state expresses its being-subject first of all in the person of the absolute and 
sovereign monarch while the church does this in the person of the sovereign papacy. 
That is the historical position of Vatican I. Then the citizen places himself in the 
position of the monarch as subject supporting the state and its history. That same 
development can be seen in the church. Vatican Π discovers other members of the 
church, apart from the papacy, who are active and responsible subjects in the church: 
bishops, priests, and laypeople. One must say theologically that God mediates salvation 
through people: Abraham, Moses, then in a very special way, Jesus, the Apostles and 
all through history, others. The real subject of this salvific mediation is God himself, 
through Jesus Christ, in the Holy Spirit. But the sacramental subject in Vatican Π is the 
40
 LG 21 breaks with the preceding period. Since the Council of Trent "on pensait l'épiscopat par 
rapport au presbytérat et l'un se demandait ce que l'ordination episcopale pouvait ajouter à 
l'ordination piesbytérale. Conformément aux données théologiques les plus certaines offertes par 
l'histoire des institutions, et singulièrement par l'histoire de la liturgie, Vaticanum Π a renversé cette 
problématique tronquée et restitué à l'épiscopat sa véritable place": Legrand 1969,136; cf Philips 
1967,257-265 and Rahner 1966, 217-219. 
41
 Ratzinger 1966/1, 45. 
41
 Kehl 1992,358 says about this that Vatican I rejected in principle and theologically an absolutist 
form of government for the church but that in reality absolutism remained possible because "das 
Zugleich von bischöflicher und päpstlicher Vollmacht weder theologisch hinreichend miteinander 
vermittelt noch auch rechtlich verbindlich in der einen obersten Leitungsstruktur der Kirche 
verankert wird". 
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church, the whole church and no longer only the papacy as it was in Vatican I o . The 
sacramentality of the church as a whole must be developed in further ecclesiologica! 
study in the search for integration of the two divergent visions of Vatican Π, or at least 
in the search for a concept that does justice to both. 
But Vatican Π hesitated. Acerbi says that Lumen gentium is like Moses, who sees the 
promised land from the mountain top, but he will not enter iL The Constitution is on 
the boundary and shows new horizons without exploring them sufficiently44. 
1.4 As illustration: consequences of the divergent visions for the Consilium 
pastorale 
Because the administrative-structural aspects are the focus of this study, it is sensible 
shortly to look at the Consilium pastorale. There the difference between the two 
concepts is very clear, as is the structural problem when the position of office is 
secured in this way over against the rest of the People of God. 
The Diocesan Pastoral council is recommended in Christus Dominus 27. Only two 
sentences are used for this: one about its composition and one about its function41. It is 
remarkable that in the first sentence the bishop is an integral part of the council but in a 
special way: as president. The task of the council is limited, but within that limitation 
we find an extensive mandate: research, consultation, practical conclusions. Neumann 
states rightly that a (juridical) consequence has been drawn from the theological basis 
laid in LG 32. Neumann speaks of "collégial consultation"4'. 
But Vatican Π was hardly finished and the Motu proprio "Ecclesiae sanctae" emphasi­
zed the difference between the bishop and the other members. First of all, the council 
has (only) a "consultative voice" which then the members offer the bishop47. One could 
say, with Neumann, that consultation means a common, careful exchange and weighing 
of arguments, in which the bishop ultimately decides and so keeps his own responsibi­
lity. And if, in certain cases, he deviates from the ideas of the majority, it will show 
understanding because one will respect the arguments and, therefore, the decision4*. 
Seen in this way, normally one has then done justice to the contribution of the partici­
pants in the process which formed the ideas. 
^Pottmeyer 1983,279-280. Also in Pottmeyer 1982,102-105. 
44
 Acerbi 1975,551; in the same sense also Wiederkehr 1992, 294-295 and 298-299. 
4 1
 ChrD 27: "Valde optandum est ut in unaquaque dioecesi peculiare instituatur Consilium 
pastorale, cui Episcopus dioecesanus ipse praesit et in quo clerici, religiosi et laici, speckúiter delecti, 
partes habeant. Huius Consilii erit, ea quae ad pastoralia opera spectant investigare, peipendere 
atque de eis practicas expromere conclusiones". 
46
 Neumann 1973,53. 
'"Motuproprio "Ecclesiae sanctae" (d.d. 6-8-1966) in AAS, 58 (1966) 757-787. It says in nr.16,2 
that the Pastoral Council has a consultative voice. 
44
 Neumann 1973,45. 
143 
Ecclesiae sanctae emphasized the position of the bishop even more clearly where it 
said that the bishop chooses the members of the council49: Christus Dominus leñ it 
completely in the open how the council was to be constituted! Why did they not give 
certain organizations the chance to propose members or to appoint the members or at 
least a number of them? Ecclesiae sanctae does leave the formation of the Priests' 
council open10! If, as Neumann suggests, consultation should help the reception of 
policy decisions and make them more easily realizable51, a broad representation of 
what is alive in the diocese is even more important. 
When LG 30 says that the bishops "were not meant by Christ to shoulder alone the 
entire salvific mission of the Church towards the world"; when ChrD 16 says that the 
bishop, "in exercising this pastoral care, he should preserve for his faithful the share 
proper to them in Church affairs; he should also recognize not only their duties but also 
their rights to collaborate actively in the building up of the Mystical Body of Christ"; 
when lay people are according to LG 31 "in their own way made sharers in the priestly, 
prophetic, and kingly functions of Christ"52; when LG 37 says that lay people are 
"permitted and sometimes even obliged to express their opinion on things which 
concern the good of the Church"; and if Apostolicam Actuositatem 3 says that every 
believer, on the basis of his charismata, is given the "right and the duty" ("HM et of-
ficium") to "use them in the Church and in the world for the good of mankind and for 
the upbuilding of the Church"; what then is the reason to be against giving the Pastoral 
council some definite "status" in the (rather limited) area of administration and policy? 
Acerbi supports that idea where he says that the passage mentioned (from AA 3) 
makes clear that the charismata of the laity are not just "support-c/iarijmafa" for the 
episcopal office and that the participation of the laity cannot be restricted to support so 
that the bishop can do a better job. In that case the episcopal office would be the only 
and adequate principle for the building up of the local faith-community; and not a 
specific and very important and fundamental office. Here we see the opposition of the 
two concepts! 
It is clear for Acerbi that "one cannot see a deliberative voice as theologically impossi-
ble in principle, nor can one see the consultative voice as an adequate expression of the 
theological status of the laity and their relation to the hierarchy. To give the laity a 
decisive voice" is for Acerbi "a possible and legitimate canonical concretization of the 
ius of (he laity"53. 
* ES 16,3. Mörsdorf 1967/1,204 remarks that ES indeed does not per se exclude that the bishop 
can provide some kind of election. 
50
 ES 15,1, says that the Priest's Council must be representative for the presbyterium, as a senate: 
cf TO 7 and с 495,1. 
51
 Neumann 1973,45. 
52
 Mörsdorf 1967/1 also links ChrD 16 with LG 31,1. 
53
 Acerbi 1982, 233-234; in Acerbi 1975, 522 he already stated: "i doni che ognuno riceve dal 
Signore per l'edificazione della chiesa debbono recarsi anche ad espressione giuridica". Acerbi 1982, 
227-234 gives his vision on the post-conciliar developments of "Synoden und Räten für die Leitung 
der Ortskirchen". Neumann 1973 is largely devoted to that too; he places the "synodal-kollegiale 
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What the Code of 1983 says in canons 511-514 is only a faint reflection of this thought. 
The Pastoral council is "sub auctoritate Episcopi" and proposes decisions; in principle 
one can ask whether only the bishop must have the authority to decide whether the 
erection of a Pastoral council is even advisable14 and whether it is necessary that he 
alone decides whether, what has been discussed, is to be made public, as the Code 
states. 
2 A Third Basic Concept in Lumen Gentium! 
Communio has been seen these last years as a central ecclesiological term which unites 
the two different concepts. The sentence "The ecclesiology of communio is the central 
and fundamental concept in the documents of the Council" in the final report of the 
Extraordinary Synod of Bishops of 1985 shows this35. Aymans, Kasper, and Kehl say 
as much5*. 
Is it possible to clarify the role of this "communio" concept in the texts of Vatican Π? 
2.1 Doubts 
In the introduction to this chapter it was already clear that Lumen gentium does not use 
one single concept as the central concept for the church. Aymans is right when he asks 
why the Council itself did not use this term at the appropriate place, namely, LG 8a57. 
The statement cannot be based in its massive reality on the places which Kasper 
Gremien" in a wider church-historical perspective and calls them "keine wesensfremde und 
revolutionäre Neuerung" (ρ 95). Cf the positive approach of diocesan and parish councils in 
Corecco 1985,356! In itself, it is strange that Aymans 1970,17-18 does not see the Priest council 
and the Pastoral council in this same light; he prefers to call only bishops meetings synods (or 
Councils). It is remarkable that Aymans (p 55-56) does not see a distinction between the Pastoral 
council and the councils which AA 27 recommends: the first is in direct relation to the bishop, the 
others not; and the latter are directed to separate sectors of policy and activity. 
54
 Anyway, that it is optional is in conformity with ChrD 27; the Priest Council is obligatory 
according to PO 7 and c. 495,1! The bishop presides over it, but it has a consultative voice except 
in a few cases: с 500. The differences between the Priests council and the Pastoral council, maintai­
ned in de Code of 1983 (cc. 495-514) reflect for Acerbi 1982, 231 the distinction between clergy 
and laity as a basic principle of ecclesiastical structures: priests and deacons participate in the sacra-
mentality of the episcopacy. 
55
 Synode 1985,559 (Π С); cf VI, nt 96. 
56
 Kasper 1986/2,64 caDs "communio": "vielleicht sogar die Leitidee des letzen Konzils". Aymans 
1972,331 posits that the concept "communio" "die besondere Eigenart der kirchlichen Körperschan 
und ihrer Komplexität zum Ausdruck bringt". Kehl 1992,51-52: "Mit recht kann daher der Begriff 
"communio" als die ekklesiologische Leitidee des Konzils angesehen werden" (italics in the 
original). 
57
 Aymans 1972, 331; later he says, in Aymans 1991, 22: "Die ekklesiologische Begriff der 
'communio' ist zu einem Schlüsselbegriff der konziliaren Ekklesiologie geworden" (italics mine; 
AL.). 
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adduces as proof4*. When we read in Provost that "communio is a secondary considera­
tion in terms of organization principles" (in relation to the "hierarchical organization") 
and when he speaks about "peripheral communio concepts"39, there grows some 
suspicion regarding the central and fundamental place of the concept "communio". And 
one can ask how one should then evaluate the determination of the church as sacrament 
inLGl! 
Saier examined the texts of Vatican Π on the meaning of "communio". From his 
bibliography it is clear that in the years after the Council (until 1972) there is hardly 
any publication about "communio" and that those publications which do exist often 
seem to deal with the "hierarchica communio". Saier himself says that in Lumen 
gentium "communio" deals especially with the relation between Pope and bishops'0. 
In short, the absoluteness with which "communio" is called the central concept of the 
Council appears not to be so obvious. The question is then how these authors arrive at 
their conclusion. The answer can be found in Thils, in Tillard, who speaks of an 
opening in Vatican Π in relation to the ecclesiology of communio^, and in Klop­
penburg. He states, more circumspectly than the others, that communio always 
resonates in the background in Lumen gentium; this is clear for him in the fact that 
precisely in this Constitution one can read that the papacy together with the episcopate 
governs the church; one never reads that "the bishops act under the leadership of the 
papacy", while one can find this formulation in the Decrees Christus Dominus and Ad 
gentes62. 
It seems important then to see more precisely how the word "communio'' functions in 
Lumen gentium and what it means for the relationships between the papacy, the 
я
 He mentiones Philips 1966, 139, bat Philips says only that in the time before the Council the 
communio idea was gaining ground Kasper then points to some passages in Philips 1967, but there 
it seems that the communio idea is a key concept only for Philips himself: Philips 1967,256,321, 
325,326,363. Grillmeier 1966/2,161 calls the communio idea and its implications (summarized) 
a "constant motive" in Lumen Gentium. As a matter of fact, Kasper 1986/2, 65-66 says that 
communio is indeed a central concept for the Council, but not a very clear one; Puza 1990Д, 23 
underlines that. 
59
 Provost 1976,191. 
*° Saier 1973,12 and 187-188. 
" Tillard 1987,177; he adds that this goes together with a "re-lecture profonde des affirmations 
centrales de Pastor aetanus": see 2.2 ("Lumen gentium 18") below. Thils 1972,210, says similarly 
that Vatican Π "a promu une ecclésiologie de communion". Cf Grillmeier's quote in nt 58. 
β
 Kloppenburg 1974,159-161, points to ChrD 2,3 and 11 (where it says "sub auctoritate") and 
AG 38 ("cum et sub Petra"). Mörsdorf 1967/1,149-151 says that these paragraphs of ChrD do not 
do justice to "die Lehre vom Bischofskollegium, die zu den entscheidenden Aussagen des Konzils 
liber die Koche gehört". We find communio (hierarchica) also in ChrD 4, 5,36, and 42 but these 
do not provide an enrichment in content for the following analysis. It is remarkable that PO 15 
indicates the whole church as communio hierarchical Saier 1973,12. 
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College of bishops, and the individual bishops63. We will pay special attention to the 
relationship between the papacy and the individual bishops because this is the most 
important for the question of the validity of the principle of subsidiarity for the church, 
in itself and against the background of the relations between the universal church and 
the particular churches. 
12 Communio in Lumen gentium 
COMMUNIO AS A KIND OF BOND 
Communio appears 26 times in Lumen Gentium** and 25 times it is used to express 
some kind of bond61. Because we are interested in the structural relationships in the 
church some of these are not interesting for our research; e.g., communio as indication 
of the bond among religious, because this is a special case (LG 43) or as indication of 
the bond with those who have already died (LG 50, 51, and 69). In itself it is interes­
ting that there is communio also with christians outside the catholic church6*. 
Then we find a number of places where communio indicates the bond among all the 
faithful67; and in one or another case communio is even used as further specification of 
the church6*, even though the difference in these places is not so great. In some cases 
communio indicates the special bond between the bishop and the priests and deacons 
in a diocese69. 
° Saier 1973 offers probably the most complete survey of all the places where it can be found in 
the texts of Vatican Π together with an interpretation. But he analyses very much without arriving 
at a synthesis or an integration of the various meanings of "communio". The same can be said for 
Soujeole 1991. Rossi 1976, 106 dares an attempt to come to a definition of the theology of 
communio on the basis of the texts of Vatican Π: "Das in der Kirche angebotene und verwirklichte 
Heil besitzt wesentlich eine kommunitüre Dimension, da Gott die Menschen nicht einzeln retten 
will, sondern Sie in Brüderlichkeit zu einem Volk zusammenfuhrt, das sich sowohl durch die 
Gleichheit aOer als auch durch einen organische Gliederung ausgezeichnet hat". It is remarkable that 
he never mentions Saier's book even though "communio" is the second main theme of his study; 
the first is "mysterium". 
" Indices 1968, 84. 
65
 In LG 11 it means Holy communion. 
66
 LG 15; see Bertrams 1966/1 about the subjects "communio cum baptizatis acatholicis quoad iura 
fundamentals baptnorum" and "communio cum Episcopis Acatholicis quoad potestatem episcopa-
lem". 
67
 LG 4, LG 9, LG 13 ("in doctrina Apostolorum et communione" and "vincula intimae 
communionis"), LG 14. 
"LG 7, LG 13 ("in ecclesiastica communione") and LG SO ("Nam sicut Christiana inter viatores 
communio propinquius nos ad Christum adducit"). Cf Rikhof 1983, 41-42, who points to the 
sentences in LG 4 and LG 9. 
69
 LG 28, LG 29 en LG 41. In ГО 7 it is stated that the unity of ordination and mission of priests 
demands a hierarchica communio with the Ordo Episcoporum; see on this subject: Saier 1973, 
246-296. 
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In all these places communio is a vague concept: it indicates some kind of bond but the 
concept is not clearly defined in Lumen gentium10. 
COMMUNIO IN THE NOTA EXPLICATIVA 
That happens in the Nota Explicativa (Praevia) to the third chapter oí Lumen gentium. 
This Nota is not part of the Constitution because it is a text of the Theological Com-
mission of the Council. But the publication and the emphasis which Paul VI placed on 
it in the official vote by the Council on Lumen gentium makes it an important key to 
interpret chapter Ш71. 
In the Nota communio appears eight times, five of them in the formula "hierarchica 
communio". Then it always refers to the special relationship between the papacy, the 
episcopate as a whole, and the individual bishops. That reality of relationships is 
indicated in Lumen gentium seven times, two of them also in the conjunction with 
"hierarchica''11. 
What is remarkable in this series of texts in the Constitution and the Nota is the 
conjunction with "hierarchica"13. The Nota explains this conjunction in nr. 2. Commu­
nio was in the early church, and is still in the East, a concept that was very much 
respected. It is not a "vague feeling" of a bond, but it is "an organic reality"; it deals 
with structural relationships. These are given content by "charity"74, but demand also a 
juridical expression. This communio is called "hierarchica" because it is not only a 
question of feeling, but also a juridical expression: as a whole it is an "affective and 
effective communio"1'. ff we may accept that the Commission saw the feeling and 
"charity" as self-evident elements of a bond, "hierarchica" refers to the juridical 
7 0
 Kloppenburg 1974, 156 says that it is not defined in any of the Constitutions or Decrees of 
Vatican Π; cf Kasper 1986/2, 65 and Soujeole 1991, 244. 
71
 See for the history and the status of the Nota: Philips 1966,154-155; Ratzinger 1966/1, 348-
349; Ratzinger 1966/2, 62-63; Acerbi 1975,469-474; Legrand 1983,303; Grootaers 1986. 
7 2
 According to Soujeole 1991,246 communio hierarchica appears also in ChrD (nr 2,4, and 5) 
and PO (nr 7 and 15). 
7 3
 Ghirlanda indicates that Paul VI is the first who during the Council used "hierarchica -
communio" in his opening address for the third session on September 14, 1964: "Alio quoque 
argumento has catholici Episcopatus laudes confirmare placet, ut manifesto pateat quantum eius 
dignitari quantum eius carilati prosint haec hierarchicae communionis vinculae, quae Episcopos cum 
Apostolica Sede coniugunt; scilicet Sedes Apostolica vobis indiget, Venerabiles Fratres": Ghirlanda 
1980,291-295; Ghirlanda 1981, 237; Ghirlanda 1988, 282-284; on the first and the last place he 
gives an extensive quotation. 
7 4
 "Charity" seems a peculiar if usual translation of "caritas" as description of the (necessary) 
personal relationships between those in office: in content it is about appreciation, benevolence, 
support, intended to help the other to fulfill his function well. 
7 5
 Nota, nr.2: "Non intelligitur autem de vago quodam affecta, sed de realitate organica, quae 
iuridkam formam exigit et simul caritate animator"; cf Ratzinger 1966/1,352-353. Conclusion 14 
of the Special Synod of the Dutch Bishops (1980) speaks of that "effective and affective commu­
nio". Cf IX, nt 97. 
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expression af the relationships without giving them content. That is the accepted 
framework for the interpretation which follows. The use of the word hierarchica does 
not imply here that there are relationships of authority between the persons mentioned, 
but that a certain order is given, which is necessary within the (proper) communio of 
those who are part of the hierarchy76. It deals with the mutual relationships of those 
who govern within one organization and their tasks must then be well ordered. The 
Nota itself says that this is self-evident Ratzinger interpreted the word "hierarchica" 
this way too. It should be clear that communio does not mean a "non-obligatory 
relation", but that this traditional expression implies the juridical form of the church. 
That juridical form is sacramentally anchored: this form finds "its basis in the common 
celebration of the Eucharistie Mystery" and it provides "the multiformity in the church 
as well as the unbreakable unity ". What is common creates mutual obligations77. 
Ghirlanda gives an interpretation which is opposite to this. Basing himself on Paul VI 
he states that the hierarchica communio links the sacramental unity between papacy 
and episcopate with a real hierarchical subordination of the bishops in relation to the 
Pope. This subordination is clear from the fact that the papacy has authority over all 
potestas ecclesiastica, also over the potestas of the bishops7". Ghirlanda is scientifical­
ly fairly well alone in this, but he seems to be the mouthpiece of present policy in the 
church and of the experience in a broad spectrum, also among the bishops. His position 
and the position of others in the debate about the validity of the principle of subsidiarity 
for the church are closely linked to this interpretation79. It makes sense, therefore, to 
study the relevant texts of Lumen gentium on the relation papacy-episcopacy and on of 
the meaning of (hierarchica) communio in the Constitution, also in the light of the 
Nota: it brings into the open some juridical questions as background to chapter ΓΠ of 
the Constitution, as a more juridical key for the interpretation80. 
76
 Kehl 1992,105: "Das einheitsstiftende und integrierende Moment innerhalb der communio soll 
mit dem (allerdings nicht sehr geeigneten) Begriff "hierarchisch" ausgesagt werden. Seine 
Bestimmung ist es ... die Kirche in einer lebens- und handlungsfähigen Einheit zu bewahren." 
77
 Ratzinger 1966/2,65-66 and Ratzinger 1966/1, 3S2-3S4; he says that the combination of the 
two words is alien in the tradition. 
" Ghirlanda 1990, 256-257: "Possiamo dire che la formula "hierarchica communio" nella mente 
di Paolo VI congiunga i due aspetti de unità sacramentale tra il Romano Pontífice e i vescovi e di 
reale subordinazione gerarchica dei secondi nei confronti del primo. Subordinazione gerarchica che 
si manifesta nel fatto che moderatore di tutta la potestà ecclesiastica nella Chiesa, quindi anche di 
quella dei vescovi, è il Romano Pontífice, in modo che essa converga verso il centro di unità e di 
communione che è la Cattedra di Pietro. Quindi per loro natura ("natura sua") i "muñera" di 
insegnare e di governare devono essere esercitati in communione gerarchica con il Romano 
Pontífice, cioè per diritto divino, in quanto tutto ciò appartiene all' indole e alla costituzione della 
Chiesa". 
79
 VI, 2.2. 
*° Philips 1967,321, says that the Constitution itself expresses the communio idea more freely and 
that the Nola is more concerned with juridical precautions. 
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LUMEN GENTIUM Я 
The first time communio is used in Lumen gentium to indicate the relation between 
papacy and episcopate is the sentence in LG 8, important for more than one reason, 
where it is said that the church "is governed by the successor of Peter and by the 
bishops who are in communion with him"". This says not much more than that the 
government of the church is a common responsibility or task for papacy and bishops82. 
LUMEN GENTIUM l» 
The second time is in LG 18 and with this we find ourselves in chapter Ш which is 
devoted to the "hierarchical structure of the Church with special reference to the 
episcopacy". Again communio is found in a central sentence, namely, where Vatican Π 
formulates how it understands Vatican I in the doctrine about the primacy and infallibi­
lity. After stating that the successors of the Apostles, the bishops, are the shepherds of 
the church, the special place of the papacy is indicated with these words: "In order that 
the episcopate itself might be one and undivided. He placed blessed Peter at the head 
of the other Apostles and instituted in him a permanent and visible principle and 
foundation of the unity of faith and communio'*3. That is the function of the primacy: to 
make sure that the episcopate remains one and undivided by being the remaining and 
visible principle of unity, of faith, and of mutual relationships. The papacy has a special 
place in this, but it governs the church together with the bishops. It is not the only 
principle and basis of unity, but it is the visible principle; apart from that there is unity 
in the Spirit, in love, in the profession of faith, and in other ways in which communio is 
expressed84! 
This short summary of central passages of Vatican I does not fit the image of one 
absolute monarch, an image which people often have of the papacy as seen in that 
Council and as it was formulated in the vision of the church as societas perfecta and as 
corpus Christi mysticum. Therefore, it is good to look once again at Pastor aeternus 
and see how this is to be interpreted regarding the primacy. That can be done following 
the (authoritative) interpretation of the German bishops (von Ketteler was one of them) 
and its laudatory affirmation by Pius DC in 1875. The bishops felt obliged to describe 
the primacy as it was seen in Vatican I because Chancellor von Bismarck had declared 
(in summary) that the episcopal authority had been subsumed in the authority of the 
papacy and that the bishops were now (only) functionaries of an absolute monarch. 
The German bishops declared against this their conclusion that "the bishops are not 
simply instruments of the papacy, are not papal functionaries without their own 
81
 LG 8: "Haec Ecclesia... a successore Petri et Episcopis in eius communione gubemata,...". 
8 3
 Grillmeier 1966/2,175, points to the remarkable exchange from "Romanus Pontifex" in the 
Schema 1963 to "Petri successor". 
8 3
 LG 18: "Ut vero ... perpetuum ас visibile unitatis fidei et communionis principium et funda-
mentum". The note which belongs to the sentence refers to Pastor aeternus. 
M
 Rahner 1966,225. 
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responsibility, but are appointed by the Holy Spirit, and that they, in the place of the 
Apostles, govern as real pastors the sheepfold entrusted to them"85. 
The "potestas suprema, ordinaria et immediata", which is ascribed to the papacy, is 
the highest authority in the church, intended to "guarantee the unity of faith, the 
discipline and the government of the church". More concretely it means also that the 
papacy must keep watch that every bishop fulfills his task dutifully and that the papacy 
as such (therefore, not as the bishop of that diocese) has the right and the duty to 
interfere in a diocese if a bishop is incapable of acting or if there is some other 
necessity to do so*6. 
This is the point of departure for this third chapter of Lumen gentium, in line with 
Vatican I: it is the will of Christ that the bishops, as successors of the Apostles, are the 
pastors in the church. Among them one is placed in a special position, but the govern­
ment of the church is a common responsibility17. 
The following paragraphs (LG 19 and 20) delineate the mission of the Apostles and the 
fact that "so also the Apostles' office to nurture the church is permanent and was meant 
to be exercised without interruption by the sacred order of bishops"; 'Ъу divine 
institution bishops have succeeded to the place of the Apostles as shepherds of the 
Church"88. 
LUMEN GENTIUM 21 
What follows in LG 21 teaches the sacramentality of the episcopacy. This was until 
then a point of discussion. The Council of Trent only spoke about the sacramentality of 
the episcopacy in close connection with the power of the priest concerning the 
Eucharist; the sacramentality of the episcopacy was experienced as derived from that. 
Now this idea is inverted89. What the ordination administratively-structurally means90 is 
" Rousseau 1962, 731-732. In the second half of this sentence the German bishops right away 
quote the Council of Trent and Vatican I and the quotation there from Acts 20,28. Rousseau says 
that in the appeal to the Holy Spirit potestas ordinis and potestas iurisdictionis are linked: o.e., 728-
729. The quote from Vatican I is taken from the earlier mentioned paragraph "Tantum autem 
abest": cf П, nt 66. In this article Rousseau gives the original texts of the German hierarchy and 
the two statements of Pius IX as well as the French translation. 
" O x . , 730-731. This analysis of the primacy of jurisdiction is agreed to byTorrell 1989, 29-36. 
He concludes: "Les théologiens ultramontains qui, avant et après le Concile, affectaient d'y voir 
ГехаЬагюп du pape au dessus de tout pouvoir, semblable à Dieu le Père, se trompaient profondément 
sur le sens de ce texte". 
r
 LG 18:" ... et in eodem incepto pergens, doctrinam de Episcopis, successoribus Apostolorum, 
qui cum successore Petri, Christi Vicario, ас totius Ecclesiae visibili Capite, domum Dei viventis 
regunt... constituit" 
" Rahner 1966,214-216 points to the extraordinary importance of the two last sentences of LG 
20: primacy and episcopacy have a biblical foundation and source; the episcopacy as such is "ex 
divina institutione". 
M C f n t 4 0 . 
M
 Distinct from that is the theological appreciation of the function as formulated in the first 
sentences of LG 21: that in the bishops Christ is present in the midst of the faithful and through 
them He teaches, administers the sacraments continuously and governs. They act "in persona 
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expressed in the following sentence: "episcopal ordination, together with the function 
("munus") of sanctifying, also confers the functions to teach and to govern: these, 
however, of their very nature can only be exercised in communio hierarchica with the 
head and with the members of the College of bishops". There are clearly two parts to 
this sentence. 
First it is said that there are three functions because of ordination, and the word 
"munus" is used as distinguished from "potestas". It was usual to speak of potestas 
ordinis and potestas iurisdictionis. Each had its own source: potestas ordinis was 
based on ordination, potestas iurisdictionis on the missio canonica™. From now on 
there is only one source for the episcopal office: sacramental ordination. This gives 
"the grace of the Holy Spirit" and a "sacred character", "so that the bishops undertake 
the task of Christ himself in an eminent and visible way, as Teacher, Shepherd, and 
High Priest, and so that they act in His person". With Bertrams one must say that an 
idea that any juridical measure transfers episcopal potestas, robs this sentence of any 
meaning92. 
The last word has not been said about the relation between the potestates and the 
muñera and their basis or assignation, but then it deals with distinctions within the one 
sacra potestas. Separating them, however, is no longer possible: potestas ordinis and 
potestas iurisdictionis are complementary elements of the one sacra potestas. it 
encompasses all potestas which every shepherd in the church possesses, as Mörsdorf 
says, and in this way Vatican Π teaches the unity of sacra potestas41. Corecco underli­
nes this: Vatican Π speaks only about the one concept "sacra potestas", and all power 
in the church finds its source in the sacrament94. 
Ordination enables a man to be bishop. The proper meaning of the sacramentality of 
the episcopacy is then clean one does not receive the office from other bishops -or 
from the Pope-; the sacrament, the ordination, contains and signifies and gives the 
grace in an instrumental causality93. And so the episcopacy has in the church an 
independence which needs a structure and ordering but not "subordination". 
Christi" as the classical formula expresses iL Wiedenhofer 1992, 43-44 remarks rightly that there 
is a danger that the representatives of the church identify themselves with truth and salvation while 
they only must communicate iL The danger is then that criticism of the institute, of the organization, 
or of those in office is seen as criticism of God's work. 
"Code of 1917, с 109. 
91
 Bertrams 1966/2, 428^30. 
" Mörsdorf 1967/2, 279; Mörsdorf 1968, 207. One can see potestas ordinis and potestas 
iurisdictionis as the focal points of the one ellipse, which is the sacra potestas: Mörsdorf 1968, 211 
and Mörsdorf 1970,223-228; Waif 1984,42-48. 
"Corecco 1985,381-385; cf Aymans 1991, 386 and 391. Corecco distinguishes: potestas sacra 
operates via ordo and iurisdiclio, sacrament and word. Those are two formally distinct modalities 
of the potestas sacra, which are identical in their salvation-content. Corecco finds the basis for this 
idea in Mörsdorf; cf Aymans 1970,273-276 and Aymans 1991,391-395. 
95Rahnerl962,320. 
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The second part of the sentence states that one cannot yet exercise these functions 
because that is possible "natura sua" only in hierarchica communio96. The task is 
never entrusted to the bishop alone, but always together with others who have received 
that same ordination. The sacramental ordination gives them all the same ontological 
participation in the muñera, and that demands a juridical determination and ordering97. 
LUMENGENTIUM22 
The bishops together form the College of bishops. This College possesses the highest 
and complete authority over the church, but only when the head of the College is with 
them9*. That is logical: if he, who has been given the special task in the College to 
guarantee its unity, and who has the task of primacy, is not with them, the College is 
not complete. 
In the sentence which indicates how one becomes a member of the College, we again 
find the words hierarchica communio: one becomes a member of the College of 
bishops 'Ъу virtue of sacramental consecration and through hierarchica communio 
with the head and members of the College"9'. Sacramental ordination is most important 
here, as is clear from the formulation100, but is not in itself sufficient: one must be in 
hierarchica communio. This complex admission procedure is explained in the Nota nr. 
2 where it is said that the muñera, received in ordination, will be practicable only 
through a further determination by hierarchical authority. This can be done in two 
ways: by giving the ordained man a special appointment or by giving him "subjects". I 
would put it this way: the muñera only become potestates when they are "incardinated" 
because the bearer is given a specific appointment. The College is not a formless 
reality, it is not a mass of people; it is a group of persons where each has a specific 
94
 Even though in the history of its origin natura sua only applies to the muñera docenal et 
regendi, there is no (linguistic) reason not to apply it to all three, unless one wants to make a 
distinction between "valid" and "licit" exercise of the muñera: Rahner 1966, 220; Mörsdorf 1970, 
224. Caïd. Seper said at the Synod of Bishops in 1969: "... tamen sua muñera sactificandi, docendi 
et regendi in consecratione collata ex eonim ipsa natura nonnisi in hierarchica communione cum 
Coltegli Capite et membrís exercere possunt": Caprile 1970,461 (nr 4, cf nr 3). Saier 1973, 224-
225 also takes the stand that it applies to all three muñera, on the basis of Nota nr 2, which does not 
distinguish in the "participatio sacrorum muneroram". In the N.B. in the Nota one can deduce it too; 
the question of "validity" and "liceity" is left there to the "disceptaüo theologorum". 
" Ratzinger 1966/2,352-353. 
" LG 22: "Ordo autem Episcoporum... exerceri potest". Waif 1988,72 makes the critical remark 
that bishops in history, e.g., during a Council, acted without or against the papacy and that they had 
to do so for the well-being of the church. He makes more remarks on ρ 70-72 regarding the theme 
"College" in Vatican Π. 
" LG 22: "Membrum Corporis episcopalis aliquis constituitur vi sacramentalis consecrationis et 
hierarchica communione cum CoUegii Capite atque membris". 
1 0 0
 Philips 1967, 303-304: it says "vi sacramentalis consecrationis" and that "vi" indicates the 
cause; and it is through the hierarchica communio as condition. The sacrament gives the effect of 
salvation as intended, the office; but the exercise demands that the communio be respected, 
according to him. See also Thus 1972,202-203. 
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task. There are many who have the muñera and there is "a need for interplay between 
the many bearers of jurisdiction"10'. The competencies need to be well distributed; 
otherwise, it will become chaos if each one has (only) a general appointment102. As a 
bishop with this specific task, one obtains one's proper place in the College, in the 
whole103. The College as such has its own status and function. 
With this thesis the Council put an end to the then current understanding that the 
papacy is the source of all potestas iurisdictionis: acceptance in the hierarchica 
communio does not add anything to ordination. Ordination is the most important act. 
After ordination the muñera need to be given a specific place where they can be 
exercised, to determine the ordering further. This determination is a juridical act, as 
such limited and important in its meaning104. One could use the word hierarchical for 
this, but only in relation to the papacy as we explained above (where we spoke about 
the texts of 1875) and clearly defined in relation to the other bishops. 
LUMEN GENTIUM 24 
The word communio appears again at the end of LG 24; this paragraph is the start of 
the (third) part of this chapter which deals with the mission of the individual bishop. 
The first part of the paragraph states that the bishops, as successors of the Apostles 
receive a missio or munus from the Lord himself to teach and to preach the gospel: that 
is the general mission of every bishop, to be seen as service105. Then, the juridical 
ordering of the munus is given (again): there is need for a missio canonica to be given 
according to legal customs not revoked by the highest and universal authority in the 
church or it can be given according to laws which that same authority has promulgated 
or has recognized, or it can be given directly by the papacy. But always the rule stands: 
"if it (the papacy; AI,.) resists or refuses the apostolic communio, bishops cannot 
assume their office". 
101
 Ratzinger 1966/2, 65. 
102
 Saier 1973,212-214, refers to this also, but he understands "hierarchica" more as a matter of 
"Ueber -und Unter-ordnungsverhältnis" not referring to the relation between bishop and papacy, 
because that is given. For him it clarifies the relation with the metropolitan and the patriarch on the 
one hand and the possible аихШгагу bishop(s) on the other. He does not indicate what is specifically 
"subordinated" in the relation between the bishop and the metropolitan, and that would not be easy 
to do! See for some historical and juridical remarks about patriarchs and metropolitans in the Latin 
church: Mörsdorf 1964, 380-385. 
103
 This is confirmed in this sentence from LG 22 which says about the college: "In ipso, Episcopi 
... propria potestate in bonum fidelium suorum, immo totius Ecclesiae funguntur, Spirito Sanctu 
organicam structurant eiusque concordiam continenter roborante". 
>M
 Philips 1967,290 compares this juridical rule with the specific permission which a priest needs 
to absolve sins; in both cases it is a question of juridical form in the ordering of the community, 
which is basic to the sacrament 
105
 LG 24: "Episcopi, utpote Apostolorum successores, a Domino... missionem accipiunt docendi 
._. Munus autem Ulud... verum est servirium... diakonia seu ministerium ...". But there is a much 
clearer vision of the episcopal ministry in LG 18, which in this way places it in relation to LG П. Cf 
VI,nt54. 
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I see missio canonica here as a juridical ordering. It cannot be that we must understand 
this term here in the same way as it was used at the time of the Council, based on a 
clear separation of the potestas ordinis and potestas iurisdictionis, which was assigned 
by the missio canonica106. The new meaning can be no other than the admission into 
the communio hierarchica in the way as we described it107. The formula communio 
hierarchica is not used here, probably because this passage wants to take into account 
the proper structure of the Eastern rite churches10*. That means that the text leaves the 
possibility that neither the papacy, nor "legal customs or laws"109, assign "a specific 
appointment or subjects". Then there is no communio hierarchica in the sense 
intended above, but there is a need for the communio as it exists between all the 
successors of the Apostles: the apostolica communio, which leaves the primacy 
unimpeded. 
From this passage two conclusions could be drawn: 
either missio canonica and admission in the communio hierarchica are not the 
same thing in the "Western Patriarchate", but then the given interpretation of 
communio hierarchica loses all meaning; 
- or the communio hierarchica is typical for the "Western Patriarchate" and does not 
say the last word about the relations in the much wider communio apostolica, as 
the communio of the "successors of the Apostles""0. 
This second conclusion safeguards what is said about the (admission to) the communio 
hierarchica, and shows the relation between the primacy and the episcopate in a 
m
 Codex 1917, с 109; cf Mörsdorf 1964,248. It is remarkable that Saier 1973,240-242 starts 
from an identical meaning and, therefore, states that the missio canonica transfers potestas 
iurisdictionis: he maintains the traditional separation of the poiestates. 
m
 Acerbi 1975,534, nt 113: "La "missio canonica" dei vescovi non coincide con quella intesa dal 
canon 109 CJC. Per i vescovi essa non è la "deputano positiva ex parte auctoritatis ecclesiasticae 
ad actum regiminis vel magisteri!", ma solo la "canonica determinano" dei soggetti о delle condizioni 
di esercizio dei poteri già ricevuti per la legittima consacrazione". 
"" The note to the passage (=nr 74) refers lo the Codex Iuris pro Ecclesiis OrientaUbus. Rahner 
1966, 234-235 refers to this too. And Ratzinger 1966/2, 65 remarks that it is usual in the Latin 
church but that it is not the only way, that the papacy juridically determines the area of work of the 
bishop. 
109
 It is based on "laws" (here с 406) that an auxiliary bishop (in the various forms of с 403) 
becomes a member of the hierarchica communio. С. 406 states correctly that the auxiliary must be 
appointed as vicarias; also, his muñera demand a juridical ordering. But it remains strange theologi-
cally that some auxiliaries take a "back seat" in the Conference (c. 454, cf ChrD 38,2) and that they 
cannot be the president: AAS 81 (1989) 388. 
110
 Saier 1973,242, understands as communio apostolica: the communio with the papacy (without 
further determining it). This is needed so that the bishops can exercise their office according to the 
text of LG 24. If they had intended Saier's meaning why then did they not say hierarchica, certainly 
in a place where every word is so important? Ghirlanda 1980, 362 (nt 390), in his discussion about 
the genesis of this sentence, can only come to the point that missio canonica and communio 
apostolica cannot be identified although they do have a certain equivalence. But he says also that 
"communion apostolique et communion hiérarchique s'identifient": Ghirlanda 1981, 240. 
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special light, because papacy and being patriarch of the West now coincide111. And so 
there is an accumulation of functions which, at least historically, is not necessary112! 
It is clear that the way the Code of 1917 saw things has been severely criticized by the 
Council and that the relationships are basically re-structured. Also Mystici corporis 
stated that the bishops receive their power of Jurisdiction directly from the Pope113. 
Ordination and administrative power were defacto separated in history, even though 
the Council of Trent already recognized how problematic this separation was114. The 
new thesis is that "the ordination and the accompanying grace confers the office, which 
for its implementation needs to be somehow activated". Ordination does not give "only 
the seed or the root or the aptitude or the condition or some such thing so that the real 
power can be received later on""5. 
SOME OTHER PLACES 
Logically the two other places where communio is found, in LG 25, do not say 
anything new. For bishops in communion with the papacy the nutnus docendi has 
become a potestas docendi. It is right then that it is said that the bishops who, in 
communio with the papacy "teach, are to be respected by all as witnesses to divine and 
catholic truth". The bishops "proclaim Christ's doctrine infallibly" when they are in 
agreement about a specifically defined question; it is not needed that they gather (in a 
Council). But it is needed that they maintain the bond of communio with each other and 
with the successor of Peter116. But this is not really new, regarding what has been said 
above. 
1,1
 Aymans 1991,55 says: Tatsächlich sind viele ordentliche Zuständigkeiten, die das Recht dem 
Papst zuschreibt, in Wirklichkeit Zuständigkeiten des Patriarchen der Lateinische Kirche. Dies gilt 
beispielsweise für eine so bedeutende Frage wie die Bestellung der Bischöfe". Cf Mörsdorf 1960, 
632-634, who says that the interplay of papal and patriarchal power in the Eastern churches gives 
a new vision on the papal primacy. This article and Mörsdorf 1957 give an insight in the church-
order of the Eastern churches which are united with Rome. Cf Tillard 1987, 338-343. According 
to Greshake 1989, 113, abbot J. Hoeck osb asked during the Council to replace the centralism of 
the church with an order of autonomous patriarchates. Philips 1967, 332 rejects this idea in favor 
of the role of the Bishops' Conferences. He briefly mentions "that Vatican Π does not speak 
anywhere about the Bishop of Rome as the Patriarch of the West". Provost 1976,236 says that one 
should not confuse the role of the papacy as successor of Peter and its role as patriarch of the West 
1 1 2
 Greshake 1989,102 (nt 35) points out that the Pope is also metropolitan of Rome. 
113
 MC 211-212: cf П, nt 66. The awareness existed already before in Pius ΧΠ and John ХХШ 
that this is not the only possibility. The Code of 1917, с 332,1 reminds us that also in the West it 
is not always so that only the papacy gives the potestas ¡urisdictionis because there are other organs 
involved, e.g., if there is a right of election: cf Mörsdorf 1964,409-410 and Kaiser 1990,56. 
,M
 Ratzinger 1966/2,64. 
1,3
 Philips 1967, 289. 
M
'LG 25: "Episcopi in communio cum Romano pontífice docentes...": after all, the papacy is the 
visible principle and basis of unity (LG 18), therefore, it is normally the first point of reference. A n i 
"Licet singuli praesules infallibilitatis non poUeant..., sed communionis nexum ... authentice ... 
docentes,... doctrinam Christi infallibiliter enuntiant". 
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Finally, communio (hierarchical appears a few times in nr 4 of the Nola. It is underli­
ned there that the College can never be active without its head, but also that the papacy 
cannot be seen apart from the College of bishops"7: the interplay in the College is 
called communio hierarchica. 
2J The relations within the episcopate 
In the light of the word "communio" we have discussed some of the central points of 
Lumen gentium Ш. For our research it is important to point to LG 27 where it is 
clearly stated that the bishops govern their dioceses as "vicarii et legati Christi""'. The 
bishop has in his diocese "(sacra) potestas propria, ordinaria et immediata" and so he 
has "the sacred right and, before God, the duty" to legislate, to judge, and to govern all 
that belongs to cult and apostolate. Bishops cannot be seen in any way as representa­
tives of the papacy or as subordinated functionaries because they have their own proper 
authority. This authority is limited in territory; and that is an important difference with 
the papacy which is instituted for the universal church. The bishop governs with his 
own proper authority what belongs to his office as institutio divina: the words "potes­
tas propria, ordinaria et immediata" indicate that. He governs in the name of Christ, 
under his own authority"9. The center of the church can indicate the way government 
should be exercised according to the text120. But their power is not "destroyed but 
rather affirmed, strengthened and vindicated" by the highest and universal power, even 
Vatican I already said this! 
It is useful to compare statements about the papacy and the episcopacy: 
- papacy and episcopacy are both of divine right (Vatican I, DS 3058 - LG 20); 
- papacy and episcopacy are both called "vicarius С his ti" (LG 18 - LG 27) 
- the papacy has ordinary, immediate, and real episcopal iurisdiction over the whole 
church and it has full, highest and universal power, the bishop has his own, 
ordinary, and immediate power in his own diocese (Vatican L DS 3060+3064/ LG 
22-LG 27); 
- the papacy is the permanent and visible principle and foundation of the unity of the 
bishops and the faithful; the bishop is the visible principle and foundation of unity 
in his diocese (LG 23). 
Apart from the proper constitutive role the papacy plays in the College of bishops 
(Nota nr. 3 and 4) where the Pope is more than primus inier pares, this survey teaches 
1 1 7
 Ratzinger 1966/1, 357, who remarks that nrs 3 and 4 of the Nota point to "die wesentlich 
plurale Communio-Struktur der Kirche" and also to the limits of centralism and the importance of 
the particular church. 
"* In LG 18 only the "successor of Peter" is called "vicarius Christi". 
'"Rahner 1966, 245-246. 
128
 "Haec potestas... a suprema auctoritate exercitium eiusdem ultimatim regañir" says LG 27: that 
"ultimatim" means that Rome does not interfere constantly in the governing of the dioceses, but that 
it assigns the tasks and that it functions as the final court of appeal, to protect either the bishops or 
their diocesans, says Philips 1967, 369. This interpretation limits the lack of clarity which is 
indicated in VL 1.3 (in relation to Principium V). Cf IX, 2.2. 
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that the papacy and the diocesan bishop possess many prerogatives in common, but 
there is the difference of the extension of their power121. 
That is why LG 22 says "semper libere" as it deals with "potestas plena, suprema et 
universalis" of the papacy in relation to the whole church. Those two words are 
intentionally combined here instead of saying "always and free", "in order to prevent 
the impression as if the Pope could interfere at any time and arbitrarily in the admini­
stration of a local bishop"122. The text emphasizes the subtle balance between papacy 
and bishops: to maintain that balance between two institutions of divine right an appeal 
is made to the Holy Spirit123. Within the church itself, as organization, there is no 
"third" or higher authority which can maintain or force such a balance: it can only be 
done because of the carefulness, which papacy and bishops must practice, not to enter 
into each other's competency. 
These thoughts can be found again and again in the places we have traced for the 
meaning of communio (hierarchica): a community of subjects of authority which 
demands to be ordered, which demands that tasks be well demarcated. The papacy is 
occupied by a bishop, the bishop of Rome. The papacy is not a sacrament nor is it a 
higher degree in the fullness of the sacrament of ordination. In ordination to bishop all 
members of the "ordo episcoporum" "participate in the same charismata and the same 
sacred functions": thus, there is an ontological-sacramental unity in the episcopate to 
which the papacy belongs12*. That appears to be the basis for the "suprema ас plena 
potestas" of the College over the whole church: that would not be logical if it were a 
college of "subordinates". Therefore, the papacy must be seen in the context of the 
episcopate as a whole123; communio comes first, hierarchica is a determination of it. 
The papacy cannot allow that the College of bishops exists only formally126. 
This ordered relationship between papacy and episcopate comes back in a similar way 
(in the vision of Vatican П) in the relationship between the universal church and the 
particular churches, the dioceses. LG 23 refers to that127. The church is a "communion 
121
 Granfield 1987,115; Granfield 1989,461. 
m
 Philips 1967, 308; cf Acerbi 1975,542. The Nota says in nr.4 that the papacy can exercise its 
power "omni tempore", always, but not "constantly". 
125
 LG 27: "Spribi... servante". LG 22 already formulated this idea about the relationship between 
the papacy and the College of bishops: "Spiritu .... roborante": cf nt 103. 
°* Acerbi 1975,528: "La "Lumen gentium' assume come centrale la considerazione sacramentale 
dell' 'ordo episcoporum'". 
125
 Tillard 1987,324-325. 
126
 Ratzinger 1966/1,356: "Während juridisch der Papst inappellabel ohne das Kollegium, dieses 
aber nicht ohne ihn wirken kann, wird auf der moralischen Ebene für den Papst ein Verpflichtung 
entstehen können, auf die Stimme der Bischöfe zu hören, und umgekehrt für die Bischöfe eine 
Notwendigkeit auftreten können von sich aus initiativ zu werden"; cf Ratzinger 1966/2, 60 on LG 
22,2 and Legrand 1983, 301. Cf Rahner 1966,227; Philips 1967,310-312. 
m
 LG 23: "CoDegialis unió etiam in rnutuis relationibus singulorum Episcoporum cum particular-
ibus Ecclesüs Ecclesiaque universali apparet Romanus Pontifex ... uniiatis... visibile principium 
et fundamentum. Episcopi autem singuli visibile principium et fundamentum sunt unitatis in suis 
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of churches because of the collégial relationships between the bishops"12* and vice 
versa Ratzinger says in his interpretation that Vatican Π closely linked the law and the 
sacraments and that the law, therefore, participates in the necessary pluralism of the 
sacramental129. It cannot be centralistic if the sacramental is given scattered form and 
substance over and over again. The emphasis on the sacramental character of ordinati­
on (and of the particular church) and thus of collegiality is linked with the transition 
from a universalist ecclesiology to an ecclesiology of the church as "community of 
sister-churches'"34. The universal church does not possess "local branches", the 
dioceses; and the dioceses are not as such autonomous churches which form a federati­
on, leaving their independence complete. The text is decisive, the universal church 
subsists "in and from" the particular churches, the dioceses, which are formed in the 
image of the universal church. That means that the universal church exists in the 
dioceses, is given form and substance there. They are all church because in them the 
Word is preached and the sacraments are celebrated, especially the Eucharist111. And 
the universal church is built up out of these dioceses: they are the building blocks. If 
one emphasizes "in quibus" too much, the universal church would be lost in the 
autonomous particular churches. If one emphasizes "ex quibus" too much the local 
church becomes an administrative branch of the universal church. There is no priority 
of one over the other. 
Therefore, the formulation "in quibus et ex quibus" is very important constitutional-
One can speak, with Aymans, of the "communio Ecclesiarum""3. The universal church 
is not one large centralistic (bureaucratic) sacíelas perfecta; it is the "network of 
mutually interdependent churches"114. Representing these churches, and naturally with 
the Pope, as bishop of Rome and as the one who has a special task among the episco-
pate, the bishops represent the church. Precisely as representatives of these churches in 
the full sense of the word, they have their own, albeit limited, task: they are the visible 
Ecclesiis particularibus ad imaginen) Ecclesiae universalis foimatis, in quibus et ex quibus una et 
unica Ecclesia catholica existit" (italics mine;A.L.). 
121
 Provost 1976, 217. Legrand 1991, 564, says about this thesis: "la reception de Vatican Π a 
connu depuis 25 ans un déplacement sur le point que nous occupe: la collégialité episcopale est de 
moins en moins invoquée indépendamment de la communion des Eglises. Mieux encore, la 
réflexion théologique la comprend comme service et expression de la communion des Eglises". 
129
 Ratzinger 1966/1, 352, where he concludes: "Das Mass der Bindung oder Lösung der 
Rechtsidee gegenüber der sakramentalen Idee entscheidet zugleich über eine ausschliesslich 
zentraüstische oder eine von innen her kollegiale Konstruktion des Rechtes in der Kirche." 
130
 Alberigo 1982/2,243-245. 
131LG26;cfChrDll. 
ш
 See for the importance of "in quibus el ex quibus": Mörsdorf 1978, 330-331. Cf П, nt 77, and 
К. 2.2. 
135
 Aymans 1970,318-324, who remarks correctly that the expression communio Ecclesiarum in 
the texts of Vatican И only appears in this way in AG 19: "... ecclesiarum novellarum communio 
cum tota Ecclesia...". 
134
 Granfield 1989,451. 
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principle and the foundation of unity in their church. The papacy is that for them and 
for all the faithful. There is a difference in mission and in competency, but this does not 
lead to subordination. Hierarchica communio is the opportunity to make the uniting 
bond between the particular churches concrete. The bishops are the mediators of the 
communio between the churches and with the universal church135. The strength of the 
universal church is in the strength of the particular churches: the stronger these are the 
stronger the whole will be. The proper pastor of each particular church has as such his 
independence. Hierarchica communio is a tensile relationship between the two poles: 
episcopacy and papacy, both de iure divino. This tensile relationship which exists also 
between the particular churches and the universal church, forms the unity of 
communio136. 
Ghirlanda takes as his point of departure that there is a relation of subordination of the 
bishops to the papacy137. In a willful interpretation of some passages from Lumen 
gentium he "proves" this. He sees a clear separation of on the one hand munus/potestas 
sanctiflcandi and on the other hand munera/potestates docendi et regendi. To 
maintain this separation he bases himself on Paul VI whose initiative brought about the 
"/jamrfli«a''inLG21IM. 
That subordination appears in two ways: 
- "hierarchica communio" from the Nota та. 2 can only mean hierarchical subordi­
nation, because this structure becomes reality only through the authority of the 
papacy"9; 
- the papacy confers, as head of the hierarchica communio, the potestates regendi et 
docendi for a diocese to the legitimately ordained bishop through the missio 
canonica'40. 
135
 The first sentence of LG 23 says this: see nt 127; cf Legrand 1969,118-119. 
134
 Minnerath 1982, 193; Kasper 1986/2, 77-78. 
137
 Ghirlanda 1981, 232: "les Evêques, qui forment la communion episcopale, sont toujours en 
relation de communion et de subordination hiérarchique avec le Souverain Pontife"; cf nt 78 en VI, 
nt 133. 
13
* Ghirlanda 1981,241-242; extensively in Ghirlanda 1980,304-306. Cf nt 96. Apart from the 
decisive question how determinative a papal address before or during the Council is for the 
interpretation of a Conciliar text, there is the question whether the most important text for 
Ghirlanda, the opening address for Sessio ΠΙ gives sufficient arguments to keep the clear division 
oithepolestales; it is not said with as many words or directly. Acerbi 1975,437-439 does not point 
to such an idea in this address even though he calls it centralistic. 
'" Ghirlanda 1988, 282-284, especially: "Mais, par le bit même que b communion, comme 
l'affirme la NEP 2, est une réalité organique qui exige par nature une relation structurelle avec 
l'autorité et qui, par l'exercice de son pouvoir propre détermine la vie de cette structure, s'établit une 
relation de subordination hiérarchique entre le Souverain Pontife et les évêques". 
m
 Ghirlanda 1988,287-288, especially: "La transmission aux évêques légitimement ordonnés du 
pouvoir de gouvernement et de magistère authentique sur une Eglise particulière se fait par le moyen 
de la mission canonique, acte direct ou indirect de l'exercice du pouvoir par le Chef de la 
communion hiérarchique." 
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In this way Ghirlanda posits that Vatican Π is in continuity with the traditional doctrine 
of the non-sacramental source of the potestas iurisdictionis of the bishops, and that it, 
in this way, confirms the position of for example Pius ΧΠ in Mystici corporis™. 
Significant for his opinion is the thesis that the actions of the primacy are essential for 
the life of the church, because they constitute the hierarchy142. 
It will be clear from the analysis we gave that Ghirlanda's ideas are very doubtful. He 
does not accept the decisive importance of sacramental ordination for the episcopal 
ministry and denies the unity of the sacra potestas as we gave them above. It is in this 
way that he can separate the potestates and agree with the equality of papacy and 
episcopacy only on the sacramental level; and that is for him not the most important. 
Primacy means for him to have power over the bishops. That does not seem reconcila­
ble with the ideas of Lumen gentium as we explained them. In this light it is under­
standable that he always speaks about a "sovereign" Pope or moderator and not about 
the "successor of Peter"; that would almost invite to think of the "successors of the 
Apostles". His terminology seems to be strongly pre-conciliar and so one can ask 
whether, according to him, there has been any change in the relation between papacy 
and episcopacy in Vatican Π. He does give an answer: "Vatican Π is in continuity with 
the traditional doctrine of the non-sacramental source of the power of jurisdiction of the 
bishops"143. It is remarkable that he does not try to strengthen his position by entering 
into a dialog with other commentators of Lumen gentium'ul 
But his thesis seems acceptable in one point: communio hierarchica is the key to 
interpret the ecclesiology of Vatican Π in general and for the vision of the episcopacy 
in particular145. 
In general we can remark that the explanation of communio {hierarchica), which is 
given here, is probably not the definitive one, because we are dealing here with the 
most difficult legal and structural problems in the church which are also theologically 
141
 Ghirlanda 1981,246. Legrand 1983,343, marks this position as "paradoxalement". 
142
 Ghirlanda 1988, 284, nt 108: "En outre, nous devons dire que par le moyen des actes par 
lesquels s'établissent les liens de la communion hiérarchique avec les évêques, le Souverain Pontife 
exerce le pouvoir de son primat de jurisdiction qui, par nature, est totalement différent du pouvoir 
d'ordre reçu lors de la consécration episcopale. Sous l'aspect sacramentel, le chef et les autres 
évêques sont égaux. Les actes qui naissent de l'exercice du pouvoir primatial sont essentiellement 
nécessaires à la vie de l'Eglise, car ils constituent la hiérarchie même de l'Eglise comme elle a été 
voulue par le Christ". It is remarkable that Mörsdorf 1976, 322 says that the technical term 
"primatus iuiisdictionis" of Vatican I does not appear anymore in the texts of Vatican Π. He says that 
this should set us thinking "weil Aenderungen in der Terminologie nicht selten auch Aenderungen 
in der Sache selbst nach sich ziehen"; cf o.e., 329-330. 
143
 Ghirlanda 1981,246. Beyer 1987,84 (Conduzione) takes the same position. 
144
 Ghirlanda (at least in the publications which I have discussed) does not even react to the severe 
criticism on his position by Congar (in his Bulletin d'ecclésiologie, in: RSPhTh 66 (1982) 93-97) 
and by Legrand 1983, 307 (cf nt 141). 
145
 Ghirlanda 1981,236. 
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very important146. The given explanation is consistent, based on the texts of Vatican Π. 
But these texts do not give a complete vision147. Acerbi makes the remark in this 
context that Vatican Π on the one hand wanted to protect the primacy while on the 
other hand it gave a vision of the episcopacy, but the outcome was not a complete and 
integrated doctrine. So we have an "open" text which needs to be determined further141. 
2.4 Communio as central ecclesiologica] term 
Discussing the concept of communio, doubts were expressed immediately about the 
thesis that this concept is central in the texts of Vatican Π. The thesis appears to be true 
and untrue at the same time. It is untrue because the texts and the first commentaries do 
not speak about communio in this way149. It is true because communio does play a 
central role in the important chapter ΠΙ oí Lumen gentium. 
The question to be asked is: could communio play an integrating role, on further study, 
in relation to the two most important and so different concepts for the church as found 
in Lumen gentium! Playing such an integrating role should then mean that communio 
as concept takes on the determination that the church is sacrament, and that it overco-
mes the opposition between the People of God-concept and the vision of LG Ш. It 
should also do justice to the achievements inherent in both the opposites. There seems 
to be a common opinion that the concept of communio can fulfill these demands as can 
be seen in these examples: 
- the choice of Paul VI for this concept where he tried to arrive at a certain synthesis 
between the People of God-concept and the hierarchical structure'50; 
146
 Ratzinger 1966/1,352 says this more concretely about the Nota, ta 2. 
147
 Rahner 1966, 212, 219-221, 223 and 234 notes more than once that there remain questions 
about the church ordering in the texts. That is true too for the diversion of opinion between 
Bertrams and Mörsdorf about the structure o( the poteslas sacra: Mörsdorf 1968, 214-215. And 
Kasper 1986/2,7S-78, says that hierarchica communio as concept does not sufficiently emphasize 
the sacramental ecclesiology, but that it gives the same momentum, as compromise, to the 
"juristische Einheitsekklesiologie". That interpretation is not the only one though as is clear from 
the above. 
144
 Acerbi 197S, 530. He states for example that the goal of primacy is not sufficiently clarified 
because that would give an objective-intrinsic limitation; and is it sufficiently clear that we speak 
about an "autorità che interviene secondo il principio di sussidiarità e in ragione dell' unità di fede 
e di regime della chiesa ... rispettando la autonomia del potere episcopale e delle sue forme di 
esercizio anche collegiale, che si fondano sul nativo diritto dei vescovi?": o.c, 540-541. 
'
4
' Apart т э т a limited number of theologians, the concept of communio as indication of the 
church was not known at the time of Vatican П: Rossi, 1976, 85-86. Kasper 1986/2,65 points out 
that the word does not yet have a clear meaning at that time. Kasper o.e., 64, nt 2 and 73, nt 16 
mentions the names and the texts of the theologians who re-discovered the concept of communio 
as indication for the church: Congar, Le Guillou, Hamer, de Lubac and Hertling. 
IS0Congar 1982,17-18 says that Paul VI "a aimé le concept de communion"; this is proved by the 
fact that he uses the concept the day after the closing of Vatican П: Granfield 1989,451. Riedel-
Spangenberger 1988,232 refers to Paul VTs address to the Second International Congres for Canon 
Law (Milan 1973), which can be found in AfkKR 142 ( 1973) 463-471 ; cf IX, 3.2. 
162 
- the opinion of the Synod of bishops of 1985, agreed to by John Paul Π'5'; 
• quite a number of theologians prefer i t Congar is a good example: he has pleaded 
for a long time in favor of it152; 
• the Congregado pro Doctrina Fidei felt it had to publish a declaration on this 
concept in 1992 , 5\ 
It is important that communio is, methodologically, a preferable term to describe the 
church. This methodological argument demands explicit explanation114. The word 
"church" has many meanings in normal daily use and often these have a common 
element: "church" indicates a group of believers who form a certain unity. To express 
this element one can give preference to "communio" because it corresponds to the 
criteria which have been given before for a scientific term155 and is more apt than other 
words. A word like "community" does not give expression to the terminological status, 
while "societas (perfecta)" has a history. "People of God" and "corpus (Christi) 
mysticum" carry a concentration on structural-institutional questions. "Sacrament" does 
not say what the church is, but rather expresses its task and function. "Communio" is 
on the one hand a quite open term, which on the other hand is not completely formal 
because of the relation with community (communitas) and communication. These are 
the reasons that Rikhof opts for this (scientific) term: the church is the communio of 
the faithful. 
Rikhof adds the following arguments for the content of the assertion. Communio points 
to the relation of the believing community as a whole with God, and points to relations 
of the faithful among themselves. Communio also demands attention for the structure 
of this communio of the faithful, because a permanent community of people demands 
an internal organization. Communio as community also raises questions also about the 
goal for which people come together and demands attention for the relations with the 
world, which is not part of the church. 
Communio shows which themes demand attention in ecclesiology without pre­
determining them as to content. An approach to the church as a part of salvation history 
is possible because we deal with a community of people. But the constitutive relation 
with God demands attention too. Organization and structure must be discussed, but 
"communio of the faithful" does not give a stringent form, nor a decentralized/de­
mocratic form, nor a strict hierarchical ordering. 
It appears indeed that the term communio can convey some of the strong points of 
Lumen gentium : 
151
 That appears, e.g., in Christifideles laici (1988), nr 19. 
, я
 Congar 1982,16-18. Kasper (cf nt 149) refers to his Chrétiens désunis from 1937, but Congar 
1954,461-466 is still interesting too. 
1,3
 Communionis not io, 1 (cf DC, nt 25) also says that the concept "communio" is important in 
Vatican Π and that it can have a key role in the attempt at a renewed ecclesiology. 
114
 The following exposition is based on Rikhof 1981,225-236 and Rikhof 1983,51-58. 
l55CfVII,nt49. 
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- the sacramental character of the church can be discussed in clarification both of the 
goal of the communio as of its nature as a not simply human community156; 
- the equality of the faithful and the aspect of salvation history as central elements of 
the concept of the People of God; 
- the proper position of the subjects of authority, those in office, and the juridical 
structure as elements of LG Ш. 
Perhaps it is possible that in the church as communio the abyss between the laity and 
the bishops, which is evident in LG Ш, can be filled in a similar way as happened in 
that chapter with the relation between papacy and episcopate: placing both at equal 
height and asking for a good ordering of the responsibilities and competencies. 
In the literature there are several meanings to communio, always from different points 
of view157. For our research what Kasper says is important : that the terminus technicus 
of "communio" is in the communio of the particular churches which are founded on the 
Eucharist. Vatican Π wants to express in "communio" the actual multiformity as well as 
the unbreakable and obligatory unity of the local churches "in which and from which" 
the catholic church exists. This "communio" expresses itself in the communio of the 
diocesan bishop with the papacy and the rest of the College of bishops151. 
As terminus technicus for the church, "communio" is defined in LG 23,1 where it is 
stated that the one catholic church as a whole exists "in and from" the particular 
churches, the dioceses. This "in quibus et ex quibus" is the hermeneutical model of the 
church as far as it is an institution'59. Seen in this way, communio brings a tensile 
relation: the universal as well as the particular aspect must be safeguarded. 
'"Tillard 1987, 202 (cf 215): life in communio of the local community, in interdependence with 
each other and the world, in prayer and liturgy is sacramental: "elle manifeste et actualise l'objet de 
la foi". 
157
 Riedel-Spangenberger 1988,230-232 gives this overview: 
1. communio sanctorum: participation of the faithful in the salvation given by God, especailly in the 
communio eucharistica, which we can find also in the biblical koinonia concept (see for an 
overview of the biblical "koinonia" (=commun/o)-concept: Tillard 1987). 
2. communio fidelium: the believer is an active member of the People of God and the faithful are 
related to one another this is juridically expressed. 
3. communio ecclesiarum: the communio of the local churches, built on the Eucharist and governed 
by the bishops; in this the one church experiences unity and diversity. 
4. communio collegialir. based on the communio ecclesiarum there is also a communio hierarchica 
or a communio apostolica, the bond between all the bishops and the papacy; or, more generally, the 
relationships between those members of the church who have been given a special task. 
5. communio Christiana: there is also a communio-non-plena with other christian churches/com­
munities. 
Riedel-Spangenberger (p 228) also calls communio the "Schlüsselbegriff und das Leitmotiv" for the 
vision on the church of Vatican Π. 
, и
 Kasper 1986/2,73-75. 
, w Cfnt l32. 
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If an ecclesiology wants to take its point of departure in the "in quibus et ex quibus", it 
must take its point of departure in the own responsibility of the particular churches, 
which essentially cannot take shape unless they accept that they are co-responsible for 
and carried by the other particular churches and the whole church. It is precisely 
because of that 'being carried by" that each particular church must draw the conclusi­
ons for its own awareness of limitation. The same point of departure is valid for the 
relation between papacy and bishops. If described in this way "communio" begins to 
sound like the principle of solidarity160! 
3 Communio and the Principle of Subsidiarity 
Everything points to the fact that the communio ecclesiology is considered to be able to 
give form and substance to the renewing insights of Vatican Π in an integrated way. 
The question is then whether and how the principle of subsidiarity will get, or must get 
a place in that ecclesiology. 
The problem which faces ecclesiology and especially the science of canon law is this: 
how can the church as societas be the external and juridical manifestation of the inner 
("spiritualis") communio! Or: will the unity of the whole People of God always be 
expressed in words only, on the level of the inner life, or will it be transformed into an 
administrative structure? That would then be the juridical form of the active participa­
tion of all the faithful as indicated in LG 32161, so that this term will not remain stuck in 
the spiritualism which Kaufmann blames Vatican Π for'62. And how is the relationship 
of the proper tasks of the papacy and of the (individual) bishops seen concretely? In 
summary: what can the communio ecclesiology offer in terms of structural-juridical 
elements? 
If a communio ecclesiology cannot offer such a structure, there is no reason to speak 
about the principle of subsidiarity. And if it does offer such a possibility the question 
will be whether the mutuality, the tensile relationship will be maintained, and whether 
in this way centralism can be countered. Then it will become clear whether the 
adversaries of the validity of the principle of subsidiarity for the church itself are right, 
for a central argument against it came from the comer of the communio ecclesiology163. 
I<0
 V, 1.2: The principle of solidarity is there described as: "the solidary alliance of each association 
with its members and of the members with their association" and mention is made there of "mutuali­
ty" and "communal responsibility". 
161
 Acerbi 1975, 553: "in altri... ecclesiale". Before, Acerbi o.e., 521-522, already noted that the 
concept of societas perfecta is here left behind. In that concept only those in the hierarchical 
functions have juridical power and the communio fidelium lies in the spiritual, not in the juridical 
sphere. Now the gifts which serve to build the church and which each person receives from the 
Lord, must be juridically expressed. 
142Cfnt29. 
'
a CfVL3. 
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IX The Meaning of the Principle of Subsidiarity for the 
Church 
1 Current Interpretation of the Principle of Subsidiarity1 
Vatican Π uses for the socio-ethical reflection the biblical-theological basis2 that all 
people are created in the image of God, that they are all called to one goal, God 
himself, and that they are called to unity "in truth and love". Love of God and love of 
neighbor cannot be separated (GS 24). Vatican Π then indicates how essentially the 
personal and the communal are interwoven in society: "the human person, by its very 
nature, absolutely needs a social life" (GS 25). For this vision it looks also for a basis 
in Scripture (GS 12 and 32). 
In this way it gives the two basic principles for a christian/catholic social ethic: 
the principle of the person who, as God's image, has a value which makes it 
impossible to ever use him as a means in relation to other goals: he is a goal in 
himself; 
the principle of the common interest of persons, who give form and substance to 
their life together and who together satisfy their needs. This interest is the goal of 
any community formation and it has two distinct aspects. There is the bonum 
commune described as "the totality of the social conditions by virtue of which 
groups as well as individuals can achieve their fulfillment more fully and more 
quickly". These are conditions which create the possibilities which people need so 
that they can realize themselves individually and together. The state or, more 
generally, the political order is ultimately responsible for these. 
But there are also values of which the realization is seen as a matter of common 
interest such as freedom, peace, justice, ecological preservation, duty, tolerance, 
and culture3. 
1
 See also V, 4 and 5. 
2
 This proper socio-ethical foundation no longer appeals to natural law, but seeks to elaborate the 
evangelical basis in a philosophical discourse which is understandable also for a non-believer cf 
Demmer 1987,1309; Furger 1991/1,126-127 and 154-156. Hoffe 1984/1,55-56 shows that this 
biblical foundation became more important with GS than in earlier texts like RN or QA: he speaks 
of a "changement radical". 
3
 GS, 26 and 74; DH 6; Kerber 1987, 857-858. Cf Kuylaars 1957,119-129; Bertrams 1957/2, 
7·*; Rosa 1962,599-602; bensee 1968,30-32; Hüber 1968, 849-859; Nell-Breuning 1990,30-33. 
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Both basic principles must always be seen in connection one with the other because 
one should not be given a higher priority than the other they belong together. In this 
vision, community is not there to serve one or more individuals, but neither is the 
individual subjected to collective interests: neither individualism nor collectivism are 
organizational models for society which can be justified by a christian ethic4. 
More concretely, the principle of solidarity and the principle of subsidiarity determine 
more precisely these basic principles with a view to the structuring of society. As 
formal or heuristic principles they are dynamic criteria which (together) indicate the 
minimal norms for a concrete socio-normative measure in order to prevent individua-
lism or collectivism5. In this sense both are also legal principles. They deal with 
relations between people in so far as they, as members of a community, will not always 
have the same interests, and especially if the individual person in his relationship to 
society (or vice versa) is in question6. 
Solidarity means that "man is a social being, that he must be open to his fellow-men 
and that he is dependent on them, that he can only develop, reach his goal, and make 
culture and history, if he cooperates with them"7. Solidarity means "to mutually carry 
each other'". 
The principie of solidarity draws from this the consequence that man is dependent on 
the community and the fate of the community cannot be seen separate from the fate of 
the individual person ("Gemeinverstrickung"); therefore, man and community carry a 
mutual responsibility ("Gemeinhaftung"). This must find organizational and structural 
expression in society'. 
The principle of subsidiarity, as a heuristic principle, is not without content. Even if it 
does not give concrete indications how society is to be structured, it does give a norm 
by which structures and policy decisions can be measured. This norm says that, if an 
individual or a small community can provide for his or its own needs or for the 
possibilities for development, the larger community must keep its distance; and if it is 
not (or no longer) possible to provide for them, the larger community must help by 
4Furger 1991/1,134-137. 
'O.e., 137-140; Curran 1992,100. 
* Nell-Breuning 1990,49 and 116. 
'Rauscher 1988,1192. 
'Sobrino 1991.130-132. 
'Pfiirtner 1980,140; Hamm 1985,163; Nell-Breuning 1990,16-17 and 20-21. 
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providing the necessary conditions10. The principle has thus a positive and a negative 
meaning: reservation where possible, support where needed". 
The principle of subsidiarity deals with the (legal) question of who is competent, who 
is responsible. The principle of subsidiarity states "that decentralized, personal 
solutions are preferable from a socio-ethical point of view rather than centralizing, and 
thus almost necessarily more anonymous, ways of acting and solutions"12. It accentua-
tes that the human person "principium, subiectum et finis omnium institutorum 
socialium est and esse debet" (GS 25). But one must not understand this in the way of 
a bourgeois individualism; the person realizes himself in solidarity'3, which is also 
based on the awareness in everyone that one is not self sufficient if one wants to 
develop oneself. 
The principle of solidarity and the principle of subsidiarity belong together. The first 
states that solidarity is not only an ethical attitude, but that it expresses an essential 
relationship: people are essentially (ontologically) united with each other in their social 
relationships and they are mutually obligated. These obligations demand an organizati-
on in society in the sense of the principle of subsidiarity .that it is possible to fulfill the 
obligation while (in freedom) developing oneself14. That is why one can call the 
principle of subsidiarity the principle of competency with regard to the principle of 
solidarity. It demands an adequate distribution of competencies in larger or smaller 
associations or in individuals. If necessary the decision about this distribution belongs 
decisively to the competency-over-competencies: and that is to be found in the person 
or organ who (which) authoritatively decides about the distribution of competencies15. 
The principle of subsidiarity is often seen as the conceptual framework to protect the 
individual person with his rights and freedom, and the society against the modem state. 
It is not for nothing that the vision of society which we have presented, opts for the 
bonum commune in the afore-mentioned sense. The responsibility for the development 
of society and of the people therein does not reside only in the political order, and there 
especially in the state, but it lies above all in the different associations in society and in 
the individual person himself. 
10
 Schneider 1985,18-37; NeU-Breuning 1990, 81-87; Kaufmann 1988,280; Kaufmann 1989, 
150; Rauscher 1989, 386-387; Furger 1991/1, 138. If someone takes offence that only German 
authors are mentioned here one should know that the principle of solidarity is not discussed for 
example in the French Initiation à la pratique de la théologie and the principle of subsidiarity is 
only mentioned briefly in the section "L'économie": Initiation 1983, Tome IV, 549. 
" Not without reason Johnson 1991, 490 remarks that the principle of subsidiarity would not be 
considered as one of the "idées claires et distinctes" by Descartes. 
12
 Kaufmann 1988, 288; Kaufmann 1989,151. With this description he wants to formulate the 
principle of subsidiarity adequately for modem complex social structures; cf V, nt 88. 
"Kroh 1982, 207-210. 
14
 Weber 1977,339. 
15
 NeU-Breuning 1986,155-156; NeU-Breuning 1990,111-113. 
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That is why the idea of the bonum commune has been influenced by the principle of 
subsidiarity16. The principle is the expression of the idea that the person has inalienable 
rights, which are not a gift from the state, but which must be recognized by the state. 
These basic rights are formulated by the United Nations in The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights". This idea leads in the way of thinking in the church to the concept 
of the state as a constitutional state, clearly distinguished from the ideas which we find 
in the encyclicals of Leo ΧΠΙ on the state. This way of thinking finds its origin in Leo 
himself in Rerum novarum, finds form and substance in principle in Quadragesimo 
anno, and unfolds in Pius ΧΠ and John ΧΧΙΠ, and is then taken up in Vatican Π. This 
appears quite typically in Dignitatis humanae, where the religious-moral order is 
separated from the juridical order. The perspective is no longer that of the rights of 
truth, but that of the rights of the person". 
This seems to be the lesson which the principle of subsidiarity tries to teach: to govern 
or to exercise power in society means to create the framework, the preconditions so 
that individuals and groups can develop themselves. This demands an ongoing 
(political) process of weighing, a process which is also attentive to judging whether in 
concrete situations organs or groups in society allow their own partial interest to 
dominate, thereby damaging the preconditions for individuals, for other groups, or for 
the whole of society; and there they will find the political order ranged against them. 
As an aside we can point to the attention to the principle of subsidiarity in the public 
debate in Western Europe today. The Dutch politician Lubbers formulated very 
succinctly what he understands by the principle of subsidiarity as "Brussels only when 
it is necessary". He means that authority should be given to the European Union only in 
those areas where common decisions must be made because, in those areas, the 
European Union can act more effectively than individual states. 
One may well question whether one speaks in this way of (the application of) the 
principle of subsidiarity. The European Union does not possess the competency-over-
competencies and it has hardly any proper authority because the member-states retain 
for now their own sovereignty; therefore, the European Union cannot on its own power 
and authority contribute to the bonum commune because that would diminish the 
sovereignty of the member-states. And also, the arguments here seem to be mainly 
about effectiveness and efficiency, and such arguments are not decisive in the concept 
of the principle of subsidiarity as we presented it. The original rights of the person or 
group are central. 
One could say that it would be more consistent if the European Union would be given 
its own authority for those areas of policy where it is deemed necessary and would not 
operate with a delegated authority. In this way the principle of subsidiarity in its 
"Pavan 1967/2, 240-246. 
17
 This Declaration of 1948 can be found, e.g., in Concilium 26 (1990) 2, 14-19. 
" Murray 1967,164-210; Minnerath 1982,138-159. 
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positive sense becomes an argument to give the European Union its own sovereignty19! 
That position fits in a development of thought which, from the side of the church, has 
already been proposed several times (albeit carefully)20. 
2 The Applicability of the Principle of Subsidiarity to the Church 
Itself 
In chapter VI we showed that the obligatory character of the principle of subsidiarity 
for the church is not a problem so long as one sees the church (also) as a societas. 
Resistance against this came from authors who see the church as communio in the 
sense that the church is a community sui generis: that it cannot be seen as societas, as 
association, as a concretely visible, institutionalized, and organized community with a 
legal order, to a very large extent subject to the same laws as any other human associa­
tion. That is why the question can be asked whether the principle of subsidiarity can be 
applied in the context of a communio ecclesiology: can it have a function there, does it 
clarify? The question is especially important because the communio ecclesiology has 
become so important today21. That is not to deny Corecco's thesis that "communio" has 
become, after Vatican Π, a concept with many meanings "which is sometimes used like 
a wand which helps one to find an answer to all problems"22. 
We will study "communio" in two ways: in its fundamental-theological sense and in the 
structural sense. 
2.1 Communio ecclesiology in general 
The Synod of Bishops of 1985 says: "communio indicates basically the communion 
with God, through Jesus Christ, in the Holy Spirit"23. Kasper says: "Through the Spirit 
the church is unity of communio with God, and of the members among themselves". 
Tillard sees the church as "the communio of the disciples of Jesus Christ, as they are, 
through the Spirit, part of the total relation between the Father and the Son". Thus, 
communio is a very broad concept for the church: it says something about the essence 
of the church; per se it does not say anything about its structures24. 
What does this basic concept say about the relationships between the faithful among 
themselves and between them and the community? It is a question which is seldom 
" Eijsbouts 1991 gives an overview of the discussion in which the Frenchmen J.Delors and 
V.Giscard dEstaing play an important role. Eijsbouts shows right away that he does not like a supra­
national sovereignty of the EU and does not recognize the principle of subsidiarity in its positive 
meaning. Bekkers 1991 is more nuanced in this. 
3 0
 Pacem in terris (1963), part Г ; GS 83-86; SRS 43, in fine; cf Nell-Breuning 1990,142-145. 
2lCfVTH,2.4. 
22
 Corecco 1981,440; Corea» 1989,199. Saier's research 1973 and Soujeole's 1991 do not solve 
the terminological lack of clarity: cf Ш, nt 63. 
ю
 Synode 1985,559 (nr Π С 1). 
M
 Kasper 1986/2,66-67; Tillard 1987, 74; cf LG 4 and Ш, 2.4 (nt 157!). 
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asked; significant is that the document from the Congregado pro Doctrina Fidei 
Communionis notio hardly speaks about it25. 
Kehl attempts to give content to this aspect of the communio ecclesiology2*. He bases 
himself on significant elements of the trinitarian communio, the relations between 
Father, Son, and Spirit In that communio there is unity as well as multiplicity, there is 
community as well as person, there is intense communication as well as personal 
individuality. And all these elements are original and cannot be reduced one to the 
other even though one determines the other27. What do these characteristic elements of 
the trinitarian communio say about the church as communio! Kehl sees that expressed 
in what is for him the social-philosophical analogy of the theological concept for the 
church as communio: the church as "communicative unity of the faithful". 
The church is the community which is constituted as such by communicative acting of 
the faithful and at the same time the church is the structural framework which makes 
such communicative acting possible. The goal of this communicative acting is to reach 
consensus, based on free dialog, on truth in faith and in its application to morality. The 
theory of "communicative acting" shows that in a true community the parts are not 
component parts, but are independent realities: the subject of faith is the individual 
person who has a personal relation to God. 
In this vision the church as community is the framework within which faith is given 
form and substance. Against the background of the theory of communicative acting the 
church as "social space" is the presupposed precondition (preceding the faithful) and it 
is tied in its realization to those same faithful. One receives the faith from the church 
into which one is incorporated by baptism, and in this way the church is the given 
precondition for personal faith; in the church the sacraments have a mediating role in 
the relation to God. But the church does not exist apart from people: faith lives in 
persons and is handed on through them. The unity as communio is based on free 
consent in dialog and on the fundamental equality of all2". Some central texts from 
Vatican Π support this vision29. 
However at least in Western Europe the church does not appear in society as "commu­
nio"', rather it appears as institution. And as such it is given a certain aspect of being 
human: the church is seen as a service institution for religious matters. People do not 
M
 The text of Communionis notio (CN) can be found in Herder-Korrespondenz 46 (1992) 
319-323; also in the (Italian) Osservatore Romano d.d. June 15-16th, 1992, 7-8, and in LU 
Documentation catholique 89 (1992) 729-734. Garyo-Guembe 1992, Rikhof 1992, Pottmeyer 
1992, Eyt 1993 and Soujeole 1993 give commentaries; only the last one agrees uncritically with 
CN. Pottmeyer (S89, nt 6) and Eyt (322), point out the demonstrably important personal input of 
Cardinal Ratzinger in this text. 
24
 See for an overview of Kehls' ecclesiological thought: Meyer 1992,34S-3S8. 
17
 Kehl 1992,63-75. See for a similar reasoning by Congan nr 2.2 below. 
a
 Kehl 1992,139-140 and 153-159. 
я
 LG 31-33 and AA 2-3: equality within the People of God and participation in its mission of the 
faithful in church and world; LG 37: advice from the faithful to the hierarchy; DV 8: deepening of 
the insight of the Tradition by the faithful; cf Garyo-Guembe 1992,324-325. 
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experience the church as communio, but rather as a large anonymous institution; not as 
a communal association within which one develops oneself and where dialog and 
equality make life possible. On the one hand this lead to "churchyfying Christianity" 
("Verkirchlichung des Christentums") as Kaufmann expresses it: only the official and 
ministerial church is competent to give form and substance to the religious element. On 
the other hand this brings about a partial identification with the church: one is formally 
a member but factually there is a clear distance. The church cannot avoid the general 
truth that in our Western society there are large institutions of which people believe 
that they are necessary but with which they do not feel much involvement30. 
Kehl underlines the importance of the institutionalization of the church: it brings 
stability, unity, ability to act, and the possibility for the community of the faithful to 
adapt to ever changing internal and external situations and expectations. The church is 
most clearly institutionalized where its typical elements are formalized: in teaching and 
doctrine, in its liturgical-sacramental life, in its ministerial structure. That is where the 
church appears objectively, that is where it shows its obligatory character and takes on 
a representative form over against the individual believer and other social institutions. 
The church acts as a visibly encompassing unity which is more than the sum total of the 
members. Then we can say the church preaches, the church celebrates, the church 
teaches. 
The institutionalization of these central elements is legitimate. Theologically these 
central elements are relatively independent from the faithful. They show God's 
initiative which, as such, precedes the faithful and makes their personal adherence in 
faith possible. The central institutional elements create a bond with the tradition and 
with the universal church. This bond keeps personal faith and the faith of the immedia­
te community open for other elements and it prevents subjective limitation and the 
curtailment of being christian to the private sphere. But these institutional elements 
also carry with them the danger that they take away from personal faith each person's 
responsibility in the free decision to believe and to internalize faith, so that the 
individual does not experience himself anymore as a subject of faith. In an institutiona­
lized communio the individual should still experience that he is a subject of faith and 
not an object of institutional care for salvation; otherwise, the relations would again be 
as they were before Vatican Π". Thus the Synod of 1985 stated: "because the church is 
communio, there must be participation and co-responsibility on all levels"32. 
That is the crux of Kehl's definition of the problem. The institutionalization of the 
church is good for many reasons, but there are dangers inherent in it. Institutionalizati­
on can create the situation that individual persons hardly see themselves as individual 
30
 Kehl 1992,181-186; cf Kaufmann 1979,102-103,128 and 143-146. See also Henau 1984. 
31
 Kehl 1992, 390-402; Kehl believes that participative co-responsibility of the faithful is very 
important for these central institutional elements. Synodal structures offer a possibility for that: cf 
Ш,1.4. 
32
 Synode 1985,561-562 (Π С 6). 
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subjects af faith, but they seem to have become objects of institutional care for 
salvation. Another danger is that the laity becomes alienated from the church33. 
Kehl does not speak about the principle of subsidiarity in his ecclesiology. One can 
deduce from his way of thinking that the principle of subsidiarity is an important 
element for a communio ecclesiology if it intends a real communio fidelium34. "Com-
munio fidelium" means that being People of God precedes all differences in ministry, 
charismata and services and is based on Vatican Us idea about the universal priest-
hood of all the faithful (LG 10), about the "actuosa participatie" (for example SC 14) 
in liturgy and in other areas such as the "sensus fidei fidelium" (LG 13 and 35; GS 43; 
AA 2-3). In this sense communio ecclesiology means that there are no active and 
passive members in the church, and it points to the fact that the church and all in it are 
subjects35. As People of God the church is a community of people called by God, not an 
institution for people. In this light it can be said that it is a lacuna that Communionis 
notio does not explicitly attribute the three-fold function ("munus") of Christ (priest, 
prophet, and king) to all members of the People of God, but (implicitly) only to the 
hierarchy36. 
A further elaborated communio ecclesiology, which takes communio seriously in all its 
theological range with the model of the trinitarian communio, will understand commu-
nio as being community in constant specificity. In the unity of the common faith the 
differentiated multiplicity of personal ways to believe is made possible and is guaran-
teed, says Kehl". All members of the communio are responsible for one another and 
are carried by one another38. According to the theory of communicative acting the 
faithful carry the church and are carried by it. Also in communio there is 
Gemeinverstrickung and Gemeinhaftung which demand structural form. And so one 
can see communio as a specific proper form of the principle of solidarity, as G. Philips 
already stated39. 
33
 Legrand 1983, 190 says that "une disqualification religieuse des laïcs, déjà fausse doctrina-
lement, serait de plus particulièrement dangereuse pastoralement, car elle est, à moyen terme, 
productrice de sécularisation". 
34
 Methodologically he is very careful: he speaks about "analogy" between institutionalization in 
general and that in the church: Kehl 1992,391 ; cf 153 and 159. His position is thus comparable to 
that of Schasching who says that the principle of subsidiarity offers a clarification for the self-
understanding and the functioning of the church: VI, 2.1. 
35
 Kasper 1986/2, 79-80 referring to Legrand's and Pottmeyer's contributions in Alberigo 1982/1; 
cf Waif 1982,204, Waif 1988,21 and Müller 1990,123. Corecco 1985 also has this as the general 
line of thought and he underlines especially that the common priesthood of the faithful is not 
concretized in the Code of 1983 with regard to the munus regendi. 
36
 Rikhof 1992,30 points out that CN nr 4 for this threefold munus does not refer to LG 10-12 and 
31 or AA 2 and с 204,1 Code of 1983, but only to LG Ш! Cf Pottmeyer 1992,581. 
"Kehl 1992,75 and 370. 
"Kehl 1992,409. 
" See VI, 1.4, nt 40. CN nr 6 only states that "communio realizes a spiritual solidarity". 
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Communio needs institutionalization, but there is an inherent danger to maintain the 
proper nature of this communio, i.e. to be a community of believers "where personal 
and communal faith are both original and basic"40, it is needed that the (personal) 
"concrete freedom" be given form and substance in the (institutionalized) structure41. 
It is important to accept that the principle of subsidiarity is applicable on this abstract 
level in order to protect the personal element. This may never become subordinated to 
the institutional because that would lose an essential dimension and it is a dead-end 
street: a church which is only institution will not remain in existence42. 
This throws new light on the position of each individual believer because he must be 
respected as such and must be given the support of the community and of the other 
faithful. This shows that the communio ecclesiology demands the principle of subsidia­
rity as a heuristic principle. 
This does not yet answer the basic question whether the principle of subsidiarity is 
obligatory to the church itself; but it is clear that attention is needed for the position of 
the individual believer in a communio ecclesiology This is to be understood as an 
organologica! concept in the Kantian sense, where the individual element has its own 
proper place and where there are mutually constitutive relationships43. 
12 The structural element of the communio ecclesiology 
VATICAN Π 
The communio ecclesiology gives a clear indication for structures, seil, in the technical 
term "in quibus et ex quibus" in Lumen gentium 23. This formulation has already been 
said to be of constitutional importance44. By indicating the relation in this way, Vatican 
Π gave the particular churches their own status within the universal church. That status 
is underlined in saying that the relation of the particular church to its own proper social 
cultural setting is an integral part of its catholicity, and in strengthening the particular 
churches institutionally45. Vatican Π emphasized this independence of the particular 
churches, i.e. the dioceses46 in 
44
 Kehl 1992,409. 
41
 See about Hegel's concept of "concrete freedom": Kehl 1976,6-19, where Kehl refers especially 
to Hegers Rechtsphilosophie, par 260 (cf Π, nt 22), and Kehl 1992,183-185. "Concrete freedom" 
means that human freedom cannot realize itself, as finite, situated freedom, in absolute spontaneity 
or without any restraint; it needs a legal order, which free people create and need; there is a dialectic 
between freedom and institution. Cf Luf 1983,29-32. 
41
 Waif 1992,204. 
4JCfI,nr5-6. 
44
 Щ 2.3 (nt 132) and 2.4 (nt 158); cf Legrand 1991,556. 
45
 Legrand 1983,151-155. 
46
 In what is said below, particular church is equated with "diocese": cc. 368, 369 and 372,2 invite 
doing that. Before the Code of 1983 there was a lack of terminological clarity: Mörsdorf 1972, 
285-287 and Puza 1990/2,24-25. 
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Lumen gentium 23 in the text which we already mentioned: "... the local churches; 
these are formed in the image of the universal church and in and from them the one 
and only catholic church exists". 
Lumen gentium 26: "This church of Christ is truly present in all legitimate local 
communities of the faithful, who, united with their shepherds, are themself called 
churches in the New Testament". This text gives the reason why the particular 
church is church in the full sense of the word: it is People of God, the Word is 
being preached, the Eucharist celebrated, Christ is present through his Spirit, and 
it possesses the necessary ministerial service. The universal church does not 
possess essentially more or other realities than the particular church47. 
Christus Dominus 11: "A diocese is a part of the People of God, which is entru­
sted to the pastoral care of a bishop and his presbyterium. Adhering thus to its 
pastor and gathered together by him in the Holy Spirit through the Gospel and the 
Eucharist, it constitutes the particular church in which the one, holy, catholic, and 
apostolic Church of Christ is truly present and operative". 
Against the background of these texts one can say with Congar that "the local churches 
are complete churches" but they exist as such only in recognition of and in communion 
with the other particular churches4*. That is why these texts speak again about "the 
churches": that they speak not only about the one (universal) church, but about 
"churches" is so to speak a Copemican revolution in Lumen gentium compared to the 
societas perfecta concept49. 
The diocese is part of the universal church but it is not simply a branch of it. The 
universal church is given concrete local form in the particular church: "the local 
Church is wholly Church, but it is not the whole Church"50. That is expressed in the "in 
quibus et ex quibus". Both parts must be seen in their connection. Universal church 
and particular church are so interwoven that the universal church cannot exist without 
its local concretization in particular churches; and in such a way that the particular 
church necessarily participates in the essence of the universal church. The formula is 
basic for the determination of the relationship between the universal and the particular 
church(es). Neither one nor the other can take a place of priority51. 
47Hiinermann 1990,137-138. 
4 1
 Congar 1980, 300-301; Congar 1982,171. 
49Congar 1980,299; Legrand 1983,150; Kehl 1992,368-369. Cf ІП, nt 17 (Chenu). CN nt 44 
says that "in quibus et ex quibus" was already announced in Mystici corporis, but the great 
difference then also appears between this encyclical, ρ 211 and LG 23: MC speaks about "com-
munitates" not about churches, "ex quibus una constat ac componitur Cattolica Ecclesia". See for 
the history of the text VE, nt 77 and Schauf 1971, who points to the important input by Congar and 
Tromp. The quotation from Cyprian (nt 68 with LG 23) is also given a different interpretation: 
Hiinermann 1990,137. 
" Granfield 1987,113, who quotes J J. von Allmen (from: "UEglise locale parmi les autres Eglises 
locales", in: Irènikon 43 (1970) 521). 
51
 Mörsdorf 1972,287-289; Legrand 1991,557. 
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COMMUNIONS ΝΟΤΙΟ AND REACTION TO IT 
It is precisely this question which the document Communions natio of the Congregati-
o pro Doctrina Fidei52 recently discussed. It states that the universal church can indeed 
be called "communio Ecclesiarum", but that the clanger then is that it weakens the 
vision of the unity of the church in its visible and institutional form. There are those, it 
claims, who see the particular church as a complete church and who, therefore, see the 
universal church as the result of mutual recognition by the particular churches. The 
document states in opposition to this that the particular churches are parts of "the one 
church of Christ", which are in a special relation of "mutual interiority" with the 
universal church, because in every particular church "the one, holy, catholic, and 
apostolic church of Christ is truly present and functions". That is why, according to the 
document, the universal church cannot be seen as the sum total of the particular 
churches or as their combination. It is not the result of their communio, but it ontologi-
cally and historically precedes every particular church. The arguments for this are: 
for the Fathers53 the church as mystery ontologically precedes creation; 
all particular churches are bom from the universal church of the first Pentecost. 
Particular churches originate in and from the universal church and derive their being 
church from it. It is then stated that "in quibus et ex quibus" in Lumen gentium does 
not give the whole truth, but that it needs to be completed with "Ecclesiae in et ex 
Ecclesia". This completion helps to understand better the concept of "mutual interiori­
ty" (CN 8-9). 
This "mutual interiority" is indicated as the ^ermeneutica] key concept" of Communio-
nis notio34. 
A first remark to be made here is that there are some real hermeneutical questions if 
Communionis notio states that a text from Vatican Π, which is so fundamental and 
which is taken over as such in the Code of 1983 (c. 368), needs completion, and this 
completion is based only on two recent quotes from John Paul Π. 
A second remark is about the question, which is important for this research, of what the 
administrative-structural meaning is of this "mutual interiority". For Communionis 
notio the basis of unity or the communio of the particular churches lies in the same 
5 2
 Cf ηt 25. An unsigned Commentary on CN was published in the Osservatore Romano d.d. 
26-3-1993 and appeared in translation in Herder-Korrespondenz 47 (1993) 406-411. The editors 
oí Herder-Korrespondenz introduce it saying: "Offenbar sah man sich in der Kurie angesichts einer 
Welle von kritischen Stimmen genötigt, im Jahresabstand nochmals verdeutlichend auf das 
Schreiben einzugehen". 
53
 Only two texts are quoted in nt 42 of CN! 
34
 Commentary 1993,407-408: "la Lettera Communionis notio formula quella che può essere vista 
come la sua chiave ermeneutica: la mutua interiorità fra Chiesa universale e Chiese particolari" 
(italics in originai; AL.)· Garyo-Guembe 1992,352 nt 15, points out that the International Theolo-
gical Commission spoke earlier already of "ein wechselseitiges Innesein, eine Art Osmose" 
("quaedam mutua interioritas, quaedam mutua interpenetratio"): Theologenkommission 1987,47. 
This idea is, therefore, not new to Eyt, because he was the final editor of the text of this commission 
as is mentioned on ρ 12; he underlines the idea of the presence of the universal church in the 
particular: Eyt 1993,330. 
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faith, the common baptism and especially in the Eucharist and the episcopacy (CN 11). 
The unity of the episcopate which is needed for that15 is based on the "head" of the 
"corpus" or the College of bishops (CN 12). It becomes clear then why Communionis 
notio thinks that "mutual interiority" is so important: "the primacy of the bishop of 
Rome and the College of bishops are essential elements of the universal church, which 
cannot be derived from the particularity of the churches". Without "mutual interiority" 
the primacy would be a general service, which would remain an external function for 
the particular church. Precisely because the particular church in this vision is church in 
the full sense of the word only through the concrete presence of the universal church in 
it with all its essential elements, it is necessary that in the particular church the highest 
authority of the church must be present as a proper and inner element56. In this way the 
primacy belongs to the essence of every particular church and it has "real episcopal 
power -not only the highest, full and universal, but immediate power- over everyone, 
over the shepherds as well as over the other faithful", as Communionis notio quotes 
Vatican I (Pastor aeternus, cap. Ш) and Lumen gentium 22. It adds that the office of 
the successor of Peter belongs intrinsically to being church of every particular church 
as a necessary expression of the relation of "mutual interiority" (CN 12-13). 
The combination of the earlier stated historical and ontological priority with this 
addition of "mutual interiority" leads us to the idea that "mutual interiority" is used to 
emphasize the authority of the primacy in relation to the particular church; that is what 
Communionis notio de facto is about. One can hardly see anything in this except a 
denigration of the proper position of the bishop and his particular church57. There is no 
mention of hierarchica communio as a tensile relationship between both poles, the 
episcopacy and the papacy51; this tension is denied here in favor of one pole. It is clear 
that the text does not do justice to the position of the bishops as successors of the 
Apostles and as shepherds of their own particular churches, to their role in the relation 
55This unity of the episcopacy is spoken of in CN 14 as "cum Petro et sub Petro". The latter part 
does not appear in the central texts of Vatican Π on the college, LG 22 and 23. As we said above 
( Ш, 2.1, nt 62) Vatican Π uses this expression only in AG 38. It is precisely from this expression 
that Beyer 1990,22, draws the conclusion: "Se è principio di unità, il Capo e Pastore di una diocesi 
о communita ecclesiale, non può esserlo che con Petro e in dipendenza da lui" (italics mine; AL). 
One could remarie that he forgets the distinction between the theological value of this passage in AG, 
which must be weighed against what is said in LG, and the administrative vision of 1965 which 
appears here: some coordination of the missionary activities of dioceses and religious institutes 
seemed important 
56
 Beyer 1988, 447 already said: "Cette présence essentielle du tout dans les parties situe le 
ministère de Pietre en chaque Eglise particulière, diocésaine ou assimilée. Elle n'est pas, à vrai dire, 
une aide subsidiaire; elle est un élément essentiel, premier, selon sa fonction et son autorité". Maybe 
he was also responsible for the writing of CN? 
57
 Pottmeyer 1992,583 points out that CN leans towards a "universalistisch-zentralistische Kirche" 
because "ein ontologischer und zeitlicher Vorrang der Gesamtkirche konstruiert wird". Gary-
o-Guembe 1992, 328 says: "Geht man aber von der Universalkirche als erster ontologischer 
Wirklichkeit aus, dann wird es schwer, eine echte Autonomie der lokalen Kirche anzuerkennen". 
я
а ш,2.з. 
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between the universal and the particular church, and to the position of the particular 
church5'. 
In the meantime the thesis of the ontological and historical priority has been nuanced. 
That the argumentation is very weak has apparently been recognized by circles of the 
Congregatio itself. In a further Commentary the ontological priority is only stated, but 
it no longer plays a role. The historical priority of the church of Jerusalem on that first 
Pentecost appears now to be the basis for what has already been called the "hermeneu-
tical key concept" of Communionis notio. From that church originate the universal and 
the particular church(es), but the most important is that the "mutual interiority" is so 
clear: unity and universality appear there in one local church, universal and particular 
coincide there. And that is considered as a constant norm60. 
"MUTUAL INTERIORITY-: A THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION 
However, there remains a challenge in the texts of the Congregatio, a challenge to 
theology to clarify the formula "in quibus et ex quibus". Therefore it is a pity that the 
idea of "mutual interiority" has been elaborated so one-sidedly. Congar showed already 
in 1980 that this idea in itself offers every occasion to deepen the idea of the communio 
Ecclesiarwn theologically. "Mutual interiority" as translation of "perichoresis" is a 
traditional term in the theology of the Trinity. It expresses not only communio but also 
the unity of the three Persons in their divinity. For Congar it is important that the 
divinity exists only in the Persons, that each possesses it fully, but that they are still 
distinct as three Persons. 
Applied to the relation between the particular churches and the universal church, 
perichoresis determines more precisely the formula that the one church exists only "in 
and from" the particular churches. Together they form the universal church because 
they possess being church individually but not only for themselves; they possess it in 
common. In this way in quibus et ex quibus receives a theological foundation. And 
Congar can then say: "there is no super-church, separate from the local churches" and 
the question about some priority of universal or particular church(es) makes no sense. 
This communio of particular churches, the communio Ecclesiarum is the universal 
church61. The universal church is not an association or confederation of individual 
59
 Eyt 1993,331-334; at the end of the article he lauds CN afterall. 
" The Commentary (cf nt 32) speaks about the importance of the text "Die Kirche: lokal und 
universal" of the joint commission of the Roman Catholic Church and World Council of Churches 
(in: Unam Sanctam 45 (1992) 336-352): it gives a balanced view, rejecting the thesis "first 
particular, then universal" regarding the early history of the church (nr 22). CN objects to that thesis 
in general too. 
" Congar 1980,301-303. On 302 he says: "Perichorese", "circumincessio"... signifie en théologie 
trinitaire la présence des Personnes divines l'une dans l'autre, leur intériorité réciproque"; 303 says: 
"La Tri-unité de Dieu sera la modèle suprême de l'Eglise". Cf Rahner 1962,282; Kasper 1986/2, 
68: "Die Kirche ist gleichsam die Ikone der trinitarischen Gemeinschañ von Vater, Sohn und 
Heiligem Geist". Kehl too pointed to that similarity between Trinity and communio: see above nr 
2.1. This basic idea could have contributed a lot to the theological deepening in nr 3 and 4 of CN. 
One could have taken the last sentence of LG 4 as a point of departure. 
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churches coming together on their own initiative, but neither are the individual 
churches provinces or administrative branches of the universal church62. The universal 
church is in origin unity and multiplicity. The universal church is thus also a "commu-
nicative unity". It is the 'presupposed precondition for the individual churches, but it 
realizes itself in the particular churches and there are mutually constitutive relations. In 
this way in quibus et ex quibus can be clarified63. 
This communio Ecclesiarum is characterized by a tensile relationship because the 
universal as well as the particular aspect must be preserved in the real multiplicity of 
the particular churches and in their unity in the universal church. That means that the 
universal church can only develop fully as the individual parts develop fully according 
to their own nature, and are rooted in their own culture (cf LG 13). Within the totality 
and in solidary alliance with it, there must be room for the proper place of the particu-
lar churches. The one church manifests, concretizes, inculturates, incarnates itself in 
time and space in the particular churches64. As churches in the full sense of the word 
they maintain their own specificity and independence in the mission to realize the 
church locally65. 
In order to determine further the "perichoretic relationship" Kasper calls on the 
principle of subsidiarity as "guide for action and as critical function"66. The communio 
ecclesiology demands (in the "in quibus et ex quibus") application of the principle of 
subsidiarity as expression of the constant tension between the totality and the parts. 
PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY AND THE COMflW/O-STRUCTURE 
The application of the principle of subsidiarity as heuristic principle to the 
administrative-structural aspects of the communio ecclesiology demands attention for 
the proper position of the particular churches. The general theological description as 
"perichoresis" of the relationship between the universal and the particular church(es) 
indicates a tensile relationship. That exists also between papacy and episcopacy, which 
are both principle and foundation, for the universal and for the particular church; as 
two focal points of an ellipse they cannot be reduced one to the other. This unity in 
° Kasper 1986/2,77-78; cf Legrand 1983,167, who points to H.de Lubac's thesis "qu'une Eglise 
universelle antérieure, ou supposée existant en elle-même en dehors d'elles toutes n'est qu'un être 
de raison", in: Lubac 1971,54. 
° Kehl 1992, 369-370; Greshake 1989, 90-91: "Beide Bestimmungen, das "in ihnen" und das 
"aus ihnen" sind wichtig, weil damit die Wechselseitigkeit der Beziehungen, also gerade nicht die 
Priorität eines Gliedes, sondern die reziproke ontologische Priorität beider angegeben ist, von denen 
keines ausfallen darf". 
64
 Müller 1990,121; Waidenfels 1991 refers here to important passages in Evangelii nuntiandi 
(anno 1975; AAS LXVin (1976) 5-76), nr 62 and 63. 
" In this Ughi the Dutch bishops ask "si on ne présente pas l'universalité comme ce qui est 
essentiellement valable, en ne considérant la particularité que comme une déviation, comme une 
concession aux conditions locales, et non comme un enrichissement": Synode 1985,254. 
46
 Kasper 1987,235-236. 
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polar tension is the basis for the unity oí communio and expresses the essential unity of 
the church67. 
To maintain that tensile relationship as such is not an easy thing to do. In general 
reflections as in Communionis notio but also in concrete administrative processes the 
position of the universal church, concretized in the primacy, seems to be inclined to 
take the upper hand68. The principle of subsidiarity underlines in such a tensile 
relationship time and again the position of the smaller units, concretely of the particular 
church and its bishop. If we described communio earlier as 'being community in 
constant specificity", the principle of subsidiarity emphasizes the "constant specificity". 
This "constant specificity" of the particular churches "in which and from which" the 
universal church exists is expressed programatically by Mörsdorf in the words "the 
autonomy of the local church". Autonomy is used in what he calls the legal-technical 
sense: "no dissipation to all sides but a free space which is related to the community, 
more precisely a totality of relationships in which the individual person relates to the 
community or in which a group in the community relates to a higher group or to the 
totality and wherein they have the right to order their own life. Autonomy is, therefore, 
a relative concept which determines the acceptable limits of proper authority in 
organization and so determines the measure of independence within a social whole". In 
this way Mörsdorf describes de facto the principle of subsidiarity69: the freedom to 
develop oneself in the context of the greater whole70. 
It is important for Mörsdorf to get the formula in quitus et ex quibus concretized 
administratively and juridically. That means that one must weigh the competencies of 
the universal and the local churches. Church law must determine these competencies 
precisely but ecclesiology must make the first step in this71. 
"Pottmeyer 1989,81; Kasper 1986/2,78; Müller 1990,121. The text quoted by Müller is literally 
the same as in Kasper, a fact which Müller does not mention (!). Rahner 1962, 291 (Art. Polarität): 
"eine polare Beziehung eint und unterscheidet zugleich". 
a
 Kehl 1992,371 also says: "Dass diese wechselseitige Beziehung nach einer jahrhunderte-lange 
einseitigen Praxis nicht einfach zu verwirklichen ist, braucht niemanden zu verwunderen. Jede Seite 
steht fast unvermeidlich in Gefahr, sich selbst zu wichtig zu nehmen und damit die schwebende, 
nur im ständigen, offenen und angstfreien Dialog einzuhaltende Balance aufzugeben" (italics in 
original; A.L.). See for some important concrete questions Waif 1992, 201-203. 
m
 Mörsdorf 1972,287. He does not mention the principle of subsidiarity in this article and the term 
does not appear in the "Sachwortregister" of Mörsdorf 1989. Cf VI, 2.1 (nt 125). 
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 Krucina 1975, 129-133 sees the meaning of the principle of subsidiarity in this way too. He 
posits that what he calls the "content of the bonum commune" of the church (the central values of 
faith, sacraments and caritas) must be concretized on the spot But because what is in question is 
the bonum commune of the whole church, a communio arises, a unity of faith, sacraments, and 
action. If the local communities (he means the parishes) can manage, the principle of subsidiarity 
demands that they should not be disturbed in their development The local realization of those 
central values demands that sphere of freedom which the principle of subsidiarity means. 
71
 Mörsdorf 1967/1,128 about the relation between LG and ChrD: "dass die theologische Aussage 
über den Bischof die Grundlage für die rechtliche Ordnung bildet". 
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This autonomy of the particular church is, for Mörsdorf, supported by the independent 
position of the local bishop. He is for his particular church "vicarius et legatus Christi" 
and he is not vicarius of the papacy (LG 27). He possesses in his diocese "per se", 
from the nature of his office, all "potestas ordinaria, propria ac immediata" which is 
needed for his function, even if the Pope can withhold certain matters from his 
authority (ChrD 8). The bishop's authority is, therefore, not derived from the authority 
of the Pope, but stands over against papal authority; it is proper authority of divine 
right. That is the most important consequence of the thesis in Vatican Π that the papacy 
is not the source of all potestas iurisdictionis, but that sacramental ordination is 
decisive for episcopal authority72. This statement in Vatican Π that the diocesan bishop 
possesses all power he needs for the exercise of his ministry, is a declaration of 
principle which needs to be concretized in legislation. 
The problem comes because Vatican Π also said that the papacy has immediate 
authority over all and every local church(es) (LG 22 and ChrD 2), without answering 
the question how such immediate authority can be reconciled with the task of the 
bishop in his particular church, which task "is not derstroyed by the supreme and 
universal power; on the contrary it is affirmed, strengthened and vindicated thereby"75. 
In the analysis of the communio hierarchica we already said that there is a subtle 
balance between the papacy and the bishop(s) so that carefulness is needed to preserve 
the various competencies. This tensile relationship is as such "a sign of ecclesial health 
evidencing mutual respect of the Church of Rome and the local Churches in their 
continuing attempt to attune their relationship to the manifold gifts of the Spirit"74. The 
principle of subsidiarity, as heuristic principle, gives precisely in this tensile relation­
ship an indication of how the tension can be maintained: the papacy has the obligation 
to clarify why it retains certain competencies for itself, because the benefit of the doubt 
should go to the particular church and its bishop if there is a question of competency75. 
The primacy of the bishop of Rome is in no way at stake here; what is in discussion is 
the practical realization of the primacy in the framework of "collegiality" and of the 
proper responsibility of the particular church and its bishop; that will become clear76. 
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 Ш, 12 and 23; Möisdorf 1972,290; Huizing 1973,160. Waif 1992, 203 says in this context 
that the episcopal structure, as the proper structure of the church, "besteht im Ordo, also in der 
Weihe, und damit besitzt die Weihegewalt die primäre Position, nicht die Jurisdiktionsgewalt Es 
ist völlig unverständlich, dass das ansonsten so aktive Wächteramt der Glaubenskongregation nicht 
längst auf den Plan gerufen worden ist, die Entwicklung hin zu einer Ueberbetonung der 
Jurisdiktionsgewalt und weg von der Weihegewalt zu stoppen". 
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 LG 27 (cf с 333,1); VJJL 2.3 (nt 123); Mörsdorf 1967/1, 149-150 and 158-160; Mörsdorf 
1972, 289-293; cf Tillard 1987,341. 
14
 Granfield 1987,133. 
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 Cf Kaufmann 1989,151 and Puza 1990/2,33. 
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 It would lead us too far afield, but it seems certainly to be worth while to see how the relation 
primacy-coUegiality could be clarified by distinguishing primacy and "patriarchate of the West", for 
"l'autorité patriarcale est par nature administrative et centralisatrice": Tillard 1987, 339; cf Ш, 
2.2.7, Legrand 1983, 313-315 and Legrand 1991, 567. The Code Canonum Ecclesiarum 
Orientalum will bring more light to this question. 
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If the universal church exists "in" the particular churches, it does not exist apart from 
them, but it has its own identity. As church, the universal church too needs office, the 
fullness of office, the episcopacy. But in the universal church it has a different task than 
in the particular church. Where it is intended for the universal church, it should 
recognize those in office in the particular churches, as churches in the full sense of the 
word, in their own proper task. But it implies also a co-responsibility for those 
particular churches in their specificity and for the proper responsibility of the bishops 
in those particular churches; and it should foster that proper responsibility77. 
This typical responsibility from the universal church can be borne if one distinguishes a 
primary and a secondary competency in line with the principle of subsidiarity: a 
secondary responsibility respects the primary competency of the respective office­
bearer7'. Only when the smaller (with regard to the universal church) community can 
no longer provide for the needs for development, there is a task for the encompassing 
association. The principle of subsidiarity combines in itself the respect for authority in 
the particular church with the will to support it79. Vatican II emphasizes also governing 
as "support" and as "service""0 and this is especially expressed in the title "Servus 
servorum Dei", said of the papacy*1. This service character is realized very well when 
the principle of subsidiarity is applied because, as we said above, it points out that 
governing or the exercise of power means that one creates the preconditions so that 
people or groups can develop themselves. 
The definition of the primacy in jurisdiction did not intend to give the papacy a power 
which would be needed for the daily governance of all particular churches. Vatican I 
had another goal in mind and Vatican Π understands it in that way: the administrative 
task is "to keep the episcopacy one and undivided" as "the permanent and visible 
source and foundation of the unity in faith and communio'*1. The papacy "protects and 
encourages the church-reality of the Churches". Because the unity it has functions on 
77
 LG 13: "Inde etiam in ecclesiastica communione legitime adsunt Ecclesiae particulares 
integro manente primant Petri Cathedrae,..., legitimas varietates tuetur..."; cf Kehl 1992, 337. Beai 
1992, 63-64 says: "This statement, it might be noted, is conspicuously absent from the revised 
Code". 
71
 Pottmeyer 1982,110: "Andererseits kann es nicht darum gehen, die aktive Gesamtverantwortu­
ng des Papstes einzuschränken, wohl aber darum, diese Verantwortung so einzu-setzen, dass sie die 
Entfaltungs- und Gestaltungsfreiheit der übrigen Strukturen und Glieder der Kirche fördert". Cf 
Hünermann 1990,147-149. 
79
 Tillard 1987, 345-346, 348 and 355. 
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 LG 18: "Ministri enim, qui sacra potestate pollent, fratribus suis inserviunt"; LG 19: "sicque 
Ecclesiam propagarent, cumque sub ductu Domini ministrando pascerent"; LG 24: "Munus autem 
illud, quod Dominus pastoribus populi sui commisit, verum est servitium quod in sacris Litteris 
"diakonia" seu ministerium significanter nuncupatur". Card. J.Willebrands brought these texts 
expressly to the attention in his letter from 1982 Dienaar in Gods gemeente. Het priesterlijk ambt 
in de Katholieke Kerk (ρ 4-5). 
" This title is mentioned once more and is explained in the Constitutio apostolica de romana 
curia "Pastor Bonus" (PB), 2: AAS LXXX (1988) 842-844. 
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the level of doctrine and church-order, it fosters mutual cooperation between the 
churches, and it judges when there are conflicts; in extraordinary situations it can 
interfere in a diocese. But it cannot impose uniformity as if the universal church could 
be identified with the diocese of Rome*3. With Congar one can say that the central 
authority in the church, the primacy, which is not the paramount source of church-
reality in the other churches, has the function and therefore also the power and the 
charisma to govern the communio of the churches84. This mission "implies the 
guarantee and the defence of the legitimate individuality of the local church and of the 
autonomy which belongs to the charismata in the church". One could say that, 
therefore, the primacy has the competency-over-competencies, the authority to assign 
competencies or to keep them for itself. That is a competency which truly belongs to 
the primacy so that it can guarantee the unity and the constant specificity"3. 
Determining the competency of persons or organs is the practical-administrative and 
juridical recognition and realization of their legitimate independence, their autonomy as 
Mörsdorf calls iL It is also important to make clear that competencies are not deman-
ded от given or denied arbitrarily. Whenever there is a difference of opinions or when 
such is possible, about which competency is competent, there is a need for someone 
who authoritatively decides, if dialog does not offer a solution. The competency-over-
competencies is the power to make that authoritative decision. And it belongs where 
the responsibility for the whole is situated86. To give this to the primacy seems to be an 
adequate explanation of Vatican Π where it says that the power which belongs to the 
bishop is "in its exercise ultimately regulated by the supreme authority of the Church 
and it can be limited in view of the advantage of the Church or of the faithful" (LG 27; 
ChrD 8). That is a function which is understandable as a competency-over-competen­
cies. 
Interpreting the function of the primacy in this way it is possible to clarify the relation 
of the tasks which Vatican Π (and the Code of 1983, in с 333,1) entrusts to primacy 
and episcopacy, but in an unmediated way, as we see it. Their competencies need to be 
determined and translated in juridical terms, starting from the first steps which come 
from ecclesiology, especially in the formulation of "in quibus et ex quibus". The tensile 
relationship which ecclesiology indicates can be clarified by the set of concepts which 
belongs to the principle of subsidiarity as a heuristic principle. 
That the application of the principle of subsidiarity in the church would leave only a 
"supplementary role" for the papacy, as Hamer says, has obviously no basis at all'7. On 
the contrary, one can say that the more legitimate pluriformity exists, the more 
" Ш, 2.2; Congar 1980, 302 and 312; Granfield 1987, 121, 130, 133. Legrand 1991, 566 
summarizes in this way the aim of Vatican I for the primacy of jurisdiction: 1. to preserve the unity 
of the episcopate, 2. to affirm and defend the power of the bishops, 3. within the constant tradition 
of the church. 
** Congar 1980, 302 and 312. 
"Kasper 1989,158-159; Kaufmann 1989,152. 
"NeU-Breuning 1986,155-156; NeU-Breuning 1990,111-113; see also nr 1 above and VL 2.1. 
"Cf VI, 1.8. 
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important is the position of the "visible principle and foundation of the unity of the 
multitude of bishops and faithful" (LG 23). In this way the papacy is the institutional 
and active expression of the theological content of the unity of the church". 
It fits in the idea of the "communio hierarchical, developed in Vatican Π, that the 
primacy exercises the competency-over-competencies within the College of bishops, in 
which the bishops exercise their task for the universal church. According to Vatican Π 
the College needs the papacy and vice versa: one cannot function without the other just 
as the universal church cannot exist without the particular churches. In this way the 
communio Ecclesiarum is mirrored in the communio hiërarchieën. 
ATTENTION TO THE BISHOPS' CONFERENCE 
The Bishops' Conference has an important role to play in the maintenance of the 
administrative tensile relationship already mentioned. In that perspective we want to 
say something, succinctly about the Bishops' Conference: it would lead us too far to 
discuss its theological and juridical status90. 
Greshake especially has pointed out the importance of the Bishops' Conference 
regarding the tensile relationship. History teaches that only by combining neighboring 
particular churches in a regional association these churches have the possibility of 
bringing their own individuality into the universal church. A strictly dual structure, on 
the one hand the competency of the diocesan bishop and on the other the papal 
competency, is not enough. If there is only a dual structure the primacy dominates and 
the particular church is not recognized as an independent partner of "Rome". The result 
is then uniformity and centralization. Another danger, which Greshake sees in the 
Eastern Churches, is that the primacy cannot realize itself, so that the "churches" are 
separated from each other without an association to act together. That is why a 
tripartite structure of the universal church is needed, built from particular churches, 
regional associations, and the universal church. This structure guarantees that the 
" Pottmeyer 1989, 83; Kehl 1992, 357-359, calls this "der eigentliche und bleibende Sinn des 
Dogmas vom Jurisdiktionsprimat des Papstes". 
"Granfield 1987, 83, 85, and 105; Tillard 1987, 341; Kehl 1992, 374-375, especially "Insofern 
ist jeder primatiale Akt des Papstes (ob ausdrücklich kollegial oder persönlich "für sich" gesetzt) mit 
innerer, theologischer Notwendigkeit integriert in die communio der Kirche und in das Kollegium 
der Bischöfe". Cf Ш, 2.3, especially nt 126. 
9 0
 The recent discussion about the "status" of the Bishops' Conference started in the preparatory 
phase of the Synod of 1985. That Synod underlined the importance of the Bishops' Conference, but 
asked for further study of its theological status, especially regarding the "auctoritas doctrinalis": 
Synode 1985, 561 and 563 (=11 С 5 and 8). That question brought forth the note "De statu 
theologico et jurídico conferenttarum episcopalium", which, in January 1988, was sent to the 
Bishops' Conferences by the Congregarlo pro Episcopis, together with a list of questions. In 1990, 
during the Synod of bishops about the formation of priests, Card. Gantin reported to the Synod that, 
now that the reactions of the Conferences were received, the Vatican would continue the study "con 
serenila e senza una fretta sterile e immatura". In the meantime there were a number of theological 
publications: the first issue of 1988 of The Jurist reports on the congress of Salamanca in January 
1988, and Müller 1989. 
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universal communio will not degenerate into a loose coalition of particular churches 
but also that the power of the primacy will not erase the variety of the expressions of 
the one faith91. Naturally it is possible to discuss the position of the Bishops' Conferen­
ce and other intermediary organs as patriarchates and church provinces from the 
viewpoint of canon law. Does an intermediary organ limit the competency of the 
primacy or of the particular church and its bishop?92. Such a question about the 
demarcation of power obviously plays a role as is clear also in the earlier mentioned 
discussion about subjects like the theological or juridical status of the Bishops' 
Conferences and the question whether they have a teaching authority or not. 
From the point of view of the principle of subsidiarity we must point out the following. 
The described interest of the particular church as concretization of the universal church 
and of inculturation is, administratively and in content, too heavy a burden on the 
diocesan bishop; but it cannot be ruled from Rome either because that would not do 
justice to the need for genuine inculturation and the independence of this particular 
church and its bishop. This calls for a regional organization which should be supplied 
with the needed administrative competencies93. In this light one can say that "divine 
law gives the hierarchy the right and the duty to establish the structures that are found 
helpful for their divinely given mission, as individuals and in groups"94. One can then 
also say that setting the juridical limits of their competency should be done ultimately 
by the primacy as competency-over-competencies95. 
In Vatican Π (in LG 23) the Eastern Churches are the example: "preserving the unity of 
faith and the unique divine constitution of the universal Church, these groups enjoy 
their own discipline, their own liturgical usage, and their own theological and spiritual 
heritage". The text then suggests that the Bishops' Conferences will become like thai96. 
The last sentence of Lumen gentium 23 points out that the Bishops' Conference can be 
"a manifold and fruitful assistance, so that this collegiate sense may be put into 
practical application". The collegiality of the communio hierarchicalinks the individu­
al bishop not only with the papacy, but also with all his co-bishops. This general 
collegiality can only be realized as "affective and effective collegiality" in the relation 
with co-bishops, where they support each other directly in the exercise of their office, 
where they together help the individual churches in a regional organization, and where 
they encourage each other in tasks which go beyond the boundaries or the possibilities 
of individual dioceses. Precisely along these lines collegiality and communio are given 
" Greshake 1989,104-106. 
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 Greshake 1989,96-97. 
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 Cf Mörsdorf 1972,297. To determine the place of the Consilium Conferentiarum Episcopalium 
Europae the term of reference was also the principle of subsidiarity: Thiede 1991,61,79-83,114 
and 204; cf VI, 15. 
94
 Granfield 1987,100, who quotes ADulIes. 
95
 Mörsdorf 1972, 295-301; Pottmeyer 1989, 86. 
"Greshake 1989,111-113; Legrand 1991,558-560, who in this context points to LG 13 and OE 
2,3 and 5, and for the specific task for inculturation to AG 4,10,15 and 22. 
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concrete and daily form, as a concrete way of solidarity97. It is therefore not surprising 
that Vatican Π in the Constitution which was defined first of all, Sacrosanctum 
concilium, gives the Bishops' Conference an important role to play in the renewal of 
the liturgy: the existing centralism in this area was thus ended in principle9*. 
THE STATE OF AFFAIRS 
In this way it is clear that the contribution of the principle of subsidiarity and the 
accompanying concepts can add more to ecclesiology than Komonchak expects, who 
observed that it will only highlight problems already indicated regarding (administrati­
ve) centralism in the universal church99. We can say that Vatican Π still left open the 
question of further specifying the relationship between the primacy and the diocesan 
bishop and the relation universal-particular church which is basic for that. Precisely in 
these questions the principle of subsidiarity can contribute some administrative 
structures as secondary responsibility and the competency-over-competencies. The 
principle of subsidiarity offers the conceptual framework to maintain the tensile 
relationship which is so important for the communio ecclesiology and to give it 
administrative form. The juridical implications of this ecclesiological clarification will 
be treated later. 
3 The Obligatory Character of the Principle of Subsidiarity for 
the Church Itself 
The principle of subsidiarity appears applicable to the church itself, in what has been 
said so far, and it appears to be an apt criterion to distinguish and divide the competen­
cies, especially in a communio ecclesiology. That is remarkable considering that the 
adversaries of the obligatory character of the application of the principle in the church 
97
 Mörsdorf 1967/2, 275-281, where he also says that this "daily" form of coUegiality remains 
rather underexposed in Vatican Π; cf Acerbi 1975, 535-536. He even says that "coUegiality" on the 
level of, e.g., the Bishops' Conferences appears in a purer form than in a Council "weil die hier tätig 
werdenden Kollegien nicht dem Papst zu ihrem Haupt haben" (275). The formula "affective and 
effective coUegiality" does not appear literally in the texts of Vatican Π, but is used by John Paul Π 
and by the Synod of Bishops of 1985: Synode 1985,560-561 (= Π С 4; as "l'esprit collégiale" and 
Teffectivitécollégiale"):cfGranfield 1987,77-78, nt l.Cf PoUmeyer 1989,83 andGreshake 1989, 
107. As "effective and affective communio" the formula appears in Conclusion 14 of the Special 
Synod of the Dutch Bishops (in 1980). 
" Code of 1917, с 1257 stiD said: "Unius Apostoliche Sedis est turn sacram ordinare liturgiam tum 
litúrgicos approbare libros". The Code of 1983 seems to contradict the determination of SC 22,2 
and 36,4; SC 36,4 states the translations must be approved "by competent territorial ecclesiastical 
authority", while с 838,2 mentions a "praevia recognitie" by the Holy See. Coriden 1985, 603 
apparently does not see the problem that it is strange, and not only in the light of the principle of 
subsidiarity, that translations need to be judged by "Rome". See also Thiede 1991,14, who quotes 
Ratzinger, that the Bishops' Conferences in SC 22 do not possess legislative power as delegation 
of a right which is per se papal, but as a power which belongs to them (from J. Ratzinger, Die erste 
Sitzungsperiode des Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzils. Ein Rückblick. Köln 1963, 30-31). 
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 Komonchak 1988,342-344. 
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base themselves on the specific nature of the church, as they see that nature expressed 
in their interpretation of the communio ecclesiology100. Is such an interpretation 
tenable? 
3.1 The remaining objections 
Earlier the opinions of authors have been given who objected to the obligatory 
character of the application of the principle of subsidiarity to the church itself. Two of 
the objections which were mentioned there have not yet been countered. 
AUTHORITY IN THE CHURCH 
The thesis is that the immediate and all-encompassing primacy of jurisdiction may not 
be limited; to say that the principle of subsidiarity is valid for the church would be such 
a limitation101. 
After what has been said it will be clear that Vatican I and then expressly Vatican Π, 
placed limits on the primacy of jurisdiction and that it is not the only and all-encom­
passing authority in the church. It is expressly situated within the communio hierarchi-
ca and collegiality, and it must respect the individuality of the particular church and its 
bishop102. The primacy of jurisdiction does not imply unlimited power because 
ecclesiology and the law give the framework for its exercise103. Where limits are placed 
on the immediate and all-encompassing character of the primacy of jurisdiction, this is 
not done on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity. In the analysis so far the principle 
of subsidiarity only accentuates those limits and it clarifies the distinction of the various 
competencies. But it is not the foundation. 
And so we can counter this objection. 
THE PLACE OF THE FAITHFUL IN THE CHURCH 
The general argument in the second remaining objection is that the position of the 
faithful in the church is different from the position of the citizen in state and society. In 
political and social relations one must accept that the individual person is prior to any 
association and that, therefore, his inalienable value and rights must be respected. In 
the church the situation is different, so they say: only those rights are valid which 
originate in baptism and which the church attributes to people. That is why the church 
does not have to take into account human rights or the principle of subsidiarity, which 
is based on those rights104. Corecco's position is a good example of this objection. 
Further study reveals why he underlines the heterogeneity" of the principle of sub­
sidiarity regarding what he understands "communio" to be"6. His rejection is based on 
,00CfVI,2.2. 
1 , 1
 Cf VT, 2.2. 
1 ( 0
 Cf Kehl 1992, 358 and 372-376. 
"°Congar 1982,173 says that in the juridical order the "plenitude potestatis" is limited by divine 
law, natural law, the respect for the "Status Ecclesiae", and Tradition. 
104
 Cf VI, 11. 
m
 Corecco 1985,343. 
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two arguments: his understanding of "communio" and his understanding of the 
principle itself. 
Corecco's vision of the faithful is an integral part of his position. The believer repre­
sents Christ because Christ in His Mystical Body is present in him. Therefore, the 
believer should not be seen as an individual reality who stands over against the 
collective reality; he is a subject in which the total community of the faithful is present 
in a "mysterious" but real way. The same structure as in the "in quibus et ex quibus" 
shows itself here; later he will describe this as "immanence of the universal in the 
particular and in mutuality the immanence of the particular in the universal"106. It is 
proper to "communio" that the faithful are integrated in it structurally and in an 
encompassing way. Belonging to it is of a totally different nature than belonging to a 
political community. In a democratic state the citizen is seen in his 'Ъевд other", over 
against the community, and he realizes himself individualistically. There is competition 
in the "survival of the fittest", and there is defense of personal autonomy in the reaction 
against society and state. In the socialist state (Corecco writes this in 1981) the 
individual as such is rejected in favor of the collective reality. 
But the believer can only be understood in the context of the church and there is no 
need to defend his rights against the "communio"; there is mutual immanence and there 
is no "conflictual polarity". This has juridical consequences too for the mutual relati­
onships in the church according to Corecco; the relations are not like those in the state. 
The goal of canonical order is only the realization of the communio. Communio is the 
formal principle of canon law107. 
One can remark here that Western democracies are not "night-watch-states" in the 
liberal sense, but that they are more or less "welfare states" in which many forms of 
solidarity are built up, organized by the state or supported by it. The bonwn commune 
is understood in a broad sense: one can think of education and medical provisions, 
provisions for old age and other social provisions. 
The individualism, which Corecco believes to be present in the modem state, is seen 
by him also in the principle of subsidiarity. That means for him that, in the case of 
conflict about competency between a higher and a lower organ, the latter will decide. 
That would mean that the decision of the lower organ has absolute value in itself10*. 
This is clearly a twisted interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity. Corecco does not 
seem to know that the principle of subsidiarity must always be understood and 
concretized in conjunction with the principle of solidarity. And he does not seem to 
know the meaning of the competency-over-competencies. The principle of subsidiarity 
does not mean individualism and does not presuppose (complete) autonomy or 
'
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 Corecco 1986, 80-94; Corecco 1989, 199 where he sees this mutual immanence as the 
meaning of "communio" as "principe structurel ontologique". 
""Corecco 1980,99-100;Corecco 1981,441-443; Corecco 1985, 362; cf Wijlens 1992,128-131 
en 167. See for his individualistically colored vision of Western society also: Corecco 1986,91. 
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 Corecco 1981,449. 
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sovereignty. We emphasized that several times already109. In this way we have at least 
nuanced his objection against the application of the principle of subsidiarity to the 
church. 
Considering Corecco's interpretation it seems right that Wijlens says that he has a 
"dialectically exclusive way of thinking"110. Corecco thinks in terms of mutually 
exclusive alternatives as "conflictual polarity" and "structural and all-encompassing 
integration"111. He does not recognize communio as "being community in constant 
specificity". The most important objection against Corecco's determination of commu-
nio as the goal of canon law is that he cannot think in terms of the subtle tensile 
relation which exists between the individual person and the community, as the social 
doctrine of the church teaches. 
That same exclusive way of thinking characterizes also the way Corecco bases canon 
law. For him, canon law can not be based on natural law or on social data; the only 
basis can be a clear theological point of departure, a proper "locus theologicus""1. 
Wijlen's analysis shows that Corecco finds that in two premises. The first is that canon 
law has as its goal to realize "communio" in the sense already explained, and the 
community which results from that is essentially, qualitatively different from any other 
human community. This community is based on grace and places man in a new 
relationship with God and with other people, and it is characterized as "encompassing 
integration" and "mutual immanence". 
Because of this difference he can no longer define canon law with St. Thomas as 
"quaedam rationis ordinario ad bonum commune", because it is not the "ratio" which 
makes "communio" and canon law understandable, but only faith. That is why Corecco 
speaks about canon law as "ordinario fidei". The personal and structural relations, 
which are part of the concrete form of the church, can be known only by faith113. That is 
the second premise. 
In this way all relations between the church as "communio" and what we understand in 
this research of the church "ut societas" are broken, in Corecco's idea. And so we must 
face the question whether the principle of subsidiarity can have a binding character for 
the church, because it starts from the person who has inalienable value and rights, 
which must be recognised and respected. Corecco "cannot accept that there could be 
rights of natural law in the church"114. 
It seems to me that the basic criticism of Corecco must be that he does not do justice in 
his concept of communio to the specificity of the particular church nor of the faithful. 
The individuality of the particular church originates in its incarnation in time and 
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space, its way of being church in a specific historical and cultural setting, its rootedness 
in a specific culture. The churches are identical in their being church, but they differ as 
far as they are interwoven with their local culture. It is not Word and Sacrament which 
make them different one from the other but the human element! 
The same criticism holds for his vision on the relations between the faithful and on 
their relation to the church. He says that the faithful as believers exist only 'Ъу their 
relation to the salvific vocation given by Christ, the vocation to accede to communion 
with the Father and with all the rest of the faithful""5. But this vocation is a general one 
which must become concrete in individual persons, each with one's own place in 
church and society, each with one's own talents and limitations. Here, too, the specifici­
ty is related to the human element because, precisely in what makes the believer a 
believer, as subject of rights and duties in the church, they are the same. What disting­
uishes them one from the other is the unrepeatable individuality of their humanity. 
Corecco does say, in a critical way, that charismata, as a source of the specificity of 
individual believers, are not recognized as such in the church"6. But he does not seem 
to draw a conclusion from this even while he manages to transform his criticism of the 
Code of 1983 into positive suggestions. 
Corecco does not indicate any truly firm basis for the rights of the faithful"7. But to 
have such a basis for the status of bishops prevents papal centralism. The episcopacy 
has its own sacramental basis, as Vatican II stated"8. Kasper's thesis, that if the church 
has only one principle it would become totalitarian, holds for the relation papacy-
bishop(s) as well as for the relation between the church as community and the individu­
al believers. But if unity is based on distinct principles and their interplay, the church 
will be an open system"9. Vatican Π made a decisive step in that direction by its vision 
of the relation papacy-episcopacy as a polar tensile relationship. By placing "commu­
nio" in his own interpretation as the only principle, Corecco moves in a direction which 
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he probably does not want to follow when he calls the individual believer the new 
"protagonist" in the Code of 1983,so. 
A proper basis for the rights of the individual believer lies in his value and rights as a 
human being. If one recognizes that, the human element becomes a constitutive reality 
of the legal system in the church. And then there is an opening for the obligatory 
character of the principle of subsidiarity for the church itself. That is what is suggested 
here in this negative criticism of Corecco, but it can be developed just as well in a 
positive way. 
32 The principle of subsidiarity is valid for the church itself 
The question of the obligatory character of the principle of subsidiarity for the church 
itself is implicitly linked to the question of whether the human element as such is an 
irreplaceable element of its form and substance. The thesis we want to defend here is 
that church is an incarnate salvific reality. From this it follows that the socio-ethical 
principles for the human associations are, in principle, valid for the church. 
THE CHURCH AS SACRAMENTAL AND INCARNATE COMMUNIO 
The decisive hallmark for this thesis can be found in Lumen gentium 8. The text starts 
by saying that Christ founded his church in the world as a "visible structure" {"compa­
go visibilis"). The church as "societas" and as "mysticum Christi corpus", the 
concrete, organized association and the spiritual communion, form one complex reality 
with a divine and a human element. With this it is stated that both visions of the church, 
which before Vatican Π played such an important role121, belong together as one 
indissoluble reality. The divine element of the church, its origin in Jesus' preaching of 
the good news and the permanent influence of the Holy Spirit (LG 3-5) is given 
concrete, incarnate form. As in Jesus Christ the divine and the human element are 
brought to unity so in his church. In this way the christological dogma of the Council of 
Chalcedon (AD 451) becomes the hermeneutical framework or point of reference for 
the understanding of the church. Chalcedon posited that the divine and the human 
nature form one "undivided and unmixed" unity in the concrete person Jesus Christ; 
such a unity also exists in this church. That is why there is no place for "ecclesiological 
nestorianism" which loosens the link between the two dimensions. Nor is there a place 
for "ecclesiological monophysitism" which dissolves the human element in the 
spiritual122. 
The ecclesiological meaning of the dogma of Chalcedon is the recognition that the 
church is an incarnate reality. That means that the church must be understood as the 
concrete form of salvation in human structures. As the concrete form of salvation the 
church is an organized reality. The principles for the building up of a human associati­
on are valid for the church as they are for other organizations123. The classical principle 
holds here: "gratia supponit naturarti etperficit earn". 
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Kehl points to Tertullian's still important axiom: "Caro cardo salutis". For the church 
this means that the supernatural character of the church, as incarnate order of salvation, 
can be experienced and known in human, historical, cultural, and social reality. Ine 
theological content of the communio must be linked to the empirical form of the 
church. Through and in this visible form, as community between God and man, 
communio becomes reality in human history124. In this way one can do justice to the 
term for the church with which Lumen gentium starts: that the church is sacrament, 
"sign and instrument for the intimate union with God and of the unity of all mankind". 
That shows her task and function. One must link the church as sacrament and the 
church as communio: the communio is sacrament. 
The true human character appears when one allows the church-sacrament to really 
enter one's consciousness. Communio as transcendental and salvific reality manifests 
itself in a visible way in the church as an ordered association, as "societas". In this the 
church can be compared to the sacraments: "the mystery of salvation is given concrete 
form and substance in sacramental signs, in symbolic acts and things, which come from 
the natural order and which are destined by the Lord to be operative carriers of His 
salvific mediation"125. And even though "the acts and things" receive a completely new 
"status", no one will deny that the laws of nature remain valid for them. That is true for 
the sacramental signs of water in baptism and bread and wine, for those in office, and 
also for the church as an ordered, juridically structured association. The church cannot 
be understood as invisible divine mystery, but neither if we look only at her external 
form as a human reality; it is both at the same time. And in and through the church as 
concrete reality God makes salvation known to people and gives it to them. That is the 
meaning of the "una realitas complexa" in Lumen gentium 8126. One can distinguish 
the two aspects but they are not to be separated, because there is a "mutual interpéné-
tration of the earthly and the heavenly community"127! Or to speak with the words of 
Paul VI: "the communio is the association of the baptized, a spiritual reality, which is 
formed as a societas". And he underlined the latter: the church is "truly a human 
community" and "a human association"128. 
"Communio" in its fundamental sense, "unity with God and unity of the members of the 
church with one another", becomes "sign and instrument" in a "communitas", a human 
124
 Kehl 1992, 135-138. "Sacrament" remains therefore a decisive term for the church as LG 1 
indicates; some doubts were expressed about this because of the emphasis placed on communio: cf 
Ш, 2.1. 
125
 Aymans 1991,31. 
124
 Aymans 1991,10-11 and 21. 
127
 Kasper 1989, 159-160; GS 40: "Haec quidem terrestris et caelestis civitatis compenetratio 
nonnisi fide percipi potest". Corecco does forget that element of the "terreslra civitas". 
m
 Paulus VI1973 (cf nt 148), 128: "la "communio" è unione dei battezati, realtà spirituale, ma 
socialmente rappresentata"; and 126: "Perciò la costituzione della Chiesa è insieme pneumatica e 
istituzionale, la Chiesa è mistero di salvezza reso visibile dalla sua costituzione di vera società 
umana e dalla sua attività nella sfera estema. In tal modo, nella Chiesa, come unione sociale 
umana..." (italics mine;A.L.) ciAßKR 142 (1973) 466^68. 
192 
community. In this way the church is sacrament of God's graceful action. It is this 
church which exists in the world as concrete, ordered association {"ut societas 
constituía et ordinata"). Lumen gentium 8 takes this element truly seriously where it 
says that the church is characterized by sin. With Kasper one can summarily say: "Just 
as grace does not abolish nature, but presupposes and prefects it, so the supernatural 
character of the Church as mysterium and as sacramentally founded communio does 
not abolish her nature as human societas"119. 
It would indeed be another classical misapprehension, in the form of ecclesiastical 
docetism, to think that the church can be visibly present and operative in the world 
without (also) being truly human110. 
COMMUNIO AND INSTTTUTIONALIZATION 
There is also the argument for our thesis from the process of institutionalization. The 
importance and the theological legitimacy of the institutionalization of "communio" 
have been shown earlier. But we also spoke then about the danger of the process of 
institutionalization. The individual believer can experience self as object of institutio-
nal salvific care, and not as an individual subject of faith. Here, too, the reality of the 
church's incarnation is clear. The church is apparently capable of the same develop-
ment as happens in every human community, institutionalization. The principle of 
subsidiarity is the formulation of the church's vision that this can become a danger for 
the value of man as a creature of God. 
THE BASIS OF SOCIAL DOCTRINE 
Also in favor of the validity of the principle of subsidiarity for the church itself is the 
fact that the current catholic socio-ethical reflection is no longer based (only) on 
natural law, but starts from a biblical-theological basis. According to Vatican Π it has 
such a basis'31. It is then difficult to maintain that the principle of subsidiarity by 
definition is a foreign element in the church, as some authors believe'32. 
CENTRAL THESIS 
With these arguments the thesis is founded that the church is an incarnate salvific 
reality, so that the socio-ethical principles which the church offers to structure human 
associations must be also valid for itself. Incarnation means that the divine element 
does not deny the human element but preserves it intact and brings it to fulfillment. 
That is why all socio-ethical principles are valid for the church too. That is certainly 
true for the principle of subsidiarity which, as "metaphysical principle is rooted in the 
christian understanding of the human person, which, according to John Paul Π, is the 
way of the church"'3J. 
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Summarizing we can say: being sacrament and the church's incarnation together show 
that the principle of subsidiarity is obligatory for the church itself. Or, as a truly human 
community the church must comply with the demands which the church itself places on 
human associations and one of those is the principle of subsidiarity. 
The principle demands respect and protection for personal faith, for the self develop-
ment of the believer, without such personal realization of faith the church is in danger 
of becoming purely an institution. That is precisely the reason that the principle of 
subsidiarity has an obligatory character also for the church itself. It offers a continuous 
counterbalance against too strong an institutionalization so that the church will remain 
a communio fidelium. The principle also makes demands on the administrative 
organization and the distribution of competencies in the church. 
3 J Consequences for canon law 
THE FUNCTION OF CANON LAW 
The principle of subsidiarity does not, as a heuristic principle, give concrete indications 
of how a specific organization should be ordered so that it responds to the principle. 
For that, the principle needs to be translated in administrative structures and a juridical 
order. The reflection on the church as institution indicated that already; to balance 
communio and institution, an appeal was made to the principle of subsidiarity. That 
needs further elaboration. 
As institution it is important for the church to realize spiritual and moral goals. It has a 
"missio" as institution. There is a need for frameworks within which people can realize 
those spiritual and moral goals, because these demand a personal realization. In this 
way the church is the communicative unity which Kehl describes. 
Law or the juridical order must assure that people can live together without conflict or 
with as few conflicts as possible in the church as association114. The first task of the law 
is to create a peaceful order, to guarantee the security of the community, and to make it 
legally enforceable. It must defend the inalienable rights of the individual. In doing this 
the juridical order defends freedom because it is no longer the power of the strongest 
which rules, but a controlled exercise of power. It is precisely this sphere of freedom 
which makes possible a personal faith and moral action. It is not the aim of juridical 
order to "promote the subjective good", to moralize; there is a clear distinction between 
morality and legality. But this should not be seen as a division between the two: a 
juridical order of peaceful co-existence demands the moral commitment of all concer-
ned. It is not possible either to divide in man his social functioning from his morality: 
in society man remains the person who makes free, and thus moral, decisions. Someti-
mes law is given the function of a moral appeal. Law cannot generate morality but it 
can secure a prevailing moral consciousness. If one tries to enforce morality with 
Waif 1984,41. 
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power, one generates intolerance135. "Morality cannot exist without the freedom of 
personal decision; enforced action is not moral. But law cannot exist without force 
because it would not be able to fulfill its social task, the protection of the peace of 
community order'"". 
Klein drew a similar consequence for ecclesiastical legal orden "The church of faith 
lacks, also as juridically ordered church, all legal pote s tas over the believing decision 
of the individual"137. Salvation, offered by God, demands a free acceptance by the 
person, it demands a personal growth and cultivation of faith and an inieriorization of 
its moral implications131. 
So, in the church, too, there is a sphere of spirituality, virtue, and morality, which, just 
as in the state, needs freedom and deserves juridical protection. That is what the 
principle of subsidiarity stands for and so there is a comparison possible regarding the 
church with the historical meaning of the formulation of the principle of subsidiarity in 
Quadragesimo anno, confirmed by Vatican Π in Dignitatis humanae. That meaning is 
interpreted as the recognition of the desire for freedom of modem time, which severely 
relativized the ethical authority of political power. That power, and associations in 
general, have the task to support the self-development of the individual'39. For the 
church this means that in the community of faith the believer finds much needed 
support, but he must realize his faith on a personal level. 
Van Nell-Breuning delicately described how the church as organization must do that. 
Man cannot effect his own salvation, but, following Christ, the church leads us to "re­
birth in the supernatural life". To preserve that life, man must cooperate with grace. 
For this cooperation the same basic principle holds true as what is expressed for the 
state in the principle of subsidiarity, only more so. Cooperation with grace is a matter 
for each individual and cannot be taken over by others. The church cannot and may not 
put itself in the place of the individual and take away that cooperation from him. 
Administrative and communal action in the church evokes, and supports if need be, the 
(sometimes difficult) self-realization as a believer, but cannot substitute for it'40. The 
independent position of the believer in the communio fidelium, in which the faithful are 
active, not passive, members of the church, sacramentally based in baptism and 
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confirmation, as well as the theory of "communicative unity" show that "moral-
religious autonomy and institutional support are not real alternatives"141. 
As "communio", as "being community in constant specificity", as "communicative 
unity", the church demands juridically recognized and protected freedom for the 
individual believer. In this way the church, as societas, creates the preconditions. This 
is indicated in various ways by those who speak in a positive way about the validity of 
the principle of subsidiarity for the church itself142. 
Within the community of solidarity, which the communio basically is, a network of 
mutually constitutive relations develops. The principle of subsidiarity constantly points 
out within that network that "communicative unity" must be retained. One should not, 
with an appeal to communio, demand a unity in which subjectivity and individuality of 
the individual believer or of the particular church is denied. 
The most important structural element of the communio ecclesiology, the "in quibus et 
ex quibus", deserves all possible attention in the legal order. It invites a search for 
balance between the powers and for demarcation of competencies'43. The recognition 
of the particular church as church in the full sense of the word demands juridical 
recognition of its independence and creates in the tensile relationship a sphere of 
freedom without separating the particular church from the universal. 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANON LAW 
From the foregoing paragraphs it is clear that the difference in appreciation for the 
meaning and the validity of the principle of subsidiarity for the church is not so much 
linked with the acceptance or non-acceptance of "communio" as the central ecclesiolo-
gical term, but rather with the question whether the basic theological content of 
"communio" is in itself sufficient for an adequate concept of the church, and specifical-
ly to be a foundation for canon law. It seems to me that this is not the case. 
It must be stated that those who directly link "communio" with the juridical order in the 
church forget other basic concepts for the church which are in Vatican II, or they do 
not draw the consequences. One may not neglect the fact that the church is incarnate, 
that it is a sacrament, and, therefore, by its very nature an ordered association of 
people. In this way the relation between the various terms becomes clear as formulated 
by Congar in an exemplary fashion: "The church is a communio in the form of a 
societas; its life demands a juridical order"144. The link between "communio" and 
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"societas", a juridically ordered community, is made by the fact that the church is 
sacrament. 
In this light we spoke earlier about the scope of Principia VI and П for the reform of 
the Code; these intend to recognize and protect the rights of the faithful, whether they 
are to be found "in lege naturali vel divina positiva"14*. Both Principia are only 
minimally realized in the Code of 1983. The summary in the Praefatio is in content 
only a shadow of the original, and in the legal statute for all the christian-faithful human 
rights are not expressly recognized as such and there is no attention to the charismata. 
There is no administrative justice system either144. 
This minimal realization becomes understandable when one sees how after Vatican Π 
there is a search for a proper foundation for canon law, where we see a clear trend to 
emphasize the dependence of canon law on theology, and especially on ecclesiology147. 
Paul VI played an important role in this. Several authors point to his address of 
September 17, 1973 to the Second International Congress of Canon Law as an 
important element'4*. He said there that the concept of "communio" used by Vatican Π 
is the spiritual foundation for law in the church and its relation to man'49. May it be 
noted already that Paul VI did not say that "communio" is the only foundation for law 
and that he recognized that law exists for the salvation of man. 
Years later the Synod of Bishops of 1985 stated that "the ecclesiology oí communio is 
also the foundation of order in the church"; but this ecclesiology is much wider than the 
organization and matters which have to do with power. The church is "communio with 
God, through Jesus Christ, in the Holy Spirit". Baptism opens the way for that and it is 
given concrete form in the Eucharist150. The Synod indicated in a subtle way the 
distinction which has already been made above: "communio" is an encompassing term 
which demands attention for structure and organization, but does not prescribe its 
form151. 
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That is why it is very important to emphasize the juridical character of the church's 
legal order1". Negatively that means that the legal order is not concerned with one's 
personal relation with God153; that comes into being and is maintained in the sphere of 
spirituality, virtue, and morality, distinct from the jurídica!. A careful reading of Paul's 
address supports this interpretation. He said in general terms that social order and its 
authority must guarantee freedom and the peaceful development of the person because 
the human person is the acme of creation and the goal of social life. That is true also for 
the church: institutions, the juridical order, and laws, everything that exists for "order 
and peace" in the church, strengthen and defend the freedom and the dignity of the 
person. The strength of the institutional-juridical dimension of the church serves to 
protect and promote the "spiritual-supernatural order in the souls of the faithful"154. He 
underlined this in 1977 when he said that the task of canon law is to stimulate, 
promote, defend, and protect the area of freedom, and he illustrated his idea with a 
quote from Cicero, whom he calls the "antiquus vir sapiens": that people obey the law 
so that they can be free135. 
Canon law can never be directed to the realization of "communio" in its most funda-
mental sense, the faith relation of the person to God and the relations between people 
which are based on that. That relation is not enforceable (DH 10) and can thus never 
be the goal of a legal system. To make this "communio" possible is a goal, to make it 
possible that believers live and act in the spirit of "communio", in the spirit of unity in 
faith. Law can help such a mentality according to Congar156. Waif says the same: 
"Canon law and the juridical structures of the church have an exclusively serving 
function: they serve to promote the spiritual life of the individual and of the communi-
ty""7. 
It remains remarkable that these relations between communio, sacrament, and societas 
have not been elaborated on earlier in the development of thought about the foundati-
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ons of canon law15". More concretely one can say that Corecco interprets the quote 
from Paul VI about the relation between communio and law out of context Mörsdorf 
makes the connection between sacramentality and canon law, but does not go into 
detail119. Aymans does not show much progress in his exposition either160. He makes 
the connection between the church as sacrament and the ecclesiastical order but 
emphasizes the ius divinum positivum as the most important "source" of canon law161. 
The step, which would be consistent, to see the sacramentality of the church getting its 
form in the church as ordered human association, is not taken. One got stuck in the idea 
that there must be a predominantly theological foundation for canon law and one 
forgets that there is more than one concept for the church so that one cannot take one, 
e.g., "communio" in a general sense, as the only foundation for canon law"2. 
The position which is taken here is that the church "in hoc mundo ut societas constitu-
id et ordinata"163 is one such concept, and that the church as such should be seen as 
any other administratively ordered association, in which the principle of subsidiarity 
must be shown to advantage. The juridical order offers an important possibility for that. 
In this way the ius naturale, which just as the ius divinum positivum belongs to the ius 
divinum, becomes an important source of canon law. Being consistent in accepting the 
sacramentality of the church leads to that. 
,M
 Minnerath 1982, 196-200 gives an impetus, especially "q'U n'y a pas contradiction, mais 
complémentarité entre l'ecclesiologie de communion et l'autocompréhension de l'Eglise comme 
société" (198); "Dans l'Eglise, l'élément société doit être le support institutional de la liberté de 
IEspriL La condition de l'Eglise terrestre est de croître dans cette tension constitutive entre l'Esprit 
et l'institution 'semper reformanda' (199). 
159
 Krämer 1992,20-21, who there agrees with A.Glässer's criticsm that Mörsdorf does not see the 
believer as a person who freely reacts to God who reveals himself; cf Wijlens 1992, 81-84. Fairness 
forces me to point to Mörsdorf 1975,65: "Gleichwohl ist die freie personale Entscheidung der von 
Gott Berufenen für alle, die eigener Entscheidung mächtig sind, notwendige Voraussetzung für das 
Heilswillen Gottes an den Menschen"! 
'** Aymans 1991, 29-32. However it is strange that Mörsdorf and Aymans did not enter in the 
discussion with Huizing, who states "Vom Sakrament her erhält die Kirchenordnung ihr Dasein, 
ihre Eigenart, ihre Geltung und ihre Finalität": Huizing 1973,160; Huizing 1978, 215 (nr 2): "The 
System of canon law must be buut, like the Church community itself, on the sacraments". See about 
Huizing's thoughts: Kuhn 1990 and Orsy 1990, 424-425. 
1(1
 Aymans 1991, 21-22, 26, 33, 35-36 and 66. On ρ 26 and 35 he allows natural law a limited 
role. 
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 Cf Wijlens 1992,205. 
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 c. 204,2 takes up these words from LG 8; cf SDL, paragraph "Ac reverá": "Cum ad modum 
etiam socialis visibilisque compaginis sit constituía, ipsa nonnis indiget,...". 
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THE TASK OF CANON LAW TO BRING ORDER: CONCRETE QUESTIONS164 
Sobanski sees the contemporary ecclesiological and canon law problem in the questi­
on: "Considering the christian claim to truth and the authoritative mediation of it, can 
there be in the church an autonomous freedom and is it possible to offer that in 
ecclesiastical institutions?" In this way he opens questions like the constitutional 
("verfassungsrechtlich'') value of the basic rights of the faithful in the church, the 
relation between spiritual authority and christian freedom, the tension between the right 
to truth and the rights of the subject, the tension between the community and the 
faithful who belong to it"1. The development of thought in what is said above plays 
itself out in connection with these questions. Because of the concentration on the 
principle of subsidiarity there is sometimes a somewhat one-sided view of these 
questions. From that vision we now make some remarks about the Code of 1983. On 
the basis of this there are also clarifications about the burning question which Sobanski 
mentions. 
In general one can say that law as norm for action is an obligatory directive for human 
action within organized communities. The totality of law in a community (the legal 
system) has as its goal to order the life of the community in such a way that people can 
live together and work together in peace. That requires a balance between freedom and 
restraint. A legal system must be enforceable if it is to function166. 
That balance between freedom and restraint is a central problem in the vision of the 
principle of subsidiarity. Because it must always be seen in relation to the principle of 
solidarity, it is necessary, from the point of view of the principle of subsidiarity, that the 
interests of the community be recognized precisely because it must support and defend 
the individual person or the smaller community when their possibilities fail. Regarding 
the church this means that the institutional aspect must be protected by the legal system 
in order that the identity of Revelation and of the evangelical message are preserved in 
continuity, and are protected167. It is an important function of the legal system to secure 
the continuity and the functioning of the church as institution and, therefore, as bearer 
and protector of "fides quae creditur"l№\ 
' " Kasper 1989,160-162 indicates that, apart from the importance of the principle of subsidiarity 
for the questions discussed below, it has, or should have consequences for the relative independence 
of religious institutes, for the moral freedom of the laity in their social life, for questions relating to 
incultoration, and for the space for individual theologians, for theological faculties, and for catholic 
universities. 
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 Sobanski 1991,475. 
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 Aymans 1991, 2-3 and "The function of canon law" above. 
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 See nr 2.1 and Sobanski 1992,110. 
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 But the "sensus fidei fidelium" (LG 12) and the "contemplano et studium credentium" and their 
"intima spiritualium rerum intelligentia" (DV 8) play an irreplaceable role here, from which it is 
clear the the church is much more than institution: cf 2.1 above. 
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The most important institutional elements are presented to canon law by ecclesiology; 
and as ius divinum positivum they provide the basic structure169. Administrative-
structurally or institutionally these elements are the primacy, the episcopacy, episcopal 
collegiality, and the technical term "in quibus et ex quibus". tf canon law is to exercise 
its ordering function adequately, it cannot be content to posit these principles; it must 
regulate their exercise170. This proper task of the legal system and daily church-
administrative practice show how irresponsible it is not to clarify the limits of the 
competencies of the various basic organs. An appeal to "communio" to resolve 
problems or to impose a one-sided solution171 shows especially that the legislator, more 
precisely as the competency-over-competencies, has not done his job, even though 
conflicts can never be prevented entirely in a tensile relationship. Such an appeal to 
"communio" is not fitting in a relation of mutual constitutive relations; it often demands 
"a subordination and the obligation to follow what Rome says" and so "communio 
becomes a mechanism of coercion"172. 
It has been shown above that the principle of subsidiarity is apt to specify the relations-
hips between the various administrative principles. But when it became clear that the 
principle of subsidiarity is obligatory for the church, precisely as an administrative-
organized association, the clarifications and possibilities which were mentioned there 
also take on an obligatory character. 
The question is then whether the primacy is seen as "secondary responsibility" and as 
"competency-over-competencies", if it is necessary to do so. And then we must say that 
the Code of 1983 in a number of places fails. That is so especially in canons 331 and 
333. As in Lumen gentium 27 and Christus Dominus 8 the Code fails to offer an 
adequate demarcation of the power of the papacy in relation to the power of the 
bishop(s), because they are placed next to one another without mediation. The papacy 
has "primacy of ordinary power over all particular churches and groupings of churches 
by which the proper, ordinary, and immediate power which bishops possess in the 
particular churches entrusted to their care is both strengthened and safeguarded"173. So 
m
 Taking into consideration the mediation of ecclesiology it is clear that the ius divinum positi-
vum is not a ready-made revealed juridical structure, and that the current one cannot be seen as such, 
because "Uebrigens sind auch die in der Schrift vorhandenen Gegebenheiten bezüglich Sendung 
und Autorität -auch wenn sie unmittelbar auf Christus selbst zurückgehen- nicht schlechthin 
"göttlichen" Rechts. Sie sollten vielmehr gottmenschliches Recht genannt werden: ein Handeln 
Gottes mit den Menschen in Formen, die für Menschen verständlich, also geschichtlich und 
gesellschaftlich bestimmt sind": Huizing 1973,168. Cf nt 71; Walf 1983,54-55; Kasper 1987/StL, 
330; Greshake 1989, 109-111; Puza 1990/2, 27; Aymans 1991, 35-36; Sobanski 1991.473-474. 
170
 Krämer 1992,31: "Das göttliche Recht bezieht sich auf die Stiftung der Kirche durch Christus, 
auf grundlegende Strukturen und Lebensvollzüge der Kirche; es ist in seinem Wesensgehalt der 
Verfügbarkeit der Kirche entzogen, muss aber im menschlichen Recht konkretisiert werden, um 
geschichtlich-gesellschaftlich wirksam werden zu können". Cf Orsy 1990,430. 
171
 Walf 1984, 67; Komonchak 1986,25, 28 and 31. 
m
 Sobrino 1991,124-125. 
171
 Krämer 1990,118-121 summarizes the problem. Cf nt 77. 
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one can say "the potential for conflict in real"'74. Precisely in a legal system this must be 
avoided as much as possible. Competencies need to be demarcated precisely so that the 
administrative and policy making freedom of a bishop and his church can be realized in 
their link with the universal church. Canons 368, 369, 375, and 381,1 offer fundamen­
tal principles for that1". 
It should not be criticized when the papacy uses its power to support bishops in a 
possible conflict with the government of their own country176. 
The criticism is valid also for the way the Code looks at particular churches. These are 
all church in the full sense of the word. The analysis of the texts of Vatican Π does not 
leave room for doubt. Because the universal church exists "in and from" the particular 
churches, this ecclesiologica! determination demands a position which is juridically 
more fundamental than the one the Code of 1983 offers, even though important 
passages from the text of Lumen gentium 23 and 26 and Christus Dominus 11 are 
taken up in canons 368-369. 
According to canon 113,1 only the "catholica Ecclesia" and the "Apostolica Sedes" 
are by nature moral persons. Other moral persons, such as particular churches, are 
erected by the competent authority. That seems to be a remnant of the earlier opinion 
that the universal church is one societas perfecta™. Because the particular church is 
truly church, in which the Ecclesia catholica exists, it should have moral personality 
'Ъу divine right"; Hiinermann expresses this as "subject of divine right". That would 
strengthen the juridical position of particular churches. They are competent to develop 
all the essential elements of their mission, which belong to the church as church178. 
We cannot explicate all the implications here but it is important to point this out. Now, 
the particular church is completely dependent on central authority for the appointment 
of a bishop if the see is vacant. A formal recognition of its moral personality would 
mean that this particular church becomes a true partner, with real influence in the 
appointment of its bishop179. The Code of 1983 (c. 377,3) sees only minor influence 
from the diocese; from this it is already clear that the appointment of a bishop is not the 
exclusive prerogative of the papacy180. That is clear also in canon 377,1 where it is 
174
 Granfield 1987,115. 
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 Krämer 1990,115-118 shows that с. 375,1 can be formulated in a much stronger way on the 
basis ofLG 23 and 27. 
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 Cf VI. 1.4. 
I77CfVn,2. 
'"Hünermann 1990,139-140; Aymans 1991,24 calls the particular church "verfassungsrechtlic-
hes Konstitutivelement der Kirche". Mörsdorf 1972,289 thinks that differences of opinion about 
the question whether the "partial church" is of divine right, are useless because: "Beide sind so 
meinander verwoben, dass die Gesamtkirche nicht sein kann ohne die orthafte Konkretisierung in 
Teilkirchen und dass die Teilkirche notwendig an dem Wesen der Gesamtkirche teilhat". 
"* The real influence was self-evident for Popes from the 5th century like Celestinus ("Nullus 
mvitisdeturepiscopus") and Leo: Legrand 1983,196; cf Beai 1992,65-66. That real influence can 
be defended also on the basis of the statement of the Synod of Bishops of 1985, that "communio" 
implies "participation et co-responsabili té": cf nt 32 above and Beai 1992,67 and nt 34 and 62. 
lM
 Cf Kaiser 1990, 83; Kehl 1992,381-383. 
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stated that the papacy not only appoints bishops, but that it is possible that it confirms 
legitimately elected bishops! 
Apart from this, the idea of the primacy as the competency-over-competencies and the 
independent position of the particular churches can bring new life to the discussion 
about the theme of "church order", which Huizing raised earlier. In opposition to a 
detailed Code, the idea of "church order" points rather in the direction of a "framework 
of legislation", within which particular churches (alone or in the context of a Bishops' 
Conference) can formulate their own canon law, which will then be more responsive to 
their own social position and their own needs'". 
Within the existing Code it might be possible to open the door for this if one could 
interpret canon 455,2 restrictively (also in the light of c. 18). Canon 455,2 says that the 
decrees of a Bishops' Conference cannot have binding force unless they have been 
"reviewed by the Apostolic See". This review should be a marginal test only to see 
whether the conference has stayed within its own competency and whether the 
decision, also in the individual churches, has been arrrived at correctly! 
The cooperation between the primacy and the College of bishops also demands a 
juridical specification. The Code (cc. 333,2 and 334) leaves it to the papacy and the 
dependence of the College on the papacy is strongly emphasized. That is somewhat 
understandable when viewed from the position of the papacy as the competency-over-
competencies;there must be sufficient guarantees so that it can act freely. Lumen 
gentium's "semper libere" is given a clear meaning in this way"2. But, on the other 
hand, the Code does not do justice to the position of a Council"3. That is even less 
understandable when the College as a whole, on the level of the office-bearers, gives 
form and substance to the communio Ecclesiarum. And precisely this "being commu­
nity in constant specificity" appears in the meeting of those who form the link between 
the particular and the universal"4. It gives expression to the ontological sacramental 
unity of the episcopate, which precedes the relations which are based on jurisdiction1*5. 
The unity urged by the communio hierarchica because collegiality and primacy are 
essentially involved in it"6 could be expressed, in a less formal way than in a Council, 
in ordering the "fraternal correction" between Pope and the College of bishops or 
individual bishops"7. But canon 333,3 is too apodictic and is too clearly an element of 
the concept of societas perfecta to be maintained after Vatican Π. 
U l
 Waif 199Z 188 and 204; in the same sense also Puza 1990/2, 28-29 and 33. See for a program­
maticeli view of a "Kirchenordnung": Huizing 1973; cf Kuhn 1990. 
,И
СГ Ш,2.3. 
'"Waif 1992,202. 
,M
 Mörsdorf 1972,295; TUlard 1987,275-276; Legrand 1991,557. 
"
J
 Ш, 2.3; cf Walf 1992, 203: see nt 72 above! 
"* PB 2 (ρ 842-843) indicates the structure of the church as communio hierarchica as "collegialis 
simul ac ptimalialis". 
i r7
 Granfíeld 1987, 86-87: "When genuine fraternal dialogue between the Pope and the bishops 
is taken as the accepted climate of opinion in ecclesia] governance, then collegiality will have come 
of age". Cf Hiinermann 1990,149-150. 
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In these ideas about the need of an adequate formulation of the various competencies 
we see also a second function of the legal system: the integrating function. It should be 
possible to express differences in such a way that, in their diversity, they can be 
brought together in a unity which is dynamic and which is capable of functioning. This 
is about the relationship -already discussed- between the individual churches and their 
relation to the universal church. But it is also about the position of the individual 
believer, who finds support in the historical continuity of the faith and the common 
experience of it; but this does not absolve the individual believer from the obligation to 
realize and deepen his faith personally18*. This concerns the problem of the disadvanta-
ges and dangers inherent in the institutional, as we showed above. Now that the 
principle of subsidiarity indeed appears to have an obligatory character for the church, 
there must be room in the church for "concrete freedom""9. There is a need to call 
attention to this in two ways. 
First of all it relates to the rights of all the christian-faithful as formulated in the Code 
of 1983, canons 208-223. They do not precede the church as do human rights in the 
state; but they come into being through baptism, by mediation of the church. They must 
guarantee personal freedom in the church"0. One should be able to expect the deepest 
respect for these rights from church authority; one should be able to expect that church 
authority will act in a reserved manner if their exercise is to be regulated. 
Canon 223, 2 opens the way for that "in the interest of the common good". One could 
even ask whether it can be possible that the common good, properly understood, could 
ever be in opposition to these rights. Because of their sacramental basis in baptism they 
are so fundamental that the "common good" must in fact mean the promotion of their 
development. For several reasons it is important to act very reservedly in these matters. 
First of all this is about sacramentally established basic rights (c. 204, 1) which are a 
foundation of the legal system and which, therefore, should be somehow inviolable191. 
Furthermore, this canon matches Dignitatis humarme 7, where the possibility is 
opened for civil authority to limit religious freedom; but it is said with a lot of reserve 
and it is surrounded by many safeguards. Then, canon 18 makes clear that this 
possibility must be interpreted strictly also for church authority: that means that bonum 
commune is only about the preconditions, not the values192. Only if there would be a 
danger that the church would no longer be able to function as institution, could a 
regulation of the exercise of these rights be defensible. If there are conflicts over these 
rights it is not correct, appealing to communio, to deny them or to use power to 
suppress them: that does not do justice to the christian-faithful. That can happen in a 
,M
 Bertrams 1977,580; Sobanski 1992,110; cf 2.1 above. 
"' See nt 41 above. 
"°Heimerll991,25. 
191
 Cf VI, nt 63. See about these basic rights and about the validity of human rights in the church 
also Waif 1990. 
192
 Coriden 1985, 158-159; cf Huizing 1973, 158-159. See for the two meanings of bonum 
commune: nr 1 above. 
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subtle way also when there is too much emphasis on duties at the expense of rights193. 
In a legal system rights and duties must be carefully laid down so that power can be 
exercised correctly in relation to the freedom of the other. A legal system presupposes 
some suspicion about good intentions or possible effects of good intentions. When the 
need arises to use these canons, there is a conflict and it is then important that the 
competencies be clearly regulated'94. Law must secure the believer's freedom: a church, 
which does not want to be only an institution must give all possible scope to that 
"concrete freedom'"93. That means that canon law must guarantee that christian 
freedom, which authority must respect, will hold fast in face of institutional structures, 
because that freedom originates in the inviolably personal character of the act of 
faith196. 
Then we need to say that canons 212,3 and 228,2 deserve attention. Their content has 
been underlined once again by the Synod of Bishops in 1985: "Because the church is 
communio, there must be participation and co-responsibility on all levels"197. Here too 
the "communio fidelium" must express itself in juridical structures. The general remark 
of canon 204,1, that all the faithful participate in Christ's "munus regale", demands 
specification in legal structures'98. This could have been taken care of if, in the 
enumeration of rights and duties or in the general norms, one would have added what 
Boniface VIII stated in 1298: "Quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus tractari et approbari 
debet"™. 
There is discussion about the validity of human rights in the church. Against their 
validity people take the position that in the church only those rights exist which are 
given by baptism200. But against this one can say that human rights are part of the rights 
m
 The tendency to trivialize these rights can be seen in Ghirlanda 1984,373-377 and in Corecco 
1981, 443. 
'*· Cf "The function of canon law" above and Gutiérrez 1972, 788. Corecco 1985,361 does not 
seem to see this intention of the juridical order when he believes that с 212,1 is sufficient, 
considering "l'atmosphère de confiance et de magnainité dans laquelle le Concile a génerallement 
traité le rapport fidèles-pasteurs". 
1,5
 Cf Sobanski 1992,112-113. In the same sense also Gutiérrez 1972,794. 
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 Luf 1983,29-31; Luf 1989, 30-32. 
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 Synode 1985, 561-562 (Π С 6). Cf nt 179. 
'"Kaufmann 1982,70-71; Waif 1982, 204; Corecco 1985, 355-356 and 368-371; Tillard 1987, 
274-275. Waif 1988,22-24 and Puza 1990/2, 37 make a connection between communio, sensus 
fidelium, and receptio and acceptalio legis: these offer a counter-balance against the danger that 
communio would become a "straightjacket" (cf nt 171 and 172) and demand a safeguard for a good 
balance between с 212,1 on the one hand, and с 212,2 and 3 on the other. See also Ш, 1.4 and 
Congar 1972/Conc about recepito and acceptât io. 
m
 Ochmann 1991, especially 129 and 148; he points out that this rule reverberates in с 119,3. 
Cf Congar 1958 and Beai 1992, 55-60 for this rule in general. Beai 1992, 62-63 says that this 
traditional rule refers to the relation papacy-College of bishops. For the rest Beai (ρ 67-69) is quite 
positive about the possibilities which the Code (cc. 460-468) offers for the diocesan synod. 
2 0 0Cfntl04. 
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which the christian-faithftil have as such201. That is true for canons 215,219, 220,221, 
and 226, 2. But in line with what we said above about the church as a juridically 
ordered association, one can, with Kasper, say much more directly that human rights 
must be operative in the church as association, therefore, in its juridical order202. 
The Holy See signed "The Charter of Paris for a New Europe" on November 21,1990, 
in the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, together 
with 31 European countries and with the United States and Canada. In this political 
declaration we read: "Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all 
human beings, are inalienable and are guaranteed by law". The Synod of Bishops in 
1971 emphasized that signing such a declaration has little value and will injure the 
credibility of the church if it does not draw consequences from it203. The draft for the 
Lex Ecclesiae Fundamentalis still did recognize these rights204. 
It would lead us too far to enter into this discussion of the more concrete meaning of 
human rights in the church. It is sufficient here and now to determine the general 
meaning for the ecclesiastical legal system. That meaning is the respect due to the 
unique and irreplaceable person in the church. This person is not an abstract believer, 
but a concrete person. Part of his identity are the charismata given by God, and the 
historical and cultural situation in which he lives. As such the person deserves 
protection in the ecclesiastical legal system201. That system must, like any legal system, 
bring order in the interpersonal relationships in a concrete community, must make 
freedom and restraint possible, must determine the legality of concrete actions or of the 
fact that one does not act206. As an institution which owes its existence to God, the 
church must at the same time be an institution of human and christian freedom, and as 
201
 Felici 1967,89: "Quae Concilium Oecumenicum totics ac tanta gravitate protulit atque elatis 
verbis exaltavit de dignitate personae humanae deque eiusdem iuribus inviolabilibus ubique 
servandis, utpote quae in natura humana fundamenlaliter sint radicata, eo magis in Ecclesia tenenda 
sunt, quod Christifideles per baptismum mysterio Christi inserentur et novam dignitatem atque 
peisonalitatem Christo concorporali adquinmt". Sobanski 1992, 111 states this based on GS 41,3 
en 76,5. 
*° Kasper 1990,165, says they are valid for the church "in an analogical way" and in this way he 
makes the freedom of religion conditional. Indeed, if based on that freedom one makes the choice 
to belong to the church and so concretizes that freedom, then one can no longer claim the (abstract) 
freedom to choose for any religious idea, but one must hold the Credo of the church. 
203
 Kasper 1990,156. 
** Ci Herder-Korrespondenz 32 (1978) 624, Art. 1, Kanon 3: "Da die Menschen nach dem Bild 
Gottes erschaffen sind, erkennt die Kirche allen und jedem einzelnen Menschen die der 
menschlichen Person eigene Würde zu und tritt für sie ein; ebenso erkennt sie die Pflichten und 
Rechte, die sich daraus ergeben an, und schützt sie auch, weil alle Menschen zum Heil berufen 
sind". Such a text is not found in the series of cc. 208-223; some kind of relation can be found с 
747,2, but this canon does not refer to the church itself. 
2 , 5
 Kasper 1989, 156 and 160-161. 
204
 Kramer 1992, 36. 
206 
such it must possess a model character207. The biblical and theological foundation of 
human rights offers every opening for that20*. 
Kasper 1987,330. 
Kasper 1990 and Furger 1991/1.141-156. 
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X Results of the Research 
1 Answer to the Specific Question 
The specific question of this research has been formulated in the Introduction in this 
way: does the church consistently apply to itself what it says about the principle of 
subsidiarity in social relationships, c.q. is it theoretically possible to do so? 
In the first part of the research it became apparent that the formulation of the principle 
of subsidiarity in Quadragesimo anno is the result of a process in catholic circles of 
searching for a modem christian vision on the person and society, a process that lasted 
about a century. 
In this process (forms of) individualism, collectivism, and centralism were rejected as 
structuring principles of society. The principle of subsidiarity's vision of the human 
being and society has as its point of departure that every person is called to self 
development, in relation to other persons and within smaller or larger associations of 
which one is part. The principle of subsidiarity presupposes that responsibilities and 
competencies for one's own development lie with the person or with the associations 
which are closest to each person. Only when it is really necessary, when the needs are 
beyond the capacities of the individual person or the smaller association, must a larger 
association help out. It has so to speak a "secondary responsibility". The principle of 
subsidiarity demands freedom where possible and bonding where necessary. The 
principle of subsidiarity presupposes the principle of solidarity and one can call the 
principle of subsidiarity the principle of competency related to the principle of solidari-
ty-
With the principle of subsidiarity the modern desire for freedom is recognized, without 
taking aboard modem individualism. Implicitly it means that the state is seen as a 
constitutional state. 
The principle of subsidiarity and the principle of solidarity together give content to an 
organological vision on society which is structured in such a way that there is relative 
independence for the constituent parts, and that these parts maintain mutually constitu-
tive relations with each other and with the whole. That is the Kantian version of the 
organological vision, of which the corpus-variation is the usual one. The interprétons 
often becomes in this the interpretandum: the image receives a normative meaning 
although it was intended as explication. That quickly results in a dominant place of the 
organ which is seen as "the head". For the church, which calls itself from its origin 
"body of Christ", this easily leads to the acceptance of a centralist vision on the church 
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and a strict hierarchical structure and the tendency to exclude any particularity'. It is 
precisely the Kantian organologica! vision which provides an interprétons in which the 
unity of the whole offers space for diversity and relative independence of the parts, and 
for an interaction between the whole and the parts, and among the parts themselves. 
In the second part of the research the question was about the validity of the principle of 
subsidiarity for the church. It has become clear in the research that justice is hardly 
done to the principle of subsidiarity in the church. 
We must immediately say that the applicability of the principle of subsidiarity always 
refers to two distinct spheres: first, the relation between ecclesiastical government and 
the christian faithful; and second, the relation between the papacy and the other 
bishops, and thus, the relation between the universal and the particular church(es). 
Already before Vatican Π there was discussion about the consequences of the principle 
for the church itself and a positive answer was given. Within the framework of the then 
existing concepts of the church (societas inaequalis perfecta being the dominant 
structuring concept) it appeared that a partial realization of the principle of subsidiarity 
was possible, namely, in the freedom which should be given to individual believers to 
realize themselves as believers. 
The ecclesiological ideas of the Second Vatican Council and what developed after it 
demand that we rethink the question of the validity of the principle of subsidiarity for 
the church. The basic question about the obligatory character of the principle of 
subsidiarity for the church has been answered affirmatively in this research. It has been 
shown that precisely in the communio ecclesiology, which is emphasized everywhere 
today, the principle of subsidiarity can be an ordering criterion; it indicates the 
structural framework in an ecclesiology of the communio fidelium and the communio 
Ecclesiarwn, which is fundamentally different from the concept of the societas 
(inaequalis) perfecta! 
In Lumen gentium the two most important ecclesiologically structuring concepts are 
that of the People of God (in LG Π) and that in which the hierarchy takes a central 
place (LG ΓΠ). The People of God-concept ends the idea of inaequalis in the societas 
perfecta-vision but hardly gives any developed ideas about structure and government. 
Lumen gentium ΓΠ does offer developed proposals. In the last years it has been said 
that "communio" as a central ecclesiological term can bring unity in relation to both 
concepts which are not, however, a seamless unity in themselves. 
In Lumen gentium communio is mainly a diffuse concept except in chapter ΠΙ and the 
accompanying Nota explicativa, where it speaks about the "communio hierarchica" 
between the papacy and the bishops. Further analysis shows that this relationship, and 
thus also the relationship between the universal church and the particular church(es), 
must be understood as a polar tensile relationship, which in an exemplary way is 
formulated in the technical term "in quibus et ex quibus" (LG 23). For Vatican Π the 
'CfWackenheiml974,15. 
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particular church is church in the full sense of the word; and that, too, is a basic change 
compared to the societas perfecta idea. 
A developed communio ecclesiology should be seen as an organologica! concept in the 
Kantian sense. Communio is being community in a constant specificity. The universal 
church exists only "in and from" the particular churches; within the whole they have 
their own place from which they contribute to the whole and to the development of 
each of them. Then it is clear that it is important to underline in this community the 
mutual constitutive relationships with each other and with the whole. 
One can say that "in quibus el ex quibus" is true also for the relation between the 
(particular) church and individual believers. Then it becomes the "ontological-structu-
ral principle" for all structural relationships in the church2. In a communio ecclesiology 
which is developed along these lines the individual believer becomes a subject of faith. 
The principle of subsidiarity and the accompanying concepts offer the framework to 
develop these ecclesiologica! polar (and thus insolvable) tensile relationships in an 
administrative-juridical way. In this tensile relationship the principle of subsidiarity 
demands time and again that attention be given to the position of the individual person 
and the smaller community in relation to the institution, which can easily become 
dominating, and to the (too) great influence of the center. 
The obligatory character of the principle of subsidiarity for the church is clear from the 
fact that the church is sacrament and is incarnated, as Lumen gentium 8 shows 
exemplarily. And so the church is an organized association of people for which the 
laws which apply to all associations of people, must be valid. The church as communio 
is not just a "feeling", but it is an "organic reality": the communio as sacrament is a 
"visible and ordered societas" with juridical structures. These juridical structures must 
guarantee the tensile relationships we mentioned and must, therefore, define as 
adequately as possible the (administrative) competencies, as a translation of the "ex 
quibus et in quibus". The principle of subsidiarity offers, as socio-ethical principle 
which needs to be translated also juridically, an adequate and obligatory framework for 
interpretation. 
Once this is determined, the relationship between the primacy and the bishop(s) and 
between the universal church and the particular church(es) must be more clearly 
defined than the Code of 1983 does. The tensile relationship in the communio Ecclesi-
arum demands the application of the principle of subsidiarity as an expression of the 
permanent tension between the universal church and the particular church(es). The 
position of the particular church as church in the full sense of the word and as incarna-
ted and inculturated church, separately or possibly in an association such as the 
Bishops' Conference, must be reinforced. The principle of subsidiarity leads to 
concretize the "in quibus et ex quibus" in an administrative and juridical way through 
2Corecco 1989,199; cf Corecco 1985,362; see for his own idea of this meaning of communio: 
DC, 3.1, especially nt 106. 
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the concepts of "secondary responsibility" and "competency-over-competencies". 
These make it possible to clarify the relation between primacy and bishop(s), where 
Vatican Π and the Code of 1983 leave their tasks "unmediated" (side by side). This 
relation should be seen as a tensile relationship between the tasks of each, each 
sacramentally based. They must, therefore, respect one another's competency. Accor­
ding to the technical term this creates an ongoing tension which cannot be removed by 
a centralizing authority or by an appeal to (or desire for) undifferentiated uniformity. 
The principle of subsidiarity (and the accompanying ideas) offers the possibility to give 
this tension form and substance in an administrative and juridical way. 
And where it is seen as a legal principle for an adequate distinction of competencies 
and for the rights of individual believers, it offers a relevant framework for their 
freedom regarding the institution and within i t The church as communio cannot exist 
without institutionalization, but the process of institutionalization is a direct threat to 
the communio as community-of-the-faithful. Communio as being community in a 
constant specificity demands for the position of the faithful: space for their "concrete 
freedom" based on their rights as baptized and based on human rights. Continuous 
emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity can prevent that the institution takes prece­
dence over community, and thus is a plea for an active role of the christian faithful. 
Church law must retain its juridical character and should define the framework in 
which the person can develop as a believer. 
The much championed idea to consider canon law as a proper sort of law has nothing 
to do with the difference of opinion about the obligatory character of the principle of 
subsidiarity for the church itself. Canon law is in fact a very special legal system 
because it has as foundation the sacramentally given positions and the "in quibus et ex 
quibus*. 
We can remark that those who deny the obligatory character of the principle for the 
church either have not appropriated the (historical) meaning of the principle (and see it 
individualistically), or they cannot (or are not willing to) see that a communio ecclesio-
logy always implies a polar, and thus unsolvable, tensile relationship between the 
administrative-constitutive elements of the church, or they do not see the consequences 
of the reality that the church is a sacrament. 
2 Relation with the Principia for the Reform of the Code 
The results of this research can also be clarified in relation to the Principia for the 
reform of the Code, which were defined in 1967. 
In this research, the choice of Principium I for the juridical character of the Code or for 
canon law is confirmed. The emphasis is on the need to make a clear distinction 
1
 Mörsdorf 1968, 213-214: "Diese Eigenart der Kirchenverfassung, die keine Parallele im 
weltlichen Bereich hat, beruht darauf dass die Teilkirche nicht nur Teil eines Ganzen ist, sondern 
in ihrem Boeien die ganze Kirche darstellt Sie macht die kollegiale Struktur der Kirchenverfassung 
offenkundig und zeigt die innere Verknüpfung von Bischofsweihe und Bischofsamt". 
211 
between, on the one hand the sphere of the institutional which is ordered by the law, 
and on the other hand, the sphere of spirituality, morality, and virtue, which is defined 
by law. 
The causal relation between Principium IV and Principium V is clarified: the applica-
tion of the principle of subsidiarity offers administrative clarification to the content of 
the status of the local bishop and the particular church which he governs. The status is 
of divine law and thus the bishop and his church have within the universal church a 
proper place and responsibility. "Decentralization" (which is seen, e.g., in the Praefa-
lio to the Code of 1983 as an expression of the principle of subsidiarity) is not an 
adequate indication to develop the aspects of the tensile relationship in the structure of 
the church "which is at one and the same time collégial and primatial", in "at the same 
time episcopal and papal communion" which the church is4. 
It is apparent that there is a direct link between Principium V and Principium VI: it is 
the task of the administration of justice to protect the rights of the individual christian 
faithful because human rights have validity in the church. With the basic rights from 
the Code of 1983 they form normative principles which give a more concrete content 
to the principle of subsidiarity as a formal and heuristic principle. 
3 Conclusion 
The principle of subsidiarity offers the formal framework for the definition of mutual 
administrative competencies of central government and the particular churches. It is 
clear that the principle does not infringe upon the hierarchical structure of the church. 
It contributes to a theoretical and practical clarification of basic concepts in the 
communio ecclesiology and their mutual relations. It clarifies administrative relations-
hips and that was the aim of this research. The clarification brings us to recommend to 
judge ecclesiastical-organizational and administrative questions under the aspect of the 
principle of subsidiarity. That will have consequences for both spheres in which the 
principle can be applicable. 
It leads to the recognition of the proper responsibility of the members of the communio 
fidelium for the way they stand in church and world, and it leads to the recognition of 
human rights in the church. And so the unnecessary chasm between church and society 
disappears, a chasm which sometimes still makes believers live in two worlds. Socially 
and politically the proper responsibility of individual persons and smaller associations 
is a presupposition which in the church is recognized only with difficulty. 
And then it gives the particular churches, individually but also in larger associations 
such as Bishops' Conferences and continental Synods, the task to profile themselves 
more clearly as churches which are rooted in their own culture, or should be. To be 
church in Europe is different from being church in Africa or Latin America. These 
larger associations must themselves give form and substance to this difference. 
Cardinal Alfrink said in 1967: "It is entrusted to each local church to be responsible for 
finding out in which concrete way it should realize the unique mystery of the church. It 
4
 Cf PB 2 and Kasper 1986/2, 78. 
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is a responsibility which belongs to it by its very nature"1. This research should be seen 
as an ecclesiologica! and canonical support for his thesis, while we pleaded for a 
special role for the principle of subsidiarity as an adequate interpretative framework for 
administrative and juridical questions of competence. In this way we also provide an 
answer to the question of the Synod of Bishops of 1985, which demanded a study of the 
theoretical and practical applicability of the principle of subsidiarity to the church 
itself. 
5
 Thiede 1991,40 quotes from the opening address by Card. Alfrink on the occasion of the First 
European Bishops' Symposium (Noordwijkerhout 1967): "A chaque Eglise locale est confiée la 
responsabilité de voir de quelle manière concrète elle doit réaliser l'unique mystère de l'Eglise. Cest 
une responsabilité qui lui revient de par sa nature même" (from: Secretariat de Liaison entre les 
Conférences episcopales de l'Europe, Les structures diocésaines post-conciliaires. Symposium 
tfévêques d'Europe (Noordwijkerhout, 10-13 juillet 1967), Vanves 1968, 5-9). 
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SAMENVATTING: Het subsidiariteitsbeginsel en de (bestuur-
lijke) verhoudingen in de kerk 
1 Onderwerp van bet onderzoek 
Het onderzoek heen tot doel een nader licht te werpen op de (bestuurlijke) relaties 
tussen het centrale bestuur in de katholieke kerk en de particuliere kerken. Het wil een 
bijdrage leveren aan een afbakening van de wederzijdse bestuurlijke competenties. 
Voor een dergelijke afbakening biedt het subsidiariteitsbeginsel een formeel kader. 
Het onderzoek wil deze vraag beantwoorden: past de kerk wat zij zegt over het subsi-
diariteitsbeginsel in de maatschappelijke verhoudingen consequent toe op zichzelf, c.q. 
is dat theoretisch mogelijk? 
Er zijn meerdere pauselijke uitspraken, dat het subsidiariteitsbeginsel ook geldt voor 
de kerk zelf. De Bisschoppensynode van 1967 onderstreepte dit, toen zij het 
subsidiariteitsbeginsel noemde als een van de leidende beginselen bij de herziening 
van de Codex 1917. Overigens was de Bisschoppensynode van 1985 weer wat voor-
zichtiger in deze, toen die de vraag opwierp of en hoe het subsidiariteitsbeginsel 
toegepast kan worden op de kerk. Dit onderzoek kan gezien worden als antwoord op 
die vraag. 
2 Het subsidiariteitsbeginsel 
Het subsidiariteitsbeginsel als "gravissimum principium" van de sociale wijsbegeerte is 
geformuleerd in Quadragesimo anno (1931) in de nrs 79-80. Het omvat 3 
grond-ideeën: 
1 de menselijke persoon is het quid pro quo van alle gestructureerde activiteit in de 
samenleving en geen verband moet tot zijn taak rekenen wat door de afzonderlijke 
persoon zelf gedaan kan worden; 
2 kleinere sociale eenheden moeten niet beroofd worden van de mogelijkheden en de 
middelen tot realisering van datgene waartoe zij in staat zijn. Grotere verbanden 
moeten hun activiteiten beperken tot taken die de kracht en de capaciteiten van de 
kleinere eenheden te boven gaan; 
3 de meer omvattende verbanden en speciaal de staat moeten de "hiërarchische" orde 
van de verschillende vormen van sociale gehelen respecteren en moeten de kleinere 
eenheden helpen, zodat zij beter in staat zijn zelf te doen waarvoor zij geschikt zijn. 
Het beginsel heeft dus een tweevoudige betekenis: terughoudendheid waar mogelijk, 
steunverlening waar nodig. Het vraagt om een adequaat vaststellen van competenties. 
Het onderstreept dat besturen of macht uitoefenen in een samenleving betekent de 
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mogelijkheidsvoorwaarden scheppen waarbinnen personen en groepen zich kunnen 
ontplooien. 
3 Hoofdstukken in het onderzoek 
Eerste deel 
Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat de formulering van het subsidiariteitsbeginsel in Quadra-
gesimo anno het resultaat is van het zoeken naar een eigen en evenwichtige positie, 
waarin de plaats van de afzonderlijke mens gewaarborgd wordt binnen de gemeen-
schap en waarbij zowel individualisme als collectivisme afgewezen wordt. 
I. Het subsidiariteitsbeginsel is, historisch gezien, ontstaan binnen een organologische 
visie op de samenleving. Het organologisch concept heeft in de geschiedenis op twee 
onderscheiden wijzen gestalte gekregen: 
- de corpus-theorie, waarin de samenleving als één lichaam gezien wordt, waar het 
hoofd de centrale plaats inneemt en de delen onzelfstandig zijn. Daardoor is deze 
theorie geneigd autoritair en totalitair te worden; 
- de kantiaanse organisme-visie, waarin er wederkerige constituerende relaties zijn 
tussen de delen onderling en tussen de delen en het geheel. Zo wordt de relatieve en 
relationele zelfstandigheid van de delen gesauveerd. 
II. Het organologisch concept structureert in de eerste helft van de 19° eeuw de visie 
van katholieken in Frankrijk en Duitsland op de maatschappij en de staat. Zij keren 
zich, met conservatieven en de Romantiek, tegen individualisme, (economisch) libera-
lisme en bestuurlijk centralisme: stromingen die na de Franse Revolutie de overhand 
krijgen. De (corporatistische) reactie op deze stromingen vormt de aanzet voor de 
moderne katholieke sociale leer. 
III. In deze lijn staat de Duitse bisschop W\E.von Ketteler (1811-1877). Ook hij 
hanteert het organologisch concept, maar is daarbij beïnvloed door liberaal gedach-
tengoed. Bij von Ketteler heeft de afzonderlijke mens een eigen onvervangbare plaats, 
maar deze mens kan niet zonder de diverse verbanden met anderen. De hem typerende 
aandacht voor de afzonderlijke mens en de (kleine) maatschappelijke verbanden brengt 
hem tot de materiële formulering van het subsidiariteitsbeginsel; de eerste keer dat het 
voorkomt in de moderne katholieke visie op de samenleving. 
IV. Hoewel bij Leo ХШ sprake is van een autoritair gezag en absolutisme in zijn visie 
op kerk en staat, zijn met name in Rerum novarum (1891) aanzetten te vinden tot de 
latere formulering van het subsidiariteitsbeginsel. Deze aanzetten zijn nauw verwant 
aan de liberale invloed in deze encycliek via het denken over arbeid en 
privé-eigendom. Juist in de sociaal-economische sfeer blijkt de afzonderlijke mens 
quid pro quo van alle (gezamenlijke) activiteit. Verder blijken het gezin en andere 
verbanden hun mogelijkheden en taken te moeten kunnen realiseren en de staat dient 
zich terughoudend op te stellen La.v. de sociaal-economische sfeer. 
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V. Het subsidiariteitsbeginsel wordt geformuleerd in Quadragesimo anno (1931). 
Deze encycliek wordt historisch gesitueerd: tegen individualisme en collectivisme 
wordt gekozen voor het solidarisme (in welke stroming de Duitse jezuïeten Pesch, 
Gundlach en von Nell-Breuning hoofdpersonen zijn). Voor het solidarisme is sociale 
rechtvaardigheid een overwegend aandachtspunt: solidariteit is niet alleen een kwestie 
van mentaliteit, maar dient juridisch en organisatorisch in structuren vastgelegd te 
worden. 
Solidariteits- en subsidiariteitsbeginsel horen bij eikaan de mens is gericht en aan-
gewezen op de gemeenschap en binnen die gemeenschap gaat het om de mogelijkhe-
den voor en steun aan de ontplooiing van de afzonderlijke mens. Het subsidiariteitsbe-
ginsel is dan de vertaling van de eigen en unieke plaats, die men de afzonderlijke mens 
en de maatschappelijke verbanden wil geven, omdat men een autoritaire, collectivisti-
sche en individualistische visie op de samenleving afwijst. Daarmee erkent Quadrage-
simo anno het vrijheidsstreven van de moderne mens, zonder dat dat tot individualisme 
leidL Impliciet betekent dit ook de erkenning van de staat als rechtsstaat. 
De positie van Quadragesimo anno wordt door Vaticanum Π bevestigd in Dignitatis 
humanae en Gaudium et Spes; deze Constitutie zegt (in nr 25) dat de menselijke 
persoon "principium, subiectum et finis omnium institutorum socialium est et esse 
debet". 
Tweede deel 
Nadat de kerk met zoveel nadruk sinds 1931 het subsidiariteitsbeginsel heeft gesteld 
als maatstaf voor de ordening van de maatschappij, kan de vraag gesteld worden of het 
ook geldt voor de kerk zelf. Die vraag wordt in het onderzoek telkens op twee manie­
ren besproken: 1 aandacht voor de (bestuurlijke) relatie tussen primaatschap en bis-
schop(-pen) of tussen universele en particuliere kerk(-en); 2 aandacht voor de positie 
van de afzonderlijke gelovigen. 
VI. Het gesprek over het verplichtende karakter van het subsidiariteitsbeginsel voor de 
kerk zelf is gevoerd door het bisschoppelijk/hiërarchisch en door het theologisch 
leergezag. 
De afwegingen binnen de kring van de bisschoppen worden besproken en daarbij zijn 
inhoudelijk vooral belangrijk het standpunt van Pius ΧΠ, van de Bisschoppensynode 
van 1967 die de Principia voor de Codex-hervorming opstelde (waarbij het subsidiari­
teitsbeginsel) en de feitelijke betekenis van die Principia voor de Codex 1983, van de 
Bisschoppensynode van 1969 en tot slot van de Bisschoppensynode van 198S. 
Vervolgens worden de opvattingen van theologen e.a. besproken. Die opvattingen zijn 
in twee groepen te onderscheiden: 
- de kerk is een geïnstitutionaliseerd verband van mensen (al gaat zij daarin niet op) en 
daarom geldt het subsidiariteitsbeginsel ook voor de kerk zelf; 
- de kerk is een gemeenschap van zo'n eigen aard, dat beginselen uit de sociale wijsbe-
geerte, zoals het subsidiariteitsbeginsel, er niet verplichtend voor zijn. De meeste 
auteurs met deze opvatting baseren deze op een "communio-ecclesiologie". 
VII. In de periode dat het subsidiariteitsbeginsel als zodanig gestalte krijgt, zijn er 
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twee overheersende concepten voor de kerk: societas perfecta en corpus Christi 
mysticum. Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat binnen deze concepten geen plaats is voor 
implicaties van het subsidiariteitsbeginsel t.a.v. de bestuurlijke stuctuur van de kerk en 
nauwelijks t.a.v. de positie van de afzonderlijke gelovigen. 
Ш . In de periode na Vaticanum Π zijn de twee belangrijkste ecclesiologische con­
cepten dat van het Volk Gods (LG Π) en het meer hiërarchische (LG Ш) uit Lumen 
gentium. De laatste jaren wordt gesteld dat "communio" als centrale ecclesiologische 
term eenheid kan brengen La.v. die beide concepten. 
In Lumen gentium is communio vooral een diffuus begrip, behalve in het al aangeduide 
Hoofdstuk Ш en de erbijbehorende Nota explicativa, waar het de "communio hierar-
chica" tussen pausschap en bisschoppen betreft. Nadere analyse leert dat die verhou­
ding, en die tussen universele en particuliere kerk(-en), als een polaire spanningsver­
houding begrepen dient te worden, die exemplarisch wordt geformuleerd in het "in 
quibus et ex quibus" van LG 23. Daarbij blijkt ook dat de particuliere kerk voor Vati­
canum II kerk in de volle zin des woords is. 
IX. Het subsidiariteitsbeginsel blijkt op twee manieren een verduidelijking te kunnen 
brengen in een communio-ecclesiologie. De kerk als communio kan niet zonder insti­
tutionalisering, maar het institutionaliseringsproces is een directe bedreiging voor de 
communio als gemeenschap van de gelovigen. Het steeds benadrukken van het belang 
van het subsidiariteitsbeginsel voorkomt een overwicht van het institutionele ten nadele 
van het gemeenschapskarakter en is daarmee een pleidooi voor een actieve rol van de 
gelovigen. 
De spanningsverhouding in de communio Ecclesiarum vraagt om toepassing van het 
subsidiariteitsbeginsel als uitdrukking van de blijvende spanning tussen universele en 
particuliere kerk(-en). Het subsidiariteitsbeginsel biedt namelijk aanknopingspunten 
om het "in quibus et ex quibus" bestuurlijk en juridisch te concretiseren door de be­
grippen "secundaire verantwoordelijkheid" en "competentie-competentie". Die maken 
het mogelijk de relatie tussen primaatschap en bisschop(-pen) nader te duiden, waar 
Vaticanum Π en de Codex 1983 beider opdrachten "onbemiddeld" naast elkaar laten 
staan. Daarmee is het verplichtende karakter van het subsidiariteitsbeginsel voor de 
kerk nog niet aangegeven. 
Dat blijkt wel uit het sacrament-zijn en het geïncarneerd-zijn van de kerk, zoals dat 
vooral in LG 8 aangeduid wordt: daarmee is de kerk ook een georganiseerd verband 
van mensen, waarvoor die wetmatigheden gelden die ook voor verbanden van mensen 
in het algemeen gelden. 
Dat verplichtende karakter heeft consequenties voor het kerkelijk recht. Dat dient zijn 
juridisch karakter te behouden en dient de kaders te scheppen waarin de mens zich als 
gelovige kan ontplooien: er dient onderscheid gemaakt te worden tussen enerzijds de 
sfeer van het institutionele, die geordend wordt door het recht, en anderzijds die van 
spiritualiteit, moraliteit en deugd, die door het recht afgebakend wordt. 
Bestuurlijk-structureel dient de relatie tussen primaatschap en bisschop(-pen) en 
tussen universele en particuliere kerk(-en) juridisch verder ingevuld te worden dan de 
Codex 1983 nu doet. De positie van de particuliere kerk als kerk in de volle zin des 
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woords en als geïncarneerde en geïncultureerde kerk, afzonderlijk of in een verband als 
de Bisschoppenconferentie, dient versterkt te worden. Communio mag noch in de 
bestuurlijk-structurele zin, noch ta.v. de positie van de christengelovigen een dwang-
mechanisme worden, maar vraagt ruimte voor de "concrete vrijheid" van de gelovigen 
op grond van hun rechten als gedoopte en van de mensenrechten. 
X. De principiële vraag naar de geldigheid van het subsidiariteitsbeginsel is positief 
beantwoord. Het subsidiariteitsbeginsel blijkt juist in de door de Bisschoppensynode 
van 1985 benadrukte communio-ecclesiologie een belangrijke ordenende maatstaf te 
kunnen zijn: het duidt structurele kaders aan voor een ecclesiologie van de communio 
fidelium en de communio Ecclesiarum, die tegenover de idee van de societas (inaequa-
lis) perfecta staat. De communio-ecclesiologie dient opgevat te worden als een organo-
logisch concept, waarin de delen niet op zichzelf kunnen bestaan, maar waarin de 
delen, i.e. particuliere kerken en christengelovigen, ook niet ondergeschikt zijn aan het 
geheel of aan het centrum van het geheel: zij onderhouden met elkaar en met het geheel 
wederkerige constituerende relaties. Men kan zeggen dat het "in quibus et ex quibus" 
evengoed geldt voor de verhouding tussen (particuliere) kerk en afzonderlijke gelovi-
gen: dan wordt het het "ontologisch-structureel beginsel" voor alle structurele verhou-
dingen in de kerk. 
Het is van belang om in die organologisch opgevatte gemeenschap de "wederkerige 
constituerende relaties met elkaar en met het geheel" te onderstrepen. Het "in quibus et 
ex quibus" is daarvan de ecclesiologische formulering. Want de universele kerk bestaat 
alleen "in en uit" de particuliere kerken: binnen het geheel hebben zij een eigen plaats 
waarvandaan zij bijdragen aan het geheel en aan eikaars ontplooiing. Binnen deze 
fundamentele visie biedt het subsidiariteitsbeginsel het formele kader voor de afbake-
ning van wederzijdse bestuurlijke competenties tussen het centrale bestuur van de kerk 
en de particuliere kerken. 
Het subsidiariteitsbeginsel blijkt een adequaat én verplicht interpretatiekader voor die 
afbakening. Dat is kort samengevat het antwoord op de vraag van de Synode van 1985. 
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The Synod of Bishops in 1985 asked for a study of the applicability of the 
principle of subsidiarity to the church itself: is it valid for the church? And if 
it is: what are its consequences? This book gives an answer to those 
questions. 
In its first part it shows how the development of ideas led to the formulation 
of the principle in Quadragesimo anno ( 1931 ) and what the content of the 
principle is. It is shown that the principle is the expression of the catholic 
vision on person, state and society: individualism, centralism and col-
lectivism are rejected. 
Then a review is given of the several answers that have been given to the 
question of the validity of the principle for the church itself. And it appears 
that there is a limited opening for the principle in the concepts for the church 
which were current before Vatican II. Then there is a concentration on the 
church as seen by Vatican II and as communio. 
It becomes clear that the principle of subsidiarity contributes to a theoretical 
and practical clarification of central ideas in a communio ecclesiology. The 
principle offers the formal framework for the demarcation of mutual com-
petencies of central government in the church and of the particular churches: 
it gives the task to the local churches to accept their own responsibilities 
more clearly. Existing vague formulas of administrative competencies get a 
theological and canonical clarification in the principle of subsidiarity. It also 
leads to the recognition of the proper responsibility of the faithful and human 
rights in the church. 
In the exposition of ideas, the unconditional validity of the principle of 
subsidiarity for the church itself is demonstrated. And so the Synod of 1985 
gets an answer! 
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